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ABSTRACT
This ethnographic research study documented the use and effects of an electronic
medical records system (EMR) by healthcare providers working in a community hospitalbased emergency room. Using data collected from participant observation, in-depth
interviews, questionnaires, and hospital documents, the research findings suggest EMRs
impinge providers’ agency, alter emergency room systems, affect communication
patterns among providers, and exacerbate structurational divergence (SD) conditions.
Findings suggest that providers’ attempts to regain lost agency tips the SD-nexus into an
SD-cycle, characterized by negative communication spirals between providers. The
discussion chapter examines the impact of EMRs on emergency room structures, system
reproduction, providers’ workflow and communication patterns, patients’ experiences,
and unintended consequences, and it expounds implications of the study with regard to
what lessons learned from this analysis suggests might be best practices for hospitals and
emergency rooms adopting EMRs.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In September 2014, a 42-year-old man with abdominal pain and a fever sought
medical care in a Dallas emergency room. A nurse assessed his condition and
determined that his symptoms did not require immediate medical attention, so he was
sent back to the waiting room. A short while later, a nurse called him into an
examination room, where a more thorough history was solicited from him and recorded
into an electronic medical records (EMR) system. The patient then was examined
medically, first by a nurse and then by a physician. The physician gave the patient a
prescription for antibiotics and discharged him from the emergency room. A few days
later, on September 28, the man’s symptoms worsened, an ambulance was dispatched to
his home, and the emergency medical services crew returned the man to the same
emergency room from which he had been discharged on September 25. The patient was
diagnosed with a virus and was admitted to the hospital’s intensive care unit—he died 10
days later from complications associated with the virus. The patient was Thomas Duncan
and the virus was Ebola.
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015b), the 2014
Ebola epidemic, the largest Ebola epidemic in history, killed nearly 10,000 people in
West Africa. Mr. Duncan, a Liberian, traveled from West Africa to the United States at
the height of the epidemic. He became symptomatic for Ebola (e.g., fever, vomiting, and
diarrhea) a few days after he arrived in Dallas, and, subsequently, he exposed almost 50
people to the virus, including members of the ambulance crew who transported him back
to the emergency room where he had been misdiagnosed initially and sent home with
antibiotics (Neergard & Weber, 2014; Stengle, 2014). Mr. Duncan infected two of the
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nurses who cared for him at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital (Stengle, 2014), which
set off a media firestorm. The public demanded to know how a “hospital slip up”
(Neergard & Weber, 2014, para. 12) could send an Ebola patient into the local
community, exposing dozens of individuals, including five school children, to the deadly
virus (Stengle, 2014).
In investigating the case, reporters uncovered certain key facts relating to Mr.
Duncan’s initial misdiagnosis and discharge from the emergency room. It appeared that
although Mr. Duncan told a nurse that he had been in “disease-ravaged West Africa” just
days before, “that information was not shared,” with a hospital spokesperson explaining
that Mr. Duncan’s travel history was “not fully communicated throughout the medical
team” (Neergard & Weber, 2014, paras. 1, 7, 8). Hospital administrators conceded that
the lapse in communication meant that relevant information was not factored into Mr.
Duncan’s initial diagnosis, which “led others to be exposed to the virus” (“Dallas Ebola
Patient,” 2014, para. 15).
Hospital administrators released a statement on October 3, 2014 that identified the
reason for the communication breakdown between the healthcare providers in the
emergency room: a flaw in the hospital’s EMR system (Jones, 2014). The flaw, which
separated “physician and nursing portions of the electronic health record [EHR]1” (Jones,
2014, para. 3), meant that “doctors never saw a nurse’s note that an emergency room
patient with fever and pains had recently been to Africa” (Gilblom & Chen, 2014, para.
1). The patient’s travel history “was located in the nurses’ portion of the EHR and, as
designed, would not automatically appear in the physicians’ standard workflow” (Jones,
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The phrases “electronic health records system” and “electronic medical records systems”
are synonymous.
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2014, para. 5). A hospital spokesperson admitted that the hospital “wrongly designed its
digital record system” (Giblom & Chen, 2014, para. 5), but many members of the press
wondered why the nurse did “not verbally alert Duncan’s emergency physician to the
travel” (Gaddis, 2015, p. 36) or why the physician “did not double check himself rather
than depend on someone else” (Giblom & Chen, 2014, para. 3) for pertinent patient
details.
According to Frazao (2014), “What happened at the Texas Presbyterian Hospital
was a break down of critical information sharing using electronic health records, a
relatively new technology now used in about every major American hospital” (para. 7).
EMR systems were supposed to improve healthcare coordination and reduce errors, but
“in the case of the Liberian Ebola patient, a major medical error––the decision to send the
sick man home instead of into isolation––is blamed directly on an EHR” (Jones, 2014,
para. 13). Press coverage of the Dallas Ebola case “thrust into social scrutiny the impact
of EMRs on workflow in hospitals” (Reyes, 2015, p. 7), especially with regard to the
imperfect communication patterns that they, potentially, create among healthcare
providers. Because I had been studying an emergency room’s adoption of an EMR
system for nearly a year when the Dallas Ebola case made headlines, an emergency
medicine physician shared the following with me:
The postmortem, as discussed on CNN and broadcast to millions, is that the house
of emergency medicine failed (and potentially exposed a city to a catastrophe) for
one specific reason: the [emergency room] nurses and doctors did not talk to each
other. They “talked” instead into an electronic medical record, and assumed that
all knew what was reported. So, a question: How often do we speak to each other
about our patients, our thoughts about their care, what the plan is from the
beginning and throughout the course? How can we maximize our patients’ visit
with us? . . . What is the potential consequence of our failing to adequately talk to
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each other, across the silos in which we live, and past the tunnels of our
understanding and knowledge? (C. Overton, personal communication, October 9,
2014)
The Ebola case shows that communication is vital for effective and safe
healthcare delivery, and, furthermore, it demonstrates that providers’ reliance on EMRs
for pertinent patient information cannot take the place of providers communicating with
one another. Health communication researchers have bemoaned the “undeniable decline
in the centrality of communication” (Rotor & Hall, 2011, p. 55)––the lack of talk––in
healthcare delivery that the Dallas Ebola case epitomized. To broaden understanding of
communication in healthcare delivery, health communication researchers have focused,
largely, on patient–provider interactions and, especially, on bounded exchanges, such as
those occurring between patients and providers during medical examinations (Ackerson
& Viswanath, 2009; Ellingson, 2003). According to Ellingson (2003), the emphasis on
patient–provider interactions has resulted in “a relative lack of problematizing of
discourse among health care practitioners,” especially with respect to “backstage”
interactions between and among providers “that occur away from patients” (p. 95). The
Dallas Ebola crisis brought the topic of communication (or, rather, the lack of
communication) between healthcare providers to the forefront.
Studying healthcare providers’ backstage interactions, as Ellingson (2003)
endorsed, allows researchers to broaden understanding of cultural and communication
processes that constitute medical practice (Chapman & Berggren, 2005). Providerfocused health communication research, for instance, has found that ineffective
communication between healthcare providers during hospital admissions delays patient
care (Apker, Mallak, & Gibson, 2007; Eisenberg et al., 2005), that poor communication

	
  

4

is a leading cause of medical errors (Shannon, 2012), and that nurses in emergency rooms
do not talk regularly with physicians (Fairbanks, Bisantz, & Sunm, 2007). Such findings
may explain, in part, what happened in the emergency room at Texas Presbyterian
Hospital.
It is important to note that the communication breakdown at Texas Presbyterian
Hospital occurred, primarily, between healthcare providers: Mr. Duncan told the nurse
that he had come from Liberia and, presumably, he would have told the physician, had
the physician asked. Many in the press speculated that Mr. Duncan could have assumed,
reasonably, that the details he shared with the nurse were part of a medical record that the
physician would have accessed and/or that members of his healthcare team would have
communicated with one another (Frazao, 2014). The nurse, however, did not tell the
physician what she knew––a man with a fever and abdominal pain had just arrived from
Ebola-stricken West Africa––and the physician did not ask about Mr. Duncan’s travel
history. Hence, studying ways in which EMRs change nurse–physician interactions,
especially in emergency room contexts, may explain what happened at the Texas
Presbyterian Hospital and why it happened, and it may prevent similar communication
breakdowns and/or medical errors from occurring in the future.
There is, however, a lack of health communication research set in emergency
rooms compared with research set in primary care venues, such as physicians’ medical
offices and clinics (Cameron et al., 2010; Fairbanks et al., 2007). Primary care-based
research findings, unfortunately, are not generalizable to emergency rooms for many
reasons. For instance, unlike primary care providers, who treat one patient at a time,
emergency medicine providers care for several patients at once in an atmosphere that is
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“rife with staff shortages, limited resources, overcrowding, and long wait times” (Roscoe
& Eisenberg, 2014, p. 393). Additionally, emergency medicine providers rarely have
established relationships with patients they treat (Govindarajan et al., 2010) and many of
those patients are unable to communicate because they are impaired (e.g., they have
dementia, are mentally ill, and/or are inebriated) or unconscious (Garra, Albino,
Chapman, Singer, & Thode, 2010). Moreover, frequently, interstaff conflicts compound
problematic provider–patient communication (Person, Spiva, & Hart, 2013), as do
“professional fault lines” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 392) that separate physicians from
nurses. For these reasons, emergency rooms are especially ripe for communication
breakdowns and are at risk for medical errors (McCarthy et al., 2013), which is why
scholars have called for more research to be situated in emergency rooms (Paltved &
Musaues, 2012).
It is especially important for scholars to focus on emergency room practices,
because understanding communication patterns within that healthcare context is essential
for ensuring that safe, effective care is delivered to the millions of patients relying on
emergency rooms for care. Emergency rooms, increasingly, are becoming the primary
source of healthcare for uninsured and publically insured patients, and for patients
seeking care after hours and on weekends (O’Shea, 2007; Overton, in press-b). In 2008,
there were 124 million emergency room visits and the number of visits was expected to
increase by 3%–6% each year thereafter (Hooker, Cipher, Cawley, Herrmann, & Lelson,
2008). By 2011, the annual number of emergency room visits hit 136 million (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015a). A shortage of primary care physicians
contributes to emergency room overutilization, because patients without healthcare
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homes have nowhere else to go when they become ill or are injured (Hooker et al. 2008;
Overton, in press-b). Moreover, the Affordable Care Act, which expanded Medicaid and
insurance coverage to 30 million people in the United States, is expected to increase the
number of emergency room visits: Studies show that Massachusetts’s healthcare reform
(after which the Affordable Care Act is modeled) and the Oregon Medicaid experiment
both resulted in more, not fewer, emergency room visits (Overton, in press-b; Smulowitz,
O’Malley, Yang, & Landon, 2014). The nation’s emergency rooms already are at or over
capacity (Dunn & Becker, 2013; O’Shea, 2007), the number of emergency room visits is
increasing steadily, and, in the last decade, “the number of emergency departments
declined significantly” (O’Shea, 2007, p. 2), as did the number of emergency medicine
physicians (Hooker et al., 2008). There, thus, are fewer emergency rooms and
emergency medicine providers available than ever before to meet the growing demand
(Hooker et al., 2008), which means that an already communicatively challenged
environment is poised to get worse.
Health information technologies, such as EMRs, were supposed to reduce medical
errors (Farley et al., 2013; Pipersburgh, 2011), cut healthcare costs (Hillestad, et al.,
2005), and improve the quality of healthcare (Noor, Mahmoo, & Kahn, 2012), but,
instead, EMRs have introduced unintended negative consequences and new types of
clinical errors (Shachak & Reis, 2009). The Dallas Ebola case demonstrated what health
communication researchers already knew: EMRs impede face-to-face communication
between healthcare providers (Hill, Sears, & Melanson, 2013; Park, Lee, & Chen, 2012)
and increase medical errors (Bukata, 2011; Kellermann & Jones, 2013). A patient safety
advocate interviewed by Frazao (2014) criticized the flawed EMR used at Texas
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Presbyterian Hospital, declaring, “The electronic health record systems in this country are
not even close to ready for prime time” (para. 8).
Although EMRs may not be “ready for primetime,” federal legislation passed in
2009 mandated that hospitals must adopt and use EMRs by 2015, or face fines. That
legislation has catapulted emergency medicine providers into unfamiliar territory: In
2010, fewer than 2% of U.S. emergency rooms had fully functioning EMRs (Landman,
Bernstein, Hsiao, & Desai, 2010). As of 2015, most emergency medicine providers in
the United States were struggling to adapt to EMR-induced changes in workflow and
communication patterns; specifically, providers were spending more time completing
documentation tasks and less time communicating face-to-face with other providers or
with patients (Park et al., 2012). These changes can have dire consequences for patients.
Several studies, published since 2012, have examined how EMRs change
emergency room dynamics and emergency medicine practice. Those studies have
focused on quantifiable changes in emergency room operations after EMR adoption, such
as the number of laboratory tests ordered, time that providers dedicated to documentation
tasks, and time that providers spent with patients (Callen et al., 2013; Hill et al, 2013;
Ward, Froehle, Hart, Collins, & Lindsell, 2013). Only one study to date, conducted by
Park et al. (2012), followed an EMR adoption from start to finish, presenting a
compelling account of an academic medical center’s emergency room before, during, and
after its EMR installation. However, fewer than 10% of the 5,724 hospitals in the United
States are academic medical centers, hospitals affiliated with medical schools (Dunn &
Becker, 2013); hence, although Park et al.’s findings are important, for several reasons,
they are not generalizable to the majority of emergency room settings. For instance,
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academic medical centers offer extensive specialty and subspecialty support to patients
(Dunn & Becker, 2013), and they rely on medical residents, who are physicians in
training, to staff specialty services and emergency rooms; consequently, physician-topatient ratios are much lower in academic medical centers compared with community
hospitals, which, typically, do not utilize medical residents and, thus, have fewer
physicians available to treat patients. Community hospitals, by contrast, have far fewer
specialty services compared with academic medical centers, and community hospitalbased emergency rooms are staffed, usually, by one or two physicians, who will see as
many as 40–50 patients a day.
The current study, thus, addresses gaps in the scholarly literature and extends
work on EMR adoption by investigating EMR-induced changes over time in a
community hospital’s emergency room during its EMR adoption, especially with regard
to how EMRs affect emergency medical providers’ day-to-day experiences; how their
interactions with coworkers and patients are altered; how emergency room culture, itself,
is changed by the presence of this technology; and unintended negative consequences that
EMRs have on emergency medicine practice. More specifically, this study documents (a)
role reversal, dissonance, and reactance during EMR training; (b) ways that providers
incorporate EMRs into their workflow and subsequent changes to workflow patterns; (c)
the presence of conflicting structures, providers’ immobilization, and ineffective
communication spirals associated with using the EMR; (d) providers’ strategies for
coping with EMR adoption; (e) providers’ perceptions of changes in their communication
patterns following the EMR installation; (f) EMR-induced changes in provider–patient
interactions; and (g) unintended negative consequences of EMRs that affect providers
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and patients alike. In investigating these important matters, the study was guided by
structuration theory, adaptive structuration theory, and structurational divergence theory
(as explained in chapter 3), with the data collected using ethnographic methods and a
survey questionnaire (as explained in chapter 4).
This dissertation is organized into six chapters, including this first chapter.
Chapter two reviews literature on interpersonal communication in healthcare contexts,
starting with patient-focused health communication research, followed by providerfocused health communication research. Literature on communication and health
information technologies, generally, then is reviewed, followed by emergency room
communication research, with studies that privileged patients’ perspectives of emergency
room communication reviewed first, followed by provider-focused studies. I then discuss
emergency medicine and EMRs, followed by literature on EMR legislation and use.
Chapter three describes the preliminary research that I conducted in 2013, as well
as the theoretical frameworks that inform this study, and it concludes with the research
questions that were posed for this study. Chapter four describes the qualitative,
ethnographic methods that were employed to achieve the research goals: participant
observation and in-depth interviewing. I explain how the methodology that I employed,
ethnography, allowed me to develop “understanding about complex social interactions”
(Paltved & Musaeus, 2012, p. 773) in situ, by illuminating how processes and practices,
such as providers’ workflow and communication habits, changed over the course of the
EMR installation. I then describe the research sites, navigating access to those sites,
study participants, institutional review board approval, and data collection, including
sensitizing concepts that shaped that collection process. I subsequently describe
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additional data-collection procedures that I used (a questionnaire and document analysis),
before discussing validity issues, researcher subjectivity, ethical concerns, and dataanalysis procedures. Chapter five presents the findings from this study regarding EMR
adoption in the community hospital’s emergency room studied. Finally, chapter six
discusses conceptual/theoretical and applied implications of the findings of this study
about EMR adoption, describes limitations that characterized the study, and offers
suggestions for future health communication research conducted in emergency room
settings about health information technologies.	
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This chapter reviews literature that informs and supports the research agenda that
was advanced in chapter one. This chapter begins with a discussion of interpersonal
communication research in healthcare contexts; specifically, with patient- and, then,
healthcare provider-focused communication research, because both sets of literature
contribute to understanding provider–patient interactions and are necessary for
understanding how electronic medical records, consequently, impact provider–patient
relationships. A review of communication and health information technology research
then precedes a discussion of emergency room-based communication research. Finally, a
brief history of electronic medical records research and recent legislation about them then
informs a review of the adoption, use, and implications of electronic medical records for
emergency medicine practice.
Communication Research in Healthcare Contexts
A substantial amount of interpersonal health communication research has
explored interactions between healthcare providers and patients, often within the context
of one-on-one bounded exchanges, such as those occurring during medical examinations
(Ackerson & Viswanath, 2009). Some of that scholarship has privileged patients’
perspectives and experiences, whereas other research has centered on healthcare
providers (hereafter, “providers”). Patient-focused research has examined issues such as
patients’ satisfaction with providers’ communication skills, how communication between
providers and patients impacts patients’ health outcomes, perceived communication
barriers between patients and providers, interactants’ competing and mismatched goals
during medical encounters, and ramifications of hierarchical differences for patient–
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provider relationships. Provider-centered research has examined communication in
healthcare teams, interactions among providers, and providers’ communication errors and
inefficiencies. Both types of interpersonal health communication research aim to
improve communication between providers and patients to promote positive patient
health outcomes.
Arguably, the patient-focused perspective has received more attention from
scholars, but by also focusing on providers, by shifting attention from the subordinate to
the dominant in what Nader (1972) called “studying up,” researchers have an opportunity
to broaden understanding of social, cultural, and communication processes that are part of
medical practice (Chapman & Berggren, 2005). Although this empirical study employs
the concept of studying up, in that it focuses, largely, on providers’ experiences with and
communication about electronic medical records (EMRs), the patient perspective is
important and warrants review, because, as this dissertation demonstrates, providers’
experiences with EMRs influence their interactions with patients, and, for some patients,
those consequences can be life-threatening. Both sets of literature, patient- and providerfocused, thus, contribute to understanding provider–patient interactions. Furthermore,
exploring both perspectives offers a more complete understanding of communication
patterns that are unique to emergency room contexts, and, consequently, how EMRs
affect provider–patient communication therein. Therefore, below, an overview is
provided first of patient-focused health communication research, followed by a review of
provider-focused research.
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Patient-focused Health Communication Research
Themes relating to patients’ satisfaction with healthcare have driven much of the
health communication research (Brundage, Feldman-Stewart, & Tishelman, 2010), and
that research is important because, for most emergency rooms, financial reimbursements,
mainly in the form of Medicare and Medicaid payments, are tied directly to patients’
satisfaction (McCarthy et al., 2013). Satisfaction often is based on patients’ perceptions
of physicians’ communication efforts (Bryant, Moshavi, Lande, Leary, & Doughty, 2011;
Ruiz-Moral, 2009), with patients wanting their physicians to listen to them and to ask
questions (Clark et al., 2008), and to encourage rapport, mutual understanding, and
participation, as well as offer reassurance, guidance, compassion, and information
(Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996). Clark et al. (2008) found that jointly negotiated treatment
plans significantly and positively affected patients’ health outcomes; in particular,
collaboration “was associated with subsequent reductions of patients’ emergency
department and urgent care visits and hospitalizations” (p. 54). Despite calls for more
patient participation in medical interactions, however, the physician–patient dyad rarely
is characterized by equally valid, negotiated selves (Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996). Many
medical interactions continue to operate according to a consistent pattern that, typically,
does not include patients’ participation (Thompson, Whaley, & Stone, 2011); instead,
physicians too often are “more concerned . . . with efficiency—keeping the encounter
short and to the point” (Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996, p. 74). Consequently, the medical
examination has become “an area of struggle” (Thompson et al., 2011, p. 299) between
patients and providers.
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Patients who are dissatisfied with their providers’ communication efforts, when
compared with patients who are satisfied, often have worse health outcomes. For
example, dissatisfied patients are more likely to have high blood pressure (Thompson et
al., 2011). One way that providers trigger dissatisfaction in their patients is by
interrupting patients when they explain their symptoms or tell their stories (Thompson et
al., 2011). Rhodes et al. (2003), studying provider–patient interactions in emergency
rooms, found that most providers’ interruptions consisted of closed questions that did not
invite patients to elaborate on their symptoms or complaints—in fact, less than a quarter
of patients finished describing their symptoms after having been interrupted by providers.
According to Thompson et al. (2011), patients who tell their complete stories to
providers, without interruption, typically, have lower blood pressure, comply more with
prescribed treatments, and are more satisfied with their physicians. Patients’
uninterrupted stories also can mean fewer diagnostic tests and lower healthcare costs
(Duggan & Thompson, 2011).
Although interrupted storytelling impacts patients’ dissatisfaction with provider–
patient interactions, patients’ dissatisfaction also can be attributed to mismatched goals
that providers and patients bring to medical interactions, and to the asymmetrical nature
that characterizes provider–patient relationships. These interactions, typically, privilege
providers’ objectives and perspectives. Studies that have explored these two additional
sources of patients’ dissatisfaction are described next.
Competing and mismatched goals. Research has identified at least two goals
that are shared by physicians and patients: accurate diagnosis and effective treatment
(Gu, 1996; Cegala, McGee, & McNeilis, 1996; Pilnick, Hindmarsh, & Gill, 2009;
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Roberts & Aruguete, 2000; Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996). However, physicians and
patients privilege these objectives differently, which can stymie communication between
them. The physician’s aim is for “the patient’s condition to improve after the visit,
whereas the patient’s is that he or she gets cured” (Gu, 1996, p. 165). Thus, patients who
are not cured, do not have their goals met and are more likely to be dissatisfied with both
their providers and their interactions with those providers. Roberts and Aruguete (2000)
identified at least one additional goal, aside from being cured, that patients have: anxiety
reduction. Physicians, however, rarely address patients’ anxiety because physicians fail
to enact “socioemotional behaviors such as expressions of concern and reassurance”
(Roberts & Aruguete, p. 310). For most physicians, and, especially, primary care
physicians, time constraints limit the number of goals they attend to during medical
examinations because they are engaged in “managed care.”
Managed care requires concise medical encounters; accordingly, physicians invite
patients’ questions in fewer than half of examinations (Duggan & Thompson, 2011), and
they restrict conversation to medically relevant topics by focusing on treatable complaints
(Eisenberg, Baglia, & Pynes, 2006; Eisenberg et al., 2005; Gu, 1996; Herdon, Chaney, &
Carden, 2011; Lateef, 2011; Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996; Vance, 2010). Emergency
medicine physicians are especially vulnerable to managed care edicts that require short
encounters with patients––regularly exceeding “length of stay targets” means that
physicians can be fired (“Metric Madness,” 2014; Vance, 2010). It is not surprising,
then, that emergency medicine physicians usually dedicate less than five percent of their
talk with patients to “friendly interactions” (Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996, p. 76). A study
by Gu (1996) found that, typically, there was “no small talk” (p. 169) in emergency
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rooms. Patients, nonetheless, often “overrun the diagnosis and discussion” (Gu, p. 169),
by offering multiple complaints and rambling sick narratives (Cegala et al., 1996), at least
as viewed from providers’ perspectives. Although most emergency room patients expect
to have all or most of their issues addressed (Lateef, 2011), “physicians pressure them to
focus on one complaint per visit” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 401). According to
Eisenberg et al. (2005), “Physicians work at getting patients to get to the crux of the story
quickly” (p. 401), which, as noted previously, means that patients rarely tell their stories
without interruption (Thompson et al., 2011). In fact, emergency room patients,
typically, are interrupted after only 12 seconds of speaking (Burley, 2011).
Instead of diagnose and treatment, some scholars have maintained that the
medical interactions are characterized by two other goals: information exchange and
relational development (Cegala et al., 1996). Cegala et al. (1996) found that both patients
and physicians prioritized information exchange as a measure of general communication
competence. Differing perceptions about how much and what information should be
exchanged, however, contributed to misunderstandings between physicians and patients,
with physicians rating themselves as far more competent communicators than their
patients rated them (Cegala et al.). Cegala et al. noted that patients wanted much more
information than they were given, whereas physicians’ overestimated the quantity and
quality of information that they provided to patients. Moreover, physicians were “not
relational enough in their interactions with patients either” (Cegala et al., p. 5); thus, they
failed to achieve consistently either goal.
Patients’ dissatisfaction with poor relational development with their physicians is
related to physicians’ “lack of feedback, insensitivity to and misinterpretations of
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relational needs, failure to express empathy, and disregard for patient input in decisionmaking” (Cegala et al., 1996, p. 5). However, patients also often are equally responsible
for these problems, as they leave relational development to physicians. Smith-Dupre and
Beck (1996) found that patients felt inhibited by asymmetrical relationships between
themselves and their physicians, and that they behaved as if they did “not have the right .
. . to express opinions, to ask questions, and to assert goals” (p. 80). Hence, although
patients often are dissatisfied with their interactions with physicians, many patients
abdicate responsibility for improving the quality of their medical care. How the
asymmetrical nature of provider–patient interactions can hinder relational development
and thwart patients’ satisfaction with health care is described next.
Asymmetrical provider–patient interactions. The asymmetrical nature of
provider–patient relationships means that patients, usually, converge, or defer, to
physicians (Giles, 2008). Generally, people converge to others who have more power or
high status (Giles, 2008); thus, in provider–patient interactions, patients’ deference gives
providers the right to direct medical interactions, ask questions, and assert goals (SmithDupre & Beck, 1996). As noted previously, many communication problems stem from
hierarchical differences that discourage patients’ participation in the medical examination
(Real & Poole, 2011). For example, as Goffman (1956) remarked, patients “may not
have the right to question their doctor” because it would deny the physician “special
apartness from the lay public” (p. 482). Physicians sometimes rebuff patients’ questions
with medical jargon (i.e., rescind downward convergence), in “a show of social ‘oneupmanship’ . . . that results in a lack of understanding on the part of the patient”
(Thompson et al., 2011, p. 295). When patients perform defiance and/or withhold
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deference (e.g., by asking questions), the relationship may become “unstable” (Goffman,
1956, p. 480).
Although O’Hair (1989) reported that patients assert themselves more than “they
generally used to” (p. 9), studies still suggest otherwise; specifically, Bensing et al.
(2006), analyzing videotaped provider–patient interactions that occurred between 1986
and 2002, found decreasing rates of patient question asking during medical examinations.
Gáspárik, Abram, Lörincz, and Ceană (2012) wrote that the typical patient “does not ruin
[the examination] with long, elaborate descriptions of sufferings, questions, or worries”
(p. 164). Even when patients do have questions or concerns, they are not likely to speak
up (Thompson et al., 2011).
Physicians’ dissatisfaction with interactions with patients also is well documented
and studies suggest that many physicians attribute communication failures
disproportionately to their patients. Coran, Arnold, and Arnold (2010), for instance,
found that physicians wanted patients to improve their communication by listening more
and by asking questions only when invited to do so by physicians, which underscores the
assumed supremacy of physicians in many physician–patient relationships. Studies
privileging patients’ perspectives, however, have found that patients believe their
physicians should spend more time listening to them (Roter & Hall, 2011; Sundar, Rice,
Kim, & Sciamanna, 2011).
Researchers have noted an “undeniable decline in the centrality of communication
to the care process” (Roter & Hall, 2011, p. 55), with negative consequences for patients
exemplified by poor medical outcomes, such as higher blood pressure (Thompson et al.,
2011). Poor communication also means that physicians are less liked and trusted by
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patients (Roter & Hall, 2011). Nonetheless, physician-training programs remain focused
on the development of “clinical skills” rather than “learning relational/patient centered
communication skills” (Coran et al., 2010, p. 10). Referencing a 2008 survey of medical
students, Coran et al. (2010) noted that the majority believed that communication was
“common sense” and that they already had “sufficient communication skills for
practicing medicine” (p. 9).
Because many physician-training programs do not develop physicians’
communication skills, as noted above, health communication scholars have advocated for
a change in medical education to prioritize communication and relational development
skills. Coran et al. (2010) and Thompson et al. (2011), for example, suggested that rather
than focusing on physicians alone, programs should adopt an interdisciplinary, dyadcentered training approach that includes both physicians and patients. The result,
accordingly, would be medical interactions that better incorporate both providers’ and
patients’ goals. The move to a more patient-centered medical interaction, one that does
not prioritize providers’ objectives over patients’ concerns, is “an achievable goal”
(Roberts & Sarangi, 2005, p. 639) that slowly is being realized in some healthcare
settings. Described below is research that has highlighted changing patterns in provider–
patient communication.
Changing patterns in provider–patient communication. Researchers have
noted a gradual shift in physician–patient discourse, with studies highlighting interactions
that include more patient autonomy and collaboration (Clark et al., 2008; Grey, 2011;
Herman, Karpinos, & Rothman, 2012). Labeled patient-centered communication, this
approach advocates a “humanistic perspective that emphasizes patient participation in
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shared clinical decision making” (Schulman-Green, Naik, Bradley, McCorkle, &
Bogardus, 2006, p. 145). This approach, more specifically, strives to elicit patients’
thoughts, expectations, feelings, values, and goals (Grosch, Medvene, & Wolcott, 2008),
with the goal of “understanding the whole person” (Cegala & Post, 2009, p. 203). Sharf,
Harter, Yamasaki, and Haidet (2011) theorized that integrating both physicians’ and
patients’ perspectives during medical interactions would produce “genuine shared
understanding” (p. 46) between them. Similarly, Politi and Street (2011) described the
ideal medical encounter as one in which physicians and patients have a “shared
understanding of the patient’s health condition and each other’s perspective” (p. 401).
Better outcomes, such as lower blood pressure (Thompson et al., 2011) and patients
taking medications or adhering to treatment regimens as prescribed (Peck, 2011), are
associated with “shared perspective and understanding” (Grey, 2011, p. 287) between
physicians and patients.
Patient-centered communication, arguably, represents a return to old-fashioned
medicine. Dr. Abraham Flexner, who was instrumental in revamping physicians’ training
during the 1910s and 1920s, encouraged both “clinical reasoning and the development of
. . . compassion” (as cited in Cooke, Irby, Sulliva, & Ludmerer, 2006, p. 1339). Flexner
advocated a biopsychosocial approach to physicians’ communication that incorporated
patients’ feelings, thoughts, and expectations (cited in Beach, Easter, Good, & Pigeron,
2005). Roter and Hall (2011) wrote that the “ascendency of chemistry-oriented sciences”
and technology, however, directed “medical inquiry away from the person of the patient
and to the pathophysiology of the patient” (p. 55). Once the medical interview was recast
as “wholly scientific and objective” (Rotor & Hall, p. 55), patients’ participation waned.
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The resulting biomedical approach downplayed patients’ input and privileged physicians’
control, as noted earlier (Grey, 2011).
Hence, although patient-centered communication currently is being encouraged
(du Pré, 2010), many physicians persist in using a biomedical approach. As described
previously, medical training deemphasizes physicians’ skills of developing relationships
with patients; thus, according to Rosenstein (2012), physicians, inevitably, adopt
“autocratic, egocentric, domineering behaviors that are the antithesis of collaboration and
[effective] communication” (p. 34). Other health communication scholars have blamed
patients for not participating, noting that engaged patients “who actively participate in the
medical interview influence physicians to adopt a more patient-centered approach”
(Cegala & Post, 2009, p. 203).
Several obstacles deter physicians from engaging in patient-centered
communication, with some medical specialties seemingly incapable of embracing the
trend. Although physician training remains focused on developing “clinical skills” rather
than “learning relational/patient centered communication skills” (Coran et al., 2010, p.
10), lack of time and insufficient financial reimbursement are the biggest impediments to
physicians adopting patient-centered communication (Marcinowicz, Pawlikowska,
Windak, & Chlabicz, 2013). The “one complaint per visit” approach means that most
conversations between physicians and patients are symptom specific, with little time left
to discuss patients’ overall health and medical interaction goals.
Ideally, medical encounters should encompass broader health issues, moving
away from the acute problem presentation–treatment model (Marcinowicz et al., 2013).
Lateef (2011) noted, however, that this shift is not likely to occur in busy emergency
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rooms for many reasons. Although emergency rooms have become the de facto primary
care home for uninsured patients (Eisenberg et al., 2006), physicians rarely form
meaningful partnerships with patients they see and treat once or twice (Lateef). In
overcrowded emergency rooms, where resources and staff usually are “stretched thin,”
patient-centered communication would “add to wait times and delay care” (Lateef, p.
165). In that context, physicians must treat patients as quickly as possible, but they often
are stymied by slow-to-report laboratory and radiology departments, and by specialists
who delay consults (Apker et al., 2007; Shershneva, Carnes, & Bakken, 2006; Vance,
2010).
Emergency medicine physicians also treat patients with high acuity, many of
whom present with several comorbidities, which further complicates diagnosis and
treatment. More than half of patients have health literacy skills at or below a ninth-grade
level, and those patients rarely comply with prescribed treatments, are more likely to
return to the emergency room with acute exacerbations, and report higher levels of
dissatisfaction with their healthcare (Herndon, Chaney, & Carden 2011). These, and
other communication problems, as discussed later, are compounded by the use of EMRs.
To review, patients’ satisfaction with their providers’ communication efforts is
linked with better health outcomes, especially for patients who are not interrupted when
describing their symptoms. The competing and mismatched goals that patients and
providers bring to the medical examination, however, impede effective communication,
as well as relational development, between them. Frequently, the managed care system
dictates short encounters and, thereby, forces physicians to restrict conversations to
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medically relevant topics. Although, in response, scholars have advocated for patientcentered communication, asymmetrical relationships continue to privilege providers.
Patient-focused research, although taking providers’ perspectives into account,
largely privileges patients’ experiences and their perceptions of communication with
providers. Provider-focused health communication research, however, focuses almost
exclusively on providers’ perspectives, which are equally important if scholars are to
understand and improve provider–patient interactions. As described in the next section,
much of the provider-focused research has examined interpersonal communication
patterns between individual providers, as well as communication in healthcare teams.
Provider-focused Health Communication Research
Most communication research in healthcare contexts has focused on provider–
patient discourse, or what Ellingson (2003) called “the frontstage of medical care” (p.
95). That tendency, in her view, is problematic because it limits analysis to bounded
episodes between patients and physicians (e.g., brief, examination room-based
interactions), with the result being a “relative lack of problematizing of discourse among
health care practitioners that occurs away from patients”; hence, she argued that “the
clinic backstage . . . [also] must be recognized” (pp. 95, 109). In her long-term
ethnography of an oncology team, which consisted of physicians, nurses, a pharmacist, a
nurse practitioner, a dietician, and a social worker, Ellingson noted that “team members
conducted significant teamwork in hallways, desk areas, break rooms, and other clinic
spaces not designated as meetings” (p. 109). Meetings of healthcare personnel, like
patient examinations by physicians, are bounded communication episodes, and such
episodes are the focus of extensive research on healthcare providers and team
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communication. However, according to Ellingson, that focus limits scholarship because
most communication about patient care, actually, is informal and unscheduled. Informal
and unscheduled discussions, for example, often are the only interactions between nurses
and physicians in busy emergency rooms (Park et al., 2012; Xiao, Schenkel, Faraj,
Mckenzie, & Moss, 2007).
Research on healthcare team meetings, however, does contribute to understanding
healthcare providers’ hierarchical relationships and communication patterns, which is an
important area of study, because discordant interactions can have serious ramifications
for patient care. One such study by Atwal and Caldwell (2005) analyzed 14
multidisciplinary team meetings and concluded that “doctors . . . had more dominant
roles in teams” than did other members, and that “therapists, social workers, and nurses
are reluctant to voice their opinions” (pp. 271, 268). In their literature review, Atwal and
Caldwell cited numerous studies that found nurses rarely questioned physicians, “even in
matters of life and death” (p. 272). In fact, studies examining interactions among
healthcare providers have found consistently that divergent communication patterns,
particularly between nurses and physicians, inhibit collaboration and affect negatively
patients (see Eggertson, 2012; Johnson & Kring, 2012). Several studies have noted
nurses’ reluctance to challenge physicians’ orders, even when physicians make glaring
mistakes (see Eggertson, 2012; Haddad, 2003; Johnson & Kring, 2012; Robinson,
Gorman, Slimmer, & Yudkowsky, 2010; Tschannen et al., 2011). Indeed, Duhigg (2012)
reported that communication habits between physicians and nurses were “so toxic” at one
hospital that they caused “terrible mistakes and patients died” (p. 157).
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The problematic relationship between nurses and physicians is well documented
in the health communication literature. As Johnson and Kring (2012) noted, “The
relationship has been an unequal one characterized by the dominance of the doctor, with
the nurse assuming a position of lower status” (p. 343). Physicians have more formal
education than do nurses, and, hence, they enjoy “a higher standing in the social pecking
order of the hospital” (Haddad, 2003, p. 28). According to Goffman (1956), such
hierarchical relationships are governed by “asymmetrical rules,” which lead “others to
treat and be treated by an individual differently from the way that individual treats and is
treated by them” (p. 476). As Goffman (1956) explained, “Doctors give medical orders
to nurses, but nurses do not give medical orders to doctors” (p. 476). Apker, Propp, and
Ford (2005) described the “nurse–doctor game” that takes place when nurses attempt to
“guide or direct physicians’ clinical decisions by appearing to be passive to the traditional
hierarchy” (p. 102). Medical schools, arguably, deemphasize physicians’ relationship
development skills, and the result, according to Rosenstein (2012), is that many
physicians adopt “autocratic, egocentric, domineering behaviors that are the antithesis of
collaboration and effective communication” (p. 34).
Many physician-issued medical orders play up role differences (divergent
communication) by asserting physicians’ dominance and by highlighting nurses’
perceived incompetence (Robinson et al., 2010), but worth noting is that the strong
hierarchical culture in most hospitals, which elevates physicians over nurses, also favors
certain physicians over others; specifically, primary versus secondary care designations
prioritize specialists over general practitioners, with specialists having more authority and
their orders superseding generalists’ orders (Shershneva et al., 2006). In asymmetric
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interactions between primary and secondary providers, fragmented care and ineffective
communication have had “a negative effect on quality [of care], patient outcomes, and
health care costs” (Shannon, 2012, p.16). Indeed, communication problems were the
most-cited cause of medical errors in 2010 (Shannon, 2012).
Communication between groups of physicians, although not always divergent,
often can be classified as “nonaccommodative,” which “can be manifest in ‘speech
maintenance’ where the speaker sustains a communicative stance . . . to maintain an aura
of authenticity” (Giles, 2008, p. 165). For example, generalists may refuse to converge to
specialists (i.e., assume a subservient position), but they stop short of divergence and still
save face. Speech maintenance is most likely to occur when the conversational “Other”
is a member of an undesirable group (Street & Giles, 1982), and the “Other” in many
hospitals is the emergency medicine physician. As Apker et al. (2007) noted, emergency
medicine physicians and admitting specialists suffer routine communication breakdowns
(see the discussion later on provider-focused emergency room communication research).
Emergency medicine physicians often have to “sell or force admissions when they
believe patients need inpatient care, whereas admittings believe they’re being dumped
on—there’s a lack of collegiality between the two services” (Apker et al., 2007, p. 889).
Ineffective communication during admission has been identified as a leading cause of
medical error, and it plays a significant role in emergency room overcrowding (Apker et
al., 2007).
Communication research has shown that although interactions among providers
can be problematic, many providers actually are interacting less with one another.
According to Shannon (2012), communication between hospital-based and primary care
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physicians happened in fewer than 20% of discharges. Without effective communication
and coordination of care, patients suffer. The Joint Commission of Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (the accrediting body for U.S. hospitals) has reported that
nearly 70% of adverse patient outcomes are caused by communication failures
(Eggertson, 2012). Most consultations between providers are not billable, and
asynchronous communication, particularly reliance on EMRs, limits conversations
among providers (Shannon). Fairbanks et al. (2007) noted that in emergency rooms,
triage nurses and ambulance crews do not talk regularly with physicians, meaning that
“most handoff information is either secondhand verbal or written” (p. 403). Handoff or
handover communication, which is the process of information exchange that occurs
during transfer of a patient’s care from one provider to another to ensure both patient
safety and continuity of care, is an especially problematic component of emergency
medicine care that has been noted in several studies (Cameron et al., 2010; Eisenberg et
al., 2006).
Communication breakdowns have important ramifications for both patient care
and hospitals’ finances. Agarwal, Sands, and Schneider (2010) conducted a study of
communication challenges among healthcare providers in seven hospitals, finding that
those challenges were related to perceived communication delays (e.g., estimated time
spent waiting for providers to return calls or respond to pages) and actual time “wasted”
looking for providers and/or waiting for calls. Agarwal et al. devised an economic model
that quantified three categories of waste: physician time, nurse time, and patient length of
stay. They estimated that these communication inefficiencies cost U.S. hospitals more
than $12 billion annually, with increased length of stay alone accounting for 53% of the
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burden. A typical 500-bed hospital, by Argarwal et al.’s projections, “loses over $4
million annually as a result of communication inefficiencies” (p. 265). Argarwal et al.
suggested that “technologies aimed at improving communication inefficiencies in
hospitals” should be adopted, because those communication technologies will “aid in
connecting to the right person about the right patient at the right time” (pp. 278, 279).
Numerous studies have pointed to improved communication and patient care following
such adoptions, but, as explained below, other research has shown that communication
and health information technologies negatively impact provider–patient relationships,
communication efficiency, and patient safety.
Communication and Health Information Technologies
Abundant research has revealed mixed results concerning the effects of using
communication and health information technologies in medical settings. The
ramifications of using such technologies, for both patients and providers, are well
documented; however, many studies are situated in primary care clinics and privilege
one-on-one bounded exchanges between patients and physicians (see the discussion later
about emergency medicine and EMRs). Nonetheless, an overview of this research shows
the impact that these technologies continue to have on interpersonal relationships and
communication within and across healthcare settings. Research about effects of
technologies on provider–patient interactions is especially important given that recent
legislation has mandated that U.S. hospitals and emergency rooms adopt EMRs by 2015
(see the discussion later about EMR legislation); hence, there soon will be even more
computers in examination rooms, and, consequently, it is important to understand what
this will mean for patients and providers alike.
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Communication and health information technologies, broadly defined, include
computers, EMRs, walkie-talkies, mobile phones, tablets, and electronic whiteboards.
Health information technologies (HIT) can improve the quality of patients’ charts and
medical histories, facilitate communication among providers, allow access to online
resources, and may reduce medical errors, but technology also can have unintended
consequences: it can increase work for providers, alter workflow, and introduce new
types of clinical errors (Shachak & Reis, 2009). Research also has shown that computers
and EMRs decrease the amount of interpersonal contact between primary care providers
and patients (Montague & Asan, 2014; Overton, in press-a). According to Montague and
Asan’s (2014) analysis of videotaped interactions between physicians and patients,
computers in examination rooms hindered communication, with a third of the physicians’
time spent looking at the computer screen instead of at their patients, meaning that those
physicians may have missed important nonverbal cues given by patients (e.g., facial
expressions that may have signaled patients not understanding physicians’ use of medical
terminology). Other studies have found that patients express decreased confidence in
physicians who use diagnostic support tools in examination rooms (Arkes, Shaffer, &
Medow, 2007; Hall, 2014). Although computers are supposed to improve operational
efficiency, Teufel, Kazley, and Basco (2012), instead, found that hospitals using
computerized physician order entry systems (CPOE) showed no significant difference in
patients’ length of stay or total cost per stay compared to non-CPOE hospitals; in fact,
CPOE hospitals averaged $70 more per case.
Not all of the findings about the effects of HIT have been negative, as some
patients have reported being more satisfied with providers who use EMRs (Hsu et al.,
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2005). A study conducted in a Veterans Administration hospital that analyzed
videotaped provider–patient interactions also found that physicians’ examination room
computer use was associated with patients asking more questions, and, moreover, long
pauses in high EMR-use conditions created more conversational turn-taking (McGrath,
Arar, & Pugh, 2007). Ward et al. (2013) also found that when EMRs were used in
hospitals, patients’ length of stay was reduced.
Hence, the literature has not provided a clear-cut answer regarding the effects of
HIT in the medical context. However, before reviewing additional findings, it is
worthwhile to discuss briefly the history and practice of patient documentation, especially
because most HIT and EMR research has centered on this aspect of medical practice.
Healthcare Documentation
Patient records have existed since the first hospitals were opened and they have
evolved to serve two primary goals: documenting expenses and improving medical
education (Overton, in press-c). The first goal is of particular interest, because many
physicians believe that the patient record still serves, primarily, a financial function for
hospitals: facilitating billing and collections (Siegler, 2010). Early hospitals established
basic rules to track patient admissions, diagnoses, and outcomes, but the purpose, largely,
was bureaucratic, with administrators using patient tallies to justify expenditures (Hess &
Ledebur, 2011). As far back as 1737, surgeons in Berlin, Germany were required to note
patients’ conditions each morning and to prescribe lunches accordingly; for example,
soup was prescribed for patients who were too weak to chew. The purpose of this
recordkeeping, according to Hess and Ledebur (2011), was to help administrators track
food costs in hospitals; it had little bearing on actual patient care. In 1791, according to
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Siegler’s (2010) analysis of early medical recordkeeping, the New York Board of
Governors required lists of patients’ names and their prescribed medications, but no
descriptions of their conditions were required; the principal objective was to track fixed
medication costs. Documenting formally the care that individual patients received was
fairly uncommon in U.S. hospitals at that time; it was not until the end of the 19th
century that U.S. physicians began recording the specifics of daily patient care for all
patients. From 1860 on, physicians used standardized medical forms to record patients’
demographic data, along with their symptoms, treatments, daily events, and outcomes.
The reports, however, usually were written retrospectively and in widely varying
narrative styles.
Widespread use of templates in U.S. hospitals helped to standardize patients’
records, but the resulting numerical data superseded narrative content (Overton, in pressc; Siegler, 2010). According to Siegler (2010), by the start of the 20th century, graphs
and tables dominated patient records, and physicians’ narrative summaries began to
disappear. The freestyle narrative form that previously had comprised the bulk of
patients’ records allowed physicians to write as much or as little as they wished.
Templates, in contrast, left little room for lengthy narratives—no more than a few inches;
consequently, summary reports gave way to brief descriptions of putatively pertinent
findings. As medical technology advanced, according to Siegler, the medical record
became more complicated and cumbersome with the addition of yet more forms for
reporting each new type of test conducted (e.g., chemistry, hematology, and pathology
tests). Although most physicians kept working notes on active patients, those scraps of
paper notating observations, daily tasks, and physicians’ thoughts seldom made their way
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into the official patient record. The official record, which emphasized tests and numbers,
as Siegler noted, changed medical discourse, with interactions between physicians and
patients becoming more data driven. This shift paralleled the change from
biopyschosocial to biomedical-driven care, as discussed previously, with healthcare
becoming less about the totality of patients’ experiences and physicians’ perceptions of
those experiences.
Today, irrespective of the charting format used, patient records are maintained
according to strict guidelines (Overton, in press-c). Several agencies publish
recommended guidelines, including the American Association of Nurses, American
Medical Association (AMA), Joint Commission of Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO), and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Each
organization/association regards the medical record as a communication tool for everyone
involved in patients’ current and future care. The primary purpose of the medical record
is to identify patients, justify their treatment, document the course of their treatments and
the results, and facilitate continuity of care among healthcare providers. Each agency’s
charting guidelines require certain fixed elements in patients’ record: their name, address,
birthdate, attending physician, diagnosis, next of kin, and insurance provider. The patient
record also contains physicians’ orders and progress notes, as well as medication lists, Xray records, laboratory tests, and surgical records. Several agencies require patients’ full
names, birthdates, and a unique patient identification number that appear on each page of
the record, along with the name of the attending physician, date of visit or admission, and
the treating facility’s contact information. Every entry must be signed or initialed
legibly, and the date/time must be stamped by the provider.
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Although patient records have evolved to ensure continuity of patient care, Siegler
(2010) claimed that their current form facilitates billing over communication concerns.
Many EMRs, for instance, are modeled after accounting systems, with providers’
checkbox choices of diagnoses and tests, typically, being categorized and notated in
billing codes. All medical procedures and treatments administered in the United States
are reported in Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes. The AMA owns that
coding schema and charges users a yearly licensing fee for the CPT codes and
codebooks, which are updated annually. CMS and most insurance companies require
CPT-coded data for reimbursement (AMA, 2014). The results often are medical charts
that few providers, and even fewer patients, can decipher without a codebook (Overton,
in press-c). Bukata (2013) echoed this assertion, writing, “All that charting . . . is read by
virtually no other medical person” (p. 4). EMRs have evolved in this financially driven
way, in large part, because the first computers used in healthcare settings were adapted
from “the business world [and] have been directly and successfully applied to billing,
scheduling, and numerical functions of medicine” (Ash & Ulrich, 1986, p. 361). One
important place where such technologies, including EMRs, have affected health care, as
described below, is examinations rooms.
Technology in Examination Rooms
Computer-aided healthcare documentation is a fairly recent development. Before
computers were brought into examination rooms, providers documented findings on
paper charts during or immediately after medical exams. Although there were early
adopters, the first EMR users (like many new technology users) struggled with inefficient
and sluggish systems. Some progressive hospitals experienced backlash when EMRs
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were installed in the early 1980s: “Attempts to force [providers] to use charting or
artificial intelligence systems have, in some cases, resulted in open rebellion” (Ash &
Ulrich, 1986, p. 362). Ash and Ulrich (1986), in their review of literature on the adoption
of computer-based patient charting systems, dating back to 1980, surmised that EMRs
were unsuccessful because they were difficult to use, did not generate reader-friendly
reports, and were not interoperable (these reasons remain the most cited in present-day
research). Cost also was a factor, because mainframe terminals were very expensive in
the 1980s. Ash and Ulrich, however, lauded the introduction of “battery-powered” and
“mobile” computers with “over 500K RAM” that were suitable for use in “hospital
wards, specialty care units, emergency rooms, and the professional’s home” (p. 363).
Although rudimentary by today’s standards, that groundbreaking technology allowed
patients’ data to be stored and transferred on floppy discs. Ash and Ulrich reviewed one
of the first commercially available charting programs, SmartChart, and reported that
when the system worked, it resulted in faster documentation over paper charting by 1 to 2
minutes per patient. Versions of the software installed on a Geneva 64K CP/M computer
suffered memory overload in 20% of visits, but the prototype was received well by
primary care physicians and by nurses working in intensive care units (Ash & Ulrich).
The problems that plagued these early computer systems, however, persisted well into the
21st century.
Modern-day computer use in examination rooms has been well documented and
researched. Frankel et al. (2005), for instance, conducted a longitudinal study in which
they videotaped interactions between primary care physicians and patients at prescribed
intervals before, during, and after computers were installed in examination rooms.
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Frankel et al. concluded that the “introduction of computers in the exam room affected
the visual, verbal, and postural connection between clinicians and patients,” and that
these factors “had the potential to alter the sense of connection . . . essential to
relationship building and maintenance” (pp. 677, 681). Frankel et al. also noted that
preexisting “facilitators and barriers” in both physicians’ verbal and nonverbal
communication were “carried forward and amplified when exam room computers were
used” (p. 681). In essence, computers magnified already engrained behaviors, both
positive and negative.
Pearce, Kumarapeli, and de Lusignan (2013) reached similar conclusions in their
systematic review of empirical studies examining computer-induced changes in
physician–patient interactions: Across numerous studies, the addition of computers
amplified existing positive and negative communication behaviors. Computer-specific
behaviors (e.g., typing and screen gaze) also diminished rapport between physicians and
patients, as well as the provision of emotional support by physicians. Shachak and Reis
(2009), whose study was cited by Pearce et al., concluded that computers negatively
affected patient-centeredness but positively influenced biomedical information exchange,
noting that the “introduction of the EMR organizes encounters around data gathering
demands rather than the patient’s narratives” (p. 645). This point can have repercussions
for patients (see the discussion later about consequences of EMR use), with Shachak and
Reis offering providers several recommendations for maintaining rapport with their
patients. These recommendations include opening visits by addressing patients’
concerns, explaining to patients why computers are being used, pointing to the computer
screen, inviting patients to participate actively in building their medical charts, looking at
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patients often, separating routine data entry from patient encounters, and learning to type.
Typing, especially, “has a negative impact on communication” (Shachak & Reis, p. 647)
insofar as communication grinds to a halt when providers type, leading Ventres,
Kooienga, and Marlin (2006) to encourage physicians to become better typists.
A study by Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al. (2006) identified typing as a main
factor fueling physicians’ dissatisfaction with EMRs. Ventres and his colleagues (2006)
conducted an ethnographic study of four primary care clinics and amassed 80 hours of
observations, interviews, and videotaped clinical encounters. With respect to how
computers are both used and regarded in clinical practice, they identified four themes:
spatial (physical placement of the computer), relational (beliefs that both physicians and
patients had about the computer), educational (physicians’ proficiency and ability to
teach patients about the utility of computers), and structural (institutional and
technological forces that influenced physicians’ perceptions of their computer use).
Structural constraints included monetary concerns, “especially regarding the question of
whether to type or dictate office visit notes . . . [and] typing was seen as the only way to
limit further expenditures” (Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al., p. 129), because
dictation would have required hiring one or more transcriptionists. The result was that
typing led physicians to rely on “quick-text features,” templates, and shortcuts to save
time. Ultimately, physicians’ shortcuts meant that patients’ charts “all started looking the
same,” leading some study participants to bemoan the practice of “cookbook medicine”
(Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al., p. 129). Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al.
concluded that the computer “becomes much like a third party to a conversation . . . and
both physicians and patients project their perceptions onto this identity” (p. 130).
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Because the use of computers affected several cognitive and social dimensions of medical
practice, Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al. cautioned that “it would be a grave mistake
to believe the effects of EMRs will be automatically and universally positive” (p. 130).
Although one obvious benefit of using EMRs is readily accessible medical
records (Shachak & Reis, 2009), providers often underutilize this feature because they
lack the expertise and time to search for and retrieve patients’ histories. A study by
Christensen and Grimsmo (2008) found that physicians rarely spent time searching
EMRs for patients’ histories; instead, they either relied on their memories or asked
patients about previous visits. Both tactics are problematic given the potential for poor
recall, which could lead to medical mistakes. Although virtually all of the physicians in
the study reported that it would be useful to review patients’ histories before encounters
with patients, 35% reported that asking patients about their past visits was easier than
using the computer system. For those physicians who attempted to access digital records,
37% gave up because the task was too time-consuming. More than half of the study’s
participants reported difficulty displaying progress notes in a user-friendly, readable
format, which harkens back to Ash and Ulrich’s (1986) findings and hints at a problem
that is becoming more pronounced: the accessibility and readability of medical data.
Patients’ records contain more data than ever before (Siegler, 2010), and the result
is that healthcare providers are experiencing data overload. Many providers have
difficulty wading through mounds of data to discern important information from
insignificant attestations and results. Although computers and EMRs are supposed to
make searching for patients’ data easier, Christensen and Grimsmo (2008) found just the
opposite. Even when electronic charts are accessed, making sense of the data can be
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difficult, as providers have trouble processing quickly the amount of numerical data and
graphs that are contained in most medical records (Overton, in press-a; Overton, in pressc; Siegler, 2010). Scott, Hallett, and Fettiplace (2013), for example, found that providers
who were given narrative summaries of patients’ records performed better on questions
about patients’ conditions than did providers who were given complete medical records,
and they did so in half the time. Their findings highlighted the importance of narrative
summaries that should be included in patients’ records. Hence, there is a clear need to
balance numbers with words in medical records, and, thereby, ensure optimal patient care
(Siegler, 2010).
In addition to computers and EMRs in examination rooms, other technology has
been studied in healthcare settings. For instance, personal wireless communication
devices (e.g., walkie-talkies) used in an emergency room were found to improve
providers’ perceptions of quality communication, because rather than relying on a public
address system, the wireless technology facilitated quiet and efficient access to on-call
providers and specialists (Richards & Harris, 2011). Fewer intercom announcements,
participants maintained, created a better and safer work environment that was free from
distractions (Richards & Harris, 2011). To assess how patients viewed physicians using
wireless devices, Miller, Ziegler, Greenberg, Patel, and Carter (2012) assigned
participants to either a treatment group, in which they received information regarding the
utility of these devices, or to a control group. The treatment group expressed more
favorable opinions, leading Miller et al. to conclude that “sharing even a small amount of
information with [patients] about the utility of handheld wireless technologies such as
PDAs, smartphones, or tablets may improve their perception of what physicians are
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doing” (p. 59). Sikka et al. (2012) found that patients were very receptive to the role that
smartphones could play in managing lacerations; specifically, the majority of participants
agreed that sending a mobile phone picture of a minor cut to a physician for treatment
recommendations would be an acceptable alternative to going to the emergency room.
As Sikka et al. explained, “Patients’ responses were in agreement that mobile health
applications can reduce cost, save time, be more convenient, and improve communication
with their healthcare providers” (p. 37). In fact, this approach now is being used
successfully by Stat Doctors, a telemedicine service that offers urgent medical care
consultations via a smartphone app (DeGaspari, 2014).
Whiteboards, which are dedicated bulletin boards used to track patients’ status
and length of stay, also have been examined and have particular significance for this
dissertation. A 5-year ethnography conducted in a trauma surgical suite charted how the
whiteboard facilitated communication and teamwork (Xiao et al., 2007). Although Xiao
et al. (2007) studied a whiteboard that could be written on with markers, they made the
argument that “replacing traditional whiteboards with electronic systems may weaken
communication if we do not fully understand how traditional whiteboards support
collaborative work” (p. 388). As it pertains to the present study, it bears mentioning that
EMRs have electronic whiteboard components; before EMRs were commonplace, a
quarter of communication events in emergency rooms occurred at or near whiteboards
(Fairbanks et al., 2007). Xiao et al. found that the surgical suite’s whiteboard encouraged
synchronous communication, with staff members meeting frequently at the board, and
“during face-to-face interactions, the operating room board provided common reference
points . . . [that] enhanced communication while reducing the effort of explicit
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communication” (pp. 391, 388). The board also enabled asynchronous communication,
as “notes were written to alert all staff to critical issues” (Xiao et al., p. 391). The
whiteboard, thus, supported collaborative work in these ways, but it also facilitated task
management, status tracking, socialization, and team building. Its location (at eye level),
interactivity, and usability made it a valuable “communication information artifact” (Xiao
et al., p. 387). Electronic whiteboards, according to Xiao et al., “do away with the
socialization and team building that the central board encourages,” and the placement of
electronic boards, usually near the ceiling, discourages asynchronous communication and
“impedes easy interaction [and] some aspects of visibility” (p. 392). Applying these
findings to emergency departments, Xiao et al. wrote:
In the ED [emergency department], a central whiteboard provides an obvious
gathering space for sign-out rounds . . . . The obvious gathering of physicians
encourages notice and involvement by other staff, whereas an isolated sign-out
around a computer-based tracking system replicates the hospital’s underlying silo
structure: physicians gather with physicians, nurses with nurses. (p. 393)
This final point underscores some of the inherent communication challenges that
providers experience in hospitals and, especially, in emergency rooms.
In sum, research has revealed mixed effects of communication and health
information technology. Although these technologies have improved some aspects of
healthcare delivery, they also have had unintended consequences; namely, increases in
providers’ workload, medical errors, and healthcare costs. Computers in examination
rooms appear to amplify providers’ existing positive and negative communication
behaviors, which can either bolster or stymy their interactions with patients. Computerassisted documentation has privileged billing functions over medical records’ readability.
Furthermore, data entry tasks, especially typing, have led providers to adopt shortcuts
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that render patients’ charts almost indistinguishable. Other technologies, such as
electronic whiteboards, also can impact the collaborative nature of emergency room
work. The “silo structure” in many hospitals also contributes to communication
challenges that plague providers, especially those who work in emergency rooms.
Because emergency rooms are unlike other healthcare settings, it is important to
understand both the unique nature of provider–patient relationships and communication
patterns that occur in that site. Therefore, the following section provides an overview of
research that has examined how providers and patients communicate in emergency room
settings.
Communication Research in Emergency Room Settings
Emergency rooms are high-stakes, fast-paced, communicatively challenged
environments, yet few studies focus exclusively on emergency rooms or communication
patterns in them (Cameron et al., 2010; Fairbanks et al., 2007). Increasingly, emergency
rooms are becoming default healthcare homes for underinsured and uninsured patients
(Overton, in press-b; Roscoe & Eisenberg, 2014); consequently, it is especially important
to study communication in that setting. Moreover, for several reasons, findings about
primary care practices, where a substantial amount of interpersonal health
communication research takes place, are not generalizable to emergency rooms. First,
emergency medicine practice, inherently, involves “caring for multiple patients with
highly variable complaints simultaneously,” whereas primary care providers see and treat
just one patient at a time; hence, “work in [emergency rooms] is unbounded, as there is
little control over the workload” (Roscoe & Eisenberg, 2014, p. 393). Second,
emergency care is provided in an atmosphere rife with “staff shortages, limited resources,
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overcrowding, and long wait times” (Roscoe & Eisenberg, 2014, p. 393). The
environment is crowded and loud, and there is no backstage where providers can
communicate outside of earshot of patients; such a setting creates a “significant source of
communication vulnerability” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 404). There also are frequent
interruptions and interstaff conflict in emergency rooms (Person at al., 2013). Third,
providers and patients in emergency rooms rarely have an established relationship
(Govindarajan et al., 2010; McCarthy et al., 2013). Most visits represent a single
encounter, and, according to Hobgood, Riviello, Jouriles, and Hamilton (2002),
the duration and quality of that encounter are influenced by time pressures . . . .
The emergency physician must quickly establish rapport and trust with the
patient, gather information, assess the cause of the emergency, and design a
treatment plan. (p. 1257)
Establishing rapport is especially difficult in an emergency room because the interactions
that occur there are “between strangers in an emotionally charged environment and . . .
[they are] often dominated by tests and painful procedures” (Hobgood et al., p. 1264).
Additionally, emergency medicine physicians experience communication barriers in
nearly half of their encounters with patients who are unconscious, suffer from dementia,
confusion, or altered mental status, are mentally ill, or have limited intellectual ability
(Garra et al., 2010). From patients’ perspectives, “piecemeal delivery of information as it
becomes available” from multiple care providers can be confusing, especially for those
“accustomed to the normal flow of information in the outpatient setting” (McCarthy et
al., 2013, p. 266). The emergency room, therefore, is especially ripe for communication
breakdowns and is at risk for medical errors (McCarthy et al., 2013; Wei et al., 2012).
For these reasons, it is important to review communication research based in
emergency rooms to understand how EMRs have and will affect that already
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communicatively challenged environment. As explained below, that research has
focused on the patient’s perspective, communication strategies that providers use when
interacting with patients, discharge communication, and interactions between groups of
providers, including communication occurring during the transfer of care and admission
processes.
Patient-focused Emergency Room Communication Research
Several studies have privileged patients’ experiences and their perspectives of
communication with emergency room staff. Much of that research, however, suggests
that emergency room patients receive too little information from providers and have few
opportunities to express their concerns or to ask questions (Crane, 1997; Farmer, Rotor,
& Higginson, 2006; Rhodes et al., 2003; Samuels-Kalow, Stack, & Porter, 2012). For
example, Rhodes et al. (2003) videotaped and analyzed 93 interactions between
emergency medicine residents and patients at an urban academic medical center, and
concluded that “the physician–patient encounter was brief and lacking in important health
information” (p. 262). Specifically, Rhodes and her colleagues noted that residents
introduced themselves only in two-thirds of encounters, only about half of the patients
were told their diagnosis, only 60% were advised of specific symptoms that would
warrant returning to the emergency room, fewer than 20% were told what they could
expect over the course of their illness or recovery, only 16% were asked if they had
questions, and none of the residents confirmed if patients understood the information that
had been conveyed to them. Despite most residents beginning examinations by asking
patients open-ended questions about their health, only 20% of patients described their
chief complaints without interruption. Only 17% of the interruptions were categorized as
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“elaborators,” whereby residents sought additional information or clarification; most
interruptions were closed questions, and 82% of patients who were interrupted did not
finish describing their chief complaints. Interruptions, as mentioned previously,
occurred, on average, only 12 seconds after patients began speaking. These behaviors are
commonplace among practicing physicians as well; in a study of 74 encounters between
physicians and patients over a 4-month period, Farmer et al. (2006) found that physicians,
typically, controlled examinations with interruptions and closed-ended questions.
Seven years later, McCarthy et al. (2013), surveyed 266 patients in an urban
academic medical center and found more positive outcomes, at least when compared with
Rhodes et al.’s (2003) study, as the medical staff did not interrupt patients when they
spoke and the staff communicated in terms that patients could understand. The lowest
scoring item on the patient questionnaire, however, was “encouraged me to ask
questions.” Although McCarthy et al.’s (2013) findings may have hinted that
communication patterns in emergency rooms had improved in the decade since Rhodes et
al.’s study was published, the majority of the research conducted in emergency rooms has
concluded that physicians and residents perpetuate ineffective communication patterns
because they do not receive adequate communication skills training (Coran et al., 2010;
Hobgood et al., 2002) and/or because they lack the time needed to engage in highly
person-centered communication (Cohen, Wilkin, Tannenbaum, Plew, & Haley, 2013;
Crane, 1997; Farmer et al., 2006; McCarthy, Cameron, Courtney, & Vozenilek, 2012;
Samuels-Kalow et al., 2012). Because physicians are “under pressure for timely
diagnosis and rapid disposition” (Farmer et al., 2006, p. 141), they often chose efficient
communication at the expense of comprehension and rapport (Dean & Oetzel, 2014).
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Cohen at al. (2013) found that although emergency room staff recognized the
need for engaging in empathic communication, only the nonmedical staff were able to
devote time to that type of communication. Many physicians are familiar with techniques
that could facilitate better communication with patients, but they rarely use them,
according to McCarthy et al. (2012), who surveyed a nationwide sample of 169
emergency medicine physicians and residents working in community hospitals and
academic medical centers. Effective techniques, identified by McCarthy et al. (2012),
include talking slowly, using simple language, reading aloud, using pictures, “following
home” (asking patients to explain how they will take medicines or dress wounds at
home), and “teach back,” whereby patients demonstrate for providers what they have
learned about their conditions or treatments. Of these methods, McCarthy et al. (2012)
found that physicians used only the first two regularly. They surmised that this finding
occurred because more advanced techniques involve asking patients questions, which
could prolong the encounter.
Effective provider communication (e.g., that which is sensitive to patients’
emotional and information needs) is associated with reduced anxiety in patients, as well
as with increased trust of physicians (Shankar, Bhatia, & Schuur, 2013). As McCarthy et
al. (2013) noted, “The need for good communication is so widely accepted that patient
satisfaction with physician communication is now linked to hospital Medicare incentive
payments” (p. 262). However, although good provider–patient communication
throughout patients’ entire emergency room visit is important, as documented below,
discharge communication is an especially important aspect of the emergency medical
interaction.
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Discharge communication. Discharge communication is the exchange of
information between providers and patients that occurs when patients have been
evaluated, diagnosed, treated, and are being prepared to leave the emergency room.
Typically, at that time, providers summarize the visit and clinical findings, teach patients
how to care for themselves at home, and address questions or concerns that patients may
have (Samuels-Kalow et al., 2012). According to Samuels-Kalow et al. (2012), “At
patient discharge, the emergency provider must effectively complete three tasks:
communicate the crucial information, verify comprehension, and tailor teaching to areas
of confusion or misunderstanding to ensure patient safety” (p. 152). Frequently,
however, discharge “becomes an afterthought, limited only to a brief exchange of forms
and prescriptions” (Samuels-Kalow et al., p. 152). In their analysis of empirical research,
Samuels-Kalow et al. found that many patients did not know their diagnosis, suggested
treatments, or reasons that would necessitate a return to the emergency room. An earlier
survey of 314 patients immediately upon their discharge from an emergency room by
Crane (1997) yielded similar results, with a quarter of the patients not understanding their
diagnosis or the purpose of their prescribed medications. Furthermore, most patients
were missing over a third of the necessary information that they needed for safe discharge
from the emergency department (including reasons to return). Crane (1997) identified
time constraints, in particular, as a factor inhibiting effective discharge communication.
Physicians consistently underestimate the time that is needed for discharge
communication, according to Ackermann et al. (2012). In their study, physicians were
given a vignette involving a chest pain patient and a list of 81 items from which they had
to select the most important to include in a 15-minute discussion with patients. The items
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chosen, by the authors’ estimation, would have taken more than a half hour to
communicate. Ultimately, this study and other studies suggest that physicians need
additional training in discharge communication. Samuels-Kalow at al. (2012) concluded
that patients need “structured content, presented verbally, with written and visual cues to
enhance recall” (p. 152). Additionally, messages should be tailored to take into account
patients’ level of knowledge, and providers should “provide education in a manner that is
clear, comprehensible, and culturally sensitive” (Shankar et al., 2013, p. 21).
Provider-focused Emergency Room Communication Research
One of the communication studies about emergency rooms that is cited most often
was conducted by Eisenberg et al. (2005), who spent 32 days over 10 months observing
interactions among providers in two emergency rooms that were affiliated with academic
medical centers. Eisenberg et al. (2005) also interviewed providers and “attended
regularly scheduled rounds, shift changes, case conferences, and formal and informal
meetings” (p. 396). One of the key findings to emerge from the nearly yearlong study
was that providers subjugated patients’ stories into actionable lists, a practice that can
affect substantially patient care (see the discussion below about consequences of EMR
use).
Although Eisenberg et al.’s (2005) study privileged patient outcomes, it also shed
light on providers’ experiences and interactions. Eisenberg et al. (2005) noted that
emergency departments were especially susceptible to communication challenges given
their fragmented and hierarchical environment. As Eisenberg et al. (2005) explained:
The ED is internally fragmented by professional fault lines separating physicians
from nurses and nurses from techs/aids/EMTs, and externally fragmented by the
frequent presence and influence of extra–ED entities (e.g., consultants, prehospital services, laboratory, radiology). (p. 392)
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In particular, they claimed, these divisions were apparent when nurses disagreed with
physicians. Ownership over patients often fueled disagreements; whereas physicians see
every patient and, therefore, spend less time with each patient, nurses are responsible for
just a few patients. The result, as described by Eisenberg et al. (2005), is that
nurses spend more uninterrupted time with patients and feel more of an authority
on particular individuals. Physicians, on the other hand, have more technical
training and can claim more authority over diagnosis and treatment; final word
always goes to the physician in terms of diagnosis and patient care. Many nurses
simply remained silent when they disagreed, following physicians’ orders and
only later expressing their objections to other nurses. This hierarchical behavior
is a serious weakness in the system, and is reminiscent of flight attendants’
unwillingness to assert themselves with pilots when they feel something is amiss.
(p. 402)
This passage is evocative of findings described in the sections above, underscoring the
magnitude of problematic physician–nurse relationships and communication across
healthcare settings.
Hierarchical behavior, as described by Eisenberg et al. (2005) and elsewhere (see
Eggertson, 2012; Haddad, 2003; Johnson & Kring, 2012; Robinson et al., 2010;
Tschannen et al., 2011), is problematic, as is the tendency of providers to cluster in
similar groups. As Xiao et al. (2007) found, the hospital “silo structure” means that
providers tend to maintain professional boundaries, congregating and communicating
with ingroup members, such that “physicians gather with physicians, nurses with nurses”
(p. 393). Eisenberg et al. (2005) also observed ingroup members clustering together,
noting that, unlike scheduled physicians’ rounds, there were no formal “face-to-face
interactions between nurses and physicians”; instead, nurses either sought out physicians
if they had questions or relied simply “on the chart as their primary medium of
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communication” (p. 402). EMRs, however, do away with the common chart, further
restraining “the collaborative and social nature of clinical work” (Park et al., 2012, p.
215).
Although Eisenberg et al.’s (2005) study is an important example of the type of
communication literature that informs the present study, the medical literature also
abounds with examples of between-group differences that are applicable to the current
study and, therefore, warrant mention. For instance, in a study assessing physicians’ and
nurses’ perceptions of nonurgent communication and communication barriers in an
academic medical center,	
  Morgan, Kawar, Rahman, Gatewood, and Fairbanks (2011)
found that opinions varied largely by group. Interestingly, half of respondents reported
that communication difficulties resulted in negative outcomes and medical errors during
some shifts. Wei at al. (2012) also found that physicians, nurses, and technicians had
significantly different views about teamwork, patient safety, and communication.
Moreover, Farhan, Brown, Woloshynowych, and Vincent (2012) found that group
differences influenced perceptions of handoff communication, its purpose, and its
execution in an academic medical center. Like discharge communication, as described
next, handoff is particularly problematic (Eisenberg et al., 2005), as poor handoff and
admission communication often lead to medical mistakes (Farhan et al., 2012; Kessler,
Kutka, & Badillo, 2012).
Handoff communication. Handoff or handover communication, as defined
previously, is the process of information exchange that occurs during transfer of patients’
care from one provider to another, and it happens under several conditions: during shift
changes, when patients are brought to emergency rooms by ambulance, or when patients
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are transferred from another hospital. In the first scenario, providers educate incoming
staff about patients’ conditions, tentative diagnoses, pending test results, and treatment
plans (Farhan et al., 2012); in the second case, the ambulance crew communicates
pertinent findings from the field, which may include patients’ vital signs, medications,
symptoms, and social histories (Redfern, Brown, & Vincent, 2009). The ambulance
crews’ report may be the only information available about unconscious patients and,
therefore, is very important for ensuring that providers give patients the most appropriate
care (Redfern et al., 2009). When patients are transferred from another facility, handoff
may occur over the phone between the referring and accepting providers, or it may occur
asynchronously through medical charts accompanying patients upon presentation. In all
scenarios, “handover is a vulnerable time for patient safety” (Farhan et al., 2012, p. 941).
Farhan et al. (2012), in their study of handoff in an academic emergency medicine
department, found that perceptions of good handoff communication varied as a function
of role and training. As Farhan et al. noted, “Handover is a skill that is not formally
included in medical training” (p. 941). Study participants estimated that they wasted up
to 3 hours of shift time “catching up with issues following poor handover” (Farhan et al.,
p. 943), with one respondent stating that an entire shift had been spent tracking down
information about a patient after receiving no handoff communication. Problematic
handoffs were believed to have led to adverse events, including delays in treatment. The
authors devised a handoff tool that could be implemented easily, irrespective of staff
members’ training or role. Their recommendations included providing a written and/or
verbal account of each of the following: acuity and diagnosis for each patient, any
equipment problems, waiting times, number of available beds, number of admitted
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patients housed in the emergency room awaiting inpatient beds, deaths occurring during
the previous shift, violent or aggressive patients, and any staff issues or shortages.
Farhan and her colleagues folded their recommendations into an easy to remember
mnemonic: the ABC method. It is formatted as follows: Areas and Allocations (location
of patients and available resources); Beds, Bugs, and Breaches (available beds, infectious
patients, and breaks with protocol); Colleagues and Consultants; Deaths, Disasters, and
Deserters (patients who leave against medical advice); and Equipment and External
Events. Early tests demonstrated that the process “takes less than 5 minutes to complete”
(Farhan et al., p. 945).
Handoff communication can be especially problematic for patients arriving by
ambulance. As noted earlier, Fairbanks et al. (2007) found that triage nurses and
ambulance crews do not talk regularly with physicians, meaning that “most handoff
information is either secondhand verbal or written” (p. 403). Redfern et al. (2009) made
a similar observation in their analysis of the handoff process involving an ambulance
crew in a London emergency room, noting that there was limited face-to-face
interaction––the ambulance crew simply handed over written assessments of patients
during brief verbal exchanges with nurses. The written report, the bottom copy of a
triplicate form, was given to a receptionist who then scanned it into the hospital’s digital
record system. The scanned document, however, was completely illegible 82% of the
time and only partially legible for the remaining 18%. The forms “contained substantial
amounts of important clinical information that was often essential to proper care of the
patient” (Redfern et al., p 659), but they never were read by physicians. A simple
solution was devised: scan the top sheet of the triplicate. After implementing that small
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change, the scanned forms were “100% wholly legible,” proving that “simple
interventions produce significant results” (Redfern et al., pp. 659, 660). Redfern et al.
expressed dismay over staff members’ inaction, citing the “extraordinary tolerance of
healthcare staff for inefficient or failure prone systems and the degree to which they cope
with frustrating working conditions rather than attempting to change them” (p. 661). As
shown in chapter 3, such inaction may be explained, in part, by tenets of structurational
divergence theory.
To review, effective and safe handoff requires clear communication between
groups of providers when care for patients is transferred. However, although handoff has
been examined within the context of shift change, patients arriving by ambulance, and
patients being transferred from other hospitals, an additional domain of handoff
communication, as described below, includes admission to the hospital from the
emergency room.
Communication during admission. Ineffective communication during
admission is a leading cause of medical errors and contributes to emergency room
overcrowding (Apker et al., 2007). Similar to handoff, admission involves transferring
care; in this case, from the emergency department to an inpatient hospital unit. The task
of admitting patients often poses communication challenges for emergency room staff,
because, according to Eisenberg et al. (2005), it “is a political process.” From the
perspective of emergency room physicians, admitting patients involves persuading
another physician (typically, a specialist) to accept patients into their service, but
specialists “are selective in whom they wish to admit, at times applying different criteria
for admission than the ED” (p. 407). As Stephens, Clark, and Patterson (2012) found,
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communication barriers between physicians and specialists inhibit timely admission and
delay patient care. In their ethnographic study of an academic emergency department,
Stephens et al. (2012) noted key barriers: paging system problems that resulted in delays,
uncertainty as to who to contact regarding admitting patients to particular services (e.g.,
cardiology or internal medicine) and how to contact those providers, specialists who do
not respond to pages or return calls, and inability of emergency physicians to follow up
on communication requests given their workload (i.e., they are busy seeing new patients).
These barriers, in addition to delaying timely care, create additional and duplicate work
for emergency room staff forced to page and call specialists several times.
Problematic communication plagues 14–24% of admissions, according to Kessler
et al. (2012). Kessler et al. found that poor admission communication increased costs for
patients and decreased the quality of care that they received and their overall satisfaction.
In their analysis of communication patterns that occurred in an academic emergency
department, Kessler et al. uncovered interpersonal and communication conflicts that were
a result of specialists “not responding to a page, not communicating, taking hours to get
an answer, being rude to ER staff, and treating ‘us as if we’re stupid’” (p. 708). When
conversations did take place, emergency room staff were expected to “speak briefly” and
get “to the point quickly” (Kessler et al., p. 708). Marshall et al. (2011), surveying
emergency medicine and internal medicine residents about the perceived quality of the
admission discussions in which they engaged regularly, found equally problematic
admission discussions. Emergency medicine residents had a much more positive view of
the quality of information that they conveyed during the admission process than did the
internal medicine residents who received it. Internal medicine residents reported that
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admission communication was clear and organized only half of the time, whereas 80% of
emergency medicine residents believed that most admissions were communicated clearly
and effectively. Internal medicine residents also thought that poorly communicated
admissions led frequently to delays in patient care and actually harmed patients, whereas
emergency medicine residents believed that these problems happened in fewer than 10%
of admissions. Taken together, both of these studies underscore the hierarchical nature of
physician specialties and the problematic communication between them.
Discordant provider interactions that delay admissions also contribute to
emergency room overcrowding. Patients “waiting for beds” often are boarded in
emergency departments; admitted patients “are routinely pushed into the hallway to make
room for new patients,” but this practice “creates significant physical and psychological
noise that negatively impacts patient care” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 408). Ironically,
these “visible” patients, according to Eisenberg et al. (2005), are “psychologically ‘out of
mind’ and receive less attention” (p. 408).
Admission also creates difficulties for both emergency room nurses and floor
nurses who continually navigate differing expectations of the admission process and its
associated workload. Emergency room nurses push for quick admission because
boarding patients, as described previously, compounds an already difficult working
environment and erodes the quality of patient care. Although boarded patients may
receive less care than active patients (i.e., patients who have not been dispositioned
and/or discharged), nurses still are responsible for them, along with all of the new
patients presenting to the emergency room. Most floor nurses, however, enjoy a “ratio of
two patients to one nurse” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 408). Even if beds are available,
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“the units will not accept new patients” if doing so violates the two patients-to-one nurse
quota, even though emergency room nurses “may be caring for twice as many critical
patients” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 408). This practice of delaying or refusing patient
admissions results in perceived inequities, and, given the uneven distribution of patients,
it creates tension between floor and emergency room nurses.
In summary, emergency rooms are communicatively challenged environments,
with studies demonstrating consistently that “key communication variables associated
with rapport and satisfaction . . . are somewhat lacking in provider–patient interactions”
(Rhodes et al., 2003, p. 266). Incomplete discharge, poor handoff, and problematic
admissions affect patients’ safety, but they also erode providers’ job satisfaction.
Structural constraints demand timely and efficient care, but inadequate resources and
overcrowding are ever-present obstacles in most emergency rooms. The problem is
compounded further by hierarchical relationships and discordant interactions between
groups of providers. As Person et al. (2013) noted, “The ED is an intense and stressful
work environment and . . . frequent interruptions, overcrowding, inter-staff conflict, and
technology barriers contribute to workplace stress” (p. 226). Understanding these factors
informs a more nuanced analysis of the impact that EMRs are having in an already
compromised communication environment, with the next section examining literature on
EMRs, EMR legislation, and effects of EMRs used in emergency room settings.
Emergency Medicine and Electronic Medical Records Systems
Although many primary care providers have used EMRs with varying degrees of
success since the 1980s, emergency room EMRs are rare, with Landman et al.’s (2010)
study finding that fewer than 2% of U.S. emergency rooms had fully functioning EMRs.
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As noted earlier, studies have shown that EMRs change workflow patterns,
communication, and patient care (Xiao et al., 2007). In 2007, Fairbanks et al. called for
more research on the effects that EMRs will have on emergency medicine practice; since
then, the U.S. Federal Government has mandated that hospitals must begin using EMRs
by 2015, and the consequences of that mandate are far-reaching.
What follows is a review of that legislation, with a subsequent discussion of
emergency room-focused EMR research. I then review literature pertaining to factors
inhibiting EMR adoption, as well as consequences of EMR use, including economic costs
and implications for patients and providers.
Electronic Medical Records System Legislation
Although EMRs are not used widely in U.S. hospitals, recent legislation aims to
change that practice. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act (HITECH) was passed in 2009 as part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. The HITECH Act was modeled after the Wired for Health Care
Quality Act of 2007 and the Healthcare Technology Act of 2008; both acts addressed
healthcare privacy management and attempted to establish unifying technology standards
(Stark, 2010). These legislative acts were fueled, in part, by reports from the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) and the World Health Organization (WHO). IOM released To Err is
Human in 1999, which reported medical errors as the eighth leading cause of death in the
United States (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999). In 2000, WHO ranked the United
States 37th in overall health system performance, citing, specifically, its poor use of
information technology as a factor contributing to the low ranking (Pipersburgh, 2011).
In 2001, IOM’s Crossing the Quality Chasm suggested that widespread use of health
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information technology (HIT) could reduce medical errors (Farley et al., 2013). That
claim was based, in part, on research that suggested EMRs could reduce medication
errors by up to 80% (Pipersburgh, 2011). Still other reports suggested that EMRs would
cut health care costs; not only would EMRs “improve efficiency and amplify the quality
of healthcare” (Noor et al., 2012, p. 15) but access to patients’ complete medical histories
would prevent overprescribing medications, which, potentially, could save billions of
dollars.
In what has emerged as an oft-quoted and maligned report (Bukata, 2013),
Hillestad et al. (2005) estimated that EMRs would result in a potential annual savings of
more than $81 billion. Hillestad et al. (2005) compared information technology (IT) use
in other sectors (e.g., banking and online shopping) with healthcare’s IT adoption and
projected enormous potential savings, provided “interconnected and interoperable EMR
systems [were] widely adopted and used effectively” (p. 1104). Telecommunication and
retail industries invested heavily in IT during the 1990s, and, as a result, they later saw
“60% annual productivity growth” (Hillestad et al., 2005, p. 1106). Assuming similar IT
investments, the report projected that hospitals could expect savings of $371 billion over
15 years. Many physicians, however, took issue with that comparison, noting that “the
analogy doesn’t hold [because] healthcare is not the airline or banking industry, it’s about
two humans, face-to-face, and computers don’t fit into this transaction” (Bukata, 2009, p.
4). Other highlights from the Hillestad et al. (2005) report included an estimated
reduction in the number of medication errors by 200,000 a year and $147 billion in
annual savings attributed to EMR-enabled chronic disease prevention and management
programs. Hilstead et al.’s report pointed out, however, that insurance companies would
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likely reap most of the savings, and, consequently, “providers face limited incentives to
purchase EMRs because their investments typically translate into revenue losses for them
and [savings] for payers” (p. 1108).
Despite promises of improved patient safety and operational efficiency, EMR
adoption rates have remained low. As Stark (2010) noted, “Our healthcare delivery
system resisted the digital revolution that . . . occurred everywhere else” (p. 24).
However, the U.S. Federal Government wants to see the same innovations in healthcare
that technology brought to banking and shopping (Ackerson & Viswanath, 2009). That
desire, potentially, is problematic, because many recent studies have identified some
barriers that stymy EMR adoption; namely, EMRs are expensive, difficult to use, timeconsuming, interfere with the physician–patient relationship, and disrupt workflow
(Ajami & Bagheri-Tadi, 2013; Nambisan, Kreps, & Polit, 2013; Pipersburgh, 2011;
Tomes, 2010). As Fontenot (2013) noted, “Evidence that (EMRs) will be essential and
effective in enabling the improvement of healthcare quality is neither conclusive nor
straightforward [and] the medical community doubt whether digital information benefits
the quality of care at all” (p. 72). Nonetheless, the HITECH Act requires EMRs in
hospitals and emergency rooms.
The HITECH Act is both promising and problematic; its Meaningful Use (MU)
program, as described below, is divisive and widely contested. HITECH’s major goals
include reducing healthcare costs by improving healthcare quality and coordination,
reducing medical errors, improving HIT infrastructure through incentives and grant
programs, and creating a national electronic health information exchange (Pipersburgh,
2011). Before HITECH was passed, only 10% of hospitals used EMRs (Pipersburgh,
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2011); by 2012, 27% of hospitals used some form of electronic charting (Berger, 2013).
The increase in EMR use was attributed to the MU program, which provides financial
incentives for hospitals and clinics adopting EMRs. By May 2013, 80% of hospitals had
received some incentive pay (DesRoches, Audet, Painter, & Donelan, 2013), but, overall,
EMR adoption was slower than expected following the MU rollout (Diana, Kazley, Ford,
& Menachemi, 2012). As of 2013, only 10% of physicians reported meeting the MU
requirements (DesRoches et al., 2013). Noor et al. (2012) noted that the “complexity of
the Meaningful Use measures” (p. 16) actually was an adoption deterrent for many
physicians. However, the goal of MU “is not simply adoption, but true meaningful use”
(Callahan, 2013, p. 56), resulting in improved coordination of patient care, reduced
disparities, and improved public health.
To begin receiving MU incentive payments, hospitals and physicians must show
that they are meeting at least 19 of 24 Stage 1 objectives for 90 days in the first year of
EMR adoption and a full year thereafter (Colpas, 2013). Stage 1 focuses on collecting
health information in a standardized format, tracking select clinical conditions, better
coordinating patient care, and implementing clinical decision support systems that
include warnings about drug interactions or contraindications (Eastaugh, 2013;
Pipersburgh, 2011). Stage 2 requirements, which include using computerized provider
order entry and electronic laboratory reporting, must be met for a full 2 years. Stage 3
will involve improving quality, safety, and efficiency, as well as expanding clinical
decision support tool use and providing patients access to their health information
(Colpas, 2013; Piperburgh, 2011). As of 2015, the U.S. Federal Government imposes
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financial penalties for hospitals and physicians failing to meet MU objectives by
withholding a percentage of Medicare and Medicaid payments (Nambisan et al., 2013).
Despite promises of financial incentives and threats of withheld payments, MU is
not working because the requirements are difficult to meet, costly to implement, and have
affected physician productivity negatively (Noor et al., 2012). Nearly 20% of 2013 Stage
1 participants did not continue the program after 90 days, “despite 5 figure financial
incentives” (Koriwchak, 2014 para. 6). Verdon (2013), surveying nearly 1,000
physicians using EMRs who had participated in MU, found that 70% believed that EMRs
were not worth the cost, did not improve patient care, and did not improve coordination
of care. Forty-five percent believed that EMRs actually made patient care worse, and two
thirds reported significant financial losses following EMR adoption (Verdon, 2013).
Interestingly, as Koriwchak (2014) noted, satisfaction among EMR users has fallen
considerably following MU, “from over 90% to about 30%” (para. 6). Forced adoption,
mandated by the HITECH Act,
destroyed the base of satisfied EMR customers from 2008, replacing it with a
much larger base of unhappy, resentful customers . . . forced to spend huge
amounts of money on unproven, underdeveloped EMR products that they did not
want and were not prepared to properly use. (Koriwchak, 2014 para. 10)
Although early adopters made deliberate and calculated purchasing decisions in a
market-driven economy, “MU-driven EMR purchasers” (Koriwchak, 2014, para. 9)
grappled with vendors churning out untested products to meet legislated demand. As
noted above, most of those systems were designed with billing departments in mind, not
end users. According to P. Viccellio, a physician, “EMRs are not user friendly or
medically oriented at all but pushed on us as a way to increase billing . . . . Instead of
looking at a medical chart, it’s like I’m looking at a spreadsheet” (personal
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communication, February 10, 2014). As Noor et al. (2012) noted, EMRs “won’t be
functional and physician-friendly until or unless physicians themselves have more input
into their design” (p. 17).
Apart from design and usability issues, there are more pressing problems with
EMRs. Vendors rushing to meet forced demand produced software packages that
“literally did not talk to one another” (Fontenot, 2013, p. 72), which is especially
problematic given that HITECH’s goals include standardized and interoperable EMRs,
meaning that “multiple clinics and hospitals should be able to access and update [records]
as patients seek treatment at multiple locations” (Eastaugh, 2013, p. 42). Most systems,
however, are not interoperable (Berger, 2013; Colpas, 2013; Eastaugh, 2013; Likourezos
et al., 2004; Rouf, Whittle, Lu, & Schwartz, 2006; Stark, 2010; Venkatraman, Bala,
Venkayesh, & Bates, 2008). DesRoches et al. (2013) found that the most difficult MU
objective to meet was data exchange among providers, noting that “more often than not
providers who do successfully adopt health IT systems find themselves on an information
island where they cannot exchange clinical data with other providers . . . given the
differing standards used by various developers” (p. 26).
To correct the interoperability problem, the HITECH Act created the Office of
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONCHIT), which oversees
EMR standardization and certification (Callahan, 2013). ONCHIT now requires
developers to use Health Level 7 international healthcare informatics interoperability
standards to ensure the electronic exchange of health information between computer
systems. In 2011, six ONCHIT-recognized Authorized Testing and Certification Bodies
began testing and certifying EMR systems; that year, only 309 of the nation’s 5,000
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hospitals were using certified EMRs (Piperburgh, 2011). That statistic means that many
early EMR adopters will spend considerable sums to bring their “systems into
compliance with the new standards issued by ONCHIT” (Stark, 2010, p. 27). Although
the U.S. Federal Government made $560 million available to state governments for
developing health information exchange capabilities, interoperability remains a problem
(Blumenthal, 2010).
In a follow up to Hillestad et al.’s (2005) report, Kellermann and Jones (2013)
addressed the issue of interoperability. Acknowledging that EMR-induced savings fell
short of projections, Kellermann and Jones blamed systems that function “less as ‘ATM
cards’ allowing a patient or provider to access needed health information anywhere at any
time, than as ‘frequent flyer cards’ intended to enforce brand loyalty to a particular health
care system” (p. 64). The authors maintained that the 2005 projections still were
attainable but would require redesigning EMR systems to ensure interoperability, as well
as usability. Hard-to-use systems have stymied adoption, but, curiously “vendors [still]
have not made usability a priority” (Kellermann & Jones, p. 65). Rather than hinder
providers, as Kellerman and Jones explained: EMRs should make documenting clinical
care easier:
User interfaces should be similar enough that a clinician working in one health
system can intuitively discern how to use another without extensive retraining.
For example, car makers offer a wide variety of makes and models, but important
controls are consistent enough to enable a customer to drive any vehicle off a
rental lot without instruction. Health IT should be no different. (p. 66)
Kellerman and Jones also noted that, contrary to predictions, EMRs “could be associated
with boosting charges” (p. 65).
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In addition to EMRs increasing healthcare costs, as Kellerman and Jones (2013)
acknowledged, there have been other unintended consequences. As described previously,
EMRs have affected both interpersonal relationships and communication patterns
between providers and patients. Although EMRs in emergency rooms are somewhat
new, as reviewed below, several important studies, all published since 2012, have
examined effects of EMRs in that setting.
Emergency Room-based Electronic Medical Records System Research
Several emergency room-based EMR studies have focused on quantifiable
changes in the frequency of certain processes or tasks, and time needed to complete those
tasks, after an EMR has been installed. Hill et al. (2013), for instance, observed 16
attending physicians, residents, and mid-level providers (e.g., nurse practitioners or
physician assistants) in an academic medical center for 30 hours, and recorded the time
that providers spent entering data into an EMR, interacting with patients, talking with
other providers, and viewing test results. Hill et al. found that providers, on average,
spent 44% of their time using the EMR and only 28% of their time engaged with patients,
whereas before EMRs, providers, especially physicians, spent more time on direct patient
care. This shift, as Bukata (2013) noted, “is the opposite of what should be happening . .
. . It is truly embarrassing to go to modern EDs and see 25 computer terminals with the
majority of staff pecking and staring into flat panel monitors” (para. 3).
Hill et al. (2013) found that face-to-face interactions with other providers
accounted for only 13% of a typical shift, mirroring what Person et al. (2013) found in
their emergency room-based ethnography: EMRs “impeded human-to-human
communication and contact” (p. 225), especially between physicians and nurses. Park et
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al. (2012) also found decreased contact between physicians and nurses in their 6-month
long naturalistic study of an academic medical center, observing physicians, residents,
and nurses before, during, and after an EMR was installed. Before the EMR, all of the
providers shared a common chart for each patient, and, as Park et al. explained:
Whenever ED doctors documented charts or put in orders, they had to go to the
nursing station to pick up the paper charts. As a result, the doctors naturally
interacted with nurses and spoke about the progress of their patients whenever the
charts were picked up. (p. 208)
After the EMR, physicians spent more time “in the charting room” where the computer
was installed and, consequently, “as the doctors’ work became more stationary, less time
was spent in the nursing stations and the patients’ rooms” (Park et al., p. 211).
Both Hill et al. (2013) and Park et al. (2012) found that EMRs reduced the time
that physicians spent interacting with nurses and with patients, but Park et al. also noted
an interesting paradox: Physicians relied on nurses for updates about patients rather than
attending to patients themselves. This outcome occurred because physicians who were
busy documenting patients’ medical cases on the EMR were “less likely to check patient
situations” (Park et al., p. 212) and, instead, they took cues from nurses regarding
patients’ conditions, but that required nurses coming to the charting room. Despite fewer
face-to-face interactions between physicians and nurses, patient updates were conveyed
during nurse-initiated discussions. Park et al. did not address, specifically, the frequency
or number of nurse-initiated updates but other studies, as noted earlier, have found that
nurses are hesitant to approach physicians with concerns (see Atwal & Caldwell, 2005;
Eggertson, 2012; Haddad, 2003; Johnson & Kring, 2012; Robinson et al. 2010;
Tschannen et al., 2011). Ultimately, as Park et al. suggested, the absence of bedside talk
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with physicians means that patients suffer because “the subtle pyscho-social aspects of
patient experiences during emergency visits” are not attended to (p. 212).
Park et al.’s (2012) study is important for several other reasons as well; namely, it
is the only observational “before, during, and after” study published to date about EMR
effects in an emergency room setting. Key findings from the study, in addition to those
discussed above, include a four- to fivefold increase in documentation time, an increased
number of incomplete patient charts, duplication of charting efforts, and increased
cognitive burdens for physicians tasked with remembering multiple patients’ data. In
using paper charts, Park et al. observed that physicians could complete their charting at
each patient’s bedside in 2–3 minutes before moving on to see the next patient, but after
EMRs were installed, documenting took up to 10 minutes per chart and had to be
completed in the charting room after several patients had been seen. The shift in charting
location, from the bedside to the charting room, introduced several unintended
consequences that affected adversely workflow. Park et al. described those changes and
the resulting workarounds:
When doctors––especially residents who collected information initially––had to
take care of multiple unfinished records at the same time, memorizing and
transferring all the information often became a challenge. To deal with this
situation, ED doctors developed a habit of using personal hand-written notes as
memory aids to carry bedside information back to the charting room for later
documentation. (p. 210)
This workaround, however, meant a duplication of effort: physicians first recorded
histories and findings by hand, and, later, they had to type the same information into the
EMR.
When compared with “quick, free hand-writing on paper charts,” Park et al.
(2012) found that data entry was tedious, because physicians had to “switch back and
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forth from clicking through many checkboxes and radio buttons, to typing in text boxes”
(p. 212). Given the time that data entry took, up to 10 minutes per chart, most physicians
delayed completing charts until after their shifts had ended, usually staying an hour or
more to finish documenting. Hence, another unintended consequence brought by the
EMR is unfinished patient charts. Sometimes, as Park et al. observed, charts would not
be completed until hours or even days after patients had been discharged, which could
“affect other nurses or attendings whose work was reliant on accessing timely
information documented in the EMR system” (p. 211). Furthermore, as Park et al.
observed, the particular EMR installed at the research site “does not specify which part of
the [medical] note is documented by whom” (p. 214), which made it difficult for
providers to address questions to the appropriate person. For these reasons, Park et al.
concluded that despite the EMR improving “legibility, readability, and searchability of
the medical record,” the EMR restrained “the inherent, collaborative, and social nature of
clinical work” (p. 215).
An important emergency room-based study that focused on emergency medicine
performance metrics “before” and “after” an EMR implementation was conducted by
Ward et al. (2013). The authors collected data over a 6-month period at an academic
medical center about five primary variables: length of patients’ stay, number of
diagnostic tests ordered, number of imaging tests conducted, medication administration,
and patients’ satisfaction. They established baseline measurements for these variables
over a 4-week period and then tracked changes after an EMR was installed. Ward et al.
found that “median length of stay increased for admitted and discharged patients, a
change that lasted approximately 8 weeks . . . [but] the interval from clinician to
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disposition showed a sustained increase and never returned to baseline” (p. 323).
“Clinician to disposition” refers to the time that it takes a physician to diagnose a patient
after an examination is conducted and tests results are evaluated. Although the number
of radiological studies (e.g., X-rays or CT scans) did not increase significantly during the
study period, other tests did increase; for example, as Ward et al. noted, “the number of
ECGs performed increased from 23.7 to 35.7 per 100 patients and laboratory testing with
results available increased from 225.4 to 374.5 tests per 100 patients” (p. 323). The
amount of medication administered also increased, as “medication administration per 100
patients nearly doubled after implementation, and this difference was sustained through
the entire study period” (Ward et al., p. 323). Patient satisfaction, presumably, because of
the increased length of stay, decreased during the first 2 months after the EMR was
installed, and although patient satisfaction rates improved over the subsequent 24 weeks,
they did not return to the baseline (Ward et al.). Ward et al. concluded that, for some
variables, postimplementation disruption ranged from 4 to 16 weeks, whereas other
variables (i.e., number of tests ordered and medications administered), never returned to
baseline.
The most pertinent finding from Ward et al.’s (2013) study was that “the observed
increases in laboratory testing, radiologic imaging, and ECG rates appeared to persist
throughout the follow-up period” (p. 326). This additional testing affects adversely
workflow, in that nurses and technicians assume more work with respect to administering
more tests, further slowing patients’ throughput times and adding to length of stay.
Increased testing also affects patients, whose hospital bills increase with each added test,
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procedure, or medication (Bukata, 2011; Kellermann & Jones, 2013). This unintended
consequence (i.e., more tests), according to Ward et al. is attributed to “order sets”:
Order sets are used by physician groups to increase adherence to local practice
patterns and to speed the ordering of complex sets of orders, and when formalized
as part of the electronic health record implementation they may also have
increased the use of radiologic tests, medications, and laboratory tests that would
not have been ordered in a paper-based system. Also, the electronic health record
may have enhanced the ability to order tests by simply clicking a button or
through the use of order sets. Although paper order sets were in use before the
electronic health record implementation at this particular facility, adoption of
electronic order entry has been shown to increase ordering of tests and
medications through order sets. (p. 326)	
  	
  
Ultimately, the EMR, as Ward et al. concluded, was associated with “diminished patient
experience,” “transient operational deficiencies,” and “sustained increases” (p. 327) in
tests.	
  
An additional finding from Ward et al.’s (2013) study, which, although not
discussed in detail, merits mentioning: “Unit clerk hours had decreased by 33% from
baseline by the end of the study period, which was a planned decrease because of the
increased administrative work that would be performed in the electronic health record by
clinicians” (p. 323). This finding means that a class of employees, unit clerks, who,
previously, had typed or processed orders for physicians, were being scaled back,
whereas “highly trained clinicians,” for whom “clerical activity” is “a waste of time and
expertise” (Foppe, 2014, p. 23), were tasked with data entry, in addition to seeing and
treating patients. Shifting data entry responsibilities to physicians has had unintended
and negative consequences. As discussed previously, Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al.
(2006) identified typing (necessary for data entry) as a main factor fueling physicians’
dissatisfaction with EMRs, and the result was that “quick-text features,” templates, and
shortcuts meant that patients’ charts “all started looking the same” (p. 129). These quick-

69

text shortcuts led study participants to bemoan “cookbook medicine,” whereby patients’
charts became almost indistinguishable (Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al., 2006, p.
129).
Callen et al. (2013) also noted that introducing an EMR into an emergency room
shifted the data entry workload from clerks to physicians, and that the results, largely,
were negative, as users “reported difficulty with assimilating the use of the technology
with their work, particularly in relation to the significant data entry demands required and
the time taken” (Callen et al., p. 136). More time spent on data entry, consequently,
meant that physicians spent less time engaged with patients. EMR-users also complained
that the system “was not user friendly or intuitive” and that the “electronic process
entailed more steps in the completion of previously simpler tasks and generally created
more work” (Callen et al., p. 138).
Callen et al.’s (2013) study, despite the aforementioned negative findings, did
report some advantages associated with the EMR. Their ethnographic study, conducted
in four Australian academic emergency departments, included observations, focus
groups, and interviews conducted with 97 physicians and nurses. Participants’
perceptions were recorded following introductions of an “ED information system” (akin
to an EMR) into their emergency departments. The system enabled almost immediate
access to patient data and, thereby, allowed all providers, including specialists and
consulting physicians, to see test results and findings, irrespective of who placed orders.
Study participants reported that the quick access “contributed to improved care
coordination, communication, clinical documentation, and the consultation process”
(Callen et al., p. 131). Prior to the EMR, requests for patients’ past medical histories
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often meant a 4-hour wait for the records department to find and deliver paper-based
charts. Faster access was valued because “past clinical information was considered
crucial, especially for those with extensive medical histories who are unable to
communicate their clinical history” (Callen et al., p. 136). The electronic records also
were advantageous over paper charts because the issue of illegible handwriting became
moot. Despite the advantages, however, Callen et al. cautioned that although EMRs can
“improve patient care delivery,” they also can “facilitate new kinds of clinical errors and
introduce additional costs” (p. 132). Ultimately, the ED information system led to
“increased task complexity, duplicate documentation, and computer issues related to
system usability” (Callen et al., p. 131).
In summary, research on EMRs in emergency rooms has revealed mixed results.
EMRs have shifted work patterns, increased documentation time, prolonged length of
stay, and upped the number of tests and medications ordered, but, in some instance,
EMRs also have improved access to patients’ medical records and led to better
coordination of care between multiple providers. Although the literature is inconclusive,
the risks seem to outweigh the benefits––even studies with positive findings cautioned
that EMRs introduced problems and unforeseen consequences (Callen et al., 2013; Ward
et al., 2013). As such, hospital administrators and emergency department directors have
been slow to adopt EMRs, with, as noted above, fewer than 2% of U.S. emergency rooms
having fully functioning EMRs in 2010 (Landman et al., 2010). Several factors that
contribute to that abysmal adoption rate are discussed in the following section.
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Factors Inhibiting Electronic Medical Records System Adoption and
Implementation in Emergency Rooms
Medicine never has been a rapid adopter of innovation (T. Cook, 2014). T. Cook
(2014), a physician and Emergency Medicine News reporter, noted that physicians “take
years to agree on anything, and older physicians seemingly do not want to change
anything” (p. 25). Although physicians often are cited for “not being comfortable with
new technology” (Noor et al., 2012, p. 17), resisting change is not unique to medical
professionals; in fact, most “people have a general tendency to stay with their current
circumstances . . . going with a new alternative is cognitively difficult, whereas a status
quo choice is mentally less laborious” (Nesterkin, 2013 p. 576). According to Lewin’s
(1947) tenets of change theory, inherently, people resist change unless they believe that
the way things are being done is problematic and that an improvement is available. Even
then, lasting change happens only if people are willing to learn the new process, feel safe
in the learning environment, and regard the change as compatible with their other tasks
and behaviors. Similarly, diffusion of innovations theory suggests that, for a diffusion to
be successful, people must be aware of an innovation, convinced that adoption of it is
beneficial, and then use it (see Rogers, 2003). Feedback is crucial to communicate that
an innovation is an improvement, especially if it is to be adopted permanently. EMRs,
however, seem doomed, according to both change theory and diffusion of innovation
theory, as few medical providers find the old way of charting problematic, few find
EMRs to be an improvement, EMR training programs are flawed, and feedback about
EMR use, largely, is negative (see sections below). As a physician blogged, “So, we
have replaced a very clear and simple ordering system which functioned well for years
with this complex mess that few can navigate and no one understands and no one can
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explain why” (cited in Armstrong, 2014, para. 14). In most organizational change
research, according to Nesterkin (2013, change is perceived as a loss that generates
“negative emotions and dispositions” (p. 576).
Innovations commonly are rejected when “talk” and “use” are at odds, according
to Leonardi (2009). Studying employee users of a new software program, Leonardi noted
that “they did not resist organizational change because it was forced on them by
management . . . but because misalignments existed between the information they
received about it in their social and material interactions” (p. 435). Simply put, the
software was rejected because it did not perform as employees expected; hence, what
they were told and what they experienced firsthand were at odds. Similarly, Huryk
(2010) found that nurses viewed EMRs more negatively when preadoption accolades
about their timesaving abilities did not materialize. In a related study, Vishwanath (2009)
found that positively framed messages about an innovation, especially messages
emphasizing performance and usability, created higher expectations among would-be
users who later rejected the innovation. Thus, when a product’s attributes are overstated,
users are disappointed more easily.
According to Vishwanath, Brodsky, and Shala (2009), ease of use, ultimately,
predicts sustained engagement with any innovation; moreover, Ilie, van Slyke, Parikh,
and Courney (2009) found that usability, more than any other variable, influenced
physicians’ decisions not to use an EMR. When given the choice, overwhelmingly,
hospital-based physicians chose paper charts to document patient care, because paper
charts were more accessible; EMRs impeded quick access to patients’ medical files with
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multiple log-on screens and drop-down menus. Even if the EMR had more up-to-date
patient information than paper charts, using it required too much effort (Ilie et al., 2009).
Regardless of physician specialty or practice environment, it appears that EMRs
have long been thought to affect negatively the physician–patient relationship (Ajami &
Bagheri-Tadi, 2013; Likourezos et al., 2004; Nambisan et al., 2013; Pipersburgh, 2011;
Tomes, 2010). As noted above, EMR use has decreased the amount of interpersonal
contact between providers and patients (Montague & Asan, 2013; Rouf et al., 2007), and
physicians’ examination room use of diagnostic support tools, a common EMR feature,
erodes patients’ confidence (Arkes et al., 2007; Hall, 2014). Citing an AMA report, Hall
(2014) urged physicians to “do as much data entry outside the exam room as possible”
(para. 9). Huryk (2010) found that many nurses, even when computers-on-wheels were
available for use, opted to leave them outside patients’ rooms because of perceptions that
the technology interfered with the nurse–patient relationship. Taken together, these
studies paint an abysmal picture of EMRs. Although there are some positive studies
supporting EMR use, largely, they are lost amid negatively framed reports that decry the
effects EMRs.
Studies, such as those just described, frame EMRs’ benefits and drawbacks in
terms of workflow changes and provider–patient relationships, but studies also have
examined EMRs with respect to how end users (i.e., physicians and nurses) communicate
about them, which is important, because how providers talk about EMRs influence how
EMRs are received, utilized, and evaluated. The following sections explore research on
message framing, including both physician- and nurse-focused studies, and highlight the
implications of that research for EMR adoption and implementation.

	
  

74

Framing physicians’ discourse about electronic medical records systems. As
noted above, research has shown that how people talk about an innovation influences its
adoption (Leonardi, 2009; Vishwanath, 2009). In particular, message framing, whether
within the confines of conversation or appearing in mediated form, is an important
variable with respect to physicians’ adoption of and satisfaction with EMRs. Message
frames influence perceptions about an innovation by becoming “the lens through which
the innovation is evaluated (and) experienced” (Vishwanath, 2009, p. 197). Thus, when
the results from EMR studies published in medical journals are framed negatively (see
Fernando, Georgiou, Holdgate, & Westbrook, 2009; Feufel, Robinson, & Shalin, 2011;
Francis, 2013; Georgiou et al., 2013; Lee, Kuo, & Goodwin, 2013; Makam et al., 2013;
Ward et al., 2013), readers/users also are more likely to rate their experiences with EMRs
as negative. Moreover, in their literature review, Nambisan et al. (2013) found an
“extreme culture of apprehension,” “distrust,” and “negativity” (p. 6) surrounding EMRs.
Thus, both negatively framed journal articles and physicians’ negative communication
about EMRs fuel this culture of apprehension and distrust of EMRs. For example, a
leading emergency medicine scholar described EMRs succinctly as “inventions of the
devil” (R. Bukata, personal communication, February 3, 2014). Furthermore, physicians’
blogs routinely recount tales of “doctors around the nation resigning over being forced to
use EMRs” (Armstrong, 2014 para. 4). In a blog post titled “My EMR/CPOE
Rant/Tantrum,” Armstrong (2014) relayed the following story that was told to him:
Started a job I was happy with. 4 months into the job, the hospital changed to
EMR. Within hours, the waiting times went from 45 minutes on average to 4
hours on average. We spent 80% of our time doing computer entry . . . . I handed
in my resignation that afternoon. (para. 5)
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Merriman (2014) posted similar sentiments, saying, “The degradation of our profession
started with the advent of EMR” (para. 1). These messages, which circulate in journals,
on message boards, and throughout emergency rooms, perpetuate physicians’
apprehension and dissatisfaction with EMRs.
EMR condemnations also have appeared in the popular press. Columnist Charles
Krauthammer (2014) wrote that EMRs “are so absurdly complex, detailed, tiresome, and
wasteful that if the doctor is to fill them out, he can barely talk to and examine the
patient, let alone make eye contact” (para. 13). Krauthammer concluded that physiciansturned-clerks were “ridiculously wasting” (para. 14) their skills. Taken together with the
negatively framed medical literature and physician blogs, such popular press musings
contribute to the negative perceptions of EMRs.
Noor et al. (2012) conceded that the most “important step towards implementing
adoption is to change the psyche of a user from ‘reluctant’ to ‘willing’” (p. 19). Leonardi
(2009) suggested that changing how people talk about new technology will change their
opinions about adoption, and, therefore, administrators/managers should encourage
positive discourse. Peer support and organizational culture also have been shown to
affect EMR satisfaction positively (Top & Gider, 2011). For example, as Huryk (2010)
noted, “If nurses work in a computer positive atmosphere, then the nurses were more
positive about technology” (p. 610). However, as the brief review of nurse-focused EMR
studies below reveals, nurses’ and physicians’ discourse about EMRs has been quite
different.
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Framing nurses’ discourse about electronic medical records systems.
Compared to physicians, nurses, generally, have been more accepting of and enthusiastic
about EMRs (Lærum, Karlsen, & Faxvagg, 2004; Likourezos et al., 2004, Otieno,
Toyama, Asonuma, Kanai-Pak, & Naitoh, 2007; Weiner et al., 1999). Studies have found
that more nurses than physicians describe EMRs as easy to use (Lærum, Karleson, &
Faxvaag, 2004), and that EMRs help them to complete documentation tasks more quickly
(Likourezos et al., 2004). Nurses also have reported that EMRs made their jobs easier
(Huryk 2010; Top & Gider, 2011), whereas most physician-focused studies have found
otherwise (see above). In her meta-analysis of nurse-focused EMR studies, Huryk (2010)
reported that, overwhelmingly, nurses’ attitudes toward EMRs were positive. Negative
attitudes, although few, were associated with poor or slow EMR performance, lack of
computer experience, and age (with older nurses being less satisfied with EMRs).
Despite concerns that EMRs can dehumanize healthcare, perceptions of enhanced
patient safety have strongly influenced positive attitudes toward EMRs (Huryk, 2010).
Top and Gider (2011) found that such positive attitudes were driven by perceptions of
enhanced communication with physicians and improved legibility of patient information,
both of which are tied closely to patients’ safety. Considering that nurses’ misreading of
physicians’ handwriting is a reason that is cited commonly for medication errors (Hewitt,
2010), improving legibility, clearly, is an EMR attribute that nurses value.
In addition to negatively framed messages and discourse, there are two other
factors inhibiting both EMR adoption and implementation processes in emergency
rooms: reactance stemming from forced adoptions and training-induced cognitive
dissonance. The following sections examine these issues more closely.
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Forced adoption and reactance. User participation in the EMR adoption
process merits discussion, as several studies have noted the importance of physicians’
involvement in the decision-making process (Brooks & Grotz, 2010; Farley et al., 2013;
Francis, 2013). Too often, however, management adopts a particular system without
consulting end users; as Tomes (2010) found, “clinicians are not brought into the
selection process until it’s too late” (p. 97). Nambisan et al. (2013) also noted that
physicians’ involvement is “crucial for the success of EMR adoption” (p. 4). Nurses also
are much more likely to embrace an EMR system if they had some role in selecting or
modifying it (Estrada & Dunn, 2012; Huryk, 2010). However, as Nambisan et al. noted,
“‘Adoption by fiat’ has been found to be quite effective” (p. 5). Recounting the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs EMR adoption process, Nambisan et al. described “top
leadership” implementing a system in which “physicians and other staff members were
required to comply as system employees” (p. 5). That example notwithstanding,
“emboldened resistance” (Nambisan et al., p. 8) usually is the response to top-down
decrees.
Forced organizational change (e.g., EMR adoption) undermines employees’
freedom, arouses negative affective states, and activates their reactance (Nesterkin, 2013.
Reactance is the motivational state following a threat to or elimination of freedom that
aims to restore that freedom and/or to subvert and resist the endorsed behavior (Brehm,
1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Reactance, typically, triggers hostile and aggressive
feelings (Brehm, 1966), and it is based on the premise that individuals value choice, as
evidenced by the need for autonomy (e.g., self-determination), and that threats to
autonomy invite resistance (Nesterkin, 2013. Psychological reactance theory (Brehm,
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1966), therefore, proposes relationships among freedoms, threats, reactance, and
(attempted) restoration of freedoms. Although direct restoration involves performing the
forbidden act, freedom may be restored, symbolically, by increasing liking for the
forbidden choice, by disparaging the source of the threat, or by exercising other freedoms
to maximize feelings of control (Quick, Shen, & Dillard, 2013). Studies have reported
similar reactions to EMRs, with Lærum et al. (2005) noting that “many physicians find
order entry is a task better performed by others, reducing their motivation for learning (or
engaging with) the new system” (p. 9).
Ongoing or frequent organizational change can evoke what Nesterkin (2013
described as “multiplicative reactance.” Lærum et al. (2005) noted that most EMR
adoptions involve multistage processes, occurring over extended periods of time and
involving hybrid electronic-paper systems that are error prone and that heighten users’
dissatisfaction. Although EMR adoptions involve multiple phases, modifications, and
updates, users face ongoing change that, according to Nesterkin, can leave employees
with layers of negative emotions and cognitions. Individuals’ dissatisfaction, multiplied
amid ongoing cycles of change, can have ramifications for the organization as a whole.
As Nesterkin explained:
The lingering layer of pervasive negative affect accumulated after each freedominfringing change, is, via reactance, likely to affect an organization negatively in
various ways . . . by increasing employee turnover, increasing deviant and
organization undermining behaviors, decreasing job dissatisfaction and job
commitment, increasing job stress, and weakening work climate and
organizational identity. (p. 586)
Reducing reactance is desirable, but difficult. As Quick et al. (2013) noted, the
presence of choice can diminish reactance. As explained previously, however, few
physicians and nurses have input in EMR selection and adoption, which led Nesterkin

	
  

79

(2013 to recommend “implementing and sustaining a socially supportive (i.e.,
interpersonally just) organizational environment, led by an emotionally intelligent
management staff” (p. 589). There is no research to date, however, about whether or how
reactance can be reduced in an emergency room setting.
There is another affective state that affects perceptions of EMRs by providers and,
especially, physicians: dissonance. As described next, dissonance often occurs during
EMR training; mainly, when trainers are nurses and trainees are physicians. Because this
hierarchical role reversal is typical of most EMR training sessions, it warrants further
review.
Training, role reversal/conflict, and dissonance. Key factors impeding
successful EMR implementation include poor or inadequate training, and traininginduced role reversal or conflict. Organizational change, inevitably, requires learning
new behaviors, and EMR adoption marks a major shift in how emergency care is
delivered, and, thus, requires providers to learn a radically different approach to
documenting care. Inasmuch as many EMR adoptions are forced, the requisite learning
that follows also is forced. Nesterkin (2013) wrote that forced learning amid change
invites reactance, because “learning requires a certain degree of deviation from one’s
existing preconceived ideas which is often seen as inherently undermining one’s
autonomy” (p. 573). As noted previously, the organizational environment can ameliorate
members’ reactance to change, and Top and Gider (2011) attributed positive learning
environments and peer support to nurses’ ready adoption of EMRs, but they also noted
that half of users received no training whatsoever.
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Several studies have found that training programs are inadequate, particularly
those provided by EMR vendors (Brooks & Grotz, 2010; Granlien & Hertzum, 2012);
however, peer-to-peer training also is problematic. Brooks and Grotz (2010) found that
because physicians “do not want to spend time learning new computer systems” (p. 81),
nurses and technicians are trained and then tasked with training physicians. However, as
T. Cook (2014) noted, “Watching an older surgeon yell at the poor guy trying to teach
him how to use the EMR is not pretty” (p. 25). Physicians’ lack of knowledge about how
to use an EMR often leads them “to view themselves as novices . . . [and] the
juxtaposition between concurrent roles of (medical) ‘expert’ and ‘novice’ creates a high
degree of cognitive dissonance” (Nambisan et al., 2013, p. 4). Reversing the hierarchical
structure of the physician–nurse or physician–technician relationship during training also
increases physicians’ cognitive dissonance; Nambisan et al. (2013) noted role-reversal
induced dissonance with respect to “physician resistance toward learning and sharing
knowledge” (p. 5). Barley (1986) also noted reversal tensions between physicians and
technicians who were tasked with training them to use new equipment. Robinson,
Purves, and Wilson (2003) cautioned that this type of cognitive dissonance can “lead to
emotional tension and avoidance of learning” (p. 432) as physicians grapple with new
technology.
The concept of “cognitive dissonance,” as noted above, features prominently in
many EMR studies and warrants further consideration. Festinger (1957), in proposing
cognitive dissonance theory, defined dissonance as “the existence of nonfitting relations
among cognitions,” with cognitions understood as “any knowledge, opinion, or belief
about the environment, about oneself, or about one’s behavior” (p. 3). According to
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dissonance theory, there is pressure to achieve or maintain consonance (i.e., balance),
such that people’s thoughts are in agreement (e.g., “I’m concerned about my health” and
“I quit smoking” are consonant, whereas “I’m concerned about my health” and “I smoke
two packs of cigarettes a day” are dissonant; Festinger, 1957; Trenholm, 1989).
Changing either cognitions or actions reduces dissonance, but attitudes are changed more
easily than are behaviors. Adding consonant elements also can reduce the magnitude of
dissonance, because “their addition functions to reduce the proportion of dissonant
relations among the perceiver’s cognitions” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 473).
Dissonance is “undoubtedly an everyday condition” (Festinger, 1957, p. 5), but it is
experienced, especially, in three major circumstances: where a choice must be made
between alternatives, in forced compliance situations that require persons to act in ways
that contradict their existing beliefs, and in certain information-processing situations
(Trenholm, 1989). With regard to the last situation, exposure to counterattitudinal
information triggers dissonance that can be alleviated by selective avoidance. Because
choice seldom is the source of dissonance for EMR users (see above), forced compliance
is of greater interest, because dissonance is “an inevitable consequence of forced
compliance” (Festinger, 1957, p. 89). To reduce that type of dissonance, “either the
attitude must be changed or the behavior denied or rationalized” (Trenholm, 1989, p.
101). Indeed, people offered large incentives for performing counterattitudinal behavior
actually experience less dissonance and attitude change, because acting to receive an
award justifies people’s counterattitudinal behavior; in contrast, people with minimal
incentive or justification for engaging in counterattitudinal behavior, typically, reduce
dissonance by believing in their actions (Trenholm, 1989).
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Physicians who are forced to use EMRs in spite of their beliefs that EMRs
undermine patient care and/or who submit to training that elicits role conflict/reversal
may deal with the resulting cognitive dissonance in several ways. Looking more broadly
at primary care physicians and learning-related dissonance, Robinson et al. (2003)
suggested that physicians respond to dissonance by dismissing the issue/message as being
unimportant or wrong, by dismissing the messenger as unimportant, by seeking
corroboration from others in support of the new information, by negotiating with the
messenger, and/or by accepting the message and changing their beliefs. As Festinger
(1957) noted, however, “There is no guarantee that the person will be able to reduce or
remove the dissonance” (p. 6).
To review, several factors inhibit EMR adoption and implementation. Resisting
change, especially change having to do with new technologies, is common. New
technologies—specifically, those offering no or few perceptible advantages in terms of
how things already are done—commonly are rejected. Many healthcare providers do not
regard EMRs as an improvement over paper charts; thus, their utility is questioned.
Misalignments between “talk” and “use” also mar providers’ perceptions: typically,
healthcare administrators “oversell” EMRs and, thereby, create false expectations, and,
later, disappointment for users who are underwhelmed by the performance of EMRs.
Resulting discourse impacts the climate surrounding EMRs. As described previously,
that discourse, largely, is negative. Forced adoption leads to reactance, which emboldens
providers’ resistance to EMRs. Role-reversal during training also triggers a negative
affective state, dissonance, which further impedes providers’ acceptance of EMRs in their
emergency rooms. However, given that legislation requires hospitals and emergency
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rooms begin using EMRs in 2015 or face fines, it is important to examine ramifications
of not only the adoption and implementation process but also consequences of EMR use,
with the next section reviewing research on those known consequences.
Consequences of Using Electronic Medical Records Systems
The culture of negativity surrounding EMRs is fueled by studies identifying their
postimplementation shortcomings; regarding EMR use in emergency rooms, predictably,
there are few positive findings. Likourezos et al. (2004) reported that both emergency
room nurses and physicians believed that EMRs would not improve quality of care and
would not decrease costs, waiting times, or emergency room overcrowding, and these
claims have been substantiated in recent studies (Fernando et al., 2009; Feufel al., 2011;
Georgiou et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2013). Emergency medicine scholars have long
predicted that EMRs would contribute to overcrowding (Flomenbaum, 2014), and
increasing numbers of emergency room visits will compound that problem, with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015a) reporting that emergency room visits
increased from 117 million in 2007 to more than 136 million in 2011, and that trend is
continuing. Although one of the aims of the Affordable Care Act is decreasing
emergency room use, its Medicaid expansion actually increased visits in Oregon by 40%
(Flomenbaum, 2014).
Emergency rooms now account for 68% of all hospital admissions, and EMRs
make processing those patients an inefficient and time-consuming chore, which
contributes to overcrowding (Augustine & Holstein, 2014). Physicians using EMRs also
have bemoaned decreases in their productivity (Likourezos et al., 2004), but more recent
studies reveal mixed results. Brunk (2013) cited a 30% postimplementation decrease, but
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Henning, Horng, and Sanchez (2013) found no evidence that EMRs reduced productivity
permanently. Additional studies have shown that EMR use increases the amount of time
that physicians spend at the computer (Hill et al. 2013), the number of laboratory and
imaging tests ordered, and overall healthcare costs (Georgiou et al., 2013; Ward et al.,
2013). Although EMR use is correlated with shortened hospital stays (.11 days or 2.6
hours), 30-day rehospitalization has increased by less than .19% (Lee et al., 2013).
Results also are mixed for EMRs’ effects on medical errors: Georgiou et al.
(2013) found that EMRs decreased medication errors and adverse drug events, but Ward
et al. (2013) found that EMRs increased errors. Other studies also have linked EMRs
with increases in medication errors (Koppel et al., 2005), causing one in five medication
errors in children (Walsh et al., 2006), and worsening patient outcomes, including
contributing to higher mortality rates (Han et al., 2005). However, in ambulatory care
settings, EMRs have had no measurable impact on quality of care (Linder, Ma, Bates,
Middleton, & Stafford, 2007) and a minimal effect on medication-error interception rates,
but no overall effect on injuries caused by errors (Walsh et al., 2008).
EMR use, thus, has not led to highly anticipated improvements in patient care.
Expected decreases in medication errors, for example, are not substantiated by EMR
studies, nor are projected healthcare savings being realized. In fact, healthcare costs
actually are increasing, as are the economic consequences of EMR use, as discussed next.
Economic consequences. EMRs are expensive to buy, install, and maintain;
consequently, EMRs diminish profits for hospitals and, simultaneously, increase costs for
patients. According to Bukata (2011), the average hospital’s IT expenses increased 80%
during EMR installation, and higher costs are sustained for years afterward, with most of
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those costs, eventually, passed on to patients and their insurance providers. Increased
laboratory and radiology tests, which are a function of predetermined order sets (see
Ward et al., 2013), also mean increased costs for patients (Bukata, 2011). In fact,
hospitals using EMRs between 2006 and 2010 reported a 47% increase in Medicare
billing (Bukata, 2014). That increase, in part, likely occurred because of both increased
testing and better charge capture associated with EMRs, the recording, and later billing,
of the full range of medical services that are performed by providers, medical supplies
used, and medications administered during patients’ examinations (Bukata, 2014). EMRs
improve charge capture in many ways; for example, scanners are used to track barcoded
supplies, such as bandages and cotton swabs, which are tallied and notated in CPT codes
that hospital billers use when filing insurance claims. By comparison, most papercharting systems do not require that providers record each bandage or cotton swab used,
and the resulting “lost charges,” therefore, contribute to hospitals’ overhead.	
  	
  Increased
charge capture, however, does not offset the high cost of maintaining and updating EMRs
(Bukata, 2011). Across the board, studies have found that the most common economic
consequences linked with EMRs are higher healthcare costs and increased documentation
time (Fernando et al., 2009; Georgiou et al., 2013; Hoffmann, 2009; Kellermann & Jones,
2013; Ward et al., 2013).
Increased documentation time merits discussion because it has economic
consequences for both hospitals and individual physicians. Makam et al. (2013) found
that EMRs, unquestionably, are associated with longer documentation times, and Hill et
al. (2013), as noted previously, reported that the average emergency medicine physician
spent nearly half of a typical shift documenting care and only 28% in direct contact with
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patients. Hill et al. counted an average of 4,000 mouse clicks per physician per shift,
which accounted for 66 minutes of unbillable time; had that time been spent with
patients, an estimated $153,000 in revenue could have been generated for the hospital in a
single year. Bukata (2009) noted that every minute a physician spends documenting
rather than seeing new patients represents $18 lost in opportunity costs for the hospital.
From physicians’ perspectives, increased documentation time often means unpaid
time spent documenting care after physicians’ shifts have ended (most emergency
medicine physicians are independent contractors who are paid hourly, and few hospitals
pay physician-contractors overtime). Because hospital “metrics” (time-based
measurements of providers’ activity) require fast care and short lengths of stay,
physicians, for whom violating metrics is a fireable offense (“Metric Madness,” 2014),
often delay documentation until their shifts are over and they no longer are seeing new
patients (Leep, 2014; Park et al., 2012). As noted above, delayed documentation inhibits
access to health information for providers who have assumed care for admitted patients
(Park et al., 2012). Furthermore, although hospitals and nonhospital-based physicians
who demonstrate meaningful use of an EMR qualify for tens of thousands of dollars in
HITECH-mandated incentive pay, emergency medicine physicians, along with
radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists, are exempt from incentive pay (Bukata,
2011). Thus, individual emergency medicine physicians using EMRs assume more work,
for which they are not paid, whereas hospitals receive financial incentives for adopting
EMRs. These financial incentives, however, do not offset costs that hospitals assume
when it comes to installing and maintaining EMRs.
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Some hospitals have attempted to regain “lost revenue” by hiring scribes, who,
according to a physician-scholar, are “a work around for systems that fundamentally do
not value physician time” (R. Bukata, personal communication, February 3, 2014). In
theory, scribes follow physicians and document patient care, and, thereby, leave
physicians more time to spend with patients. The practice, however, has been criticized;
as Krauthammer (2014) noted, scribes are “a whole new category of previously
unnecessary health workers” (para. 11) that has been created by EMR mandates.
However, physicians-turned-clerks are not efficient either, as Krauthammer admitted (see
above).
Scribes have the potential to alleviate 80% of the documentation burden that falls
currently to emergency medicine physicians, inasmuch as they can document patients’
medical histories and findings (Foppe, 2014), but who should pay for scribes is a
contentious issue (Bukata, 2009). Scribes make between $10 and $20 an hour, and
although most emergency medicine physicians believe that hospitals should pay for
scribes, the cost usually is split evenly between hospitals and physicians (Bukata, 2009).
An equitable arrangement, as proposed by Bukata (2009), has physicians paying 20% of
scribes’ salaries, but a fair “splitting of costs rarely occurs” (para. 16). Regardless,
increasingly, scribes are a common solution for physicians seeking to circumvent
inefficient EMRs.
Despite the economic consequences associated with EMRs, the HITECH Act
means that EMRs will become even more commonplace, and, as such, there are other
consequences to consider; namely, the emotional toll that they extract from both
providers and patients. As Genes (2014) pointed out, “Hospital administration doesn’t
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care too much about doctors’ . . . frustrations. They care about the bottom line: are
patients happy?” (p. 47). As discussed below, however, recent studies (including Ward et
al., 2013) have suggested that patients are not satisfied and that EMRs are partly to
blame.
Growing patient dissatisfaction. Patients’ satisfaction scores are affected
negatively by EMRs, albeit indirectly. As noted above, EMRs decrease providers’
productivity and, thereby, increase patients’ wait times and lengths of stay—two factors
that are tied directly to patients’ satisfaction (Ward et al., 2013). Hospital administrators
are fixated on patients’ satisfaction, “despite the fact that high patient scores are
correlated with worse outcomes and higher costs” (Drake, 2014, para. 4). Many hospitals
have instituted “throughput times” to reduce long waits, with administrators monitoring
carefully how long it takes to get from “door to doc,” and penalizing slow physicians
(“Metric Madness,” 2014; Rosenstein, 2012; Vance, 2010). That practice, however, fails
to account for overcrowding and bottlenecks that begin in triage (Eisenberg et al., 2006).
Matters are further compounded by EMRs that have doubled the average length of stay
(“Electronic Health Record Blamed,” 2012). Long before patients see emergency
medicine physicians, slow triage and registration processes violate patients’ expectations
of timely service; when they finally do see a physician, “they’re angry and hungry after
waiting for hours” (Eisenberg et al., 2006, p. 202). Primary care physicians add to
overcrowding by dumping their patients after hours and on weekends; rather than taking
call, these physicians tell their patients to go the emergency room, but they seldom
explain that patients will have long waits in unpleasant and crowded conditions
(Eisenberg et al., 2006). Unfortunately, EMRs, which are supposed to make accessing
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patients’ histories easier, are slow or incompatible, rendering those EMRs largely inept
(Likourezos et al., 2004; Rouf et al., 2006).
In addition to increased wait times and lengths of stay, EMRs have affected how
information is solicited from patients in such a way as to almost eliminate their illness
stories altogether. For patients, “Stories are a way of making sense of an uncertain or
chaotic set of circumstances and . . . enable control in the face of disorder” (Sharf et al.,
2011, p. 38). As described previously, patients who tell their stories have better health
outcomes (Pennebaker, 2000), but most patients’ stories are interrupted by providers
(Thompson et al., 2011). Truncated storytelling increases patients’ uncertainty and
feelings of helplessness, thwarting their identity and arousal management goals. As
noted previously, Eisenberg et al. (2005) found that most interrupted stories were reduced
to “actionable lists” (p. 390) that prioritized physicians’ goals. Technical lists “fail to
capture the whole meaning” (Real & Poole, 2011, p. 110), but EMRs limit the amount of
free text that is available for generating either lists or stories. As a physician explained,
“The nurses can type some limited narratives, but the doctors usually just check boxes”
(P. Viccellio, personal communication, February 10, 2014). Resulting medical records,
largely, lack context, and are comprised of “a bunch of numbers, lab results, and tests, but
there’s no story” (L. Garranger, personal communication, January 10, 2014). A Canadian
physician whose government does not mandate EMR use commented, “We don’t have
EMRs because patients are not check boxes; they’re people with stories, and I have to tell
those stories to the consultings and admittings during handoff of care” (K. Milne,
personal communication, February 10, 2014).
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Although patients are affected negatively by EMRs, so, too, are providers, as has
been well documented in the sections above, but beyond the frustrations associated with
hard-to-use EMRs and economic penalties that they bring (namely, uncompensated afterhours work), EMRs contribute to providers feeling dissatisfied with their careers. As
discussed in the next section, career dissatisfaction can lead to burnout, which has
important consequences for both providers and patients.
Providers’ dissatisfaction and burnout. Many of the studies noted above posit
that physicians are dissatisfied with EMRs, but that dissatisfaction also can extend
beyond EMRs and affect physicians’ overall career satisfaction. During a typical 12-hour
shift, emergency medicine physicians manage interactions with dozens of patients, their
respective family members, nurses, and consulting specialists, along with EMRs,
laboratory, and radiology reports. Moreover, physicians are “under the proverbial gun to
deliver faster and faster care and earn a score of 5 on Press-Ganey patient satisfaction
surveys, in the face of staff cuts and dwindling resources” (Vance, 2010, p. 144). During
a routine shift, emergency room physicians are interrupted up to 42 times an hour,
whereas other specialists are interrupted only four times (Burley, 2011). Hence,
compared to other providers, emergency medicine physicians experience higher
dissatisfaction and communication overload (Spencer, Coiera, & Logan, 2004).
Irrespective of EMRs’ contributions, career dissatisfaction among physicians is
well documented. Analyzing cross-sectional data from a national survey of 6,590
physicians, Leigh, Kravitz, Schembri, Samuals, and Mobley (2002) found that only two
in five physicians were highly satisfied with their work, whereas 18% were very
dissatisfied; 13% of emergency medicine physicians reported being dissatisfied. Leigh,
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Tancredi, and Kravitz (2009) ranked emergency medicine 31st of 42 specialties with
respect to providers’ overall career satisfaction. Although 44% had been very satisfied
with their jobs in 2002, that number had fallen to 31% just 7 years later (Leigh et al.,
2009). In the wake of costly EMR implementations and declining Medicaid/Medicare
reimbursements, hospitals’ cost-cutting measures often include reduced physician
staffing and increased reliance on midlevel providers. Physicians oversee the work of
those midlevel providers and, simultaneously, care for their patients, which increase
physicians’ workload and malpractice risk. Along with documentation encumbered by
EMRs, these factors contribute to physicians’ dissatisfaction with their careers (Vance,
2010). As Kuhn, Goldberg, and Compton (2009) noted, overcrowding and increasing
numbers of chronically ill patients compound physicians’ dissatisfaction; in emergency
rooms, “high volumes, high acuity, and high complexity of disease are combined and that
results in the need for rapid decision making in a highly ambiguous environment” (p.
107), which is associated with high anxiety and concern for bad outcomes (e.g., fear that
a patient may die or that a malpractice lawsuit may be filed), both of which are predictors
of burnout.
Maslach and Jackson (1981) defined burnout as “a syndrome of emotional
exhaustion and cynicism” (p. 99), coupled with the tendency to evaluate oneself
negatively, particularly with regard to work. Burnout affects the quality of job
performance and is a factor in job turnover, absenteeism, and low morale; burnout also is
correlated with self-reported personal distress, physical exhaustion, insomnia, drug and
alcohol use, and marital and family problems (Maslach & Jackson). Physician burnout is
“a pervasive health care problem characterized by a loss of emotional, mental, and
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physical energy due to continued job-related stress” (Fortney, Luchterhand, Zakletskaia,
Zgierska, & Rakel, 2013, p. 417). About half of all physicians suffer burnout, with
emergency medicine and primary care providers having the highest rates (Gregoire,
2013). In fact, burnout is more common among physicians than any other professional
(Fortney et al., 2013).
Physician burnout usually is measured along two dimensions: emotional
exhaustion and depersonalization (i.e., feeling callous toward others, especially patients).
Several studies have identified emotional exhaustion in large numbers of physicians who
are dissatisfied with the percentage of night shifts that they are required to work (Rehder,
Cheifetz, Markovitz, & Turner, 2014); lack of resources, compensation, and workload
(Opoku & Apenteng, 2014); and a lack of “clinical autonomy, combined with the
challenges of emergency medicine practice and life stress” (Kuhn et al., 2008, p. 110).
Keller and Koenig (1989) found that 60% of emergency medicine physicians scored high
in emotional exhaustion, 79% scored moderate to high in depersonalization, and 84% had
a low sense of personal accomplishment.
Similar findings were reported by Goldberg et al. (1996), but Kuhn et al. (2008)
found that only 32% of emergency medicine physicians exhibited emotional exhaustion.
According to Fortney et al. (2013), up to 60% of physicians experience burnout at some
point during their careers, and 30–40% experience burnout at any given time. Burnout
also has even been reported in 34% of medical students (A. F. Cook, Arora, Rasinki,
Curlin, & Yoon, 2014).
Both providers and patients suffer when physicians experience burnout. Mood
disorder and suicide are “considerable occupational hazards for physicians” (Fortney et
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al., 213, p. 417), with 300 physicians estimated to commit suicide each year, making it
the nation’s second most suicidal occupation (Drake, 2014). Fortney et al. (2013) noted
that the problem of burnout is compounded by physicians’ tendency to give suboptimal
attention to self-wellness, as well as affected by a medical culture that “places little
emphasis on clinician well-being” (p. 419). Burnout also affects many aspects of patient
care, resulting in increased medical errors, decreased quality of healthcare, lower patient
satisfaction, and poor treatment adherence (Fortney et al., 2013). Moreover, burnout is
associated with reduced provider empathy (West, Drybye, Slaon, & Shanafelt, 2009).
The connections among patient dissatisfaction, poor treatment compliance, and lack of
provider empathy also have been linked to physicians’ communication skills (SmithDupre & Beck, 1996; Cegala et al., 1996; O’Hair, 1989), with several studies showing
that patient dissatisfaction stemming from inadequate communication by physicians is
correlated with poor medical outcomes and higher malpractice claims (Coran et al., 2010;
Roberts & Aruguete, 1999; Roter & Hall, 2011).
Patients are more satisfied when they believe that their physicians care about them
and communicate accordingly (Ruiz-Moral, 2009), and burnout makes caring
communication less likely between physicians and their patients. Fortney et al. (2013)
cautioned that burnout is poised to become an even bigger problem, as the Affordable
Care Act means that more people will be seeking care in a market with fewer and fewer
providers, and that increased workload, coupled with diminishing reimbursement, may
increase alienation and/or depersonalization among physicians (Fortney et al., p. 412).
In summary, numerous studies have linked EMRs with negative outcomes,
ranging from emergency room overcrowding to decreased provider productivity. EMRs
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have been shown to increase the number of tests ordered, which, in turn, increase
healthcare costs. Several studies have found that providers spend more time using EMRs
than engaging with patients; providers also spend more time completing electronic
documentation, often after their shifts are over. Documentation, in these instances,
amounts to uncompensated work, and, furthermore, incomplete medical charts can
impact negatively patient care. Hospitals looking to boost productivity during
postimplementation slowdowns have turned to scribes to offset providers’ inefficient
charting, but paying scribes is a contentious subject. The well-documented productivity
slump that follows EMR rollout contributes to patients’ wait times and lengths of stay,
and, consequently, patients are less satisfied with their emergency room experiences.
Moreover, EMRs shape the information-gathering portion of the medical examination by
constraining patients’ sharing of their stories, with providers ticking off checkboxes with
little space available for free text that might, otherwise, be used to record patients’
stories. EMRs also contribute to providers feeling dissatisfied with their jobs, which can
lead to burnout.
Conclusion
As demonstrated in this review of literature, provider–patient relationships and
interactions are affected substantially by technology, and those effects are especially
problematic in emergency room settings, where time constraints, limited resources, and a
lack of established provider–patient relationships compound efforts in an already difficult
communication environment. Electronic medical records systems, which were instituted
to improve healthcare delivery, have been associated, instead with increases in medical
errors and spiraling healthcare costs. Patients and providers alike suffer important
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consequences when these systems are installed, which, in addition to higher costs,
include longer wait times and lengths of stay for patients, and, for providers, increased
workload, uncompensated work, and burnout. A significant amount of research about
electronic medical records systems, as demonstrated, has focused on quantifiable
changes––the number of tests ordered, patients’ wait times, the time that it takes to
complete medical charts, and how much time providers spend with computers versus
with patients. These studies have yielded important findings and, thereby, contribute to
better understanding of workflow and communication patterns in emergency rooms. This
study extends that work by investigating how electronic medical records systems affect
providers’ day-to-day experiences, how their interactions with coworkers and patients are
altered, and how emergency room culture, itself, is changed by the presence of this
technology. This study also focuses on unintended consequences that electronic medical
records bring to emergency medicine practice; some consequences have been identified,
as this review of literature documents, but there may be additional unintended
consequences that have yet to be documented. Preliminary research, as explained in the
next chapter, helped to hone my focus, the theoretical perspective that was employed to
better understand those unintended consequences, and the resulting research questions
that were posed for this study.
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CHAPTER THREE: PRELIMINARY RESEARCH,
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This chapter presents the preliminary research that inspired both this study and the
selection of theoretical frameworks that shaped the research agenda. This chapter begins
with a description of an ethnographic research project about emergency room culture that
I undertook when I was enrolled in a qualitative research methods seminar, because the
iterative process of that observational fieldwork, subsequent reflection, and analysis gave
rise to the suppositions, deductions, and questions that were advanced in this study. A
review of theoretical concepts follows, starting with a description of conceptual linkages
that were drawn from Goffman’s (1959) notions of “facework” and “performance,”
which shaped the preliminary research and, ultimately, led to the theoretical frameworks
that were employed for this study. Those selected frameworks, including structuration
theory and its derivatives, then are explained. Finally, the research questions addressed
in this study are presented.
Preliminary Research
In 2013, I studied emergency room culture as part of the assignments for an
ethnography seminar in which I was enrolled, with some of the findings from that study
becoming the foundation for this dissertation. Ethnography is a “written representation
of a culture” that is derived from fieldwork, which is the “investment of a researcher over
a lengthy period of time (typically unspecified) and consists mostly of ongoing
interaction with the human targets of study on their home ground” (Van Maanen, 2011, p.
1, 2). Before my fieldwork could commence, however, the seminar instructor cautioned
that I would need several things: access to a research site and the site’s inhabitants, a
reliable gatekeeper with whom I could coordinate my research efforts, and approval from
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the University’s institutional review board (IRB). With these considerations in mind, I
chose to study emergency room culture because, in addition to a number of other reasons,
my husband, an emergency medicine physician, could arrange access to a research site.
Furthermore, he could facilitate introductions to key informants, including other
physicians, nurses, midlevel providers, and technicians.
My husband (hereafter, “Dr. C”2) has been practicing emergency medicine for the
entirety of our relationship––nearly 20 years. During those 2 decades, I spent a lot of
time in the emergency rooms in which he worked, and I became an astute observer of
emergency room customs and interactions, which proved invaluable as I completed the
seminar assignment. I studied emergency room culture for another reason as well: Long
before embarking on a doctorate in health communication, I trained to be an emergency
medical technician, volunteered on an ambulance crew, and, for a while, majored in
premedicine as an undergraduate student. Although, certainly, Dr. C shaped both my
experience with and perspective of emergency medicine practice, I was interested in
emergency room dynamics long before we met. Thus, with the prodding of my
instructor, and with Dr. C’s assistance, I began my ethnographic fieldwork in September
2013.
Fieldwork commenced after receiving an IRB exemption, which was granted, in
part, because I proposed limiting my observations to emergency room workers. Focusing
on providers and excluding patients from the study was done for several reasons. First,
an emergency room’s “culture” is constructed by occupants who inhabit that space every
day insofar as culture is “understood as residing largely within a sphere of social
2

The names and/or initials of all emergency room workers used in this report are
pseudonyms.
98

relationships . . . [and] refers to the meanings and practices produced, sustained, and
altered through interaction” (Van Maanen, 2011, p. 155). Furthermore, culture is
“expressed (or constituted) only by the actions and words of its members [emphasis
added]” (Van Maanen, 2011, p. 3). Patients, for whom emergency room visits largely are
atypical or infrequent, certainly engage with and may, at times, impact an emergency
room’s culture, but that culture is crafted and reproduced by regular and daily interactions
of healthcare providers. Second, as noted in chapter two, health communication research
often has privileged the patient’s perspective. By studying up (Nader, 1972), and,
thereby, focusing on providers, a more complete understanding is possible of social,
cultural, and communication processes that characterize medical practice (Chapman &
Berggren, 2005). Lastly, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) restricts nonessential access to “individually identifiable health information”
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2015, para. 1), and, thereby, protects
patients’ privacy.
Because I was studying the culture of providers working in emergency rooms, I
had little reason to interact with patients, for whom my presence during a medical
interview or examination, arguably, may have constituted a violation of HIPAAmandated patient privacy. Additionally, patients’ medical information is protected data,
and access to those data, even tangentially, may have required full institutional oversight
of my research. As such, eliminating patients’ perspectives meant that IRB approval was
obtained more quickly and easily (see Appendix A). Nonetheless, because, almost
certainly, I would overhear or witness portions of provider–patient interactions during the
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course of my fieldwork, I signed HIPAA agreements attesting to my willingness to
uphold patient confidentiality (see Appendix B).
Three hours a week for 14 weeks, I observed and interviewed physicians, nurses,
midlevel providers, unit secretaries, and technicians in three emergency rooms (see
chapter four about research methods that were employed, both in the preliminary research
and in the dissertation study). One of the emergency rooms that I studied was in rural
Mississippi (hereafter “Hospital M”3), and the remaining emergency rooms were in
southern Louisiana: one was in a major metropolitan area (hereafter, “Hospital T”) and
the other was near several densely populated suburbs (hereafter, “Hospital H”).
I studied three emergency rooms for several reasons. First, I was curious about
regional differences that might manifest in the everyday practices of emergency room
workers in rural, suburban, and urban hospitals. Second, Dr. C, my gatekeeper, worked
in several emergency rooms and, therefore, could facilitate my access to multiple
research sites, which allowed me to observe differences in three practice environments
(in addition to locale, each site varied in terms of annual patient volume; daily patient
census; average patient acuity, as gauged by either admission or discharge from the
emergency room; and how its providers documented patient care). Additionally, I took
inspiration from Wolcott (2010), who conducted a similarly structured multisite analysis
of beer garden culture in Africa. Reflecting on that research, Wolcott commented:
I could not make one particular beer garden the center of my attention. That
would have been impossible under the circumstances. (I did not speak either of
the local indigenous languages, and my repeated presence would have raised
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The names of the hospitals described in this study are withheld to further protect the
identities of informants whose working affiliations, if known, could compromise their
confidentiality.
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untoward suspicions among people already superstitious) . . . . I felt I should look
at the whole set of practices surrounding the beer gardens. (p. 73)
Although I could have studied just one emergency room without raising suspicions, I
chose to look “at the whole set of practices surrounding” (Wolcott, p. 73) emergency
rooms. This tactic allowed me to draw comparisons between emergency rooms that,
eventually, would lead to the issues addressed in this dissertation study (see the
discussion later about research questions).
During the completion of the preliminary fieldwork in 2013, I found that there
were many shared behaviors, customs, and interactions across the three research sites, but
I also observed one stark difference: the presence of an electronic medical records system
(EMR) appeared to change the type, duration, and frequency of talk among providers.
Because EMRs, subsequently, became the focus of this dissertation study, I limit my
discussion here to pertinent observations about EMRs that I detailed in my fieldnotes and
described in the seminar assignment.
To that end, my fieldwork began on September 8, 2013 at Hospital M in
Mississippi, which still was using paper charts to document patient care but was prepping
for an eventual adoption of an EMR. I showed up, wearing surgical scrubs, and hoped
that I would blend into the scene. Dr. C escorted me to a small desk near the nurses’
station, and then he grabbed a patient chart and headed into an examination room. The
head nurse introduced me to the staff as “Dr. C’s wife,” and for those who had not been
told beforehand about my research, I explained that I was studying emergency room
culture. I sat there, alone, scribbling in my notebook and craning to hear the nurses
conversing at the far end of the counter. I interpreted their hushed tones and physical
distance as conveying suspicion of me; after all, I was a stranger in their space. After
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about 30 minutes, most of the nurses resumed what, eventually, I would categorize as
“normal chitchat.” I often heard such chitchat in the ensuing weeks and it revolved, more
or less, around five topics: what they had eaten, or were going to eat, for lunch; whose
spouse had behaved poorly; whose children were mischievous, gifted, or ungrateful; who
had seen a good movie recently; and who had weekend plans. Regularly, the talk
centered on food. On my first day at Hospital M, I recorded conversations about who had
eaten breakfast, who brought the cookies that were in the breakroom, who ate the last of
the potato chips, which brand of smoked almonds was best, whether the cafeteria’s tilapia
was “too fishy,” and how much they liked that Dr. C brought them Goldfish crackers
every day (the Goldfish crackers were my idea).
The frequency of talk at Hospital M did not strike me as unusual or excessive,
until I visited Hospital H’s emergency room the following week. The nurses working in
Hospital H were different from those at Hospital M in that they said very little; indeed,
the emergency room at Hospital H was comparatively quiet. On my first day at Hospital
H, I observed nurses sitting at computers, clicking checkboxes, and, occasionally, cursing
to themselves. Other nurses pushed portable EMRs from room to room. At times, I
could hear alarm bells dinging, phones ringing, and fluorescent lights buzzing. The
“silence” was punctuated with occasional mumbles by nurses about “damned
computers.” I did not, however, hear much in the way of conversation. There were
utterances from several nurses along the lines of “I need a wheelchair for 64” or “We got
a knee lac [laceration] in 2,” but there was no chitchat. In fact, there was no indication
that the people working side-by-side even knew each other. Information exchange, at
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Patients, typically, are referred to by their chief complaints and/or room numbers instead
of by their names.
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least as it seemed to me on that day, was the primary focus of any and all discussion.
Later, after reviewing several sets of fieldnotes taken at Hospital M in Mississippi, I
surmised that the nurses there talked a lot and that most of their conversations were
marked by an intimate knowledge of one another––their talk revolved around relational
growth with each other just as much as it involved information exchange about patients.
The only thing different between the emergency rooms at Hospital M and Hospital H was
the presence of an EMR.
I learned that Hospital H had begun the first phase of its EMR adoption process
earlier that year. On April 1, nurses began using EMRs to document both the care that
they provided and medications that they administered to patients. A nurse, J,
commented, “The irony of introducing EMRs on April Fool’s Day was not lost on us.” I
discovered that the physicians still used paper charts for documenting their findings, but
they had just begun learning how to use a computerized physician order entry system
(CPOE) the month before, with full conversion to computer-based charting scheduled to
take place that November. The sheer number of computers in the space, was, as I wrote
in my notebook, “overwhelming, with just one half of the emergency room boasting eight
computers along an L-shaped counter with several mobile computers-on-wheels
(COWs).” Six more computers lined the trauma bay, and each designated physician
workstation had at least two computers. Dozens of paper notices were hung all over the
emergency room noting temporary workarounds for the various EMR glitches that the
information technology (IT) department was trying to resolve. I noted within minutes of
arriving that “the hum of the computers is very loud.” Their humming, as well as the
nurses’ grumblings about them, seemed constant. Over the course of 3 hours, I logged 14
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specific events or conversations about the computers: approximately a third of my
handwritten notes were about the EMR.
During my first visit to Hospital H, I had two conversations with providers about
the new EMR. A physician assistant, N, told me that he believed the EMR meant that all
of the providers (nurses, midlevel providers, and physicians) spent less time engaging
with patients at their bedside. Interestingly, before our conversation, I had written in my
fieldnotes that “the physician assistant, N, has been at the computer the whole time I’ve
been here, 45 minutes and he doesn’t appear to be seeing patients; he’s just manning the
computer.” N also complained that the system was slow, difficult to use, and had
affected negatively both patient length of stay and satisfaction. As he remarked:
We spend most of our time with the damn COWs, not with the patients. The
programs aren’t very good and they are not user-friendly, plus patients don’t like
them. They see us sitting here playing with computers when we should be in the
exam room, doing our jobs. I just want to throw the damn thing through the wall.
Later, following a shift change, I recorded in my journal that “a nurse just spent
over 10 minutes trying to get her COW up and running.” The COW crashed and she
began again. The nurse, J, told me that the EMR often kept her “chained” to a desk––
even when using the COW, its bulky configuration made maneuvering it into
examination rooms difficult. J further explained that because the new EMR was “hard to
use,” it was responsible for “gumming up the works when the ER [was] busy,” by
reducing drastically “patient throughput” (the time that a patient spends in the emergency
room from initial presentation to diagnosis and discharge). As J elaborated:
They force us to code everything as we go, which slows things way down. On
paper charts, we could write the meds down and go back and chart everything else
later. Especially if we were busy, we might have 20 or 30 patients; that way, we
could see them, treat them, and get them out. Now, we have to chart everything
right as it happens, and things just get backed up.
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Another nurse, A, chimed in, “Especially during codes, administration wants you to scan
medicines right then and there. We should be focused on patients during codes, not
trying to get a scanner and computer to work! It takes up way too much time.” One of
my final observations that day, as written in my journal, was, “So far, this nurse [J] has
been here an hour and she has been engaged with the computer the whole time, save for 2
minutes to administer some meds.” J repeatedly “bitched about the EMR,” as I noted,
although she did “fix her hair in the monitor’s reflection.”
I visited Hospital H in suburban Louisiana several more times in the coming
weeks and recorded similar observations each time. Later, reflecting on those early
notes, I saw that the computer’s presence dictated not just how work was done but also
where it was done. Paper charts, like those used at Hospital M, freed providers to sit
anywhere while documenting, even at the patient’s bedside, but the EMRs used at
Hospital H assigned specific, inflexible spaces where tasks had to be performed. As I
wrote in my journal, “Nurses cluster along the counter at eight stations, midlevels have a
designated space on the other side of the counter, whereas physicians are housed in a
small workstation with two computers (one for charts and another for viewing X-rays).”
Even the mobile COWs, largely, were stationary, because many nurses found them to be
too heavy and cumbersome to push around. Each charting task and its dedicated EMR
physically isolated workers, making face-to-face communication either less frequent or
more difficult to initiate (particularly for nurses and physicians, who were not within
visual sight of each other).
My first visit to Hospital T took place on October 5, 2103. Hospital T had
installed its EMR 3 years earlier; consequently, providers, more or less, were accustomed
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to using it. Nonetheless, on that afternoon, several nurses were struggling to update a
chart for a patient who had left against medical advice and whose departure was unseen
by the emergency room staff. The chart could not be closed without a “discharge time”;
however, because the patient had not been discharged officially, and no time was
recorded, the EMR registered the chart as “incomplete.” Incomplete charts invite
sanctions from administrators, leading providers to be keen to complete charts for all of
their patients. At 5:10 p.m., a nurse sitting at the EMR complained, “We still don’t know
what time 2 left, do we?” At 5:15 p.m., she beckoned, again, “Does anyone know what
time 2 left earlier?” When no reply was forthcoming, she asked, “Am I the only one here
concerned about getting this right?” Someone suggested that she make up a time, “Just
type in 4:00 p.m.,” to which she responded, “It won’t let me type any new text and I can’t
get it to go to the discharge page.” Several nurses then argued about how to resolve the
issue. They took turns at the EMR, clicking various tabs and boxes as they attempted to
access the appropriate page. An hour later, they still had not resolved the problem and IT
had not returned their phone calls. These nurses did not engage in patient care whilst the
incomplete chart issue lingered.
Dr. C, and several of the other nurses, did see patients, but as I recorded in my
fieldnotes, “despite seeing patients, they mostly sit at the computer typing up orders or
test results.” For instance, I noted that Dr. C went into a patient room at 4:55 p.m., and 2
minutes later, he was back at the EMR. He commented, “The cases aren’t medically
difficult, just challenging to document with the computer system and how long it takes
everything [tests and medication orders] to get put in.” “Putting in orders” often created
“logjams,” as a nurse, MJ, explained, “We have to wait for the doc to put in the orders.
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We’re not allowed to put in orders for them, so we have to sit here and wait. If they type
slow, or can’t find the order set, well, we wait some more.”
Whereas paper charts, like those used at Hospital M, guaranteed some face-toface communication between physicians and nurses regarding patients’ vital signs,
diagnoses, and treatment plans, I noticed that the EMR at Hospital T reduced such
interactions to a series of one-way instant messages. As described by MJ, nurses sit at
computer terminals “waiting for orders to pop up on the screen” and then they “go do
what the computer says, such as ‘Give room 6 some pain meds’ or ‘Discharge room 8.’”
Most of the orders, as I noted on that day, were carried out without any discussion
between nurses and the attending physician. MJ conceded that the lack of discussion,
sometimes, could be problematic, but she emphasized that if nurses had questions or
concerns, they “usually” approached the physician. “All in all,” she concluded, “I still
prefer the computers to the paper charts. It was hard learning to use them though, but it’s
better than the old way. We don’t have to figure out the doc’s handwriting.”
When I went back to Hospital M a few weeks later, I asked nurses about some of
the potential benefits that EMRs might bring to their emergency room, such as not having
to decipher physicians’ handwriting. A few nurses conceded that EMRs might be
advantageous in that respect, but a nurse practitioner, D, who worked both at Hospital M
and another hospital that already was using EMRs said, “Yeah, maybe, but the computers
destroy personal communication. I’ve been at this other emergency room about 6
months, and I don’t know if any of the other nurses have children. We just don’t talk.”
The other nurses appeared to mull this statement over, and one of the younger nurses
asked if the EMRs increased the workload. D responded, “Well, everything takes so
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much longer, so, yeah, it is more work, plus it impacts the patients, too. We don’t make
eye contact because we’re looking at a computer screen.”
Over the next few weeks, I rotated among the three hospitals and saw several
scenes unfold consistently. At Hospital M, nurses and physicians shared a common
paper chart and frequently discussed, face-to-face, patients’ treatment plans and
diagnoses. When they were not busy with patients, nurses talked and joked a lot. At
Hospitals H and T, however, nurses waited for physicians to enter orders into the EMR
and then carried out whatever appeared in the electronic record, from administering
medications to taking vital signs to prepping patients for examinations. In comparison to
Hospital M, physicians at Hospitals H and T, routinely, were isolated physically in
separate spaces (in offices or workstations that were away from nurses’ stations), and,
accordingly, there appeared to be fewer face-to-face discussions between them and the
nurses. By this point in time, I had begun observing physicians other than Dr. C; hence, I
was certain that the practice habits that I recorded in my fieldnotes were not idiosyncratic
of just one physician or one group of nurses. When not engaged in direct patient care,
nurses at Hospitals H and T talked, but not nearly as much as did nurses at Hospital M,
and the type of talk differed as well. Providers at Hospitals H and T complained a lot
about the EMRs, asked one another for help using certain EMR features, and expressed
profound dissatisfaction with both the EMRs and their working environments. Their
“non-EMR talk,” such as the chitchat that I recorded at Hospital M, eventually, turned to
spouses, children, and food, but those topics were discussed with less frequency than
their talk about the EMR.
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In late October 2013, I developed a questionnaire (see Appendix C), which, I
hoped, would document statistically significant correlations among EMR use,
communication patterns, and providers’ career satisfaction at each of the three hospitals. I
believed that the questionnaire, in addition to observations and interviews, would further
validate what I suspected: that the EMRs caused lasting changes to the type and
frequency of interactions among providers. I posted the questionnaire online and
distributed paper copies at each of the three hospitals, but the response rate was abysmal,
as only 11 providers completed the questionnaire. I also posted the questionnaire to an
online physician-only message board to look for similar trends in other hospitals (but
only nine physicians completed the questionnaire). Overall, although the findings lacked
statistical significance, nonetheless, they were interesting, as there was evidence that I
had intuited the situation, more or less, astutely. Across the board, respondents reported a
preference for paper charts, and for those using EMRs, they reported that they were
dissatisfied with the EMRs and talked less with coworkers about everyday topics (e.g.,
movies, current events, and family). Most of the respondents who reported using EMRs
also reported feeling less satisfied with their careers, and many had considered quitting,
retiring, or changing careers. Again, the questionnaire findings were not statistically
significant given the small sample sizes and lack of statistical power but the results
confirmed my hunch––in some instances and in certain practice environments, EMRs
appeared to erode aspects of face-to-face communication and contributed to providers’
dissatisfaction with their working environments and with their careers.
I completed the seminar assignment in December 2013, and that report was
recognized as a Top Student Paper by the Ethnography Division at the 2014 National
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Communication Association convention. I subsequently decided to continue my
fieldwork at Hospital H and to document its ongoing EMR adoption process for my
dissertation. As I conducted research on EMRs for what would become my literature
review (see chapter 2), I realized that there had been no long-term observational studies
conducted about an EMR adoption that were set in a community hospital-based
emergency room, such as the project that I was proposing. The study that was most
similar to the one that I was planning was conducted by Park et al. (2012), which
documented changes in workflow patterns before, during, and after an EMR adoption,
but that study was set in an academic medical center. Furthermore, all of the emergency
room-specific EMR studies that I reviewed, largely, were numerical, researcher-driven
studies, and virtually all of them also were set in academic medical centers. As noted in
chapter one, although there are more than 5,000 community hospitals in the United
States, less than 10% (approximately 400) are designated academic medical centers
(Dunn & Becker, 2013), yet few studies had been conducted in community hospitals,
limiting the generalizability of their findings to a minority of U.S. hospital settings. The
study that I was proposing, therefore, could address a clear gap in the scholarly literature
by documenting EMR-induced changes over time in a community hospital’s emergency
room, with the findings, potentially, being applicable to a greater number of emergency
room settings instead of being limited to a small subset of emergency rooms in academic
medical centers.
To review, I began preliminary research for this study as an academic exercise in
ethnographic research methods. In observing interactions among providers in three
emergency room settings, I deduced that EMRs affected communication among and
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between nurses, midlevel providers, and physicians; specifically, EMRs reduced face-toface interactions, influenced the nature of interactions (i.e., restricted opportunities for
chitchat and, consequently, some aspects of relational development among providers),
and narrowed the range of topics discussed. Moreover, EMRs seemed to contribute to
providers feeling dissatisfied with their careers and with their working environments.
Results from the questionnaire that I created and distributed, albeit of limited statistical
significance, suggested that my deductions were, more or less, astute. Taken together
with fieldnotes collected over a 3-month period and information that was gleaned from
multiple interviews that I conducted with providers, the questionnaire’s findings were
significant enough to justify additional inquiry into EMR-induced changes in emergency
room communication patterns. Given that Hospital H was partway through an adoption
process and that its physicians just were beginning to use components of an EMR, I saw
an opportunity to document EMR-induced changes over time. Additionally, I could
conduct research in a community hospital-based emergency room, which is a setting that,
largely, has been underrepresented in both medical and communication literature. I
needed, however, a theoretical lens to frame my continuing research.
In writing the initial ethnography on emergency room culture, many of my
findings were framed using Goffman’s (1959) conceptions of “facework” and
“performance.” These concepts are described here because they shaped both early and
ongoing research at Hospital H, and because Goffman’s work influenced Giddens (1984),
whose structuration theory frames much of this study (see the discussion later about
theoretical frameworks).
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Facework, according to Goffman (1959), is a specific kind of social performance
that is designed to engineer or maintain a certain impression during an interaction.
Goffman (1959) proposed that all people are social performers who “act [when in] one
another’s immediate physical presence” (p. 254). For example, a physician is expected to
be sympathetic and, similarly, a patient should be ill, such that each person performs
accordingly during the medical examination. These types of performances are infused
with participants’ assessments about the interaction, one another, and themselves
(Goffman, 1967). Face, then, becomes “the positive social value a person effectively
claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular [social]
contact” (Goffman, 1967, p. 5). Put more simply, face is the conception of “self” as seen
by one’s self and by others; hence, face, essentially, is identity, and people are
“concerned with maintaining the impression that they are living up to the many standards
by which they . . . are judged” (Goffman, 1959, p. 251).
Face concerns play out, largely, in frontstage scenarios, when social performers
are engaged in expected, and role-appropriate, performances. Frontstage demands can set
the stage for “profane” performances, which Goffman (1961) attributed to “the obligatory
world of social roles” (p. 152) requiring an actor to continually monitor and alter his or
her performance to fit the “understanding and expectations of the society in which it is
presented” (Goffman, 1959, p. 35). Too many frontstage or profane performances, often,
can “set the stage for a kind of information game––a potentially infinite cycle of
concealment, discovery, false revelation, and rediscovery” (Goffman, 1959, p. 8).
In contrast, when backstage, an actor may slip into a “sacred” performance,
which, largely, unfolds in an unseen way by any frontstage audience; stripped of social
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obligations, an individual can be “warm, spontaneous, and touched by humor” (Goffman,
1961, p. 152). Backstage, the performer no longer is preoccupied “with the amoral issue
of engineering a convincing impression” (Goffman, 1959, p. 251). Members of
“performance” teams, such as physicians and nurses, who stage performances for their
patients, can express and enjoy familiarity with one another “only when the audience
[patient] is not present,” (Goffman, 1959, p. 128). Goffman (1959) described the
distinction further:
Since back regions are typically out of bounds to members of the audience, it is
here that we may expect reciprocal familiarity to determine the tone of social
intercourse. Similarly, it is the front region that we may expect a tone of
formality to prevail. (p. 128)
Backstage, team members’ interactions, typically, are marked by reciprocal name-calling,
jokes, profanity, and “elaborate griping” (Goffman, 1959, p. 128). During my fieldwork,
I witnessed many frontstage and backstage performances, both profane and sacred;
hence, Goffman’s work gave me a useful vocabulary for describing social interactions
that I saw play out in those emergency rooms.
Goffman’s (1959, 1961) work was invaluable when analyzing the cultural
practices that I observed in emergency rooms, especially those having to do with
frontstage and backstage performances, but many of his theoretical propositions
addressed individuals’ social roles and performances as opposed to the organizations in
which those performances were carried out. A system-wide study of Hospital H’s
emergency room practices during and after its EMR adoption, in my estimation, required
a theoretical lens that could encompass the organization, as well as its individual
performers. Although Goffman (1959, 1961) did address performance teams, his work
did not dwell on the social institutions or structures that housed performance teams.
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Accordingly, a member of my dissertation committee suggested that, instead, I consider
using structuration theory to frame my study. Proposed by Giddens (1984), structuration
theory extended many of Goffman’s propositions, thus making it, from my perspective,
both familiar and accessible. Structuration theory and its offshoots, all of which inform
this study, are detailed in the next section.
Theoretical Frameworks Used to Analyze Effects of Electronic Medical Records
Systems in Emergency Rooms
Theory ensures that health communication research is “founded in established
principles generated by systematic and cumulative knowledge,” but health
communication research “often lacks theoretical underpinnings” (Nazione, Pace, Russell,
& Silk, 2013, p. 225). For example, only 38% of studies published in the Journal of
Health Communication between 2000 and 2009 were theory-driven (Nazione et al. 2013).
According to Nazione et al. (2013), most of the studies published in that journal
described situations, interventions, and outcomes, but few studies explained or predicted
phenomena. The present study, therefore, is grounded in theory such that it may not only
describe but also explain and, potentially, predict ramifications of EMR adoptions in
community hospital-based emergency room settings. Moreover, the study’s theoretical
frameworks extend its usefulness by contributing to cumulative knowledge about EMR
adoptions, technology-induced structural changes, and structurational divergence in
healthcare contexts. Because several concepts central to structuration theory were
extensions of Goffman’s (1959) work, and because structuration theory explained
system-wide social reproduction, I chose it to frame my analysis. Described next are the
central tenets of structuration theory, followed by a review of three derivatives that also
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shaped the study: adaptive structuration theory, the modified adaptive structuration
model, and structurational divergence theory.
Structuration Theory
Structuration theory is an ontological theory of social organization (Jones,
Orlikowski, & Munir, 2004) that has been employed to explain many social contexts but
has not been used often in empirical health communication research (Heracleous, 2013).
Giddens (1984) developed structuration theory to explain how social systems are both
produced and reproduced during social interaction. “The basic domain of study,”
according to Giddens, “is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence
of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time” (p. 2).
Social practices, according to Giddens (1984), are carried out by actors whose
performances are “positioned” (p. 83). With respect to social practices and
performances, Giddens shared many of Goffman’s (1959) views, although the two
scholars often used different terms. For example, rather than using “role,” as had
Goffman (1959, 1961, 1967), Giddens (1984) used “position” to describe expectations
and limits that are imposed on social actors. As Giddens wrote:
Social positions are constructed structurally as specific intersections of
signification, domination and legitimation which relates to the typification of
agents [actors]. A social position involves the specification of a definite
“identity” within a network of social relations, that identity, however, being a
“category” to which a particular range of normative sanctions is relevant. (p. 83)
In other words, social positions allow and, in many instances, require actors to “assign
every act/utterance a signification, judge its appropriateness, and ascertain [their] place in
a domination hierarchy” (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013, p. 95). Nicotera, Mahon, and Zhao
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(2010) described ways in which social positions and the signification/legitimation/
domination process can affect providers’ communication in a medical setting:
The physician writes a medication order. The nurse looks at the prescription and
questions, “50 mg?” setting off a too-familiar conflicted interaction. Imagine that
the nurse’s meaning system centers on safety checks and the physician’s on an
authority/compliance nurse-physician relationship. For the nurse, that simple act
(“50 mg?”) signifies a safety check, is legitimate because nurses must be
constantly vigilant for medication errors, and presumes an egalitarian relationship
in which all caregivers are equally responsible for safety (nondominant). For the
physician, the act signifies disrespect for authority, is not legitimate because a
nurse must simply comply with physician orders, and presumes a
dominant/submissive relationship. (p. 365)
The dramaturgical metaphors that Goffman and Giddens used to describe social actors,
positions, and interactions are similar, but in terms of frontstage and backstage
performances, Giddens (1984) deviated from Goffman (1959).
Both theorists acknowledged that there were frontstage and backstage regions that
constrained social practices, but Giddens (1984) took exception to Goffman’s (1959)
treatment of the backstage. Giddens wrote that Goffman’s (1959) stance suggested that
the “frontal aspects of [performance] are inherently inauthentic, and that whatever is real
or substantial is hidden behind” (Giddens, p. 124). Furthermore, as Giddens wrote:
If agents [social actors] are only players on a stage, hiding their true selves behind
the masks they assume for the occasion, the social world would indeed be largely
empty of substance. . . . The sustaining of ontological security could not be
achieved if front regions were no more than façades. (p. 125)
Rather, as Giddens proposed:
The backstage may very well be “on stage” so far as the ordinary routines of
social life, and the ordinary proprieties, go. For these sorts of occasion do involve
fixed performances for audiences, though there is no necessary implication that
those in the back regions are able to relax the usual courtesies of tact or “repair.”
(pp. 127–128)
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Instead of housing “reciprocal familiarity” (Goffman, 1959, p. 128), such as joking and
name-calling, Giddens’s notion of backstage does not involve necessarily “a ‘private
sphere’,” especially when subordinates “move among their inferiors” (p. 127). In some
social settings, backstages can be “zones within which agents recover forms of autonomy
which are compromised or treated in frontal contexts” (Giddens, p. 127), but most
“front/back differentiations [occur ordinarily] in circumstances of marked imbalances of
power” (p. 128).
Giddens’s (1984) theoretical propositions extend beyond the dramaturgical model
that he and Goffman (1959) used frequently to explain social interaction; structuration
theory, as proposed by Giddens, encompasses much more than social practices,
positioned performances, and frontstage/backstage region differentiations. The theory
describes social organization in terms of structure, agency, rules, resources, systems,
routines, and unintended consequences.
Structuration theory hinges on two key concepts, structure and agency, which
should be understood as a mutually constitutive duality (Giddens, 1984). Structure is
defined as both the medium and outcome of social reproduction, and it consists of the
“rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems [and]
exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and is
instantiated in action” (Giddens, 1984, p. 377). Agency is defined as human activity.
Structure has primacy over agency because structure, simultaneously, enables and
constrains action (Giddens). Structures can be thought of as being similar to
organizations or institutions that, themselves, simultaneously, are produced and
reproduced by human conduct. For example, a hospital may house and constrain
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interactions among physicians, nurses, patients, and tools; at the same time, the very
presence of these people and things in the hospital give it purpose, and, thereby,
simultaneously, maintain and reproduce it.
Some of the terminology and concepts of structuration theory warrant further
elaboration. Structure, in addition to being the medium and outcome of social
reproduction, assumes primacy over action because it encompasses “rules and resources
[that are] implicated in the production and reproduction of social systems” (Giddens,
1984, p. 169). Rules are norms that govern social life. Resources are either allocative,
material goods or objects with which agents work, such as stethoscopes, tongue
depressors, and EMRs, or authoritative, intangible abilities and skills that agents use
when they exhibit transformative power over people through either persuasion or
coercion. Many factors, such as gender, age, and/or group affiliation, can influence
authoritative resources; for example, I observed that male physicians working at Hospital
H influenced the behavior of female nurses far more than female nurses influenced male
physicians. Things and power, according to Giddens (1984), however, only become
allocative and authoritative resources through human agency.
Systems are the observable, reproduced relations between agents (i.e., people or
social actors), and they are organized as regular social practices or behaviors. Social
interaction refers to “encounters in which individuals engage in situations of co-presence,
and hence to social integration as a level of the ‘building blocks’ whereby the institutions
of social systems are articulated” (Giddens, 1984, p. 89). Giddens (1984) defined
structuration as the “structuring of social relations across time and space” (p. 376).
Studying day-to-day life, situated in specific interactions and routines that are time–space
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dependent, is integral for analyzing reproduced practices. Settings and chronology allow
agents “to sustain meaning in communicative acts,” and daily routines are “essential for
curbing sources of unconscious tension” and they influence “the contours of institutional
reproduction” (Giddens, p. xxv).
Routines, however, can be disrupted during critical situations, “circumstances of
radical disjuncture of unpredictable kind which affects substantial numbers of individuals
(or) situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of institutionalized routines”
(Giddens, 1984, p. 61). Hospital H, as I observed during my preliminary research, was
experiencing a “critical situation” during its EMR implementation, which is an additional
factor that makes structuration theory an attractive lens for viewing and analyzing that
change.
Agent, agency, and power also are important concepts to consider in relation to
the current study. People are knowledgeable agents who understand a lot when it comes
to conditions and consequences of their social interactions. They also do what they do
for particular reasons, although, as Giddens (1984) cautioned, “we have to separate out
the question of what an agent does from what is intended” (p. 14). Agency, as defined
previously, is action, but it also hinges on an agent’s capability “to ‘make a difference’ to
a preexisting state of affairs or course of events” (Giddens, p. 14). Agency and autonomy
are intertwined, for without some measure of power, agency is not possible. Power has
two facets: it can be understood as the ability of agents to carry out decisions that they
favor and as the capacity to resist those that they dislike. Although subordinates may
appear to be without power, Giddens suggested that “all forms of dependence offer some
resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their
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superiors” (p. 16). Giddens referred to subordinates’ ability to influence their superiors’
actions as the “dialectic of control” (p. 16). However, identifying and utilizing sources of
power amid organizational change often can be an insurmountable challenge for
subordinates.
Critics of structuration theory have claimed that structures limit agents’ choices
far more than Giddens (1984) allowed (see, e.g., Jones et al., 2004); for example, workers
without resources have only one option—to sell their labor. The constraints of material
resources “mean that at any moment not everything is possible” (Jones et al., 2004, p.
311). Stones (2005) decried this aspect of structuration theory as well, arguing that
depending upon where the emphasis was placed, structure or agency, it could be
presented as either an overly voluntaristic theory—one that overestimates the
knowledge and power of agents and the consequent ability to “make a
difference”—or an overly fatalistic and deterministic theory, where the structures
make all the running. (p. 7)
Giddens’s (1984) elucidation on bureaucracy addressed some of the issues raised
by critics of structuration theory. Bureaucracy and its disciplinary power are structural
factors that impinge on agency, but the constraint is limited to prescribed periods of time
and occurs usually with agents’ consent, such as when agents “go to work.” Giddens
wrote that “the journey to work probably indicates as much about the institutional
character of modern societies as do carceral organizations” (p. 154). The time–space
separation of work and social life makes submitting to administrative discipline tolerable.
“Work” is only part of an agent’s day, and although the agent must adhere to “a criteria
of conduct not in accord with the enactment of activities in other spheres of life”
(Giddens, p. 154), eventually, the workday ends and the agent reclaims lost agency.
Emergency room workers, however, enjoy less time–space separation than do other

	
  

120

workers. A typical emergency room shift is at least 12 hours, and, at work, agency or
autonomy almost wholly is restricted. As a physician at Hospital H commented, “We
don’t get lunch breaks; you can’t just leave the ER and go the cafeteria. What if someone
has a heart attack while you’re eating a sandwich?” Bathroom breaks also are governed
largely by patient volume. “We can go if it’s not too busy,” a nurse remarked, “but you
better not be in the loo if a code or trauma rolls in.” These descriptions of the emergency
room make the hospital appear to be a “total institution,” in that “there is no exterior nor
gap, it cannot be interrupted except when the task is totally complete” (Giddens, p. 153).
Agents endure this type of discipline, according to Giddens, because “submitting is a
trade-off for rewards that derive from being freed from such disciplines at other times”
(p. 154).
Another aspect of structuration theory that informs this study has to do with
“unintended consequences” of EMR adoption. As Giddens (1984) wrote, “Some of the
most important tasks of social science are to be found in the investigation of . . . the
significance of unintended consequences for system reproduction” (p. 282). Unintended
consequences are a regular feature of institutionalized practice in that “the flow of
[human] action continually produces consequences which are unintended by actors”
(Giddens, p. 27). An unintended consequence, as Giddens explained (1984), is “the
‘composition effect’ or an outcome of an aggregate of acts . . . each of which is
intentionally carried out. But the eventual outcome is neither intended nor desired by
anyone. It is, as it were, everyone’s doing and no one’s” (p. 10). Unintended
consequences also can “systemically feed back to be the unacknowledged conditions of
further acts” (Giddens, p. 8), potentially creating an infinite cycle of unintended
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consequences. With respect to this study, there are many well-documented, unintended
consequences that are associated with EMR adoption: increased waiting times, longer
lengths of stays, decreased physician productivity, lower patient satisfaction scores, and
employees’ reactance (see chapter two).
A related concept is perverse consequences, which are consequences of intended
but contradictory acts that “are perverse in such a way that the very activity of pursuing
an objective diminishes the possibility of reaching it” (Giddens, 1984, p. 313). As
Giddens (1984) elaborated:
Contradictory consequences ensue when every individual in an aggregate of
individuals acts in a way which, while producing the intended effect if done in
isolation, creates a perverse effect if done by everyone. If all the audience in a
lecture hall got to their feet to obtain a better view of the speaker, no one will in
fact do so. . . . These are outcomes not only that no one intends but also that run
counter to what everyone in the situation wants; none the less, they derive from
conduct that is intended to satisfy wants, and could do so for individuals, were it
not for the fact that the conduct in question becomes generalized. (p. 311)
Perverse outcomes are likely in “circumstances of structural contradiction” (Giddens, p.
317), where agents feel at odds and/or are immobilized (see the discussion later about
structurational divergence theory).
Although structuration theory, generally, is underutilized in health communication
research (Heracleous, 2013), it has guided research on technology adoption in medical
contexts. Barley (1986) used structuration theory for framing an analysis of effects that a
new technology, a CT scanner, had on a radiology practice, and how that technology
“altered the organizational and occupational structure of radiological work,” as well as
ways in which “institutional roles and patterns of interaction changed” (p. 78). Barley
noted that engrained patterns of interaction and interpretation are subject to change when
social systems encounter “exogenous shocks, such as the acquisition of new members or
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the arrival of new technology” (p. 80). With respect to studying technology and
structure, Barley proposed three axioms:
First, since structuring implies process, its temporal nature enjoins researchers to
adopt longitudinal as well as cross-sectional perspectives on technological
change. Second, since the social context of actions and interpretations is
important, it becomes unsound practice to lump together organizations with
radically different institutional histories and ecological milieux. Finally, since
technologies exist as objects in the realm of action, one cannot hope to understand
the technology’s implications for structuring without investigating how the
technology is incorporated into the everyday life of an organization’s members.
(p. 81)
Barley posited that new technologies in organizations should be regarded as occasions
that trigger social dynamics, which, in turn, modify or maintain an organization’s
contours. Because these dynamics are likely to be multifaceted, to “vary with time, and
to reflect the situational context, it is quite likely that identical technologies used in
similar contexts can occasion different structures in an orderly fashion” (Barley, p. 81).
With these considerations established, Barley recommended that researchers “document
traditional patterns of behavior, interaction, and interpretation before, during, and after
the technology arrives” by relying on “participant observation to record who interacts
with whom in what ways at what times and to elicit actor’s immediate interpretations of
events” (p. 83).
Although structuration theory is a useful theoretical lens for analyzing
technology-induced system changes, as Barley (1986) demonstrated, Giddens (1984) did
not address, specifically, technology and its role in system reproduction. Other scholars,
however, have extended Giddens’s work and adapted his theoretical axioms to better
describe what happens when technology impacts structuration (i.e., the structuring of
interactions across time and space). As described in the next section, adaptive
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structuration theory and the modified adaptive structuration model are useful extensions
of Giddens’s original work, especially for studying how EMRs change emergency room
structures.
Adaptive Structuration Theory
Although Giddens’s (1984) original formulation paid little attention to
technology, structuration theory, clearly, is applicable when studying interactions
between people and technology (Barley, 1986). The effects of technology adoption on
social systems have less to do with the actual technology itself and more to do with how
people use it: people may adapt technology to suit their needs, resist it, or reject it
altogether (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994). DeSanctis and Poole (1994), subsequently,
proposed adaptive structuration theory (AST) to study “the role of advanced information
technologies in organization change . . . [and to consider] the mutual influence of
technology and social processes” (pp. 121, 125). In AST, structures (i.e., rules or
resources that are entwined in system reproduction and that enable and constrain action)
and structural change are examined from two vantage points: structures that technologies
provide and structures that actually emerge as people interact with technologies
(DeSanctis & Poole). Two central concepts, “structuration” (i.e., structuring relations
across time and space) and “appropriation” (i.e., ways that people use technology
structures), highlight the interplay between technology and action; as these structures “are
brought into interaction, they are instantiated in social life . . . there is a recursive
relationship between technology and action, each iteratively shaping the other”
(DeSanctis & Poole, p. 125).
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Social structures that emerge from technology can be assessed according to
structural features and spirit. For instance, an EMR’s structural features, by definition,
would consist of its inherent rules, resources, or capabilities; simply put, structural
features establish what the EMR can do and its effects on human agency. For example,
an EMR may allow providers to access patients’ pharmacy records, but not their medical
files from other hospitals. The first feature enables providers’ agency, whereas the
second feature constrains it. With respect to spirit, DeSanctis and Poole (1994) defined it
as the intention behind a technology. DeSanctis and Poole likened spirit to what Giddens
called “legitimation,” because spirit, similar to legitimation, “provides a normative frame
with regard to behaviors that are appropriate in the context of the technology” (p. 126).
With regard to EMRs, spirit can be analyzed by examining EMRs’ design metaphor (i.e.,
whether their interface resembles a paper medical chart or an accounting spreadsheet),
the presentation and labeling of their features, training or support materials that
accompany them, and their usability. Well-designed technologies have a coherent spirit;
an incoherent spirit exerts weaker influence over people and “may send contradictory
signals, making use of the system more difficult” (DeSanctis & Poole, p. 127). Structural
features and spirit, taken together, make up a technology’s structural potential.
Appropriation, the other central concept of AST, is defined as “the immediate,
visible actions that evidence deeper structuration processes” (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994, p.
128). Examining the appropriation process allows researchers to uncover how rules
and/or resources are brought into social action. Consider the following explanation
(“EMRs” can be substituted for “GDSS”):
Appropriation of a GDSS’s [group decision support system] structures is
evidenced as a group makes judgments about whether or not to use certain
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structures, directly uses (reproduces) a GDSS structure, relates or blends a GDSS
structure with another structure, or interprets the operation or meaning of an
GDSS structure. GDSS structures become stabilized in group interaction if the
group appropriates them in a consistent way, reproducing them in similar form
over time. (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994, p. 129)
Adoption processes vary across groups and time, but how individual agents use a
technology, if at all, can be assessed by examining their appropriation moves. AST
identifies four appropriation moves: agents may choose to (a) directly use the technology,
(b) relate the technology’s structure to other structures in the environment (e.g., make
conceptual linkages between the EMR and other tasks), (c) constrain or interpret the
technology as it is in use, and/or (d) make judgments about the technology (e.g., praising
or condemning its performance). Appropriation moves can be either faithful, using the
structure in accordance with its spirit, or unfaithful. Unfaithful use is not inherently
negative because it can speak to the ingenuity and attitudes of users. Hence, an EMR’s
structures may be appropriated differently across groups as a function of users’ attitude:
users may be confident in the technology’s abilities, they may doubt its usefulness, or
they may perceive themselves as lacking the necessary skills to use it effectively.
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) cautioned that “if group interaction processes are
inconsistent with the structural potential of the technology, then the outcomes of group
use of the structures will be less predictable and, on the whole, less favorable” (p. 131).
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) adapted Giddens’s (1984) theory to analyze
technology adoption in any context, but others have modified AST to study new
technologies in healthcare settings (e.g., Schwieger, Melcher, Ranganathan, & Wen
2004). The modified adaptive structuration model, described next, has been used to
explain adoption processes that are associated with medical billing systems. This
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extension of Giddens’s work, as well as the work done by DeSanctis and Poole, sheds
light on some of the EMR adoption issues facing Hospital H.
Modified adaptive structuration model. Combining AST with aspects of
diffusion of innovation, Schwieger, Melcher, Ranganathan, and Wen (2006) framed an
analysis of a newly introduced medical billing system in a family practice clinic. The
modified AST model (Schwieger et al., 2004, 2006) identifies three sources of structure;
as with AST, there are structures embedded in technology and the environment, but the
modified model divides the environment into external and internal sources of structure.
External structures are outside influences, such as government policies and
interorganizational relationships (e.g., vendors or insurance companies), that may
influence if and how a technology is adopted and then used (Schwieger et al., 2006).
According to Schwieger et al. (2006), internal structures include the diversity of workers
inside an organization (e.g., their specific skill sets), the decision-making activity among
groups, and cultural resources (e.g., agents’ education, experience, and interaction styles).
Schwieger et al. (2006) concluded that communication to employees, “both implicit and
explicit, plays a significant role” (p. 90) in the adoption and diffusion process.
The most important aspect of the modified AST model, as it pertains to the
present study, is the division of environmental structures into external and internal
structures, and, in particular, the role that external structures play in Hospital H’s EMR
adoption. As discussed in chapter two, the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act requires nationwide EMR adoption; thus, the single
greatest external structure affecting Hospital H is government policy. Moreover,
providers working at Hospital H had little say in which EMR was adopted, inasmuch
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as external structures—namely, corporate policy makers working at Hospital H and for
its parent company—made the decision.
Although the modified AST model is a useful tool for examining certain aspects
of the technology adoption process, there is an additional extension of Giddens’s (1984)
original work that is helpful for examining agents and agency amid conflicting structures:
structurational divergence theory. Described next, that theory has been used frequently to
explain discordant communication patterns among hospital-based nurses.
Structurational Divergence Theory
I discovered the work done on structurational divergence (SD) theory about 6
months after beginning the second phase of my research at Hospital H. SD theory
extends and elaborates many of Giddens’s (1984) concepts, but more important, from my
perspective, the theory addresses “what happens to agency under contradictory
structures” (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013, p. 94), which Giddens did not address in his
seminal work. Giddens acknowledged that structural contradictions existed “between
different groupings or categories of people” (p. 198), and that structural constraints
limited “the range of options open to an actor, or plurality of actors, in a given
circumstance” (p. 177), but such attestations did not explain adequately the phenomena
that I was observing at Hospital H. In inquiring about the EMR adoption process and
how it affected healthcare delivery at Hospital H, providers used phrases, such as “I’m
stuck between a rock and a hard place,” to explain the contradictory situations and
obligations that they experienced, as using the EMR helped hospital administrators to
meet certain Meaningful Use objectives (as described in chapter two), but using the EMR
also delayed frequently timely healthcare delivery and increased costs, which was not in
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patients’ best interests. Providers struggled to meet the oftentimes-conflicting demands
of administrators and patients. Although I struggled to explain this contradiction as
something other than just another unintended consequence, a member of my dissertation
committee shared an article with me, entitled “Between Rocks and Hard Places:
Exploring the Impact of Structurational Divergence in the Nursing Workplace” (Nicotera
& Mahon, 2013), that, in combination with subsequent discussions with that article’s lead
author, led me to apply SD theory to my study.
SD theory is an extension of structuration theory, and, consequently, it describes
social organization in terms of structure, agency, rules, resources, and systems, but SD
theory introduces two additional components: the SD-nexus and the SD-cycle (Nicotera,
Mahon, & Zhao, 2010). According to the theory, the copresence of an SD-nexus with
one or more SD-cycles creates SD, which “is an organizational phenomenon that
manifests, in interaction, at the individual level” (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010, p. 34).
The SD-nexus is the “intersection of incompatible rule systems,” and results in
“unresolvable conflict” (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010, p. 32). Agents caught at a nexus
are compelled to “simultaneously fulfill obligations from multiple rule systems”
(Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010, p. 32); hence, they often report feeling stuck between a
rock and a hard place. Nonetheless, agents usually are compelled to act, especially in
healthcare settings, where inaction could jeopardize patients’ health and safety;
consequently, agents must choose “which structure to violate––setting off the normative
sanctions of that structure” (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010, p. 34).
The SD-cycle is a downward spiral of negative, ineffective, aggressive, or
argumentative communication that self-perpetuates (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013; Nicotera
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et al., 2010). Nicotera and Mahon (2013) described an SD-cycle between nurses working
in a geriatric care unit (GC) and nurses working in the emergency department (ED):
ED staff complained GC staff was uncooperative with inpatient admissions. GC
staff complained that ED patients who should be admitted to intensive care (ICU)
were transported to GC to await admission. When these patients became
unstable, requiring immediate care, GC staff provided it, acting from a patientcentered ethic. These patients were subsequently admitted to ICU. Records
reflected admission to ICU from ED with no way to document care given by GC.
When performance reviews, cost calculations, and other such management
reviews were conducted, GC care for those patients was credited to ED, but its
negative impact (e.g., cost, time, and delayed care for other patients) resulted in
poor performance sanctions for GC. This deepened GC resentment for ED and
perpetuated the conflict. GC nurses became hesitant to provide care because of
bureaucratic consequences—a severely immobilizing ethical dilemma. (p. 91)
Immobilization is the hallmark of SD. The unresolved conflict that the SD-cycle
perpetuates, according to Nicotera and Clinkscales (2010), causes the immobilization:
Unresolved conflict immobilizes the individual as he or she is unable to locate, in
his or her repository of skills, actions that satisfy both (or more) interpenetrating
structures. Immobilization prevents the individual from attaining goals or
achieving positive progress, eroding organizational and individual development.
Inability to develop spirals into more intractable conflict, and the cycle continues.
(p. 32)
Recurring cycles of conflict and immobilization stymy both individual and organizational
development.
SD manifests, primarily, as unresolved conflict, immobilization, and erosion of
development (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010), but there are many surface-level
manifestations and consequences that warrant discussion. Role conflict, defined as
incompatible role expectations, for instance, is a surface-level manifestation of SD that is
associated with stress and burnout (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010). Role conflict,
according to Nicotera and Clinkscales (2010), is present in an SD-nexus and is part of the
SD-cycle. In conjunction with burnout and workplace bullying, SD-induced role conflict
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is a predictor of job dissatisfaction among nurses (Nicotera et al., 2014). Additionally,
the role conflict, burnout, emotional exhaustion, and bullying that are present in SD-rich
nursing environments have been linked positively with nurses’ intentions to quit their
jobs (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013).
SD, which takes “a deep emotional toll on people” (Nicotera et al. 2010, p. 369),
also can manifest in actual (vs. intended) turnover, as well as in “verbal abuse, horizontal
violence [bullying], adverse events, costs, and other professional and patient outcomes”
(p. 381). In healthcare settings, according to Nicotera et al. (2010), the SD-cycle can
contribute to medical malpractice:
The SD-cycle creates tenuous conditions for patient care wherein the potential for
mistakes and missteps is quite high. Staffing issues and difficult workplace
environments increase the likelihood of adverse events, including compromised
patient safety, medication errors and others. SD seriously compromises the
workplace environment, thereby increasing the likelihood of these adverse events.
These include challenges within and between patient care units, as well as
between staff nurses, managers, and administrators. (p. 369)
Healthcare settings, according to Nicotera et al. are “especially susceptible to SD because
of the intersection of multiple institutional, professional, community, and other cultural
meaning systems” (p. 364).
When SD is present in an organization, individual agency is limited. According
to Nicotera and Mahon (2013), “In a structurationally divergent interaction system, action
cannot coherently re/produce or transform structure because the actor does not control
resources . . . and agency lacks force” (p. 94). Although agency is “never zero,” it
becomes “nonfunctional” in an SD-nexus:
We always have action choices, but in SD none satisfy all structurational
constraints in place. This positioning is mystifying because the opposition is
invisible or stultifying because the opposition is unsolvable. If to avoid a kick
from the mule, I must choose being run over by the cart, I may just not move. I
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have agency to decide not to act but no efficacy to impact either structure
transformatively. Acting on one structure subverts another, negating agency for
the whole. (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013, p. 94)
Nicotera and Mahon (2013) theorized that surface-level manifestations of SD,
such as role conflict and burnout, actually represent loss of agency. SD-entrenched
systems foster what Nicotera and Mahon dubbed impotent agency, which is the inability
to meet goals effectively because of conflicting structures in environments where
performance and productivity are monitored closely. Impotent agency feeds unhealthy
communication patterns, and, in addition to immobilization, it can lead to developmental
regression (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013). The only way to reduce SD, according to
Nicotera, Mahon, and Wright (2014), is for individual agents to regard those with whom
they are engaged in an SD-cycle not as enemies but as colleagues with a common
problem.
In summary, structuration theory and three of its offshoots (AST, the modified
adaptive structuration model, and SD theory) provide theoretical frameworks for this
study. Structuration theory explains how social systems (i.e., social interactions) are
reproduced across time and space. The theory assumes that people are knowledgeable
agents who act with purpose and whose interactions are shaped by their social positions
or roles. Agents’ positions dictate the signification and legitimization that they assign to
their interactions, and those positions allow them to ascertain their place in a domination
hierarchy. Structuration theory hinges on two main concepts: structures, which consist of
unseen rules and resources shaping human action that, simultaneously, enable and
constrain that action; and agency, which is both action and the ability of an agent to act,
which is intertwined with the concept of autonomy. Agency requires power, or the
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capacity to act on and change structures. Routines are an essential element of
institutional reproduction, but change can introduce exogenous shocks and create critical
situations that threaten social systems. Actions have unintended consequences and are a
regular feature of institutional practice, but not all unintended consequences are negative.
Perverse consequences, however, are negative inasmuch as the very act of pursuing a
goal diminishes the likelihood of reaching it; perverse consequences often are present in
conditions of structurational contradiction. AST was developed to explain how
technology changes social systems and focuses on appropriation (i.e., how agents use or
reject technology). Structures that emerge as agents use a technology can be analyzed
according to structural features (i.e., how that technology affects human agency) and
spirit (i.e., the intention behind that technology). The modified model combines elements
of AST with diffusion of innovation theory. In addition to structures that emanate from
the technology and those that are agent/user-initiated, the modified model takes into
account internal and external environmental structures. Lastly, SD theory posits that in
an environment ripe with contradictory structures, agents find themselves at a nexus of
incompatible rule systems that lead to a cycle of ineffective communication and
unresolved conflict. The cycle immobilizes agents and, effectively, robs them of agency.
SD also manifests in role conflict, burnout, emotional exhaustion, bullying, and turnover.
Moreover, SD in healthcare settings threatens patients’ safety by increasing the likelihood
of medical errors. Collectively, these theoretical frameworks shaped this study, leading
to the following research questions that were posed.
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Research Questions
This study extends previous work on EMR adoption by investigating how EMRs
affect emergency medical providers’ day-to-day experiences; how their interactions with
coworkers and patients are altered; how emergency room culture, itself, is changed by the
presence of this technology; and unintended consequences that EMRs bring to emergency
medicine practice. Thus, my preliminary research, as described in this chapter, and my
reading of structuration theory and its derivatives, led to the following research questions.
First, how do EMRs influence social interactions among providers working in the
emergency room at Hospital H? Second, how does the EMR affect structures, agents,
and systems in the emergency room at Hospital H? Third, what, if any, unintended
consequences emerge during and after EMR adoption at Hospital H? Lastly, do
providers working in the emergency room at Hospital H experience SD? To answer these
questions, as explained in the next chapter about research methods employed, I observed
and documented providers’ interactions at Hospital H’s emergency room and conducted
numerous interviews with them.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY
This chapter begins with an overview of emergency room-based observational
research, addressing, specifically, issues of rigor in those studies. This brief review of
that research informs an understanding of methodological concerns that are evidenced in
the emergency room literature. This study addresses a clear gap in that literature, not
only because it is a long-term observational study about the adoption of an electronic
medical records system (EMR) in a community hospital-based emergency room but also
because it utilizes rigorous ethnographic techniques. Following a brief discussion of
ethnographic methods, the research sites, participants, and data-collection methods are
described. The methods that were employed in this study included (a) participant
observation of emergency room operations and EMR training sessions; (b) interviews
conducted with administrators and providers; (c) a questionnaire to assess providers’
perceptions of EMRs; and (d) document analysis of memoranda, patient satisfaction
surveys, physicians’ metrics reports, and EMR training materials. A discussion then
follows of the subjectivity of my participation as a researcher and ethical concerns that I
confronted. Lastly, data-analytic procedures are described.
Methodological Issues in Observational Emergency Room Studies
Instead of simply describing emergency medical care, according to Paltved and
Musaeus (2012), observational or naturalistic research can “help to unpack the processes
surrounding emergency medical care and explain ‘how, why, and what’ is going on,”
and, thereby, produce “a deeper understanding of emergency medicine as a social
practice” (pp. 772, 773). Paltved and Musaeus outlined three key reasons why more
naturalistic research is needed about emergency medicine. First, naturalistic methods
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illuminate processes pertaining to staff members’ thinking, feeling, and acting as
emergency medicine providers. Second, naturalistic research captures organizational and
team processes amid medical and social practices. Third, naturalistic work may lead to
theory development that has important clinical and/or organizational implications (see,
e.g., Eisenberg et al., 2006).
Too often, however, emergency room-based naturalistic studies lack
methodological rigor. Cooper and Endacott (2007) analyzed studies published in
Emergency Medicine Journal between 2001 and 2006: 462 were conducted using
researcher-drive methods (e.g., questionnaires), 8 were naturalistic studies, and 6 used
mixed methods. All of the naturalistic studies took “a generic approach and rarely
conformed to established [so called] qualitative approaches such as phenomenology,
ethnography, and grounded theory” (Cooper & Endacott, p. 816). Cooper and Endacott
found that these generic approaches often failed to incorporate procedures to increase the
accuracy of the qualitative findings, such as triangulation (i.e., examining data from
different sources to build sound justification for themes) and obtaining respondents’
feedback about written reports.
More recently, however, Paltved and Musaeus (2012) conducted an extensive
review of emergency room-based naturalistic studies published between 1971 and 2012.
Using electronic databases and searching volumes of Academic Emergency Medicine and
Emergency Medicine Journal, they identified 46 studies that employed observational
methods, many of which did not use an amalgam of generic approaches but, instead,
employed proven methods, such as ethnography, action research, grounded theory,
phenomenology, discourse analysis, and critical incident analysis. The authors concluded
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that, despite having used valid and reliable methods, even more rigorous designs were
needed in naturalistic research. Ethnography, in particular, was identified as an important
method for “developing understanding about complex social interactions because it
allows the researchers through participant observation to study medical work in situ”
(Paltved & Musaeus, p. 773). Nugus and Forero (2011) also noted that because the main
focus of ethnography is on language and social realities that languages construct,
ethnography is especially “important in EDs [emergency departments] because of the
unique patient management tasks that emergency doctors and nurses perform [through
language]” (p. 69).
This study addresses a clear gap in the literature, by conducting a long-term
ethnographic study about an EMR adoption. As explained next, ethnography
encompasses several data-collection practices, including participant observation and
interviews.
Ethnographic Methods
Ethnography, as defined in chapter three, is a “written representation of a culture”
that is derived from fieldwork, which is the “investment of a researcher over a lengthy
period of time . . . and consists mostly of ongoing interaction with the human targets of
study on their home ground” (Van Maanen, 2011, pp. 1, 2). According to Frey et al.
(2000), “Ethnographers want to understand the explicit and implicit tacit assumptions that
exist in particular cultural groups that simultaneously enable and constrain interaction
among members” (p. 259). In this study, ethnography was used to address ways in which
EMRs enable and constrain structures that affect healthcare providers at Hospital H. The
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specific ethnographic techniques—participant observation and in-depth interviews—that
were employed to address the goals of this study are explained below.
Participant Observation
“Observation is the central data collection method in ethnography” and is
especially valuable because “observation overcomes the discrepancy between what
people say they do and what they actually do” (Cooper & Endacott, 2007, pp. 816, 817).
Observation in ethnography most often is accomplished through participant observation,
which is the “craft of observing and recording events in social settings” (Lindlof &
Taylor, 2011, p. 135). Methodological practices associated with participant observation
involve “one’s being in the presence of others on an ongoing basis . . . [as] a coparticipant in a significant part of their lives” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 135). By
combining participant observation with other data-collection methods (e.g., interviews
and/or document analysis), researchers can “discern how a social work appears to its
participants––principally, by eliciting schema they use to construct and associate
meaningful phenomena” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 136).
Observations are recorded in fieldnotes, which are “intended to capture and
represent the lived experiences of others” (Goodall, 2000, p. 90). According to Lindlof
and Taylor (2011), fieldnotes are “concerned with describing and interpreting (i.e.,
textual) qualities of communication in social action,” allowing researchers to “develop
two important forms of intersubjectivity: (1) empathetic understanding of their
participants’ experience and (2) successful representation of that understanding for
others” (p. 159). Moreover, fieldnotes should “contain extensive (if not exhaustive)
descriptions of appearances and activities”; provide “rich, specific detail” about what was
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observed; and “record participants’ remarks and conversations as close to verbatim as
possible” (Lindlof & Taylor, p. 159). Goodall (2000) prioritized capturing verbal
interactions in fieldnotes because “verbal exchanges are the organizing focus of everyday
experience” (p. 98).
In-depth Interviewing
In addition to participant observation, in-depth interviewing is an important
ethnographic methodological technique (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). In-depth interviews
are useful, among other things, for understanding social actors’ experiences and
perspectives; gathering information about things, people, and processes that cannot be
observed directly; inquiring about past events; verifying information that was obtained
from other sources; clarifying processes or procedures; and eliciting language forms that
are used by social actors in situ (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).
Lindlof and Taylor (2011) identified five types of in-depth interviews:
ethnographic, informant, respondent, narrative, and focus group. Ethnographic
interviews are informal, spontaneous interviews that, usually, occur “in a cultural scene,
while the investigator is busy hanging out with the people being studied” (Lindlof &
Taylor, p. 176), and they are particularly useful for soliciting participants’ immediate
reactions to events or conversations. Informant interviews solicit insiders’ perspectives
on cultural or group practices. Interviewees in this interview form are “called informants
because they inform the researcher about the scene––the scene’s history, customs, and
rituals; the local ‘lingo’; the identities and actions of key players; and so forth” (Lindlof
& Taylor, p. 177). Respondent interviews elicit open-ended responses from cultural
members and are used to clarify interviewees’ meanings; elucidate their opinions, beliefs,
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and attitudes; identify sources of influence that are tied to certain beliefs and behaviors of
interviewees; classify complex attitude patterns; and understand people’s attributions
about what motivates their beliefs and behaviors (Lindlof & Taylor). Unlike informants
who speak about the scene, respondents “speak only for, and about, themselves” (Lindlof
& Taylor, p. 179). Respondent interviews are “stand-alone procedures” (Lindlof &
Taylor, p. 180); in the case of the present study, they would be conducted outside of the
emergency room in a controlled setting and not combined with other methods of field
study. Narrative interviews seek entire stories from interviewees, which become the
basis for analysis. Finally, focus groups are interviews conducted with several people at
once.
As described below, I combined the techniques of participant observation and indepth ethnographic, informant, respondent, and focus group interviews with a
questionnaire and document analysis to address the goals of this study. A discussion of
the research sites and study participants precedes an account of the data-collection
procedures employed. Discussions of the validity of the findings, subjectivity of the
researcher, ethical concerns confronted in the study, and procedures that were used to
analyze the collected data then follow.
Research Sites
Although Hospital H was described briefly in chapter three, a more
comprehensive description of the site is warranted. Below, I describe some of the
external structural constraints that affect Hospital H’s emergency room and explain its
patient documentation systems. This information was gleaned from several online
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sources,5 including Hospital H’s website and the website of its parent company. Several
informants, including nurses and hospital administrators, provided additional
information. That information is followed by a description of an additional site, Hospital
W, where I observed and interviewed scribes who were employed, primarily, to alleviate
some of the EMR-induced documentation burdens that plagued Hospital W’s providers.
In studying that additional site, I also talked with physicians and a nurse about their
perceptions of scribes’ contributions.
My decision to incorporate a second research site into this study merits an
explanation. According to Wolcott (2010), “Ethnography is comparative [because]
everything we do is based on comparison” (p. 90). Studying three emergency rooms in
the first phase of my research allowed me to draw important comparisons among rural,
suburban, and urban emergency rooms. Similarly, visiting Hospital W allowed me to
compare an emergency room without scribes (Hospital H) with an emergency room that
employed them (Hospital W). Visiting Hospital W was necessary, in part, because
providers at Hospital H discussed, at length, the possibility of scribe support, yet none of
those providers had ever worked with a scribe nor knew anyone who had. Moreover, my
key informant, Dr. C., accepted a position at Hospital W and, for the first time, would
work with scribes. I accompanied him on his first few shifts and observed the process. I
returned to Hospital H with a newfound understanding of the role that scribes can play in
a busy emergency room, which shaped both how I viewed documentation processes at
Hospital H and how providers navigated those chores (see the findings in chapter five).
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These sources are not identified to protect the confidentiality of the research site and its
employees.
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Although ethnography, potentially, is comparative, Wolcott (2010) cautioned that
comparison sometimes can be a shortcoming, especially if it becomes a preoccupation, as
comparison can “draw one’s attention away from what is being observed” (p. 97). In line
with that position, although Hospital W was a rich site with numerous structural
influences at work, I focused my observations on provider–scribe interactions and the
EMR.
Hospital H
Hospital H is a for-profit, short-term, acute care facility in southern Louisiana that
is certified by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and is accredited by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare. It has approximately 140 in-patient
beds and 20 emergency room beds. A few years ago, Hospital H was sold to a
corporation, G6, that specializes in small but growing healthcare markets. Despite
millions of dollars invested in infrastructure, technology, and advertising, the hospital has
operated at a deficit for several years. Since the change in ownership, Hospital H has
undergone changes to its leadership structure: in the past few years, Hospital H has had
two new chief operating officers, a new chief financial officer, a new vice president, and
a new medical director. Turnover in the information technology (IT) department has
been high––in 2014, the staff was replaced en masse. Turnover among nurses has been
high as well; when nurses’ pay was cut to save the hospital money, many nurses found
employment elsewhere.
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The name of the corporation is withheld to protect the confidentiality of Hospital H and
its employees.
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The emergency room also was affected by the change in ownership. Prior to the
sale, Hospital H retained a company, S7, to manage emergency room operations.
Company S hired emergency medicine trained and board certified physicians to staff
Hospital H’s emergency room. Company S also billed patients for the emergency
medical care that they received, paid physicians’ salaries with the funds collected, and
shared a portion of the remaining profits with Hospital H. The average annual
emergency room profit retained by Company S was more than $1 million. After Hospital
H was sold, the new administrators severed ties with Company S, with emergency room
operations and billing handled in-house. The physicians who stayed on after Company S
lost the management contract became either full-time employees of Hospital H or parttime independent contractors. Since that change, revenue has fallen and the emergency
room has operated at a loss, despite increases in patient volume; specifically, Hospital
H’s emergency room sees more than 40 patients a day, an increase of about 50%, but
revenue is approximately half to two-thirds of what it was when billing was managed by
Company S.
Before Hospital H was sold, physicians documented the care that patients
received in the emergency room using a proprietary paper-based system, called
“TSheets.” There were more than 120 individually tailored TSheets that were
customized for chief complaints that range from chest pain, to lower back pain, to
trauma. TSheets were two-sided forms with multiple boxes in which physicians
documented the following for a patient: the patient’s history and physical examination,
chief complaint, review of systems (neurological capacity, vision, hearing, respiration,
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The name of the company is withheld to protect the confidentiality of Hospital H and its
employees.
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circulation, etc.), results of laboratory and radiological studies, progress notes, clinical
impressions, and diagnosis (see Appendix D). Physicians wrote instructions for patient
care on separate paper order sets, checked boxes next to the desired laboratory and
imaging tests, and then handed the forms to either nurses or technicians, who entered the
orders into a computer that was connected to the hospital’s laboratory and radiology
departments (see Appendix E). Medication orders and in-patient admission instructions
were carried out in similar fashion. All of the completed paper forms for each patient
were kept in a numbered folder that corresponded to the patient’s room number. Both
physicians and nurses shared this folder, adding to it as needed (e.g., inserting new order
sets or test results).
Nurses also documented patient care on paper forms before Hospital H was sold,
but, unlike physicians, they used a documenting system that was designed in-house. The
nursing note was a 6-page, trifold form that was kept with the physician’s TSheets and
order sets in the common patient folder. The nurse’s note was similar to the TSheet, but
it included additional space for documenting more detailed patient histories and physical
examination findings, tasks and procedures performed, and medications administered
(see Appendix F).
Because Hospital H’s new administrators wanted to take advantage of the federal
government’s Meaningful Use program, which provides financial incentives for hospitals
and clinics that install EMRs (see chapter two), they were quick to adopt an EMR.
Administrators chose an EMR that was made by McKesson Corporation, in part, because
Corporation G had purchased McKesson EMRs for another of its hospitals. Although
McKesson is an inexpensive EMR by industry standards (it costs about $2 million,
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according to one of Hospital H’s vice presidents, whereas similarly designed systems cost
$7 million or more), it is “one of the worst-ranked ED information systems [and] scored
at or near the bottom for many fields, including provider satisfaction, perceived workflow
integration, and speed of charting” (Genes, 2014, p. 17).
All of the nurses’ documentation chores were shifted from paper to the McKesson
Paragon system on April 1, 2013. Physicians continued documenting patient care using
TSheets, but paper order sets were augmented by a McKesson computerized physician
order entry system (CPOE) in August 2013, and the paper order sets were replaced
altogether by the CPOE in October 2013. At that juncture, physicians and nurses no
longer shared a common chart; in fact, their respective computer programs, despite both
being part of the same McKesson EMR, were not fully interoperable, meaning that nurses
could not see everything that physicians typed into the CPOE, and physicians could not
see nurses’ electronic notes. Although nurses still had access to physicians’ paper
TSheets, eventually, TSheets would be replaced by an electronic version. Rather than
purchasing the proprietary electronic TSheet system, which could have been integrated
into the McKesson CPOE and EMR systems, for approximately $35,000, Hospital H’s
administrators tasked the IT department with designing and building a generic version inhouse. The first iteration of the generic, electronic TSheet was supposed to launch in
November 2013, but that launch was rescheduled for June 2014, then August, and then
December; as of May 2015, physicians still were using paper TSheets.
Hospital W
Unlike the hybrid paper–electronic system that Hospital H was using, Hospital W
had been using a fully operational EMR for several years. Hospital W is an acute care
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center with 760 beds in Kansas, and it has a network of three emergency rooms with an
annual patient volume of 65,000 (by comparison, Hospital H’s emergency room sees
approximately 14,000 patients a year). Hospital W is a major trauma center that is
staffed by both emergency medicine physicians and trauma surgeons. Because Hospital
W also is an academic medical center, medical residents see and treat patients as well.
The same large, national corporation that owns Hospital T (described in chapter three)
also owns Hospital W, and both hospitals use the same EMR system, which is made by
Medical Information Technology, Inc. (MEDITECH). The MEDITECH system,
although problematic in some respects, is ranked higher than the McKesson system
(Genes, 2014).
A company called Scribe America trains and supplies the scribes who work at
Hospital W, most of whom are college students who are planning careers in healthcare.
Hospital W contributes $10 an hour to cover a portion of scribes’ salary, and physicians
who elect to have a scribe accompany them on their shifts have $10 an hour deducted
from their salaries, which offsets the cost that Hospital W pays Scribe America.
According to the Scribe America (2014) website:
A Medical Scribe is a revolutionary concept in modern medicine. Traditionally, a
physician’s job has been focusing solely on direct patient contact and care.
However, the advent of the Electronic Health Record (EHR) created an overload
of documentation and clerical responsibilities that slows physicians down and
pulls them away from actual patient care. To relieve the documentation overload,
physicians across the country are turning to Medical Scribe services. A Medical
Scribe is essentially a personal assistant to the physician; performing
documentation in the EHR, gathering information for the patient's visit, and
partnering with the physician to deliver the pinnacle of efficient patient care.
(para. 1, 2)
Typically, scribes at Hospital W are available 18 hours each day, but that schedule leaves
many of the night shift providers at a disadvantage. During gaps in scribe coverage,
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providers input healthcare data into the EMR, often after their shifts are over and they no
longer are seeing new patients.
Although Hospitals H and W are very different (e.g., in size, academic affiliation,
patient volume, and availability of scribe services), their patient throughput processes,
essentially, are the same. Furthermore, the EMRs enable and constrain providers’ agency
in similar ways (see findings in chapter five). These similarities, thus, made the
comparison between Hospital H and W worthwhile. Below, I explain how I gained entry
to both of these research sites.
Navigating Access to Sites
I gained access initially to both of the research sites though Dr. C. My
arrangement with Hospital H was formal, marked by an affiliation agreement between it
and Louisiana State University (LSU; see Appendix G). The agreement gave me
unlimited access to all emergency room common and private areas, barring patients’
rooms, and it allowed me to observe and interact with emergency room staff for the
duration of this study. In exchange, I agreed to follow the hospital’s rules and to observe
patient privacy mandates. After the agreement was signed, the emergency room nurse
manager became my sponsor, which, according to Lindlof and Taylor (2011), is
“someone who goes around and personally introduces you, vouches for your study, and
helps you gain access” (p. 101). The nurse manager, Q, asked that I let her know in
advance when I planned to visit the emergency room, so that she could notify staff
members and remind them of my study’s parameters. She advocated on my behalf and
facilitated arranging interviews with several administrators and physicians.
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I did not have a formal sponsor at Hospital W; however, Dr. C facilitated my
access in several ways. Specifically, he approached the emergency room director and
explained my study. After providing the director with a copy of my Institutional Review
Board (IRB) exemption, she granted me access to Hospital W’s main emergency room,
but she requested that I limit my interactions to Dr. C and his scribe, although I was free
to speak with other providers if they initiated conversation with me. Next, I describe the
participants who I interviewed and/or observed throughout the study.
Participants
The participants recruited for this study represented a purposive sample because I
made “informed judgments about . . . who to interview” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p.
110). Over the course of this study, I observed and/or interviewed 2 scribes, 4
technicians, 15 nurses, 3 midlevel providers, 9 physicians, 2 hospital administrators, and
2 EMR trainers. Most of these people worked at Hospital H, some were affiliated with
Hospital W (two scribes, one nurse, and one physician), and one of the participants, Dr.
C, had worked at both hospitals. The majority of the participants were male and White.
Female participants included the technicians, half of the nurses, two physicians, a
hospital administrator, and the EMR trainers. Three African American physicians
represented the only nonWhite participants. The nurses and physicians, who comprised
the bulk of the sample, ranged in age from early 30s to mid-60s.
Sampling of participants proceeded “in a serial fashion” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011,
p. 117), with new participants added based on what I learned and as I learned it; that
iterative process supported the analysis, reflection, and theorizing about the principal site
(Hospital H) and its agents. Hospital H’s emergency room regularly employs 4 to 5

	
  

148

technicians, 26 nurses, 3 midlevel providers, and 10 physicians. I observed and/or
interviewed all of the technicians, almost half of the nurses, all of the midlevel providers,
and all but one of the physicians. Thus, the sample size reflected sufficiently the types of
providers working in Hospital H’s emergency room. Moreover, the sampling process,
according to Lindlof and Taylor (2011), usually ends “when new data no longer add
much of significance to the concepts that have been developed” (p. 117). Therefore,
having achieved saturation with this sample (i.e., no new information was seen or heard),
I stopped enlisting new participants.
In addition to participants recruited from Hospitals H and W, I interviewed
leading emergency medicine physician-scholars. I did so when attending medical
conferences, to tap into broader trends surrounding EMRs and emergency medicine
practice. Dr. Ken Milne, Chief of Staff at South Huron Hospital, and Dr. Peter Viccellio,
Clinical Professor and Vice Chair of Emergency Medicine at Stony Brook School of
Medicine, described their experiences with EMRs and drew comparisons between forced
and free EMR adoption scenarios (see the findings in chapter five). At one medical
conference, I spoke with numerous physicians and midlevel providers whose experiences
and expertise informed my understanding of EMR adoption processes. I also exchanged
e-mails with Dr. Rick Bukata, editor and founder of Emergency Medical Abstracts, on the
subject of EMRs. Lastly, I consulted with Dr. Anne Nicotera (George Mason
University), whose structurational divergence (SD) theory framed this study.
In presenting the data, participants’ names are withheld and pseudonym initials
are used to protect their confidentiality; the only exceptions are those scholars named
above who are not affiliated with either Hospital H or W, and who consented to having
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their names appear in this study. Additional considerations with respect to participants’
confidentiality and data security, as required by the LSU’s IRB, are described next.
Institutional Review Board Approval
The first phase of this study (see chapter three) received exemption from full
institutional oversight by LSU’s IRB on October 7, 2013 (see Appendix A). The study
was amended in December 2014 to include a revised questionnaire (see Appendix H),
and the modifications were approved by that IRB on January 9, 2015 (see Appendix I).
My sponsor distributed copies of the informed consent release (see Appendix A) to
employees at Hospital H, and all of the participants agreed verbally to its terms. I
provided copies of the consent form to participants I recruited from Hospital W, as well
as those I approached at medical conferences. Participants’ verbal consent was obtained
before interviews commenced.
In accordance with LSU’s policy on security of data, handwritten fieldnotes were
locked in a safe, and electronic copies were stored on a password-protected computer.
Backup versions of electronic data, including fieldnotes, e-mail correspondence, and
other documents containing identifying information, were stored on an external hard
drive, which was locked in a safe when it was not in use. All of the documents appearing
in the appendices that contain identifying information have been redacted.
To review, I observed and interviewed healthcare providers working at Hospital H
in southern Louisiana. Hospital H was acquired by Corporation G a few years ago and
has undergone numerous changes. In addition to new emergency room management,
there were several changes made to the hospital’s executive team, and there was high
turnover in the IT and nursing departments. The hospital was operating at a deficit, and
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adopting EMRs meant that it might recoup some lost revenue—namely, in the form of
Meaningful Use incentive payments. Portions of a McKesson EMR system were
installed, which nurses began using in April 2013. Physicians began using the McKesson
CPOE component in August, but they continued to use paper charts as well. As of May
2015, the last component of the EMR system, the electronic TSheet, had not been
installed. Although Hospital H’s EMR adoption was delayed, I did observe a fully
functioning EMR at Hospital W, an urban academic medical center in Kansas. At
Hospital W, I interviewed scribes and spoke with physicians about their perceptions of
the scribe program. I also interviewed several physicians attending medical conferences
to gain a more complete understanding of EMR adoption processes and implications.
Participants’ confidentiality was preserved through the use of pseudonyms, and the data
were safeguarded in accordance with LSU policies. The methods that I employed to
collect data are described in the next section.
Data Collection
To address the goals of this study and to understand how structures and agents
were affected by Hospital H’s EMR adoption, four methodological practices were used to
obtain data: (a) participant observation of Hospital H’s emergency room operations and
EMR training sessions was conducted, augmented by observation of Hospital W’s scribe
program; (b) interviews were conducted with Hospital H’s administrators and emergency
room employees, with Hospital W’s scribes and providers, and with leading emergency
medicine scholars; (c) a questionnaire was designed and administered to Hospital H’s
emergency room employees to assess their perceptions of the EMR, diagnose SD, and
measure burnout; and (d) analysis of documents, including Hospital H’s emergency room

	
  

151

memoranda, patient satisfaction surveys, physicians’ metrics reports, and McKesson
EMR/CPOE training materials. Each practice is explained below.
Participant Observation
Spending time in Hospital H’s emergency room allowed me to observe
interactions among providers and to witness how they engaged with and talked about the
EMR. My participant observation, which included emergency room operations and two
stand-alone EMR training sessions, spanned from December 2013 to May 2015. In
addition to the 42 hours of fieldwork that I conducted in Fall 2013 (see the preliminary
research study in chapter three), I spent another 145 hours at Hospital H’s emergency
room and recorded my observations in 162 handwritten pages. Similar to Eisenberg et al.
(2006), I followed commonly accepted observational procedures by visiting the hospital
at various times of the day, observing on weekdays and on weekends, following
numerous individuals who had varied roles, and taking detailed fieldnotes. I also
positioned myself in specific places (see, e.g., Nugus et al., 2011) and regularly observed
activity near the electronic whiteboard, at the nurses’ station, at the physicians’ work
space, by the midlevel providers’ desk, near the triage room, and by the breakroom. As
patterns and themes emerged from the collected data, I revisited certain shifts, locations,
and providers to confirm or revise them.
“The goal of fieldwork,” according to Wolcott (2010), “is to recognize patterns,
[which is] the precursor to finding themes”; however, “there is no reason not to be
thinking of ‘themes’ from the beginning of your story and trying to test hunches” (pp. 8,
40). I developed several hunches during the preliminary fieldwork (described in chapter
three) and from researching literature about EMRs and emergency medicine. In the
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parlance of Tracy and Geist-Martin (2014), these hunches became sensitizing concepts,
“interpretive devices––almost like magnifying glasses––that offer frameworks through
which researchers see, organize, and experience the data” (p. 246). Certain sensitizing
concepts, described next, led me to focus on particular behaviors, discussions, and
interactions.
Sensitizing concepts that shaped my participant observation. Several
sensitizing concepts informed my observations at Hospital H; primarily, concepts that
were rooted in structuration theory and its derivatives framed my observations. For
instance, I was attentive to how agency was enabled or constrained in certain situations,
where structural contradictions seemed apparent, if and how appropriation moves were
executed, and if negative communication spirals emerged. Additionally, the literature on
EMR adoptions shaped my perceptions. For example, Park et al. (2013) found that
physicians-in-training rarely initiated talk with nurses; consequently, I was attentive to
who initiated conversation (i.e., physician or nurse) and what was discussed (i.e., patient
care, the EMR, or something else). Moreover, because Callen et al. (2013) found that
physicians spent less time with patients after, as compared to before, an EMR installation,
I noted the amount of time that providers spent at EMR stations and inside patients’
rooms. My preliminary research and literature review also sensitized me to the following
concepts: how physicians and nurses framed their talk about EMRs; role, group
affiliation, and hierarchical relationships, which, sometimes, manifested in divergent
interaction patterns; how providers discussed feeling either satisfied or dissatisfied with
the working environment at Hospital H and with their careers; providers’ communication
patterns when out of sight of patients (i.e., backstage interactions); the number of mouse
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clicks that were required to perform certain operations, such as ordering medications, and
the length of time involved; reactance amid forced EMR adoption situations; and
dissonance that was caused by role reversal during EMR training episodes. Reactance
and dissonance, as described next, shaped many of my observations.
Reactance, as defined in chapter two, is the motivational state following a threat
to or elimination of freedom that aims to restore that freedom and/or to subvert and resist
the endorsed behavior (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Because reactance usually
triggers hostile and aggressive feelings (Brehm, 1966), I was attentive to situations where
I believed that reactance would be expressed, such as when Hospital H’s administrators
required physicians to use the CPOE exclusively, and when generic, electronic TSheet
prototypes were tested in the training sessions. Reactance cannot be measured directly
(Quick et al., 2013), and scales devised to detect reactance are “psychometrically
unsound with poor reliabilities, unstable factor structures, and poor convergent and
discriminant validities” (Nesterkin, 2013, p. 588). Reactance, therefore, is better viewed
as a situational outcome with observable characteristics (Nesterkin, 2013). Extending the
view articulated by Brehm (1966), that reactance triggers hostile or aggressive feelings, I
looked for any hostile or aggressive communication (or other behavior) relating to
EMRs/EMR use. Moreover, because subverting the mechanics of power (i.e., resisting
constraining structural forces) with disruptive talk or behaviors targeting EMRs is
“asserting autonomy of action” (Giddens, 1984, p. 292), when providers disparaged the
EMR, refused to use it, or circumvented order-entry processes, I noted that reactance
might have been a factor, and I followed up by conducting ethnographic interviews for
confirmation (see the discussion of interviews in the next section).
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Dissonance is “the existence of nonfitting relations among cognitions” (Festinger
1957, p. 3). For example, physicians’ lack of knowledge about how to use EMRs often
leads them “to view themselves as novices . . . [and] the juxtaposition between concurrent
roles of (medical) ‘expert’ and ‘novice’ creates a high degree of cognitive dissonance”
(Nambisan et al., 2013, p. 4). Although Sweeney, Hausknecht, and Soutar (2000) argued
that there is “no well established scale to measure dissonance” (p. 369), they developed a
22-item scale that boasted strong evidence of discriminant validity and reliability.
Although the scale was designed to measure consumers’ postpurchase dissonance,
several of the scale’s emotional dimension items certainly are applicable to providers in
forced EMR compliance situations: resentment, fear, anger, unease, annoyance, and
frustration (Sweeney et al.). Nadeem (2007) adapted Sweeney et al.’s model for
observational research; instead of administering a questionnaire, Nadeem asked
participants about their feelings in accordance with the scale’s emotional dimension
items. I adapted Sweeny et al.’s model in a similar way, noting behaviors and
conversations that suggested providers might have felt resentment, fear, anger, or unease
regarding the EMR. For example, if a provider sighed loudly or mumbled profanities
when using an EMR, I attended to the occasion as an example of frustration and,
possibly, dissonance. My hunches, then, were either confirmed or denied in ethnographic
interviews, with those interview procedures described next.
Interviews
Individual interviews were conducted to ascertain providers’ experiences both
practicing emergency medicine and using EMRs at Hospital H. I also questioned
participants about their perceptions of EMR adoption processes, EMR training,
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communication among providers and between providers and administrators, working
conditions, and career satisfaction. Interview questions were derived from the
questionnaire that was developed during preliminary research (see Appendix C). Most of
the interviews that I conducted in the field were ethnographic and/or informant
interviews. Because interviews often took place on the fly and in a busy emergency
room, they were not audio recorded; instead, I took copious notes during interviews and
shared frequently what I had written with informants to make certain that I had captured
conversations accurately.
In addition to ethnographic and informant interviews, I conducted several inperson respondent interviews with three physicians, a nurse manager, and a nurse. Those
in-person interviews were audio recorded, producing 5 hours and 46 minutes of material,
which I transcribed (giving verbal content only). I conducted telephone interviews with a
physician and the head of Hospital H’s IT department, recording detailed notes during
and immediately following those interviews. I also conducted e-mail interviews with a
physician and an administrator that consisted of open-ended questions asking about EMR
adoptions, implications, and limitations.
All of the ethnographic and informant interviews were conducted with
participants who seemed eager to explain the scene and share their perspectives. Nurses,
technicians, and scribes were especially glad that I valued their opinions, but some
physicians, initially, seemed hesitant to speak with me. In time, and with prodding from
my sponsor, most of the physicians accepted my presence in the emergency room and
answered willingly my questions. Hospital H’s administrators, however, were more
difficult to reach and phone calls requesting interviews were not returned. After multiple
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e-mailed requests, one administrator consented to an interview. Rather than meeting in
person, as requested, I was instructed to e-mail my questions, and the administrator
addressed most of the questions in her e-mail reply. The head of the hospital’s IT
department called me in response to an e-mailed request and addressed a series of openended questions about the adoption process, the in-house TSheet design process, and
EMR training. I also conducted ethnographic interviews with two EMR trainers, and
although one of the trainers consented to a follow-up respondent interview, she later
canceled the interview and did not return my e-mails.
The ethnographic and informant interviews were shaped, largely, by what was
happening in the emergency room that I observed. My questions, therefore, were
improvised and sought clarifications and/or explanations of behaviors, interactions,
phrases, and processes observed. Sensitizing concepts, as described previously, led me to
focus on particular occurrences; specific questions that I posed about certain events, such
as forced EMR compliance or EMR training episodes, were shaped by the literature on
reactance and dissonance, as described next.
Sensitizing concepts that shaped interviews conducted. Reactance often
manifests in a preference for the prohibited object or process (Brehm, 1966), and, at
Hospital H, providers’ reactance was expressed in statements that both praised paper
charts and condemned EMRs. When providers disparaged the EMR, refused to use it, or
circumvented order-entry processes, I followed up with ethnographic interviews to
ascertain why that was the case. For example, because a common occurrence involved
physicians asking nurses to enter orders into the CPOE, usually, I asked physicians why
they had made the request. Moreover, I was careful not to jump to conclusions, because
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context (e.g., whether physicians otherwise were busy with tasks that prohibited entering
orders), nonverbal behaviors (including paralinguistic cues, such as tone of voice), and
apparent affective state needed to be taken into account when deciding if physicians
asking others to enter orders qualified as reactance. Additionally, I considered carefully
whether negatively framed talk (e.g., griping) about the EMR might have signaled
reactance or was intended to bolster belonging by reinforcing group membership. For
example, a nurse who, generally, was enthusiastic about some aspects of the EMR
complained frequently alongside other nurses about its many shortcomings. When I
asked why she changed her mind about the EMR, she said that she enjoyed “letting off
steam” with her coworkers, and that “complaining together,” even though she thought
that “the EMR [wasn’t] so bad,” helped her to “feel connected to them.” Asking about
speakers’ intentions, thus, was important for validating or refuting initial assumptions
that I made about participants’ reactance in many situations (see findings in chapter five).
With respect to dissonance, thought listing—which requires people to list their
thoughts before, during, and/or after a task; inferences about dissonance then can be
made by analyzing data obtained across various occasions or groups (Cacioppo, von
Hippel, & Ernst, 1997)—has been used to measure consonant and dissonant cognitions.
This approach has been incorporated into questionnaires, with respondents reporting the
frequency and intensity of thoughts from among a list of cognitions that they are given
(Cacioppo, 1997). Rather than asking providers to write their thoughts, I elicited thinkaloud statements, which involve participants verbalizing their cognitions and/or emotions
during and after completing EMR-related tasks. The think-aloud approach has been
found to produce twice as many thoughts as does thought listing (Blackwell, J. Galassi,
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M. Galassi, & Watson, 1985). Moreover, given the busy nature of this research site, the
think-aloud approach was faster and more practical to administer than was thought
listing. I engaged providers in think-aloud exercises during and after EMR training
episodes, defined as situations where physicians solicited or received help using the EMR
from nurses or mid-level providers. I focused on hierarchically imbalanced situations
that were more apt to create role reversal and/or dissonance, as opposed to nurse-to-nurse
or physician-to-physician training episodes. In addition to think-aloud statements, I
asked providers to indicate if they experienced any of the emotions listed in the shortened
version of the Sweeney et al. (2000) questionnaire (resentment, fear, anger, unease,
annoyance, frustration, and/or discomfort).
Questionnaire
I administered a questionnaire (see Appendix H) that providers completed
anonymously about effects of the EMR on their experiences working in Hospital H’s
emergency room. Questionnaires were completed by 30 of the 42 full and part-time
employees (71% response rate); respondents included 4 technicians, 17 nurses, 3
midlevel providers, 5 physicians, and 1 respondent who identified as “other.”
The questionnaire was intended to supplement observational and interview data
with a numerical account of providers’ experiences with and perceptions of the EMR.
The questionnaire asked participants about a variety of topics, including their job titles,
how long they had worked in emergency rooms, if the administration solicited their
opinions about the EMR before it was chosen and installed, how they believed the EMR
affected communication between themselves and other providers, if they were satisfied
with the EMR, and if they had considered changing jobs or careers. Additionally, the
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questionnaire included items to measure structurational divergence and burnout, which
are described next.
Structuration divergence (SD) was measured via a 17-item scale. Nicotera et al.
(2010) constructed the scale items from interview data that they collected, which “were
specified to be driven by three first-level factors: immobilization/individual-development,
unresolved conflict, and managerial/organizational-development” (p. 376). The scale in
Nicotera et al.’s (2010) study displayed a clear factor structure that was validated across
several subsamples, and it showed strong internal consistency. According to Nicotera et
al. (2010), the model “resulted in the following fit indices: χ² (113, N = 142) = 179.73, p
< .001, CFI = .95, RMSEA = 06, 95% CI of RMSEA = .05 to .08 [and] values indicated
that the modified model provided reasonable fit to the data” (p. 377). The reliability
coefficient was .94 (Nicotera et al., 2010).
Because the original SD self-report instrument was intended for nurses and nurse
administrators (Nicotera et al., 2010), I adapted several items to administer it to
physicians, midlevel providers, and technicians (see Appendix H, prompt 7). For
example, the item “I can’t go to my nurse manager for help resolving conflicts because
s/he won’t do anything to help” became “I can’t go to administration for help resolving
conflicts because they [sic] won’t do anything to help.” Modifying some of the items
was necessary because physicians working in the emergency room do not have managers
or supervisors per se. There is an emergency department director at Hospital H, a
physician, but he does not provide direct oversight of physicians’ daily work. Physicians,
thus, largely, work unobserved, but because many people equate administrators with
managers, each occurrence of “manager” or “supervisor” in the original scale was
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changed to “administrator” or “administration.” Dr. Nicotera approved these changes, as
well as the addition of the following item: “Medical staff and administration view
patients differently, and this causes conflict.” The original scale, as well as my modified
version, “can be used to diagnose whether SD may be at the root of morale or
productivity problems” (Nicotera et al., 2010, p. 381).
Several scales have been used to measure burnout. The Maslach Burnout
Inventory (MBI) has been used in 90% of all empirical burnout studies (Kristensen,
Borritz, Villadsen, & Christensen, 2005); consequently, according to Kristensen et al.
(2005), the questionnaire and the Maslach definition of burnout have “become two sides
of the same coin: burnout is what the MBI measures, and the MBI measures what burnout
is” (p. 193). There are, however, concerns that the operationalization of burnout in this
instrument is unclear, because it is characterized by the simultaneous occurrence of three
dimensions, but, according to the MBI, those dimensions should be measured
independently because they have been confirmed by factor analyses as three distinct
dimensions (Kristensen et al.). Nonetheless, and despite its length (22 items), researchers
continue to use the MBI because it has been validated by studies (Fortney et al., 2013;
Kuhn et al., 2008).
McManus, Smithers, Partridge, Keeling, and Fleming (2003) proposed an
abbreviated 13-item MBI to measure burnout in physicians. The abbreviated scale has
been used in several studies (see, e.g., Opoki, 2013; Rehder, Cheifetz, Markovitz, Turner,
2014), and it has demonstrated strong validity and reliability (McManus et al.). West,
Drybye, Sloan, and Shanafelt (2009), however, found that two single-item measures
exhibited the highest factor loadings within their respective burnout domains. On the
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emotional exhaustion item (“I feel burned out from my work”), Spearman correlations
between the single item and the full emotional exhaustion domain score minus that
question ranged from .76 to .83 across four large samples; the depersonalization item (“I
have become more callous”) ranged from .61 to .72 (West et al.). West et al., thus,
concluded that “the results of our study indicate that results on these two questions can
serve as useful surrogates for the MBI in settings where it is not possible to administer
the full 22 item instrument” (p. 1320). Although it is not yet used widely, the two-item
scale recently was employed to measure burnout in medical students (A. Cook et al.,
2014). To keep the questionnaire short, I also used the two-item scale (see Appendix H,
items 11 and 12).
Document Analysis
Finally, I reviewed many of Hospital H’s emergency room memoranda, patient
satisfaction surveys, physicians’ metrics reports, and McKesson EMR/CPOE training
materials. I also examined notices from the IT department that described several EMR
technical glitches and temporary workarounds. Taken together, those documents helped
me to understand more the EMR installation process and its ramifications for both
providers and patients (see the findings in chapter five). Moreover, as described next,
this approach triangulated the findings to enhance their validity.
Validity of Findings
In naturalistic research, conventional notions of validity derived from positivistic
and postpositivistic research (e.g., predictive validity) do not hold much relevance
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011), but descriptive validity––“the factual accuracy of the reportage
of events” (Lindloff & Taylor, 2011, p. 276)––can be assessed by triangulating multiple
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sources and methods (Frey et al., 2000; Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Triangulation includes
“comparison of two or more forms of evidence [and] if data from two or more methods
point toward the same conclusion, then validation is enhanced” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011,
p. 274). For example, self-reports may have little relationship between what people say
they do and what they actually do, but employing self-reports with others’ reports and
observations create a triangulated measurement. “Triangulation can be done with
multiple methods,” as I have done, whereby “the researcher looks for convergent data in
fieldnotes, interviews, documents, or other qualitative evidence” (Lindlof & Taylor,
2011, p. 274). Moreover, the questionnaire that I developed and administered was used
to further triangulate data obtained from observations, interviews, and documents.
Additionally, I conducted regular member checks, which involve “taking findings back to
the field and determining whether the participants recognize them as true or accurate”
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 279).
Although I took steps to ensure the descriptive validity of findings (e.g.,
triangulation), there was a potential threat to this study’s internal validity: the Hawthorne
effect, whereby people behave differently when they know that they are being observed.
As Wolcott (2010) noted, however, “No one can keep up appearances forever so the
ethnographer eventually sees things as they are” (p. 92). How the ethnographer sees
things, though, as explained below, is shaped, largely, by his or her subjectivity.
Researcher Subjectivity
As Wolcott (2010) wrote, “Make no mistake, the observer-researcher always has
a perspective, always offers a point of view” (p. 23), and because “facts are personal
interpretations” (Goodall, 2000, p. 95), researchers need to “carefully consider how their
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(and any co-participant’s) subjectivity impacts the research and writing” (Tracy & GeistMartin, 2014, p. 248). Moreover, according to Madison (2012), because “our subjectivity
is an inherent part of research,” researchers should “contextualize our own positionality,
thereby making it accessible, transparent, and vulnerable to judgment and evaluation”
(pp. 10, 9). For these reasons, it is important to address my subjectivity, and, specifically,
how Dr. C., as my husband and as an informant, influenced me.
Dr. C’s perceptions, certainly, shaped my view of physician–nurse relationships
and interactions between them. Traditionally, the physician–nurse relationship “has been
an unequal one characterized by the dominance of the doctor, with the nurse assuming a
position of lower status” (Johnson & Kring, 2012, p. 343). Although some physicians
enjoy “a higher standing in the social pecking order of the hospital” (Haddad, 2003, p.
28), many emergency room physicians, including Dr. C., believe that they are near the
bottom of the hospital hierarchy; as independent contractors without tenure or union
protection, they see themselves as disposable and beholden increasingly to “nurse packs”
(i.e., groups consisting of nurses). In conducting preliminary fieldwork (see chapter
three), I saw evidence of a hierarchical shift that favored nurses’ preferences and working
conditions over those of physicians. Here, I describe two such instances and my
reactions, but it is important to note that my relationship with Dr. C influenced how I
recorded and interpreted those events.
In conducting fieldwork in 2013, I noted that every emergency room shift that I
observed involved a single physician and a “nurse pack.” A nurse practitioner at Hospital
M joked about “nurse packs,” saying, “We’re like a wolf pack: We can gang up on a doc
and drive him out.” She also commented, “Twenty years ago, if a doc walked in, you
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were expected to give him your seat and say, ‘How would you like your coffee?’ A lot’s
changed since then.” In response, a physician replied, “Yeah, now we’re the one’s
getting you the coffee.” Although he was joking, another physician, most assuredly, was
not joking about “nurse packs” when he later shared the following story:
I had started working at a small town ER and the nurses just didn’t warm to me.
It came to a head when an asymptomatic high blood pressure showed up. Tests
came back fine, so I discharged him home with a ‘scrip. The nurses thought I was
incompetent. They said they admitted everybody with high blood pressure, no
matter what. I showed them the Joint National Commission’s recommendations,
“send ‘em home with a ‘scrip.” They went behind my back, called an internist,
and had the guy admitted. He ended up leaving a few days later with the same $4
‘scrip I had given him, and an $80,000 hospital bill. I tried to talk to
administration about it, but those nurses got me fired because I didn’t do things
their way.
I sympathized with the physician because Dr. C had had similar experiences with
hostile nurses, with some nurses even going so far as to hide his medical charts and throw
away his order sets. Such petty ploys could have endangered patients, as Dr. C. pointed
out. Moreover, the physician who lost his job had difficulty getting credentialed at other
hospitals. Without admitting privileges, he would, in effect, have been unemployable,
which would have been disastrous, for, like Dr. C, this physician owed more than
$200,000 in student loan debt and he needed a job. I now concede that there probably
was more to the story, and that the nurses may have acted out of ignorance (of then
current best practices) instead of malice or spite. When I was told the story, however, I
blamed hostile nurse packs wholeheartedly for the physician’s predicament.
On October 6, 2013, I observed the following scene at Hospital T that, I believe,
alludes to the changing hierarchy of nurse–physician relationships that Dr. C and other
physicians described. That day, all of the nurses talked about, negotiated, and,
eventually, took lunch breaks, whereas the physician, Dr. C., went without a break. The
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six nurses on shift timed and orchestrated carefully the particulars of their lunch breaks,
each one taking 30 minutes. It was a busy day, and Dr. C moved quickly from one
patient’s room to the next. He returned to the counter and sat at the EMR, typing up
patient histories, orders, and preliminary findings. As Dr. C typed, he reached into a bag
beneath the counter and pulled out a beaten-up, squished-flat Subway sandwich. He said
that he had picked it up a few days before but that he had not had time to eat it during his
previous two shifts. Even though I already knew the answer, I asked if he, like the
nurses, took lunch breaks. I posed the question hoping that the nurses sitting nearby
would overhear his reply. As Dr. C said:
Almost never. Well, certainly never on a day shift. Maybe a night shift. If it’s
not too busy, I might have time to eat. I can eat only if I have food right here at
the desk in front of me. I can’t leave the emergency room and go the cafeteria.
Basically, you get to eat only if things are under control, which means that you
[physicians] don’t generally get a lunch break.
As he unwrapped the soggy sandwich, he elaborated:
What if you were the patient? What if you saw the doc get up and leave, and take
a 1-hour lunch break to eat a sandwich? You can’t do that! You would get your
butt sued off! Ya know, if ya don’t [get sued], then all the patients complain. Ah,
geez, you cannot possibly do that!
Dr. C paused his two-fingered typing at 1:05 pm and tore into the sandwich. An
impatient nurse sat behind him, rapping her fingers on the countertop. She huffed and
rolled her eyes, and, finally, said, “Hey, Doc, did you finish charting on room 2?” “I’m
doing it now,” Dr. C replied, pecking at the keyboard between mouthfuls. His “tap, tap,
tapping” was punctuated by her “rap, rap, rapping.” At 1:10 pm, he downed the last of
the mangled sandwich. I inquired, again, about lunch-break policies, hoping that the
impatient nurse would take notice of the inequities. I asked him, “So, docs don’t get
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lunch breaks but the nurses do?” He looked at me and shrugged. From around the
corner, another nurse announced that she was back from lunch.
Although I was quick to judge the nurses that day (it was, after all, my husband
who was hungry), it is worth noting that most nurses are employees who have every
reason to expect lunch breaks during their 12-hour shifts. In contrast, emergency
medicine physicians usually are “hired guns,” who, like Dr. C., have no benefits, health
insurance, sick days, retirement funds, or lunch breaks. A nurse with whom I spoke was
quick to point out, “Yeah, but they [physicians] make a pile of money, so it evens out.”
Physicians feel differently; as one said, “we make more money, sure, but we carry all of
the malpractice risk, and we do more work.” When I asked that physician to clarify, he
explained that emergency medicine physicians are sued much more often than are nurses,
and that physicians see every patient in the emergency room, whereas nurses are
responsible only for three or four at a time. These “tit-for-tat” comparisons positioned
me between two divergent perspectives; although I often sympathized with nurses,
usually, I identified with physicians.
Like the emerging nurse packs, access to food may signal that power dynamics
and hierarchical nurse–physician relationships are changing in some emergency rooms,
and, certainly, Dr. C thought as much. Hence, these early episodes tainted my view of
vindictive and well-fed nurse packs preying on innocent and hungry physicians; namely,
my husband, whom I very much wanted to protect. As I shifted my focus away from Dr.
C, started observing other physicians, and spent more time with nurses at Hospital H, I
started to see nurses in a different light. Nurses at Hospital H were nice to me from the
start, whereas the physicians, especially those I had not met previously in social settings,
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were slow to warm to me. Although being introduced as “Dr. C’s wife” signaled that I
was “okay” (i.e., I could be trusted), many physicians seemed reserved during our
interactions. In time, I found that I was more comfortable sitting with the nurses rather
than near the physicians’ workstation. I even started wearing blue scrubs, as opposed to
the green scrubs that physicians usually wore. The nurses offered their snacks to me and
I brought Goldfish crackers along on every visit. When I was practically force-fed
birthday cake by one of the nurses who insisted I eat instead of count calories, I knew that
I was “one of the gang.”
Although Dr. C arranged my entry into the site, the nurses ensured that my time
there was fruitful. My sponsor, Q, was my biggest ally. She responded to all of my emails, always in a prompt and courteous manner, and she seemed genuinely enthusiastic
about my research. Several nurses became trusted advisors and friends. One of my
nurse-informants, B, acted as my “spy” by sending text messages that alerted me to
important EMR issues and personnel changes that, otherwise, may have gone
undiscovered for weeks. B also e-mailed me regular updates and consented to several
respondent interviews that I conducted with him. Without Q and B, my research would
have been less productive. They, along with the other nurses, helped me to see that
emergency medicine practice is hard for everyone––nurses work as hard as do physicians,
and, in many ways, nurses’ EMR burdens are more cumbersome (see the findings in
chapter five). Although these experiences and insights do not guarantee that this report is
“objective,” I tried to approach my research and these participants with an open mind.
Moreover, given that my view of nurses changed during the time that I was in the field, I
made every effort not to favor the perspectives of physicians over nurses when writing

	
  

168

this report. Nonetheless, as Goodall (2000) cautioned, “Every text, every story,
privileges someone’s point of view” (p. 160).
Ethical Concerns
According to Frey et al. (2000), there are at least four moral principles that shape
the ethical guidelines for how researchers should treat study participants: “(a) provide the
people being studied with free choice; (b) protect their right to privacy; (c) benefit, not
harm them; and (d) treat people with respect” (p. 148). I obtained permission and/or
informed consent from all participants; I used pseudonyms to protect their identities and,
thereby, mitigated potential harm; and I treated them with respect. Moreover, my report
is true to my experience. There were, however, two ethical issues that I addressed but did
not resolve fully: (a) my husband’s role as informant, and, consequently, his free choice
in this research; and (b) how I could benefit the study’s participants.
On the matter of intimacy between researchers and participants, Wolcott (2010)
wrote that “one wonders whether intimacy itself is ever desirable when the threat of
possible discovery or betrayal lurks in every ethnographic report, revealing things told in
confidence, or inadvertently reporting something that embarrasses the teller” (p. 117).
My husband’s voice was peppered throughout the ethnography that I wrote in Fall 2013
(see chapter three), and when I shared that report with him, he said, “I would have left
some things out, but you saw what you saw and heard what you heard.” I do not think
that I coerced my husband; he participated freely and signed consent forms attesting as
much. He, generally, welcomed my inquiries. He also introduced me to gatekeepers and
allowed me to shadow him. I absorbed his ethos and was received better by emergency
room personnel for it. He also, however, was defensive at times and did not always like
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the mirror that I held up to his profession. We argued about a number of things, but in
the end, we made peace, because, as he said, I saw what I saw and I heard what I heard.
For this study, however, I limited his participation because it could have affected
adversely my subjectivity and threatened his privacy. There were two exceptions when
his perspective was invaluable and necessary for this report: submitting to formal EMR
training and working with scribes. Apart from these instances, I did not observe him
during my fieldwork.
Frey at al. (2000) maintained that, if there is any way possible, research
participants should benefit from research, and Goodall (2000) asked, “What should you
be expected to give back to those whom you lived with and studied?” (p. 154). After
more than a year with the emergency room staff members at Hospital H, I felt obliged to
repay their kindness and honesty. That feeling was cemented on October 10, 2014, when
I conducted a joint interview with a physician and the nurse manager, Q. They were very
forthcoming about their strained interactions with administrators, and they seemed
despondent as they pondered the EMR installation. Q paused and said, “I’m telling you
all of this because you’re here to help us. You’re like one of us.” Later, I wrote in my
journal, “Q’s admission triggered a strong reaction. I need to give back. I’m taking for
the sake of my dissertation, but other than Goldfish crackers and a sympathetic ear, I’ve
not given much.”
I spoke with Dr. Eric Eisenberg (University of South Florida) about what I could
or should do for the providers at Hospital H, because he has used his work in emergency
rooms to improve communication among providers and between providers and
administrators (see, e.g., Eisenberg et al., 2005, 2006). Dr. Eisenberg suggested that I
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start by preparing a summary of my findings for Hospital H’s administrators, being
certain to incorporate providers’ concerns and suggestions into that report. I will
complete and present that document during Summer 2015.
Lastly, as Van Maanen (2011) noted, “Ethnography irrevocably influences the
interests and lives of the people represented in them––individually and collectively, for
better or worse” (p. 5). I hope that this ethnography influences people for the better, but
“there is no way of seeing, hearing, or representing the world of others that is absolutely,
universally valid or correct” (Van Maanen, p. 35). In conclusion, I refer to Wolcott’s
(2010) sentiments on ethics, which I have taken to heart:
I am not so sure that ours is an ethical line of work––in the course of finding out
everything we want to know, we can’t help finding out things we do not want, or
need, to know. . . . I have told the truth. But I have not told everything, even
about my self. I am silent about some things, but what I have told is true. I am
guided by an old proverb that reminds us that if you tell the truth you don’t have
to try to remember what you told them the last time! For me, that is about as
close as I can come to defining the real lesson of ethics” (pp. 123, 124).
In summary, I conducted 145 hours of participant observation and numerous
ethnographic, informant, and respondent interviews that were shaped by sensitizing
concepts that were derived from structuration theory, adaptive structuration theory, and
SD theory. Findings from my preliminary research and literature review also guided
observations and interviews. I administered a questionnaire, which assessed providers’
perceptions of emergency medicine work, EMR adoption, and career satisfaction, as well
as measured SD and burnout. I also analyzed several documents, including memoranda
and training manuals, to better understand Hospital H’s EMR adoption. To address
validity concerns, I triangulated findings by comparing information gleaned from
participant observation, interviews, and questionnaires. I addressed subjectivity by
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acknowledging ways in which my husband and key informant, Dr. C., influenced my
perspective and preliminary research. To limit his influence and to treat him ethically
(providing free choice and protecting his privacy), I restricted his role in this study. I
behaved as ethically as I could by offering participants freedom of choice, protecting
their privacy, shielding them from harm, and treating them with respect. Moreover, I
have presented the findings honestly. Although my research has not yet benefited
participants, I am committed to trying to improve their working conditions and their
communication with administrators. I now explain how the collected data were analyzed.
Data Analysis
Analyzing fieldnotes and other textual data involved three steps: data
management, data reduction, and conceptual development (Lindlof & Tylor, 2011). Data
management involves categorizing and sorting, data reduction “means that the use value
of evidence is prioritized according to emerging schemes of interpretation,” and
conceptual development involves recognizing the links between themes, which become
“more dense and elaborate” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 243) throughout the analysis
process. I managed the data that I gleaned from participant observations and interviews,
first and foremost, by “identifying patterns of behavior,” which are the “precursor to
finding themes” (Wolcott, 2010, p. 39).
I began with open coding the data, which is “the initial, unrestricted coding”
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 250) of data to generate categories. During a second round
of open coding, I incorporated in vivo coding, which involves “coding the terms used by
social actors to characterize their own scene” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 251). For
example, routinely, providers mentioned “gaming the system,” which included
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techniques and EMR workarounds for avoiding poor metrics reports. Sensitizing
concepts guided the sorting process and determined inclusion or exclusion of categories
for further analysis. For example, I recorded many instances of food politics playing out
in the emergency room, but those instances were excluded from analysis, because,
although food politics are an important aspect of emergency room culture, they bear little
relevance on EMR adoption processes. Thus, in sorting data, I also reduced those data to
the most salient and applicable categories from which I could derive themes.
I used Owen’s (1984) three criteria for identifying and classifying categories and
themes. According to Owen, a theme emerges when there are (a) recurring descriptions,
phrases, or utterances with the same meaning, irrespective of wording; (b) repeated use of
the same wording; and (c) forcefulness of expression, as evidenced in vocal pitch and/or
volume. In reviewing my fieldnotes, interview data, and other data-collection
procedures, I identified and refined 15 themes that were evident in talk and/or action that
was connected to the EMR: (a) assessment, use, and/or rejection of the EMR and its
features, including reactance; (b) interactions with or about patients; (c) orders and order
entry; (d) chitchat and/or griping about the EMR, which supported relational growth
and/or support; (e) EMR workaround strategies; (f) EMR avoidance strategies; (g)
communication with or about administrators; (h) personal and/or career satisfaction; (i)
role hierarchy in the emergency room; (j) “us” versus “them” language, with “them”
being agents outside the emergency room, including administrators, specialists and
consulting physicians, nurses from other departments, and IT staff; (k) EMR training
issues, including role reversal and dissonance; (l) conflicting structures; (m) metrics and
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surveillance; (n) providers’ diminished agency; and (o) unintended consequences. Each
of these themes are discussed in further detail in chapter five.
During conceptual development, I reexamined the themes, reviewed the data
again, and revisited the theoretical frameworks. Some of the themes that I identified (i.e.,
g, h, k, m, and n) could be grouped together under a single theme of “structurational
divergence”; still others (i.e., a and c) could be folded into a broader theme that
encompassed “appropriation moves.” According to DeSanctis and Poole (1994), an
appropriation study should begin with a microlevel analysis of technology structures that
emerge in everyday talk, because “it is in specific instances of discourse that the
formation of new social structures begin” (p. 133). A global appropriation analysis then
follows, which examines whole conversations instead of isolated speech acts (DeSanctis
& Poole, 1994). Lastly, institutional-level appropriation involves a longitudinal analysis
that identifies persistent patterns across units (e.g., day and night shift) and users (e.g.,
physicians and nurses). I revisited the concept of “appropriation” by first reviewing my
fieldnotes and transcriptions for recurring adjectives that were used to describe EMRs; I,
then, looked for whole conversations about EMRs; and, finally, I linked those
conversations to day or night shifts, and to specific user types (e.g., physicians or nurses).
This conceptual development prompted me to recategorize and to expand the
appropriation theme and add several subthemes. I also regrouped, collapsed, and/or
expanded several other themes (see Table 4.1).
Analysis of the questionnaire data involved, primarily, tabulating frequencies and
percentages. Given the small sample size (N = 30), there were too few data points to
warrant more advanced statistical analysis (e.g., analysis of variance procedures) because
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Table 4.1
Themes and Subthemes for Identifying Structural Changes Amid an Electronic Medical
Records System Adoption

1.) Training

2.) Appropriation Moves

3.) Structurational Divergence

4.) Strategies

a.) role reversal
b.) dissonance and reactance
c.) peer-to-peer (e.g., nurse-to-nurse)
a.) direct use (implicit or explicit)
b.) relating the EMR to another structure (using and
then comparing the EMR with another structure)
c.) constraining the EMR (how the EMR is used and
interpreted; inlcudes asking questions about it,
offering advice, and commenting on its
performance)
d.) judging the EMR (praising or condemning)
a.) conflicting structures
b.) personal/career satisfaction (includes
intention to quit and burnout)
c.) “us” versus “them” interactions
d.) communication with/about administrators
e.) diminished agency/autonomy
a.) workarounds (includes “order dumping” and
using scribes)
b.) avoidance

5.) Communication
between Providers

a.) topics and frequency of talk
b.) relational support/growth (includes chitchat and
griping)

6.) Patients

a.) interactions with patients
b.) patients’ perceptions/satisfaction

7.) Unintended Consequences

a.) patients’ stories/truncated narratives
b.) billing
c.) metrics and surveillance (includes “gaming the
system”)
d.) providers’ ages and EMR use
e.) malpractice
f.) wage theft

Note: The appropriation moves and subthemes are adapted from DeSanctis and Poole,
1994.
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the tests would have lacked statistical power. Responses to the 17 SD items were
summed. The responses of “rarely,” “sometimes,” “moderately often,” “usually,” and
“very frequently” were coded 1 through 5, respectively, with items 4, 7, and 17,
appearing beneath prompt 7, reverse coded (see Appendix H). According to Dr.
Nicotera (personal communication, February 4, 2015), “A diagnosis of high SD is a score
(or group’s average score) above 51.” Responses to the burnout items (11 and 12) were
summed as well. The responses (“never,” “a few times a year or less,” “once a month or
less,” “a few times a month,” “once a week,” “a few times a week,” and “daily”) were
coded 0–6, with scores above 3 suggesting burnout (McManus et al., 2003).
In conclusion, data analysis was an iterative process that involved sorting,
classifying, reducing, and conceptually linking themes. From 15 initial themes, I arrived
at 7 major themes and several subthemes that reflected providers’ EMR systems-related
actions and talk. Most of the responses to the questionnaire items were tabulated and
reported in frequencies or percentages, with responses to SD and burnout items summed.
The results of the data analysis are presented in the next chapter.	
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS
This chapter presents data derived from fieldwork, in-depth interviews, document
analysis, and the questionnaire that indicated providers experienced structural changes in
the emergency room at Hospital H during and after portions of an electronic medical
records system (EMR) installation. Findings, described next, are grouped into seven
major themes: (a) EMR training for providers; (b) providers’ appropriation moves, which
include direct use, relating, constraining, and judging moves; (c) structurational
divergence, which include immobilization and negative communication spirals; (d)
providers’ strategies for coping with the EMR; (e) changes to providers’ communication
patterns; (f) how the EMR affects provider–patient interactions and patients’ experiences;
and (g) unintended consequences associated with the EMR.
Electronic Medical Records System Training for Providers
Key factors known to inhibit physicians’ learning, in general, include rolereversal tensions arising from hierarchically imbalanced relationships; cognitive
dissonance, which often is compounded by role-reversal tensions; and forced learning,
which invites reactance. My observations of physicians’ formal EMR training sessions
and informal EMR training episodes at Hospital H were planned with these factors in
mind. I also observed and recorded peer-to-peer EMR training episodes that occurred
among nurses and among midlevel providers. The findings from those observations are
discussed below. First, I describe role-reversal tensions, dissonance, and reactance that
was demonstrated in formal training sessions; next, I explore these considerations in the
context of informal training episodes; lastly, I discuss peer-to-peer training episodes and
implications for patient care.
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Role-reversal Tensions, Dissonance, and Reactance in Electronic Medical Records
Formal Training Sessions
As discussed in chapter two, lasting change happens only if people regard a
change as compatible with their other tasks and behaviors, are willing to learn a new
process, and feel safe in the learning environment (Lewin, 1947). Nesterkin (2013),
however, pointed out that forced learning amid change invites reactance, defined, in
chapter two, as the motivational state following a threat to or elimination of freedom that
aims to restore that freedom and/or to resist the endorsed behavior (Brehm, 1966; Brehm
& Brehm, 1981). Reactance, typically, triggers hostile and aggressive feelings (Brehm,
1966) and is based on the premise that individuals value choice and that threats to
autonomy invite resistance (Nesterkin). Forced learning “requires a certain degree of
deviation from one’s existing preconceived ideas which is often seen as inherently
undermining one’s autonomy” (Nesterkin, p. 573). Moreover, in the context of EMR
adoption in emergency rooms, “many physicians find order entry is a task better
performed by others, reducing their motivation for learning” (Lærum et al., 2005, p. 9).
Another factor that inhibits physicians’ willingness to learn, in general, is
dissonance (Barley, 1985; Nambisan et al., 2013), defined, in chapter two, as “the
existence of nonfitting relations among cognitions” (Festinger, 1957, p. 3). Physicians’
lack of knowledge about how to use an EMR often leads them “to view themselves as
novices . . . [and] the juxtaposition between concurrent roles of (medical) ‘expert’ and
‘novice’ creates a high degree of cognitive dissonance” (Nambisan et al., 2013, p. 4).
Reversing hierarchical structures of physician–nurse or physician–technician
relationships during training further increases physicians’ cognitive dissonance, which, in
turn, increases “physician resistance toward learning and sharing knowledge” (Nambisan
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et al., 2013, p. 5). This type of cognitive dissonance can “lead to emotional tension and
avoidance of learning” (Robinson et al., 2003, p. 432), especially as physicians grapple
with new technology.
Reactance and dissonance were sensitizing concepts that shaped my observations
of two formal training sessions at Hospital H, which I defined as planned meetings that
occur outside of the emergency room between medical providers and designated trainers
for the purpose of EMR and/or computerized physician order entry (CPOE) system
education. Early in the EMR adoption process, formal training sessions were mandatory
for physicians, which, predictably, triggered reactance. Moreover, physicians were not
paid for the many 2–3-hour sessions that they attended, which further exacerbated their
frustrations. Even more infuriating, from the perspective of many physicians, were
ongoing EMR upgrades, which meant that lessons learned in prior training sessions were
not applicable to new and evolving EMR features.
In June 2014, Hospital H’s chief executive officer (CEO) sent an e-mail to all of
the physicians that acknowledged their frustrations with the EMR adoption process.
Reading the e-mail aloud, Dr. C said, “Administration understands implementation of the
McKesson EMR did not go as smoothly as expected, and recent experience has been less
than gratifying; however, the administrative team has been working to fix it and we are
ready to relaunch.” The relaunch would require additional mandatory training. Dr. C
continued reading aloud, “Physicians must complete training prior to June 30 and, while
we recognize the burden of another training event, we want to assure you of the necessity
and usefulness of this training program.” Two 2-hour sessions, which would be led by a
former McKesson Corporation employee, were compulsory for all physicians and
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midlevel providers. As Dr. C lamented, “I have 3 days off for the rest of the month and I
have to spend two of them at the hospital, not getting paid, so I can learn how to use a
piece of crap EMR that doesn’t work.” His reaction to the decree suggested that the
formal training session would elicit reactance from providers.
I observed the formal EMR training sessions attended by Dr. C the following
week. The trainer, PJ, showed up in surgical scrubs despite having no medical
background––she had been a computer programmer with McKesson and, later, she joined
Hospital H’s information technology (IT) department. Dr. C regarded her attire with
suspicion and asked her where she had completed her medical training. PJ did not
respond and, instead, opened the session by stating, “McKesson will make changes [to
the EMR] if patient safety is impacted, but they [sic] typically don’t prioritize userfriendly suggestions.” Dr. C’s response was curt, “Well, okay then, so you’re saying
keep my opinions to myself. My opinions and experience don’t count?”
Later, as Dr. C sat in front of the EMR, he clicked through a series of boxes and
commented that the multiple “confirm” screens following each medication order that he
entered into the CPOE slowed charting. PJ said, in response to Dr. C’s comment, “It [the
confirm screen] helps you make better clinical decisions. It makes you think about what
you just ordered and if it was the right decision.” Dr. C’s response was the first example
of dissonance that I observed in the session (which I confirmed when he reported, in a
think-aloud session that followed the training, feeling both anger and frustration). He
turned to PJ and asked, “Did the computer go to medical school? What about the
computer programmer who designed it; did that person go to medical school?” PJ did not
acknowledge his statements but, instead, redirected the conversation to another topic.

180

Throughout the 2-hour training session, there were several terse exchanges in
which Dr. C verbalized his frustrations with the EMR, with PJ, largely, ignoring or
negating his observations. For example, when Dr. C asked if the EMR could be modified
to allow more space for free text to type detailed accounts of patients’ complaints and
symptoms, PJ responded, “We don’t like free text because it’s hard for the system to
recognize it. Try to select from the checkboxes because they’ve been coded and already
are in the database.” Dr. C replied, “So stick with check boxes because it’s easier for the
billing department?” He paused, and then continued, “What about what’s easier for the
physician?” PJ, who looked exacerbated at that point, sighed and retorted, “Look, every
part of our documentation system is moving toward electronic. It will happen.” Dr. C
replied, “I hope I’m not working here when it does. These things [EMRs] are not ready
for prime time and it impacts patient care.”
In addition to dissonance, physicians’ reactance also was evident throughout the
session. As described in chapter two, psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966)
proposes relationships among freedoms, threats, reactance, and (attempted) restoration of
freedoms. Direct restoration involves performing the forbidden act (in this case, using
paper charts), but freedom may be restored, symbolically, by increasing liking for the
forbidden choice, by disparaging the source of the threat, or by exercising other freedoms
to maximize feelings of control (Quick et al., 2013). Dr. C expressed repeatedly his
preference for paper charts with statements such as, “Paper is so much faster,” “I can find
everything in one chart, instead of clicking through a bunch of screens,” and “Paper
charts have room to write, not just a bunch of check boxes.” Reactance and symbolic
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restoration of freedoms are described later in more detail (see the discussion on
structurational divergence and loss of autonomy).
After the training session came to an uneasy end, I asked Dr. C about his
exchanges with PJ. He acknowledged that he was angry at being forced to sit through
another training session for which he was not paid. Moreover, he was upset that his
concerns were either minimized or ignored. As Dr. C elaborated:
I don’t know anything about this woman. She wears scrubs, but she’s obviously
not a physician. She hasn’t practiced medicine. She had no idea what I was
talking about in terms of patient care issues. I didn’t mean to seem like a jerk but
she doesn’t understand the repercussions. She just keeps saying, “We’re going
electronic,” but what she showed me today isn’t ready. I can’t function in a busy
emergency room with a system that slows me down and can lead to mistakes. It
pisses me off that they make us use these stupid EMRs instead of TSheets. If I
was a jerk, then I’m sorry, but no one seems to be listening to us, the end users.
Dr. C’s description of the encounter contains allusions to role-reversal tensions,
dissonance, and reactance. The trainer’s nonmedical background meant that, in Dr. C’s
estimation, she should have deferred to his acumen on matters pertaining to patients’
safety. Instead, as he implied, she directed the exchange and disregarded his status as a
medical expert by insisting that “we’re going electronic,” which triggered Dr. C’s anger,
annoyance, and frustration (i.e., dissonance). Dr. C’s reference to forced adoption was
followed by his stated preference for paper charts (which demonstrated a symbolic
restoration of freedom).
Because dissonance and reactance can hinder learning, as noted above, I asked
Dr. C if he learned anything about the EMR during his training session. He said, “No,
not really. It might save me a few clicks, but I don’t think I learned anything new today.”
I asked four other physicians what they learned after their respective training sessions,
and all of them said, more or less, “Nothing new.” All of them commented that the EMR
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training would have been more productive had they been given user manuals or handouts.
I asked if they would have preferred handouts in lieu of their mandatory sessions with PJ,
to which three responded, “Yeah.” I asked several physicians if they, like Dr. C, found
their training sessions with PJ difficult, and the consensus was that their sessions, largely,
were unproductive. I scheduled an interview with PJ to discuss her thoughts on the
physicians’ training sessions, but she later canceled the interview and did not respond to
subsequent e-mailed requests.
A second trainer I later observed, K, did consent to a follow-up EMR training
interview in March 2015. During that interview, K confessed that training physicians
was difficult, particularly if they regarded her as an outsider; consequently, she made a
point of highlighting her past work as a physical and occupational therapist. “I know
that’s not the same as being a doctor or nurse,” she explained, “but I’m not a complete
outsider either. I’ve done charting, so I know what it’s like.” Nonetheless, she admitted
that some of the physicians at Hospital H were difficult to deal with, and she attributed
their frustrations to the forced adoption. As K elaborated:
They’re being made to learn something that’s very different. There are different
cognitive processes involved [than when using paper charts], and that means it’s
going to be a strain for the physicians for a while. We have to honor that, let them
complain, and blow off steam. It’s natural, but some trainers take it personally
and get nasty right back.
I asked if she was referring to PJ, whose reaction to Dr. C’s criticism of the EMR, in my
opinion, bordered on “nasty.” K shrugged and said:
I’m just saying you can’t do that. You can’t disrespect them [physicians]. Give
them their space and let them gripe. They need to vent. If I nod and listen to their
complaints, they feel like they’ve been heard, and then we can get on with the
training.
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K’s strategy seemed to produce better results than did PJ’s approach. Following Dr. C’s
session with K, I asked him to describe it, and he said, “I liked her. She wrote down
some of my suggestions. I have more confidence that it [the EMR] will get improved.” I
asked if he learned anything new, and he replied, “Yeah, I did learn some new things. I
learned some shortcuts that should help save time when I’m charting.”
Whereas K was forthcoming, PJ declined to discuss her experiences, but I
learned, secondhand, how PJ felt about training physicians. In a phone interview that I
conducted in October 2014 with SR, the head of the IT department, he explained that PJ
was “beyond frustrated” with the physicians. I asked SR if role-reversal tensions affected
the training, and he lamented that the hierarchical imbalance was problematic. He
blamed physicians, stating, “Opportunities have been available in a controlled
environment, but they’ve been rebuffed.” When I asked him to elaborate, he shared the
following story:
PJ has a set curriculum, one-on-one training, but it was optional training and the
ED [emergency department] staff was resistant to commit to the additional time
needed for training. Trust me, they [sic] need the training. For example, some
CPOE items are not being signed off by the physicians. They need to
acknowledge certain medication orders and click the boxes, but they’re not doing
it. The physicians think they know it all and they don’t want training from an
outsider. They wouldn’t come to us, so PJ ended up going to the ED, which is not
a neutral space, because there are lots of distractions. She tried to do training, but
the doc didn’t want to engage her. He left and went to the cafeteria. He didn’t
have the respect to come back and finish the training.
I pointed out that training was mandatory, not optional, as SR indicated, and I noted that I
observed two training sessions and interviewed several physicians who had attended oneon-one sessions, to which he replied, “I don’t know who has done what and with whom.
There’s no consistency with the providers.” I wrote in my notes, “His reply suggests
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there is no consistency among administrators either, certainly not with respect to
communication, especially if he doesn’t know the CEO mandated training.”
I asked the emergency room director, Dr. F, and my sponsor, Q, about SR’s story.
Dr. F was not aware of the incident that SR described but he shared his experience of an
impromptu training session:
I’m here one morning and the place is hopping; we have two chest pains and
another on the way. PJ shows up, unannounced, and says, “I’m here for your
training.” Are you kidding me? I’m treating patients. I don’t have time for this.
No heads up, nothing.
Q noted that she and Dr. F had twice scheduled formal training sessions for
nurses, only to have training canceled at the last minute, without explanation, by IT staff.
Additionally, Q was adamant that she would not schedule additional training sessions
until all of the remaining EMR components (e.g., the generic, electronic TSheets) were
developed fully and ready for launch, saying:
I’m not going to schedule any more training until they bring us all of the TSheets;
otherwise, it’s a waste of time to schedule physicians and nurses to show up, and
there’s nothing to show them. I scheduled training last December, but we had to
cancel because IT [staff members] didn’t have anything ready. They didn’t have
a single TSheet.
Q noted that she and the nursing staff actually had coordinated most of the EMR and
CPOE training, informally, for themselves. As she said, “We taught ourselves how to use
it. We went over it together, figured out how to use it, and we did it without
administration getting involved.” Informal training episodes, such as those described by
Q, are discussed next.
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Role-reversal Tensions, Dissonance, and Reactance in Electronic Medical Records
Informal Training Episodes
I defined an informal EMR training episode as any situation that occurs in the
emergency room when a provider (typically, a physician) solicits or receives help using
the EMR or CPOE from another provider; typically, a nurse or mid-level provider
(special consideration is given in the next section to training episodes between
hierarchically matched providers). As discussed in chapter two, because physicians,
generally, “do not want to spend time learning new computer systems” (Brooks & Grotz,
2010, p. 81), nurses, midlevel providers, and/or technicians are trained to use EMRs and
then tasked with training physicians. Although this approach reverses the hierarchical
structure of providers’ relationships, it is not without problems but, as described above,
the tactic remains commonplace. In an e-mail exchange with one of Hospital H’s vice
presidents, she explained that Hospital H’s approach to training and support included
reliance on super-users, defined as designated nurses and midlevel provides with
advanced training on EMR and CPOE features who have been appointed to facilitate
physicians’ proper utilization of the technology. Super-users are supposed to be available
to answer questions, assist with order entry, and troubleshoot.
Nurse B, one of my key informants, explained that the super-user designation at
Hospital H was confusing because no two super-users were skilled equally in using the
EMR’s various components. For example, nurses’ notes and the CPOE were separate
programs, and, eventually, the electronic TSheet would represent a third program, and
none of the super-users could navigate expertly all three facets of the EMR. Furthermore,
because many physicians had no way of differentiating among the super-users, physicians
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tended to direct their inquiries to whoever was closest physically. B, who is not a superuser, recalled being asked repeatedly by a physician for help using the CPOE:
I just kept saying, “I don’t know how to use the CPOE,” but the doc got frustrated
because he was having trouble putting in an order. Finally, a midlevel helped him
out. It puts us [nurses] in an awkward position, because we don’t have to use the
CPOE to do our jobs, so why would we know how to use it?
Recognizing that super-user variability was a problem, an administrator decided
that all of the nurses should receive special training on how to use the electronic TSheets
to facilitate electronic TSheet implementation by assisting physicians during the
transition. B complained that although nurses would not use the TSheets to document
patient care, they would be required to sit through additional training nonetheless.8
Several nurses remarked that they were dreading the additional stress of training
physicians. I asked if their reticence was because they anticipated role-reversal tensions,
which, as described above, often elicit physicians’ dissonance and reactance. One of the
nurses replied, “It’ll be more work for us, but we won’t get paid more to do it. It adds to
our job stress.” Another nurse, A, remarked, “I’m not comfortable telling the docs what
to do. They’re [physicians] fine; they’ve never been mean about it, but I just don’t want
to be in that position.”
Nurse A’s admission prompted me to review my fieldnotes. I had recorded
dozens of informal EMR training episodes between physicians and super-users, and I had
described repeatedly those episodes as “friendly exchanges between coworkers.” Thinkaloud sessions conducted with physicians that followed these episodes had not produced
evidence of dissonance (e.g., fear, anger, unease, discomfort, annoyance, or frustration).
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The training was delayed several times, and, as of May 2015, training had not been
rescheduled.
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Most physicians were very forthcoming about their inability to navigate the EMR, and
they asked for help gladly. Although many physicians expressed reactance in these
episodes—namely, by expressing their preference for the forbidden choice (i.e., paper
charts)—their hostility was not directed at the super-users who assisted them; more often
than not, physicians and super-users cursed the EMR together. I asked Dr. C why he
believed that role-reversal considerations and dissonance did not appear to be factors in
informal training episodes, and he explained, “These guys are my coworkers; we all sink
or swim together. The trainers, I don’t know them from Adam, and they could care less
if I sink.”
I had not considered previously that nurses and midlevel providers would
experience role-reversal tensions during EMR training episodes, let alone dissonance, but
I began soliciting think-aloud statements from them following such episodes. N, a
midlevel provider, said, “I have some angst about being a super-user, whatever that
means. I know the system better than they [physicians] do, but, at the same time, I’m not
on par with them. It’s awkward.” Another midlevel provider later echoed N’s assertion:
It really changes the dynamic of the relationship, and I’m not sure I’m
comfortable with it. I’m not trying to one up the doc but here’s this guy who
knows way more than me and I’m the one telling him what to do? I don’t want
the doc thinking that I think I’m better or know more than him.
I asked nurses and midlevel providers how they interpreted physicians’ behavior
and comments during informal training episodes. With the exception of two physicians,
who, as nurses described them, were “hierarchically minded,” most physicians were
polite and expressed their appreciation for the help that nurses offered. Nonetheless, no
one with whom I spoke welcomed the prospect of being designated a super-user.
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Peer-to-peer training issues. Among the designated super-users, several nurses
expressed their frustrations at having to engage in peer-to-peer EMR training episodes,
defined as hierarchically matched informal EMR training episodes that occur in the
emergency room among nurses or among midlevel providers. Nurse super-users
complained that they often were tasked with training temporary nurses who were called
in to cover staffing shortages. Although many of these temporary nurses “worked the
floor” at Hospital H (i.e., the intensive care unit), the EMR interface that they were
accustomed to using was very different from the version that was used in the emergency
room. One of the super-users I observed, M, spent more than 30 minutes helping an
“upstairs nurse” to insert a battery into the computer-on-wheels (COW), boot up the
system, and then sign onto the EMR. He remarked, “They send these nurses down who
have no idea what to do, no training, nothing. It’s up to me. This just takes time away
from me being able to see patients.”
Nurses bemoaning time spent training others instead of engaging in direct patient
care also was a recurring theme. M explained that new users who arrived in the
emergency room did not solve staffing shortages but, instead, intensified them:
Say we’re short a nurse and the floor sends someone down. If that person hasn’t
used our EMR before, I have to show her everything. Guess what? That means
that instead of an extra nurse, you’re actually down by two. I’m teaching the new
nurse and neither one of us is seeing patients. That leaves 2 nurses to cover 20
beds, which is a nightmare. Without that extra help [the floor nurse], we’d at least
have three nurses working.
Situations such as the one that M described have far-reaching consequences: patients do
not receive medications in a timely fashion; procedures that require nurses’ assistance,
such as suturing lacerations or performing pelvic exams, are delayed; and metrics that
track patients’ lengths of stay go up, causing providers’ performance reviews to go down.
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Group affiliation (i.e., floor nurses vs. emergency room nurses) appeared to
influence nurses’ perceptions of peer-to-peer EMR training episodes. Compared to
emergency room nurses, upstairs or floor nurses enjoy lower nurse–patient ratios and
they care for patients who, generally, are more stable medically (Eisenberg et al., 2005).
Additionally, floor nurses often grapple with the emergency room staff during patient
admissions (Eisenberg et al., 2005; Nicotera et al., 2010). The perceived imbalance in
workloads and floor nurses’ tendency to resist patient admissions leads many emergency
room nurses to regard floor nurses with disdain (Eisenberg et al., 2005). M alluded to
this perception that floor nurses are not well liked by emergency room staff when he said,
“I don’t mind helping my crew but the upstairs nurses get on my nerves.” Nurse J echoed
M’s assertions, saying that floor nurses “just show up and expect us to stop what we’re
doing and do everything for them. It’s ridiculous. Now, if you’re new and you’re ER,
that’s different. We take care of our own.” Floor nurses, thus, are cast as “them” in a
continual “us” versus “them” divide (see the discussion later on structurational
divergence).
Peer-to-peer EMR training between midlevel providers, generally, was more
pleasant than exchanges that I witnessed between emergency room nurses and floor
nurses. Because only midlevel providers work in the emergency room, “us” versus
“them” dynamics were not an issue. Along with their nurse coworkers, midlevel
providers expressed concern that time spent teaching one another to use the EMR was
time taken away from patients. They cited frequent EMR updates for necessitating
regular peer-to-peer training. As N explained:
Every time they do an update, all of our templates get wiped out. Someone has to
go back in and set them up again, but not everyone knows how to set up a

	
  

190

favorites list or set up shortcuts. I’m happy to help out and teach people, but it
takes time and the patients wait longer. In a lot of ways, it’s wasted time, because
the hospital’s not making money if I’m not seeing patients.
I observed N show another midlevel provider how to alphabetize the list of medication
orders: N spent 16 minutes completing that task and another 5 minutes explaining how he
had done it, 21 minutes that could have been spent providing patient care but, instead,
was wasted time (because it was unbillable).
Peer-to-peer training, despite its shortcomings, was necessary because there were
not enough trainers to train and support emergency room users adequately on an ongoing
basis. Moreover, Hospital H’s trainers were not well regarded by the emergency room
staff, and forced learning scenarios, likely, would have generated reactance akin to what
physicians experienced in their formal training sessions. Nurses bemoaned regularly the
mandatory electronic TSheet training, complained that it would prove “a pointless waste
of time,” and they rejoiced when it was postponed indefinitely.
As described previously, Q praised the emergency room staff members for
teaching themselves how to use the EMR “without administration getting involved,” but
IT staff members found fault with emergency room staff members’ approach. The trainer
I interviewed, K, informed me that many of the nurses and midlevel providers were not
using EMR features correctly:
Bad habits were passed from one person to the next, and, now, no one is using the
system the way it was intended. Basically, no one voiced any concerns or issues,
no one asked questions. I could have addressed some of the problems they were
encountering, which were tied to user error and were not necessarily flaws with
the system, but now it’s too late. They’ve already formed habits.
According to K, the staff’s maladaptive training strategies complicated ordering
procedures, compromised efficient charting, and eroded users’ satisfaction with the EMR.
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In sum, formal EMR training sessions, as expected, triggered dissonance and
reactance in physicians. Hierarchically imbalanced relationships exacerbated rolereversal tensions for physicians during formal training sessions, but not during informal
training episodes. Instead, nurses and midlevel providers reported that they experienced
feelings associated with dissonance (e.g., unease and discomfort) when they trained
physicians in the emergency room. Peer-to-peer training delayed patient care and
aggravated tensions between emergency room nurses and floor nurses. Additionally,
poor practice habits were passed on in peer-to-peer sessions, which diminished users’
satisfaction with many of the EMR’s features. Next, I describe findings associated with
EMR users’ appropriation moves.
Appropriation Moves
According to DeSanctis and Poole (1994), appropriation moves describe the
interplay between technology structures and action (i.e., how people use technology). As
explained in chapter three, adaptive structuration theory (AST) identifies four
appropriation moves: agents may choose to (a) directly use the technology, (b) relate the
technology’s structure to other structures in the environment (e.g., make conceptual
linkages between an EMR and other tasks, or compare it with other structures), (c)
constrain or interpret the technology while it is in use, and/or (d) make judgments about
the technology (e.g., praising or condemning its performance). Appropriation moves can
vary across groups as a function of users’ attitudes: users may be confident in the
technology’s abilities, they may doubt its usefulness, or they may believe that they lack
the necessary skills to use it effectively (DeSanctis & Poole).
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An appropriation study, according to DeSanctis and Poole (1994), should begin
with a microlevel analysis of technology structures that emerge in everyday talk (e.g.,
recurring words or phrases describing the technology), followed by a global appropriation
analysis of whole conversations, and conclude with an institutional-level, longitudinal
analysis of patterns across units (e.g., day and night shift) and users (e.g., physicians and
nurses). As described in chapter four, I reviewed the data for recurring words and
phrases that providers used to describe the EMR; I studied whole conversations about the
EMR; and, lastly, I linked those conversations to day or night shifts, and to specific user
types. Below, I present findings from each phase of analysis. I begin by sharing briefly
the microanalysis results, and, then, I focus on the global and institutional analyses for
each of the four appropriation moves (i.e., direct use, relating, constraining, and judging).
Microanalysis
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) argued that “written or spoken discussion about the
technology is particularly important since this is evidence of people bringing the
technology into the social context” (p. 133). Studying the process of technology
introduction begins with a microanalysis, which “examines the appropriation of
technology structures as it occurs in sentences, turns of speech, or other specific speech
acts” (DeSanctis & Poole, p. 133). As a participant observer at Hospital H, I produced
162 pages of fieldnotes that contained references to over 500 exchanges about the EMR.
During data analysis, I compiled a list of the 12 most common words and phrases that
providers used to describe the EMR. “Frustrating” appeared most often, followed by
“slow,” “hard to use,” and “difficult.” Using the list of recurring words and phrases (see
Table 5.1), and “as a method of showing an innovative way to textually analyze data”
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Table 5.1
Microanalysis of Providers’ Talk: The 12 Words and Phrases Used Most Frequently to
Describe the Electronic Medical Records System
Word or Phrase

No. of Occurrences

Frustrating

450

Slow

307

Hard to use

267

Difficult

250

Confusing

212

Not user-friendly

201

I hate them!

167

Waste of money

80

Patients don’t like them

72

Okay

68

They’re better than paper charts

52

Have potential

47

(Tracy & Geist-Martin, 2014, p. 255), I developed a word cloud to highlight the
comparative dominance of each word or phrase (see Figure 5.1), with the size of the font
paralleling the number of times that the word or phrase appeared.
As discussed in chapter two, how people talk about an innovation or new
technology influences its adoption (Leonardi, 2009; Vishwanath, 2009). My
microanalysis of providers’ speech acts at Hospital H revealed that talk about the EMR,
largely, was negative. Of the 12 most common words or phrases that were used to
describe the EMR, 9 were negative, 2 were neutral (“Okay” and “Have potential”), and
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Figure 5.1. Word Cloud Illustrating the Words and Phrases Used Most by Providers to
Describe the Electronic Medical Record System
only a single phrase (“They’re better than paper charts”) was positive. Most of the
neutral and positive comments were made by nurses, which is in line with research
showing that nurses, compared to physicians, generally, have been more accepting of
EMRs (Lærum et al., 2004; Likourezos et al., 2004, Otieno et al., 2007; Weiner et al.,
1999). Overall, though, providers’ attitudes about the EMR, reflected in the words and
phrases that they used to describe it, were negative.
Noor et al. (2012) cautioned that the most “important step towards implementing
[technology] adoption is to change the psyche of a user from ‘reluctant’ to ‘willing’” (p.
19); however, the results of my microanalysis suggest that users at Hospital H, generally,
were “reluctant” and, thus, not willing to embrace the EMR. Although the microanalysis
examined only isolated speech acts, global and institutional analyses explored whole
conversations, and over an 18-month period, the results suggest that the majority of
providers remained reluctant about the EMR throughout the entirety of the study. Next, I
describe the global and institutional analyses of each of the four appropriation moves.
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Global and Institutional Analyses of Direct Use
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) described scenarios in which would-be users could
choose to interact with or ignore new technologies. Under such conditions, individuals
who choose to use a new technology do so through direct use, which, according to
DeSanctis and Poole, is either implicit (i.e., agents use the technology but do not refer to
it) or explicit (i.e., agents use and refer to the technology). Expanding the definition of
explicit use, it is technology use accompanied by neutral commentary that references or
describes the technology in action (DeSanctis & Poole). Additionally, explicit use does
not compare or relate the technology to other structures. Negatively framed talk that
disparages the technology and, simultaneously, compares it to another structure (e.g.,
“Paper charts are better than poorly designed EMRs”) would not be considered explicit
use but, instead, would be considered a constraining move, whereas condemnation
without comparison (e.g., “EMRs are a waste of money”) would be classified as a
judging move.
Given these parameters, and because the EMR adoption at Hospital H was forced
(i.e., providers could not ignore the EMR), I did not record instances of freely chosen
direct use; nearly all of the appropriation moves that I documented were relating,
constraining, or judging moves. Moreover, neutral commentary was rare. Nonetheless,
examples of what would be considered implicit use or explicit use in other contexts (i.e.,
situations where providers could choose to use or ignore an EMR, respectively) merit
mention.
What would be considered implicit use in free-choice scenarios was observed
during all of my visits to Hospital H. Day shifts (from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m.) produced more
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examples of implicit use when compared with night shifts, because patient volumes,
generally, peaked during day shift hours, which meant that providers who worked during
day shifts often were too occupied with tasks to refer to or discuss the EMR. The EMR’s
introduction, ironically, compounded providers’ workloads, further reducing their
available time for discussion or commentary (see the section below on communication
between providers). Implicit use, typically, consisted of a provider sitting at an EMR or
standing at a COW, clicking a computer mouse, and typing on a keyboard. Nurses used
an additional component, a scanner, to scan and record barcoded medication labels and
patients’ barcoded wristbands.
Examples of what would be considered explicit use in free-choice scenarios were
recorded across both day and night shifts; however, it was more common at night.
Explicit use was observed among all user types (i.e., physicians, midlevel providers, and
nurses). Commentary included phrases such as, “The EMR’s flashing; that must mean
labs [laboratory test results] are back,” “The [electronic] whiteboard just updated the
patient list,” and “New medication orders are highlighted in red.” Despite these
examples, explicit use was uncommon. Discussions that compared the EMR with other
structures (i.e., relating) or commented on its performance (e.g., constraining or judging)
were more common.
To review, examples of what would have been implicit use in free-choice
scenarios were commonplace, especially during day shifts when providers were too busy
for conversation. Examples of what would have been explicit use in free-choice
scenarios occurred frequently at night. Because the EMR adoption was forced, evidence
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of direct use was limited compared with examples of relating, constraining, and judging
moves, which are described in the following sections.
Global and Institutional Analyses of Relating Moves
Relating a new technology to other structures is a measure of how well that
technology has been integrated into the system. Providers at Hospital H related the EMR
to other structures in two ways: first, by using the EMR in conjunction with other
structures; and, second, by comparing the EMR with other structures and then discussing
the comparison. I observed the first mode of relating when providers used the EMR
frequently in conjunction with paper charts. During each of my visits, physicians and
midlevel providers combined paper TSheets and paper order sets with the EMR and
CPOE to complete documentation tasks and to admit or discharge patients. Nurses often
reviewed physicians’ completed TSheets for information that they then used to augment
their electronic notes. Providers also used the EMR in combination with the X-ray
display system, the medication-dispensing system, printers, and fax machines. The EMR,
as evidenced by these examples of relating, appeared well integrated into Hospital H’s
emergency room operations; however, the EMR was not well liked, which affected my
observations of the second mode of relating.
The second mode of relating involves comparing a new technology with another
structure and then discussing the comparison using neutral phrases (DeSanctis & Poole,
1994), fact-based phrases that do not convey judgment or attribute value to the EMR.
For example, “The EMR produces the same amount of paper as do paper-based charting
systems,” conveys a fact and does not impart judgment. Given that many of Hospital H’s
providers disliked the EMR (57% of respondents who completed the questionnaire
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reported being dissatisfied with it), and given that my microanalysis of providers’ speech
acts revealed that the nine most common words used to describe the EMR were negative,
neutral phrases about the EMR were infrequent.
Despite providers’ negative talk about their EMR, there were enough occurrences
of providers comparing the EMR with other structures and then discussing the
comparison, in neutral terms, for themes to emerge. Reviewing my fieldnotes for
evidence of relating revealed four themes that characterized providers’ talk about the
EMR: (a) how the EMR changed their workflow patterns (e.g., how much time it took
providers to complete charting, duplication of work, and perceived cognitive disruptions
to task management), (b) the completeness of (or amount of data in) the medical record,
(c) the EMR’s spirit (i.e., the EMR’s design and features), and (d) the EMR’s
performance. Findings for each theme are reported below.
Workflow changes. As discussed in chapter two, EMRs change how work is
done in emergency rooms. For instance, Park et al. (2012) observed a four- to fivefold
increase in documentation time after an EMR installation. Because the transition from
paper-based charting to an all-electronic system for the physicians at Hospital H was
postponed and, later, stalled, I was unable to measure changes in documentation time
with exact precision, but providers’ comments suggested that documentation time
increased. For instance, the nurses, who had transitioned from paper charts to the EMR
in April 2013, often remarked that documentation took longer. As Nurse B explained,
“Triage with paper usually took about 5 minutes; with the EMR, it takes 15 minutes.”
Midlevel providers made similar comments about the EMR’s CPOE component; as N
observed, “Versus paper order sets, the CPOE takes longer.”
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In addition to lengthened documentation time, EMRs affected workflow in other
ways. For example, Park et al. (2012) observed that prior to an EMR installation,
physicians completed their documentation tasks during or immediately after seeing each
patient, but after the EMR was installed, physicians began seeing several patients before
retreating to the charting room and then entering all of the patients’ data into their
respective electronic records. Park el al. also found that physicians recorded important
information on scraps of paper that they later referred to when they updated patients’
electronic health records. This EMR-induced change to workflow patterns resulted in
duplication of work, with physicians documenting care twice: first on paper and then later
on the EMR.
I observed similar changes at Hospital H. For instance, as Nurse L explained:
Bringing the COW into the patient room isn’t feasible because the physician is
performing a procedure in the room, or I have to see several patients in a row and
pushing the COW around from room to room is a hassle, [so] I take an old
nursing note in and write everything down, so I don’t have to try and remember
things like vitals. I have to put it in the EMR later, so, I suppose, I’m doing the
work twice.
Dr. G, an older physician who worked day shifts at Hospital H, approached orderentry tasks by first writing medication orders for several patients at once, and then typing
the orders into the CPOE. He conceded that the practice doubled his workload: “I still
write orders using the old order sets, because that’s how my mind works; then I go to the
CPOE. Doing it that way means doing it twice.”
Dr. G’s comment also referenced perceived disruptions to cognitive processes. K,
the EMR trainer, acknowledged the perceived disruption, saying, “There are different
cognitive processes involved . . . [because EMR’s] do not trigger the same mental
processes as paper charts.” Several physicians explained that paper TSheets organized
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how they approached patient care. As Dr. F, the emergency room medical director,
explained:
The paper sheet is laid out with everything visible to you all at once, and so it
reminds you to do the ROS [review of systems], for example. With the computer,
you don’t see the prompt, so, maybe, you’re not thinking, “Oh, there’s the ROS
box; I need to do that.” It’s a different mental approach. You have to adjust how
you think about practicing medicine.
Dr. O, a young physician who recently had completed her residency training, described
having experienced a similar shift in her cognitive processes:
I think because the electronic chart is zoomed into small sections, it forces you to
think differently. The cues and reminders that you had on paper charts aren’t
visible. You’re not seeing the whole thing on the EMR, so it changes the thought
process. I find that I think differently on paper and on the EMR.
In sum, many providers at Hospital H reported that they experienced workflow
changes after the EMR was installed. I recorded references to four workflow changes.
First, providers believed that documenting healthcare took longer. Second, providers
began seeing several patients before documenting the care that each patient had received,
whereas before the EMR was installed, most documentation was completed at each
patient’s bedside. Third, because documentation took place often after––not during––
patients’ examinations, some providers reported taking notes to facilitate their recall of
patients’ data, but this practice resulted in additional work. Fourth, some providers
believed that the EMR changed how they processed cognitive tasks associated with
practicing emergency medicine. Next, I describe providers’ beliefs about the contents of
electronic health records and ramifications for healthcare delivery.
Perceived completeness of the medical record. The amount of information
contained in the electronic health record affected how providers at Hospital H thought
about patient care. Many providers acknowledged that there was a difference between
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paper charts and the EMR. N, a midlevel provider, said, “There’s less information in the
electronic chart.” When I asked him to elaborate, he explained:
It isn’t necessarily better or worse but it changes how I might approach a patient.
If I see something in the chart from a past visit, it might make me think differently
or consider a different diagnosis. If I don’t have that information, then I might
order different tests or more tests. Generally, I find the paper charts have more
information.
Other providers noted that, when compared with paper charts, there was more
information in the electronic record. As Nurse L commented:
There’s a lot of data in here. The EMR has a good bit, from past labs [laboratory
test results] to medication orders. I think there’s more here than in the paper
charts, at least on the nursing side. It may be different for the docs. Having more
information lets me know what to look out for and how I might approach
managing certain patients.
In addition to the perceived volume of data contained in electronic records varying
according to user type, the EMR’s spirit, described next, also was a factor that many
providers referenced when they discussed the relative completeness of the medical chart.
Spirit. DeSanctis and Poole (1994) defined spirit as the intention behind a
technology. As discussed in chapter four, well-designed technologies have a coherent
spirit; an incoherent spirit exerts weaker influence over people and “may send
contradictory signals, making use of the system more difficult” (DeSanctis & Poole, p.
127). An EMR’s spirit can be analyzed by examining its design metaphor (e.g., whether
its interface resembles a paper medical chart or an accounting spreadsheet), the
presentation and labeling of its features, training or support materials that accompany it,
and its usability.
Providers at Hospital H compared regularly the EMR’s spirit (i.e., its design and
features) with paper charts. Most comments had to do with checkbox-based charting

	
  

202

versus free-text charting; examples included phrases such as, “There’s more space to
write on paper” and “The EMR is more clicking boxes versus writing.” Many
providers—namely, physicians and midlevel providers—attributed the perceived shortage
of information in the electronic record to the EMR’s checkbox-based design. Other
providers compared the EMR’s interface with a spreadsheet. A nurse super-user
commented, “It looks like an Excel spreadsheet.” N echoed that assertion, adding, “It has
to look like a spreadsheet because it’s designed to go to the billing department. The
checkboxes correspond to billing codes.” Comparing paper charts with EMRs also led,
inevitably, as described below, to discussions about the EMR’s performance.
Performance. Neutral observations about the EMR’s performance were rare, but
among the few that I recorded, providers’ comments had to do with the dependability of
technology structures (e.g., the EMR’s performance during power outages or system
upgrades), potential threats posed by computer viruses, and the perceived permanence of
the medical record. For example, a nurse commented, “The system [EMR] goes down
for upgrades about once a month, which didn’t happen with paper charts.” A midlevel
provider asked, “I know security is a concern for both paper charts and electronic charts,
but how safe are computer files from viruses? What keeps charts from disappearing if
there is a glitch?”
To review, relating moves (i.e., using the EMR in conjunction with other
structures) signaled that the EMR was well integrated into emergency room operations at
Hospital H. Discussions in which providers compared the EMR with other structures
revealed that the EMR changed workflow patterns, lengthened documentation time,
doubled work for some providers, and changed how providers thought about and/or
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planned patient care. Physicians and midlevel providers believed that the EMR contained
less data than did paper charts. The EMR’s design was compared to a spreadsheet, and
its performance capabilities were questioned. Although I, along with many providers,
regarded these events negatively, providers’ neutral statements showed that comparison
without condemnation occurred on several occasions. I recorded more instances of
neutral commentary as the study progressed, which seemed to signal many providers’
resignation that using the EMR was unavoidable. Thus, in reviewing providers’
comments, I concluded that providers’ feelings about the EMR appeared to soften
somewhat over the 18-month-long study. Next, I describe providers’ constraining moves.
Global and Institutional Analyses of Constraining Moves
As discussed in chapter three, an EMR’s structural features (i.e., its inherent rules,
resources, and capabilities) establish what the EMR can do and its effects on human
agency. For example, an EMR may allow providers to access patients’ pharmacy
records, but not their medical files from other hospitals. The first feature enables
providers’ agency, whereas the second feature constrains it. Constraining moves
compare technology structures and include observations about how structures affect
human agency in positive and/or negative ways (i.e., enabling or constraining agency).
Although not observed in this study, constraining moves also encompass how users
enable or constrain a technology’s structural features (e.g., by using an EMR in ways that
are consistent or are inconsistent with its spirit).
Providers often compared the EMR at Hospital H with EMR systems that they
had seen or used in other healthcare facilities. An EMR made by Epic was the system
referenced most frequently because it was used widely in hospitals throughout
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southeastern Louisiana. Nurse L compared Epic with Hospital H’s Paragon system,
which was made by the McKesson Corporation, saying, “Epic isn’t perfect, but it’s better
than Paragon. It [Epic] lets me customize all of the templates to my liking. Paragon isn’t
as customizable.” Dr. A, a typical “floater” who worked at several emergency rooms in
the region, also explained why he preferred Epic:
I like Epic better for one reason: not as many warnings. With Paragon, all of
these warnings pop up when you’re trying to order something. Some of them
make sense, like reminding us about patients’ drug allergies, but there are some
that are annoying. “Interacts with grapefruit juice.” Well, I didn’t order grapefruit
juice! But it adds extra steps because I have to click through all those boxes.
Dr. A elaborated:
You have to acknowledge the warning by clicking on it. There’s a 3-second delay
every time you click “okay.” All those clicks add up. Thirty checkboxes, and
that adds a minute and a half to each patient every time you put in an order. With
Epic, there’s no delay, but that system costs more.
Several other physicians and all of the midlevel providers drew similar conclusions:
When compared with Epic, Paragon made documenting patient care more timeconsuming and difficult. Because they acknowledged frequent warning boxes that they
deemed to be “annoying” or “unnecessary,” they were unable to engage in other aspects
of patient care; thus, constraining their agency.
Dr. E, who also was a floater (i.e., he worked at several different emergency
rooms) described another way that ordering medication differed between Epic and
Paragon:
Epic controls how meds are put into the system better, which makes ordering
easier. It [Epic] limits how medicine formulations are called up, restricted to
what’s available and common versus every imaginable, possible formulation.
That saves me wasted time scrolling through endless lists of options.
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Dr. E added, “With Epic, you can do voice dictation. Paragon doesn’t have that. It’s
better to work with vocal cords than fingertips. Have you seen how slow some docs
type?” Dr. E’s comments suggested that the Paragon system constrained his agency
because the time that he could have spent on other tasks was “wasted” when he was
forced to scroll through long lists of medications or type orders.
Many of the nurses’ comments also suggested that Hospital H’s EMR constrained
their agency. Several of Hospital H’s part-time nurses worked at other facilities where
they used a system made by Medical Information Technology, Inc. (MEDITECH).
Similar to the physicians and midlevel providers, most of the nurses there preferred the
other system to Paragon. One nurse, in particular, Nurse R, to the consternation of his
coworkers, compared regularly the two systems. As two nurses tried, with difficulty, to
access a patient’s medical history, Nurse R remarked that MEDITECH made accessing
medical histories “easy” and, moreover, that MEDITECH could pull data from a regional
network of interconnected hospitals. As he concluded, “A bunch of retarded third
graders could figure out MEDITECH it’s so easy.” One of the nurses mired in the
history-retrieval task mused that MEDITECH would be as asset in Hospital H’s
emergency room, but lamented, “You have to pay to play with the good toys.” The other
nurse quipped to R, “Just shut up about MEDITECH. I’m sick of hearing how awesome
it is.” All of the comments from nurses that compared Paragon with other EMRs
centered on ways that Paragon limited their agency by impinging on their ability to
deliver timely care to patients.
In addition to comparing Hospital H’s EMR with other EMR systems, providers’
constraining moves included interpreting the EMR’s features and/or performance, asking
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questions about or offering advice on how to use it, and discussing its effects on
workflow. As described below, as with relating (described in the previous section), the
same four themes surfaced in providers’ constraining moves and subsequent talk: how the
EMR changed workflow patterns, the perceived completeness of the medical record, the
EMR’s spirit, and the EMR’s performance.
Workflow changes. Whereas workflow changes were conceded in providers’
neutral relating moves (described previously), providers’ constraining moves addressed
specific ways that the EMR affected workflow negatively. Providers complained that
Hospital H’s EMR introduced longer documentation times, duplicated effort, delayed
work, and interrupted their “train of thought.” These changes affected the amount of time
that providers spent with patients, and, in some instances, they threatened patients’ safety.
Each perceived change is described below.
Longer documentation times. Providers, overwhelmingly, attributed longer
documentation times to the EMR’s medication ordering and administering processes. A
physician explained the difference between ordering medications using paper order sets
and using the EMR’s CPOE component:
When medications orders were on paper, you would write for the same drugs a
lot, the same doses, and always the same way. In the computer, they have 100
different ways to prescribe a medicine, some, I’ve never even heard of. I have to
scroll through all of that to find the one I want, and it adds time. In a code
situation, that’s valuable time that could make a difference in the patient’s
outcome.
I observed the same physician ordering pain medication for a patient with sciatica––the
process involved 22 mouse clicks and took more than 3 minutes. Ordering a steroid shot
for another patient required 23 mouse clicks and took 5 minutes. Both orders were
hampered by multiple “confirm screens.” As the physician complained:
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I put the order in and up pops a screen, “Do you want to order this medication?”
Yes, I want to order this, so click. Then there’s another screen. Yes, I still want
to order this. Click. I have to click four more times: submit the order, confirm it,
then confirm it again, and then once more. One screen, maybe two, I can see
being useful for patient safety reasons, so you don’t accidently order the wrong
thing, but this is ridiculous.
To ascertain whether the slow medication-ordering process that I observed was
unique to Hospital H, its McKesson-made Paragon EMR, and/or its providers, I asked
five physicians who I met at a medical conference about their respective medication
ordering experiences. All of them agreed that ordering medications––irrespective of the
EMR––took longer when using EMRs than when using paper order sets. As Dr. Peter
Viccellio, Clinical Professor and Vice Chair of Emergency Medicine at Stony Brook
School of Medicine, explained:
I log on and that takes about 15 seconds. I find the patient’s name, that’s another
few seconds. I have to make sure I have the right patient, and then I click on it to
open the chart. Most of the time, it opens within 5 seconds. Sometimes, it takes
up to 2 minutes to open. Up to 2 minutes to open a chart is an extraordinarily
long time to wait when you’re experiencing it. Once the chart is open, you have
to click on “add order,” then under “orders,” you have find the medicine, click on
it, sign it, and close the chart. The whole process, if you’re very efficient and
quick, you might get in and out in a minute and a half or it may take you 4 or 5
minutes to do it.
The physicians all perceived that medication ordering was the single most timeconsuming task associated with EMR use and that it limited the time they spent with
patients.
At Hospital H, I observed that changing medication orders also was problematic
and time-consuming. Routinely, nurses approached physicians and indicated that
incorrect doses had been ordered because physicians “clicked on the wrong option.” On
one occasion, I noted that it took a physician 17 mouse clicks and 6 minutes to correct a
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medication error. As the nurse waited, she remarked, “On paper, it would take the doc 3
seconds. Cross out the old dose, write ‘300,’ and initial. Done.”
I asked most of the nurses how the additional minutes that physicians spent at the
EMR ordering medications and/or correcting orders, compared with using paper order
sets, changed their perceptions of nursing workflow. All of them agreed that the EMR’s
medication order process prohibited them from giving care in a timely fashion. As Nurse
L explained:
When they [physicians] type, we wait, and the patients wait. Nothing happens
until the doc clicks “submit.” I can’t do my job until the order is submitted. If
it’s you with a broken bone or migraine headache, that’s another 10 minutes that
you’re not getting your pain medicines. That’s just ordering, but actually giving
the medicine takes time, too.
When asked to describe the medication administration process, Nurse L explained that
after a physician or a midlevel provider submitted a medication order, the EMR
registered and processed the order, which allowed nurses to retrieve the medication from
a locked cabinet (i.e., the Pyxis). As L noted, “We can’t physically get the medicine
unless the doc puts in the order.” She explained that because the EMR controlled the
Pyxis, without a valid medication order, “the Pyxis can’t be unlocked or opened.” Nurse
B elaborated on the steps involved to administer medications:
It typically takes 8–10 clicks to give one medication; before, it was writing down
one line in the chart. It takes too long now, and that’s just on the nurse’s side of
it. It can take me 15 minutes to give one medication, because I get the order, go
to the Pyxis, get the med, scan the med, go to the patient, confirm the patient, scan
the patient, explain the med, click the screen, scan the med and patient again, give
the medicine, then click the box that says I gave the medicine. When the scanner
doesn’t work, I have to type up those little barcoded numbers! There are a lot of
steps, and while I’m doing this, I’m not taking care of anyone else. There are
other patients in pain, but they have to wait.
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In explaining the medication administration process, Nurse B also referred to duplicated
effort, which is described next.
Duplicated effort. Providers who took notes during patients’ medical
examinations and, later, entered the data into the health record acknowledged that the
practice doubled their workload, but the EMR also duplicated providers’ efforts in other
ways. As Nurse B explained, “There’s a lot of redundancy because when the doc notates
something, the nurse is compelled to add to the nursing record. The doc writes discharge
summaries, so the nurse types them into the computer.” Nurse B’s comment revealed
that work was replicated regularly because the patient record consisted of separate
physicians’ notes and nurses’ notes. Nurse M, a super-user, said that the EMR “doesn’t
make positive changes, from the nurse’s point of view. There’s so much duplication.
Why do you have to have three people doing the same thing?” When asked to elaborate,
M said:
Take for example, consultations. Consults with floor docs are written on paper
first and then we type them in the nursing note. If a patient is admitted, then
someone has to type the consult in the progress notes, which is a separate chart.
Usually, an upstairs nurse will do that, but it could be one of us. Then, if there are
orders, someone puts that in the emergency room record. If the consulting doc
doesn’t enter the orders, then the tech passes them to a midlevel to put in. The
emergency room doc has to document all of this, too. So you have five or six
people basically documenting the same thing in three or four different places. It’s
stupid. How is that efficient?
Although the duplicated effort annoyed many providers, some providers, like
Nurse L, acknowledged that the redundancy could serve as a “checks and balance to
ensure patient safety.” Duplicated effort, which increased providers’ workloads, led,
frequently, as discussed next, to delayed work.
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Delayed work. Many providers noted that the EMR added additional work, and
that the time needed to complete it could pose risks to patients, because providers often
delayed documenting certain tasks until “things slowed down” and “patients cleared out.”
Dr. A explained that when physicians and nurses shared a common paper-based chart,
certain documentation tasks, such as updating patients’ vital signs, were completed
regularly by the nurses. Although he lamented having to read nurses’ handwriting
(“Nurses have crappy handwriting, too”), he told me that because writing vital signs was
“quick and easy,” he knew that the medical chart would remain current throughout a
patient’s emergency room stay. Because entering vital signs into the EMR took longer
than writing them in a paper chart, many nurses put off updating the electronic record
until the emergency room was no longer busy or until they had completed their other
documentation tasks. Nurses’ tendency to delay charting had consequences, as Dr. A
revealed:
A while back, there was a patient I discharged home, and a few hours later, the
nurse puts in the vitals. That patient left with a heart rate of 170! Nobody told
me! We had to call him and bring him back to the hospital. That could have
ended badly for everyone. The patient could have had a bad outcome and it could
have led to a malpractice suit.
Physicians and midlevel providers also delayed completing documentation tasks,
especially when the emergency room experienced a surge in patient volume. Drs. E and
G both explained that the practice, although necessary “to stay on top of critical patients,”
could affect negatively continuity of care. As Dr. E noted, “For admitted patients, it can
be a problem, because the admitting [physician] isn’t seeing everything in the chart that
we did.” Dr. G expressed frustration when he complained that “our hands are tied, but
we can’t do two things at once.” He concluded, “We can either be at the bedside and take
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care of patients or we can sit at a computer and click boxes, but we can’t do both.” Next,
I discuss the final workflow change that I observed: interrupted train of thought.
Interrupted train of thought. A lot of providers’ constraining moves centered
on beliefs that the EMR interrupted their train of thought. Dr. Viccellio explained that
EMRs, when compared with paper charts, exposed physicians to more cognitive
disruptions:
For example, a patient needs pain medicine. With paper, you could simply write
the order and go back to what you were doing with minimal interruption. With
the EMR, you have to go to the computer, log on, get to the patient’s chart, find
the medication, order the medication, and sign off on the medication, and now
your chain of thought has been completely and totally interrupted. You have to
mentally reboot.
Interrupted train of thought was cited frequently at Hospital H, but several
physicians explained that using paper TSheets minimized disruptions.9 For example,
many physicians spread all of their patients’ paper TSheets along a counter and alternated
quickly between them, documenting laboratory test results or updating findings as they
became available (see Figure 5.2). When they used the CPOE component of the EMR,
however, moving between patients’ charts involved, according to Dr. F, “clicking back
and forth between multiple tabs and waiting for screens to refresh.” As Dr. G explained,
“With TSheets on the counter, I don’t lose my train of thought. I can move from chart to
chart. I write something in one chart, then go back to what I was doing in the other one.”
Dr. A described how using the CPOE sometimes interrupted his train of thought:
With the CPOE, I have to completely switch gears. I get out of one chart, look for
another one, open it up, and click through multiple tabs. You can have three or
four patient charts up and running at the same time, and it’s easy to click on the
wrong chart. I’ve done it, and I type all this stuff and realize, “Oh, wrong
patient.” I have to delete it and start all over again, and, by then, I’ve completely
9

This advantage will disappear when Hospital H installs, finally, electronic TSheets.
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lost focus on what I’m doing. I have to mentally go back and ask myself, “What
am I doing and which patient is it for?” Is this safe medicine? No, because
mistakes can happen. If my thinking isn’t 100% on the task at hand, if I’m
distracted, then there are consequences.

Figure 5.2. Physician Workflow When Using Paper TSheets. Physician accessing
quickly several charts spread along a counter. Most physicians believed that this work
habit reduced cognitive disruptions.
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As he concluded, “I’ve seen more wrong orders on electronic charts in the last few years
than I’ve ever seen on paper charts. Wrong orders put on the wrong patient’s chart,
wrong medicines, you name it.” In addition to the perceived cognitive disruptions that
providers described, as explained below, many providers believed that the contents of
medical records and their ability to access patients’ data affected patient safety
negatively.
Perceived completeness of the medical record. Whereas relating moves
indicated that the perceived completeness of medical records changed how providers
thought about healthcare delivery, constraining moves revealed that providers believed
that the EMR restricted their access to data, which limited their ability to make informed
judgments. Perceptions varied according to user type: nurses, generally, found the
medical records adequate, whereas physicians and midlevel providers bemoaned both the
quantity and quality of the medical records.
N, a midlevel provider, explained that although most hospitals’ EMRs displayed
patients’ medical histories from all of their previous hospital and emergency room visits,
the version of Paragon that Hospital H purchased limited search functions to the last 120
days. Moreover, according to PJ, the EMR trainer, the Paragon system could not display
patients’ past cardiology test results. As she explained, “If you want to see old [EKGs],
you have to purchase that option. We don’t have it yet, but we’re looking into it.” Citing
the Paragon EMR’s limited search function, Dr. G declared, “If all I have is a 4-month
window, how is this useful for identifying patterns or diagnosing a recurring problem? If
I can’t see the chart, I may not even know that the patient is having a recurring problem.”
Several physicians commented that inadequate patient records led them frequently to
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order laboratory and diagnostic tests that they would not have ordered otherwise, which,
ultimately, increased healthcare costs.
N explained that although a patient’s past medical record was not crucial for
delivering emergency medical care, accessing the record, in many situations, could
expedite some aspects of healthcare delivery. He shared the following example:
We had a patient who came in over the weekend and she was discharged home.
She wound up back in the emergency room a few days later on an overdose. She
was unconscious, so I can’t ask her anything, like height or weight. That’s
important for calculating certain medications. You would think I could pull up
her chart, her visit from 3 days ago, and see it [her height and weight], but no, I
can’t. The new chart didn’t auto-populate any of her past information.
In addition to N grumbling that the EMR did not “auto-populate” the patient’s
height and weight, several physicians complained that, in their estimation, the EMR
generated too much automatic text. Dr. A commented that he rarely looked at past
records because they often contained “gobbledygook,” which he described as long lists of
numbers, irrelevant laboratory test results, copied and pasted text, and checkboxes that
lacked cohesive narratives and/or context. As he said, “A lot of old charts are full of
garbage, stuff that’s automatically generated. It’s too much of a hassle to sort through.”
Dr. Viccellio shared with me that one of his emergency room patients had been admitted
and, when discharged 2 weeks later, the patient’s medical record contained over 8,000
pages of “garbage [and] about 10 pages of useful data.”
Given the volume of data contained in the medical records, most physicians
bypassed the medical records and gathered information directly from patients and/or
patients’ families. As Dr. E explained, “It takes lots of clicks to go digging around,
looking for relevant information. It’s not worth the time, so I just see the patient and go
from there.” Similarly, Christensen and Grimsmo (2008) found that physicians rarely
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spent time searching EMRs for patients’ histories, but, instead, asked patients about their
previous visits and medical histories. Most of the physicians at Hospital H agreed with
Dr. E’s assessment of the medical record’s utility. Upon reviewing my fieldnotes, I found
that I recorded only three instances of physicians attempting to access past records.
Difficulty accessing data in electronic health records was not unique to the
providers at Hospital H. As Dr. Viccellio explained:
One of the biggest disadvantages to EMRs is that these remain data systems, not
information systems. In other words, it doesn’t display information to me in an
intelligent way. I have to hunt and hunt and hunt. New critical information may
be in there, but there’s no signal to me that it’s there. I have to be lucky enough
to find it.
Several providers also cautioned that information in active medical records, not just data
in past records, was unavailable or concealed regularly. N stated that “sometimes, it’s a
matter of hitting the refresh button and, suddenly, you see labs results or new orders.
You have to make an effort to look for these things when it should be automatic.”
Another midlevel provider commented, “It’s funny because EMRs are supposed to help
you find stuff. With paper, you pick up the chart, and, ‘Oh, hey, here’s a new order.’
Instead, it takes multiple steps to find orders now.” Nurse B added, “If I’m spending
time refreshing the screen every few minutes, then when am I free to leave the COW and
take care of patients?”
Although Hospital H’s EMR appeared to enable providers’ agency by using the
EMR’s search functions to access limited data (e.g., records dating back 120 days),
providers believed that the restricted search capability, coupled with the dearth of useful
information in the record, hindered their agency. Moreover, oftentimes, accessing data in
active records was difficult and/or time-consuming, further restraining providers’ abilities
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to deliver timely care to their patients. The relative completeness and value of the
medical record was due, in large part, to the EMR’s structural spirit, which is described
next.
Spirit. As explained previously, the spirit of an EMR can be assessed according
to its design, features, and usability (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994). I recorded more than
100 constraining moves condemning aspects of the EMR’s incoherent spirit (i.e., poor
design). Many such moves included providers asking questions or making statements
about the EMR’s interface. For example, Nurse J had trouble adjusting the display such
that patients’ names appeared across the top of the screen. She often sought help from
super-users to customize, temporarily, the interface in a way that maximized her
productivity. As she commented:
I need the names at the top, instead of going down the side of the screen. For me,
it’s easier to click between tabs that way. It takes less mental effort if I can look
at the screen and say, “Oh, that’s what tabs in my web browser look like,” so
moving between them is a little more intuitive. I don’t know why they didn’t
design it that way in the first place.
Many providers believed that, in addition to the spatial orientation of the tabs (i.e.,
vertical versus horizontal), the number of tabs also was problematic. As Dr. G, who
described the CPOE component of the EMR, explained, “Most of the tabs I don’t use. I
don’t even know what this other stuff is. I have not been given any orientation on it.
You’ve got 30 or 40 things up here.” I observed that the CPOE interface actually
consisted of about 95 tabs, information fields, and/or icons. Along the top of the screen,
there were seven information fields and a refresh icon; beneath that, there were three
other information fields and eight icons. A drop-down menu, 4 icons, and 13 information
fields occupied the next row. Below that, there were three additional rows containing 21,
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17, and 4 tabs, respectively. The first tab in the third row contained an extra 11 tabs and
a refresh icon. I asked a midlevel provider, who also was a super-user, to explain the
significance of the tabs and icons, and he commented, “I don’t know what half of those
are for.”
Most providers complained that the tabs and icons, in addition to being too
numerous, were too small. As Nurse Y remarked, “The EMR is killing my eyes. I can’t
read this tiny shit and I can’t make it bigger.” When asked if the text could be enlarged, a
super-user replied, “Not that I’m aware of. You just squint and lean into the screen.” As
Dr. G noted, “You can’t read any of this stuff. It could say the patient’s coding for all I
know. I simply can’t see the text.”
Other providers complained that medication lists were not displayed
alphabetically. According to X, a midlevel provider, “Because the drug list doesn’t
default to alphabetical, we have to do it. Every single time we have to search for a drug,
we have extra clicks just to get it in an alphabetical list.” I observed N alphabetize the
medication list one afternoon for a physician who had given up trying to do it himself. N
assured the physician, “It’s not an intuitive process.” N began the task at 5:24 p.m. The
physician, unable to enter orders with N sitting at the CPOE, complained, “Why can’t
this be a default setting? If I have a chest pain to work up, I don’t have time for this
crap.” At 5:41 p.m., nearly 16 minutes later, N finished alphabetizing the medication list
and showed the physician how he had done it.
In addition to providers’ complaints that multiple tabs and small text marred the
EMR’s interface, many providers complained that there were too many log-on screens
and password prompts; hence, for providers who worked at several facilities, they had the
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added task of remembering multiple sets of usernames and passwords. Providers’
comments about “pointless and unnecessary” tasks, such as logging on repeatedly and
alphabetizing lists, indicated that they believed aspects of the EMR’s design impinged on
their agency because the EMR limited how they spent their time. For example, a nurse
said, “Every log on and mouse click is time away from treating patients.”
Some of the EMR’s other design features, besides being incoherent, were
believed by providers to threaten patients’ safety. For example, Hospital H’s EMR and
CPOE components, although part of the same McKesson-made Paragon system, were not
integrated, meaning that emergency medicine physicians could not access nurses’ notes,
and nurses could not see physicians’ electronic notes. EMRs with separate sets of
providers’ notes were not uncommon; as Dr. Viccellio explained:
When we rolled out our EMR [at Stony Brook], we couldn’t see the nurses’
documentation, so if a nurse writes, “Patient’s complaining of much more pain,
their blood pressure dropped, they look ashen, and I think they’re going to die,” I
would not even see that. EMRs, as they are now, are not designed to facilitate
data exchange between providers.
Several nurses at Hospital H explained that although not seeing what physicians
documented was not detrimental, necessarily, to their practice, they believed that
physicians being unable to see what nurses had documented could have disastrous
effects. Nurse B alluded to the Dallas Ebola patient, Thomas Duncan, whose travel
history, although recorded in nurses’ notes, was unseen by emergency room physicians,
when he said: “If the doc had seen that this man [Duncan] had been in West Africa, that
he had a fever, etcetera, he [the physician] may have put two and two together. Instead,
an Ebola patient gets sent home.” Nurse Y added, “Dallas was a wake-up call. We can’t
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depend on EMRs to communicate. I need to [say], ‘The doc can’t see what I type,’ and
so if it’s really important, then I have to go tell him [the physician].”
Several physicians agreed that the EMR could not take the place of face-to-face
communication. As Dr. A commented, “I’ve tried to look up the nurses’ notes, but I
couldn’t figure out how to do it. I have to trust the nurses will find me if there’s
something I should know.” Another physician said, “The problem is that nurses are
nurses. They may not know when something needs to be brought to your attention.”
When asked to elaborate, he explained, “They don’t know what they don’t know,
medically. They’re not doctors. The new ones [nurses] think, ‘It’s in the EMR,’ so
they’ve done their job.”
Providers at Hospital H believed that their EMR was flawed, not only because of
the separate sets of notes for physicians and nurses but also because, according to Nurse
L, “anyone, anywhere in the hospital” could alter emergency room patients’ medical
records. L explained that anyone “with a username and password [could] add orders, put
in meds, you name it.” She then elaborated:
We’ve had upstairs nurses click our patients by mistake, and we start seeing
orders show up that don’t make any sense. A lot of meds are put in for the wrong
patient; it happens a lot. So, if the chest pain protocol shows up for a headache,
you have to ask, “Is this the right patient?” Usually, someone clicked the wrong
chart. Usually, it’s someone upstairs. Why they even have access is a mystery. I
think the system isn’t designed to prevent these kinds of mistakes.
During the second training session that I attended with Dr. C, I observed the
trainer, K, accessing the charts of active patients and entering orders. Although she
deleted immediately the “dummy orders” after she demonstrated the order-entry
processes, I saw that L was right—that “anyone, anywhere in the hospital [with] a
username and password” could manipulate charts.
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Although the constraining moves described here highlight the EMR’s role in
diminishing agency, several providers—mainly, nurses—acknowledged that some
aspects of the EMR’s spirit enhanced their agency. For example, a nurse commented that
the EMR’s flashing icons alerted him to laboratory test results in a timely fashion:
There are these little icons next to the patient’s name; one is for med orders, one
is for labs, and another one is for radiology. They flash red when the doc puts
them in and green when [results are] back. I can see as soon as the tests are back,
and I can address them right away, without constantly having to go around
looking for the paper chart. There’s no waiting with the EMR.
Another nurse explained that the flashing icons helped nurses to “keep an eye on each
other’s patients better.” As he said:
I can look over at your screen and see you have orders pending or tests back. I
can let you know, “Hey, room 2’s labs are ready.” If you’re busy, maybe I pitch
in and give meds for one of your patients. With the old [paper] charts, we
wouldn’t necessarily see that an order is pending, because it’s a piece of paper in
the back of the chart. With the EMR, anybody who looks at the screen knows
what’s going on.
Nurse B, who conceded that the flashing icons were “a nice feature,” said, “with time,
EMRs will be great. I see the potential.” Dr. Viccellio also appeared hopeful when he
said, “These things [EMRs] can be absolutely fantastic, if they’re properly designed, and
if they’re designed as information systems instead of data repositories. I wish we
[physicians] could have designed them. Maybe someday.”
To review, although providers working in the emergency room at Hospital H
believed that EMRs, generally, had potential, an incoherent spirit tainted Hospital H’s
Paragon system. Providers complained that multiple tabs, information fields, and icons,
in conjunction with small text and numerous log-on screens, complicated the EMR’s
interface and impinged their agency. Separate sets of physicians’ notes and nurses’ notes
were thought to be detrimental to patients’ safety. Moreover, anyone with a user name
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and password could manipulate patients’ records, which contributed to an increased risk
of medication errors. However, some providers found some of the EMR’s features
helpful, like flashing icons that announced laboratory test results or pending orders.
Next, constraining moves associated with the EMR’s performance are discussed.
Performance. I grouped the constraining moves that involved the EMR’s
performance into two categories: hardware performance and software performance. The
constraining moves, largely, were negative. Providers believed that poor performance
contributed to longer documentation times, which, consequently, meant less time spent at
patients’ bedsides. Thus, the EMR’s poor performance affected negatively providers’
agency, because they believed that they were forced to use a structure that robbed them of
their freedom to practice medicine how and where they wished, which was with paper
charts at patients’ bedsides instead of at computer terminals. A discussion of each
category of performance constraining moves follows.
Hardware performance. Early in my fieldwork, I noted that “numerous paper
notices hang all around the emergency room, alerting users to various glitches and battery
issues.” Some of the notices contained “workarounds” that instructed users to reboot
and/or replace COW batteries at regular intervals. Nurse J complained that the prescribed
workarounds were ineffective:
This is the fifth COW battery I’ve put in today, and it’s already about to die.
Every time I do this, I have to completely sign back on. Do you know how long
that takes? Plus, the last time I rebooted, the patients’ names weren’t even
showing up! I couldn’t administer meds because nothing showed up! We need
new batteries, or new COWs.
J then directed my attention to the nurse manager’s office door, which was covered in
handwritten post-it notes that called attention to the poor battery performance. One note
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read: “Battery life is getting worse. Can we please, please, please do something about it?
We need to buy new ones. Please tell them [administrators] to fix this!”
Over the course of a year, the number of notes plastered on the nurse manager’s
door grew. In that time, I recorded dozens of episodes of battery failure, followed by
rebooting procedures that, sometimes, took more than 10 minutes. As Nurse M
complained, “This is bullshit. I do this multiple times every shift. If they
[administrators] are going to make us use this crap [the EMR], at least make sure the
damn batteries work.” When asked why replacement batteries had not been procured, Q,
the nurse manager, explained that she had requested repeatedly that new batteries be
provided but had been told that funds were not available.
I asked the nurses how the deteriorating battery life affected their work. Aside
from the time spent replacing batteries, rebooting COWs, and signing back onto the
system, providers complained that the process interrupted their train of thought. As
Nurse B remarked, “It just takes you out of whatever you were doing and then you have
to mentally reboot yourself.” Nurses also stated that the delay associated with replacing
batteries and rebooting COWs added to patients’ lengths of stay. As Nurse L said, “If
you’re the patient, that’s another 10 minutes you’re stuck here when you’d rather go
home, plus, it makes our times look bad.” She explained that nurses’ performance
reviews were based, among other things, on metrics that tracked patients’ lengths of stay.
Several physicians complained that although they did not use the COWs (they
used exclusively computers that were housed in a small workroom adjacent to the
emergency room’s common work area), they depended on nurses receiving orders
through the COWs. For example, Dr. A explained that earlier that day, he had ordered a
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suture tray, which contained a scalpel, needles, sutures, and numbing medications, but
when he entered the patient’s room a short time later, ready to begin suturing the patient’s
laceration, he found that a suture tray had not been set up—the nurse was busy rebooting
her COW after replacing its battery, and, therefore, she had neither seen nor addressed
any of her pending orders. Dr. A’s frustration was apparent when he said:
So now, the whole emergency room comes grinding to a halt. I can’t suture the
patient. I can’t get the meds out of the Pyxis.10 I can’t do anything but move onto
the next patient. Meanwhile, this guy [patient] is sitting here with a nasty head
wound and I can’t close it until the nurse gets her COW working. What if I have
several procedures waiting? Multiple lacerations? Pelvic exams? All of those
require nurses setting up and assisting. If they’re preoccupied with COWS,
everything stops.
In late 2014, several surgical nurses and floor nurses complained to administrators
that their COW’s batteries were performing poorly. In December 2014, a battery
malfunctioned in an unused surgical suite and caught fire. Only after this incident did the
emergency room receive, finally, the replacement batteries that Q had been requesting for
over a year. A nurse commented, “All it takes is for the upstairs nurses to complain and
everybody gets new batteries. We’ve been begging for a year and nothing.” Q added,
“Good thing no one was in there when it [the COW] caught on fire. This could have
been prevented if administration would have taken our complaints seriously last year.”
In addition to the COW’s faulty batteries, compatibility issues between the EMR
and other technology structures were viewed as problematic. For instance, the
connection between the EMR and the printer failed frequently. On one occasion,
technicians complained that because they could not print admission orders, they were
unable to transfer patients from the emergency room to the floor. One of the technicians
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At Hospital H, and most other hospitals, only nurses can access the Pyxis machine.
224

explained, “The floor nurses won’t take patients without printouts, so we have to babysit
them [patients] down here. They [floor nurses] can see the orders on their EMR, but they
still won’t take the patients.” On another occasion, nurses were unable to print discharge
summaries, which meant that they had to copy, by hand, the entirety of the discharge
summaries as they appeared in the EMR, to give to patients before patients were allowed
to leave the emergency room. A repairperson was dispatched, but he arrived 3 hours and
several discharges later.
Software performance. Providers’ constraining moves that focused on the
EMR’s software also were commonplace. Providers referred to most performance issues
as “glitches,” and there were two major types of glitches: those that stemmed from
programming errors, which providers were made aware of through McKesson
Corporation memoranda; and glitches that were experienced by providers firsthand.
Below, I discuss briefly each type of glitch.
Programming errors. McKesson sent numerous “alerts” to Hospital H over the
course of this study that documented programming errors and temporary workarounds.
Many of the notices described issues that affected billing. For instance, a coding error
meant that the cost of electrocardiograms (EKGs) could be billed only to patients or their
insurance companies if the EKGs were ordered in a very specific way. Other notices,
however, detailed problems that threatened patients’ safety. One such notice was posted
in the emergency room in August 2014. In part, the memorandum, which was titled
“Random patient context issue” read:
When the user changes patients by selecting a patient from the dropdown in the
Work List, the lower portion of the screen may not refresh leaving information
from the prior patient displayed. . . . While the occurrence of this issue is
infrequent, it appears to be related to the user quickly changing tabs and patients
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without waiting for the screen to refresh. . . . If this situation occurs, selecting any
other tab will refresh the lower portion of the screen and will ensure that all of the
data displayed is for the same patient. Until this issue is resolved, users should
visually confirm the screen display changes as expected when changing patient
information displays.
I asked several physicians and midlevel providers what they knew about this
programming error, and one of the midlevel providers mentioned, “Oh, we get these
notices all the time.” Dr. G called my attention to the phrase “related to the user,” which
appeared in the memorandum, and said, “They’re blaming us for the problem. See that?
It’s always ‘so-called’ user error.” Another midlevel provider pointed out the numerous
notices that were posted inside the physicians’ workroom; most of those notices were
taped onto the wall, behind the CPOE monitor––when a user sat at the computer, as I did,
the notices were not visible.
One of the physicians told me that, in addition to the “random patient context
issue” error, there was another programming error that put patients at risk. This
additional glitch, although infrequent, meant that not all patients’ allergies were stored in
their electronic health records and that some allergies were attributed erroneously to the
wrong patients. He rummaged through a pile of notices that he had printed out, but was
unable to locate the memorandum in question. He recalled that the memorandum
instructed physicians to “double check allergies with every patient.” He then said:
I check anyway, but, sometimes, people forget. You think it’s in the chart, you
look, it says, “No allergies,” so you write the prescription. Especially if you work
in a busy emergency room, you take for granted that the tools you’ve been given
work, so you do your job as quickly as you can. You might not ask every single
patient about allergies. You should, but all it takes is one lapse. You would think
something like that, that kind of mistake, wouldn’t have made it out of the testing
phase. How does a company release a product that can kill people?
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A nurse, who had been listening in, answered the physician’s question, “Because they
don’t get sued; you do.”
Although these kinds of glitches (i.e., programming errors) occurred regularly,
glitches experienced firsthand were more common. Next, I describe providers’
constraining moves specific to this type of glitch, as well as several instances where
glitches affected providers’ agency.
Glitches experienced firsthand. A number of minor, “inconvenient glitches”
occurred during every shift that I observed, but on several occasions, the glitches were
more bothersome to providers. Minor and major glitches alike disrupted emergency
room operations regularly. I defined minor glitch as a temporary inconvenience caused
by a malfunction in the EMR’s software, whereas a major glitch created significant
disruptions to providers’ workflow, increased patients’ length of stay, and/or posed risks
to patients’ safety. Described below are examples of minor and major glitches that I
recorded.
I observed three nurses confront a standard minor glitch connected to the EMR’s
refresh function: J, M, and B tried to close a dialogue box that appeared in J’s EMR
monitor. J noted that she “clicked on it three times” but that the window did not close.
M noted that because the emergency room was “full of patients, the system [was] running
slow.” He then explained, “There’s too much information running through the system, so
it’s overwhelmed. It’s not refreshing.” B resorted to rebooting the system, noting, “This
is the kind of inconvenient glitch that happens when we get more than a dozen patients.
For some reason, it just seizes up sometimes.” It is worth noting that although the
emergency room was “full of patients,” three nurses who, otherwise, could have been
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caring for patients, instead, were addressing a computer glitch. Other minor glitches,
according to providers, included regular system updates that erased individual users’
customizations, and free-text entries that disappeared “magically” from patients’ medical
records.
Among the major glitches that I witnessed, one had to do with the electronic
whiteboard component of the EMR, which displayed several columns of data for each
patient that included the patient’s name, room number, length of stay and the name of the
nurse assigned to care for the patient. I overheard a heated exchange between two nurses
who, unbeknownst to them, had been caring for the same patient for at least an hour. A
major glitch meant that although the large electronic whiteboard, which was mounted
near the ceiling, displayed correctly names of patients alongside names of the nurses
caring for them, the data contained in the miniature version of the whiteboard visible on
each nurse’s COW, unfortunately, were incorrect. When looking at their COWs, both R
and Y saw their names next to the name of the patient in room 3. Both nurses proceeded
to perform and, then, document physical examinations of the patient. Although this
glitch resulted only in duplicated effort and wasted time for the nurses, it could have
proven disastrous had the nurses not discovered the error before they administered
medications to the patient. As R noted, “What if we gave the patient a double dose of
something? That might not have ended well. That’s why we have checks and balance,
but the damn EMR screwed up.” As Y pointed out:
We can’t see the whiteboard from the nurses’ station, so we look at our screens
instead. You would think they’d match. Now, I have to walk all the way around
to the other side, look up at the ceiling, and double check that my patient is really
my patient.
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Another major glitch that I observed on several occasions had to do with
“dropped” orders. For example, one evening, the physician on duty, Dr. A, kept checking
the radiology reporting system for the results of a computerized tomography (CT) scan
that he had ordered several hours before. I asked how long it took, generally, for the
radiologist to read the CT scan and then send a report to the emergency medicine
physician. Dr. A replied that the entire process, from the time the patient was scanned
until the report was generated, took, usually, 3 or more hours. Tired of waiting, Dr. A
asked the technician to follow up with the radiology department, to which the technician
replied, “What CT scan? We didn’t send anyone to CT.” The patient, apparently, had
been left waiting for several hours, with the physician believing, erroneously, that the
requested procedure had been performed. The midlevel provider on duty remarked, “The
EMR drops orders all the time. Computer glitches steal them. ‘I swear, I just put those
orders in and they’re gone.’”
The glitches, both minor and major, disrupted providers’ workflow patterns and
annoyed them. Taken together, suboptimal performance with respect to the EMR’s
hardware and software components constrained providers’ agency by not allowing them
to allocate their time on a shift. Poor EMR performance meant that providers spent a
disproportionate amount of time changing batteries, rebooting computers, and noting
programming errors and workarounds, instead of engaging in direct patient care.
In sum, the constraining moves that I documented, overwhelmingly, were
negative––providers’ constraining action and talk underscored many ways that they
believed the EMR hindered their agency and, in some cases, threatened patients’ safety.
Providers compared routinely Hospital H’s Paragon EMR with other EMR systems, and

229

they concluded that the Paragon system increased documentation time and, generally,
was harder to use. In addition to longer documentation times, Hospital H’s EMR
changed workflow in other ways: When compared with providers’ perceptions of using
paper charts, they believed that the EMR led to duplicated effort, delayed work during
periods of peak patient volume, interrupted train of thought, and increased the risk of
medication errors. Physicians and midlevel providers complained that EMR-generated
medical records contained little useful data and, moreover, that searching the medical
records for valuable information was difficult and time-consuming. Providers found the
EMR’s spirit incoherent, with poorly designed features (e.g., multiple tabs, small text,
and numerous password prompts) limiting the EMR’s usability. Additionally, separate
sets of physicians’ notes and nurses’ notes hindered physicians’ practice and put patients
at risk. Hardware and software that performed poorly affected providers’ agency and
prolonged patients’ lengths of stay. In the next section, I discuss appropriation moves
involving judgment.
Global and Institutional Analyses of Judging Moves
Users’ judging moves, according to DeSanctis and Poole (1994), praise or
condemn a technology’s performance, but unlike relating and constraining moves,
judging moves do not compare the technology with other structures. Judging moves
indicate whether users accept, negate, or ignore a technology structure.
At Hospital H, most of the providers’ judging moves that I documented
condemned EMRs (e.g., “I hate these things,” “EMRs suck,” and “EMRs are not very
good”). Although the majority of judging moves criticized EMRs generally, some moves
critiqued, specifically, Hospital H’s Paragon system. For example, in late 2014, Dr. G
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stated, “I hate Paragon. It’s a crappy EMR. It’s basically the DOS 1.0 of medical
information systems.” All of the physicians and midlevel providers I interviewed shared
Dr. G’s sentiments. X, a midlevel provider, said, “I’m quitting my job before the rest of
this godforsaken system is installed. That’s how much I hate Paragon.” Another
midlevel provider added, “Paragon is especially bad and a total waste of money.”
Nurses’ feelings about the Paragon system, however, varied and ranged from
revulsion to excitement. One nurse claimed repeatedly that he was so upset by the EMR
that he would “rather shovel shit for a living than use the damn thing [the EMR] another
day.” In contrast, another nurse remarked, “I think our EMR is a good thing because it
makes our jobs a lot easier.” Another nurse commented, “I love Paragon because we can
read everything now. There’s no more figuring out people’s sloppy handwriting.”
Nurses praising the EMR were in the minority (i.e., 5 of the 15 nurses I
interviewed), and although they lauded enthusiastically its structural potential, they
acknowledged that the EMR made work more difficult for physicians and midlevel
providers. As a nurse explained, “I see that it’s [EMR] harder for the docs and midlevels.
They struggle with it. Paragon makes my job easier, but it definitely makes things worse
for them.” Providers’ judging moves that I recorded supported research that found
nurses, usually, were more accepting of EMRs than were physicians (Lærum et al., 2004;
Likourezos et al., 2004, Otieno et al., 2007; Weiner et al., 1999).
Results from the questionnaire that I administered supported my reading of
providers’ judging moves, as providers, largely, condemned the EMR, although minor
differences existed between user types, with more nurses than physicians reporting being
somewhat satisfied with the EMR (see Table 5.2). Only 43% of respondents (N = 30)
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Table 5.2
Responses to the Questionnaire Item, “Overall, how satisfied are you with the EMR that
your emergency room uses?”
User Type
Response

MD
(n = 5)

MLP
(n = 3)

RN
(n = 17)

Tech
(n = 4)

Other
(n = 1)

Total
(N = 30)

Very
satisfied

0% (0)

0% (0)

0% (0)

25% (1)

0% (0)

3% (1)

Satisfied

0% (0)

0% (0)

0% (0)

0% (0)

0% (0)

0% (0)

Somewhat
satisfied

20% (1)

67% (2)

29% (5)

25% (1)

100% (1)

40% (12)

Somewhat
dissatisfied

20% (1)

0% (0)

12% (2)

0% (0)

0% (0)

10% (3)

Dissatisfied

20% (1)

33% (1)

18% (3)

0% (0)

0% (0)

17% (5)

Very
dissatisfied

40% (2)

0% (0)

35% (6)

25% (1)

0% (0)

30% (9)

Note. MD = physician; MLP = midlevel provider; RN = nurse; Tech = technician.
reported being somewhat satisfied, satisfied, or very satisfied with the EMR. Among
physicians (n = 5), 80% condemned the EMR and reported being somewhat dissatisfied,
dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the EMR, compared to 65% of nurses (n = 17) who
were somewhat dissatisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the EMR.
Three midlevel providers completed the questionnaire and two of them reported
being somewhat satisfied with the EMR, whereas the third midlevel provider reported
being dissatisfied. Results from the questionnaire, which was administered in January
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and February 2015, suggested that midlevel providers’ attitudes changed over the course
of the study. Midlevel providers’ comments that I recorded throughout 2013 and 2014,
mainly, were negative, but their questionnaire responses, mostly, were positive. When
asked how he interpreted the discrepancy between my fieldnotes and the questionnaire
results, N replied:
Well, I guess that means we’ve finally surrendered. At some point, you just give
up and make the best of it, or try to. I know that X is still planning to quit, but
even he’s quit his bitching about EMRs. Personally, I feel defeated, but the EMR
is here to stay. I still don’t like it [the EMR] but I have to suck it up.
Similar to midlevel providers, nurses also appeared to adjust their positions on the EMRs
(e.g., see the previous discussion on relating moves), softening somewhat over the course
of the study, but the questionnaire results suggested that their opinions remained, mostly,
negative. Physicians’ attitudes, however, remained negative throughout the course of this
study.
I asked physicians working at Hospital H and physicians I met at medical
conferences why they believed that physicians, generally, appeared so steadfast in their
disdain for EMRs. As Dr. F explained, “It’s because EMRs have been around for 20
years, but they are not very advanced. The programs were not designed by medical
people, and that’s why we hate them [EMRs].” Dr. Bukata, the editor of Emergency
Medical Abstracts, indicated that although some types of physicians—namely, those with
office-based practices, such as generalists and pediatricians—appeared to be embracing
EMRs, he believed resolutely that most emergency medicine physicians would not
change their views on EMRs. He explained his position in an e-mail that he sent to me:
It’s very important to make a distinction between EMRs in physicians’ offices and
EMRs in the emergency room: doctor’s offices don’t see an average of 2.5 new
patients per hour, have all new patients per CMS [Centers for Medicare Medicaid
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and Services] charting criteria, and need ROS [review of systems], FH [family
history], SH [social history], etc. Plus, with 20% of patients admitted, there is a
lot of interval progress notes and decision making that needs to be documented by
emergency physicians. . . . We are having EMRs driven down our throats by a
government providing hospitals with financial incentives to install these
inventions of the devil. (R. Bukata, personal communication, February 3, 2014)
Dr. Milne, Chief of Staff at South Huron Hospital in Ontario, Canada, stopped short of
calling EMRs “inventions of the devil,” but he condemned them because “computers
cannot read facial expressions, talk to patients, meet the family, or provide care.” He
explained that because EMRs were not mandated in Canada, he could decide if his
emergency department would adopt an EMR:
In my situation, EMRs vendors are always coming to my institution and I say to
them, “Prove to me that it improves patients’ outcomes. Show me the literature.”
They don’t have the data because EMRs don’t improve outcomes! So, I say,
“Thank you very much, but no thanks.” Physicians, not computers, improve
patient outcomes.
In sum, the majority of providers’ judging moves condemned EMRs, generally,
and Hospital H’s EMR, specifically. Although midlevel providers’ moves were negative,
questionnaire results indicated that their opinions shifted over this 18-month study.
Nurses’ moves were varied, but physicians condemned unanimously the EMR. In the
next section, I discuss findings related to structurational divergence and their implications
for providers at Hospital H.
Structurational Divergence
As explained in chapter three, structurational divergence (SD) theory proposes
that recurring, intractable conflict cycles are based in oppositional meaning structures that
impede effective communication and goal attainment (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010).
The theory hinges on two concepts: SD-nexus, the unresolvable conflict that arises from
the intersection of incompatible structures (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010); and SD-cycle,
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a self-perpetuating downward spiral of negative, ineffective, or aggressive
communication that is rooted in unresolved conflict (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013).
According to Nicotera and Mahon (2013), immobilization, interrupted goal attainment,
and stymied individual and organizational development characterize the SD-cycle, which
predicts negative outcomes among nurses (e.g., burnout, bullying, poor job satisfaction,
and turnover). What pushes an SD-nexus into an SD-cycle, however, has not been
established empirically (A. Nicotera, personal communication, April 7, 2015), but Dr.
Nicotera and I agreed that my findings, discussed next, suggest that loss of agency
characterizes the SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation.
Observational findings that pointed to the presence of SD in Hospital H’s
emergency room were assembled from fieldnotes and interview transcripts, and, then,
grouped into five themes: (a) conflicting structures, (b) providers’ satisfaction and
burnout, (c) “us” versus “them” language, (d) negative communication spirals between
providers and administrators, and (e) providers’ diminished agency. Moreover, results
from the questionnaire items were summed and revealed varying degrees of SD and
burnout among providers. These findings are described in the sections that follow.
Conflicting Structures
Federal mandates, hospital policies, physicians’ goals, and patients’ needs collide
in the emergency room at Hospital H every day; thus, the emergency room, inherently, is
an SD-nexus. Providers identified three examples of “federal interference” that they
believed placed them at the intersection of conflicting structures: the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH), and the Centers for Medicare and
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Medicaid Services (CMS). These three external structures, according to Dr. O,
“intertwine and create unrealistic demands on emergency rooms.” As she elaborated:
Because of EMTALA, HITECH, and CMS, we [physicians] have to comply with
tons of mandates. It all trickles down, from the government and from the
hospital, and we’re stuck in the middle. If we order a test to meet a mandate, then
the bill goes up and the patient is upset. We skip the test, save the patient some
money, then the CEO clamors, “You didn’t meet metrics.” We can appease either
the policy makers or the patients. Which is it going to be?
Dr. O and most of the physicians at Hospital H likened their predicament (i.e., appeasing
policy makers or patients) to being “stuck between a rock and a hard place.”
The first external structure, EMTALA, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1986,
requires that “all hospitals participating in the Medicare program must provide
emergency department screening evaluation and stabilization” (Zink, 2006, p. 270),
regardless of patients’ ability to pay. The unfunded mandate was intended to curb patient
dumping, a practice whereby “some hospitals refused to accept, or inappropriately
transferred indigent or uninsured patients to other hospitals” (Zink, 2006, p. 270).
EMTALA, thus, ensured that patients with medical emergencies who sought care in
emergency rooms would receive emergency medical care.
Over the years, however, EMTALA has been reinterrupted as guaranteeing free
care irrespective of the seriousness of patients’ medical problems. As a result,
increasingly, emergency rooms provide primary care for uninsured and publically insured
patients without healthcare homes, and patients seeking care after hours and on weekends
(Overton, in press-b). Consequently, nearly half of all emergency room visits are for
“nonurgent” conditions that are treatable in primary care settings; thus, EMTALA
contributed, albeit inadvertently, to emergency room overcrowding (Overton, in press-b).
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Dr. E explained that emergency rooms are the only part of the healthcare system
required by federal law to provide free care to “anyone who shows up, no matter the
reason.” As he said, “Primary care docs don’t have to take patients. If a patient doesn’t
have insurance, private practice docs can say, ‘No.’ You’ve seen those signs: ‘We have
the right to refuse service.’ It’s like that.” Dr. E lamented:
Because of EMTALA, patient volume has gotten out of hand. Got a toothache?
Come to the emergency room! It’s free! Need aspirin for your headache? Why
bother going to the drugstore and paying two bucks for it when you can get it here
for free? The problem is that EMTALA doesn’t distinguish between medical
emergencies and primary care issues. Most toothaches and headaches don’t
constitute medical emergencies but I have to treat them as if they were
emergencies, and, meanwhile, we have heart attacks, strokes, gunshots, you name
it, piling up in overcrowded emergency rooms. Turn a patient away? That’s an
automatic $25,000 fine. These patients need care, absolutely, but not emergency
care at the expense of the truly sick and dying.
Nurse L also discussed the role that EMTALA played in emergency room
overcrowding:
We need to be more proactive with public health initiatives and teach people
where and how to access appropriate care. Because of EMTALA, they’ll come to
us in the emergency room with acute care issues. The emergency room isn’t the
most appropriate place for these issues. We’re getting overwhelmed, but where
are you going to tell these people to go? You have to treat them or risk an
EMTALA violation, which can get you fired or cost you your [medical] license.
Providers, thus, decried EMTALA, largely, because they believed that it stripped them of
agency. For example, Dr. F commented, “Let me direct the nonurgent cases somewhere
else, especially if we’re busy with critical patients, but EMTALA says I can’t be trusted
to do what’s medically or ethically right for my patients.”
The second external structure, the HITECH Act, was described in chapter two.
HITECH was passed in 2009 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
and its major goals included reducing healthcare costs, improving healthcare quality and
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coordination, reducing medical errors, improving IT infrastructure, and creating a
national electronic health information exchange (Pipersburgh, 2011). Providers at
Hospital H cited the HITECH Act, frequently, in their complaints about EMRs and
forced adoption. For example, Dr. G shared the following diatribe:
The government forced EMRs down everyone’s throat. These are broken
systems, but do you know who is benefiting? The companies that make them.
They now have zero motivation to make EMRs any better because they have a
captive audience of forced adopters. I’m dumbfounded by HITECH. There had
to be dirty money involved or lobbyists somewhere who made that happen. This
legislation is going to kill patients.
Although not all providers believed that the legislation was funded by “dirty
money,” there was a consensus among physicians that the HITECH Act, in conjunction
with CMS policies, created unresolvable conflicts. For example, Dr. E said:
I do things that I know are not in the patient’s best interest because of the EMRs,
the mandates, et cetera. . . . I’m running up huge bills; I’m doing things that
won’t help, won’t improve anything, and won’t change outcomes [because] of
hospital policy and CMS mandates. I feel like I’m a cog in a horrible, broken
machine.
Dr. E explained that the “CMS mandates” he referenced were the time-based
performance metrics that CMS devised to reduce emergency room overcrowding, which
was caused, in part, by EMTALA.
The last external structure, metrics, are recorded by EMRs and tracked closely by
CMS. The most important metrics, according to providers at Hospital H, measure
patients’ length of stay and “door-to-doc times.” Dr. O explained that door-to-doc refers
either to the time that it takes a provider to “lay eyes on the patient and do a quick
assessment, such as ‘the patient’s not going to die this minute’ or ‘the patient needs
immediate attention’” or to the time that it takes for a provider “to order some sort of
diagnostic test, like blood sugar or CBC [complete blood count].” She added, “Ordering
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tests is easier and faster, especially if we have a lot of patients. It drives up the bill, but if
you don’t meet metrics, CMS doesn’t pay the hospital.” When asked if metrics could
incentivize faster care and, possibly, alleviate overcrowding, Dr. O replied:
The problem with metrics is that acuity isn’t factored in. There’s a difference
between someone with a stroke or a toothache. If you have a choice between
seeing the stroke or the toothache, are you going to leave the stroke so that you
can be sure to say “hello” to the toothache within 10 minutes of arrival? I don’t
think so. What if you’re busy with a heart attack or car accident? The metrics
don’t distinguish. The EMR says that this patient, the toothache, waited an hour
to be seen, but the EMR doesn’t explain that you were busy saving lives down the
hall. So, you’re going to order a bogus test on the toothache just so you can click
the box and stop the clock, “Yup, seen the patient.”
Complicating matters for providers is that many of the metrics conflict with each
other, “making it impossible to meet all of them simultaneously and adding to the
unrealistic demands placed on emergency departments” (“Metric Madness,” 2014, p. 22).
During an interview conducted with Dr. P, he opined:
The thinking behind metrics is a “move the meat” mentality. Get the patients in
and out as fast as possible, and then you won’t have overcrowding. If a hospital is
too slow, then it loses some of its Medicare and Medicaid money. But guess
what? We still have overcrowding. Metrics don’t work. They just run up bills
and add to our stress. I have to pick which metric I’m going to satisfy and hope
that the one I don’t pick isn’t the one that will get me fired.
All three external structures––EMTALA, HITECH, and CMS––intersect and
leave emergency medicine providers feeling as if they are at an impasse: patients’ health
and financial interests are pitted against federally mandated EMR use and “fast-care”
metrics that, oftentimes, subject patients to unnecessary tests, and, when unmet,
jeopardize physicians’ employment and carry fines. The impasse left many providers at
Hospital H feeling both immobilized and dissatisfied with their careers, which are
hallmarks of an SD-cycle.
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In addition to the external structures just named, there were contradictory internal
structures that contributed to SD-nexus conditions at Hospital H. For example, because
revenue at Hospital H had fallen, administrators decided to advertise heavily the
hospitals’ emergency medical services. Billboards, print advertisements, and radio
advertisements described “short wait times,” but Q, the nurse manage, worried that the
EMR, which resulted in slower care delivery and increased lengths of stay, would
prohibit providers from delivering the timely care that the advertisements promised. As
Q commented, “We’re getting a lot busier because the CEO is pushing marketing, but
they don’t understand that we’re not equipped to meet the demand. The EMRs slow us
down and we’re short staffed.” She went on to explain:
Patient volume went from 19,000 to around 33,000 this past year, but
administration hasn’t funded nurse positions to keep pace. I was allowed to hire
temporary nurses, but I wanted to offer permanent positions. Administration
balked at the $2 an hour raise requested by at least one potential hire, so he left.
Three other nurses have also left for various reasons, so now we have a real
shortage. That means that existing nurses have to work overtime and now
administration is complaining about paying them time and a half. They could
have given this guy his $2 an hour raise, but, instead, they’re paying twice that in
overtime pay. They wonder why we can’t meet their time quotas? There are too
few nurses doing too much work! Of course, the patients are going to wait! With
slow docs on the EMRs, they [patients] wait even longer!
Most of the nurses also complained that the advertisements added to their workrelated stress. Nurse B bemoaned the advertisements because not only did they promise
short wait times but they recast patients from “people seeking medical care to customers
calling the shots.” He described the patient/customer dilemma:
The CEO’s motto is “Make the patients happy,” but we [nurses and physicians]
are in the “make people well” business, which doesn’t always make them happy.
There’s a difference between good customer service and good medical care.
Good customer service is more expensive. Ever heard of therapeutic radiation?
Patients insist on the X-ray because they’re sure they have a broken leg. The
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doctor assures them, but nope, only an X-ray will do. The X-ray costs more, but
without it, the doctors get complaints. The customer is always right, even when
he’s not.
Nurse B and several other nurses complained about the untenable situation that
they believed they were put in by administrators’ customer service mandates. As Nurse
Y said:
How do I defend practicing “so-called medicine” when I know in my heart that
this isn’t right? Your kid doesn’t need a CT scan because he bumped his head,
but you demanded it. Now I’m the one wheeling your kid down to radiology to
get his head zapped for no good reason and I know he’ll lose IQ points because of
it. Is it right? No. Is it what I have to do to keep my job? Yes.
Physicians also complained about hospital policies that left them immobilized and
angry. Dr. E believed that his hands were tied by “policies that increasingly marginalized
physicians.” He admitted to writing prescriptions that he knew patients did not need, to
avoid violating customer service directives:
Yeah, you write for the antibiotics and the narcotics just to stave off the patient
complaints, because those can get you fired if the CEO gets bad patient surveys
that say, “The doctor didn’t give me antibiotics” or “The doctor didn’t give me
pain meds.” That almost happened to me. A patient complained that I didn’t give
her kid antibiotics for his virus. A virus! You don’t give antibiotics for a virus.
She wrote a letter and I had to answer to the CEO. So, now I give the antibiotics.
I don’t feel like I have a choice.
Dr. P expressed similar sentiments:
I hate what medicine is becoming: Give patients a door prize [a prescription] and
send them off with a smile on their face. Be sure to give them every test they ask
for, whether they need it or not. I’m starting to think the MD after my name
means “Mustn’t Deny.” I feel bad about it, especially when it comes to the cost
of everything, and what I know they charge for what we do, the grossly inflated
charges, I feel terrible. People, the public, think I have a voice in this. I don’t.
They think greedy docs made it this way. It’s the hospital and I don’t have the
power to change it. I feel guilty that I’m a part of a broken healthcare system, but
what can I do?
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I observed that these external structures (EMTALA, HITECH, and CMS),
together with internal structures (e.g., Hospital H’s customer service policies), collided
regularly with patients’ best interests and providers’ goals. Despite what patients wanted
(e.g., “therapeutic radiation”), what was best for them––namely, affordable care and
better health––could not be delivered by providers who were constrained by
contradictory structures that restricted and, oftentimes, penalized them. According to Dr.
F., providers wanted to “first and foremost, do no harm and, second, keep their jobs.”
Conflicting structures meant that providers were immobilized, mired in unresolvable
conflict, and experienced erosion of development (e.g., patient complaints and/or poor
performance reviews), which, taken together, suggested an SD-nexus in the emergency
room at Hospital H (see Figure 5.3). Additional evidence that pointed to SD at Hospital
H is described next.

SD-nexus

SD-cycle

Figure 5.3. The Interpenetration of Contradictory Structures and the Resulting Negative
Spiral
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Providers’ Satisfaction and Burnout
Because many of the providers at Hospital H felt “stuck,” given the conflicting
structures, they also felt dissatisfied. Nurse A told me, “We’re kind of damned if we do
and damned if we don’t; no matter what we do, we piss somebody off. Would you be
happy working in a place like this?” She added, “Since the EMRs, my work satisfaction
has gone way down.” An older nurse volunteered, “I was a nurse for 33 years before
they put these computers in. I almost quit. I would [quit] if I could get a job doing
something else.” X, a midlevel provider, revealed that he planned to resign from
Hospital H and open an urgent care clinic. He spent his weekends renovating a rented
space and preparing to open his practice. As he explained:
My goal is to be out of here before the electronic TSheets are put in. And you
know what? I’m not putting an EMR in my clinic. I’ll take the hit from CMS.
I’ll save more [money] by not buying an EMR than CMS would pay me in
Medicare money anyway. Plus, and I know this sounds crazy, but I might
actually like my job again. It’ll be nice looking patients in the eye and having
conversations again.11
Over the course of this study, several nurses resigned from Hospital H and a
physician left. The most shocking, from my perspective, was the resignation by Q, the
emergency room nurse manager and my sponsor. Q, who had worked for Company S,
stayed behind after Corporation G bought Hospital H, because she believed strongly in
the hospital’s potential. As she explained, “I believed in what the administrators wanted
to do. I had faith in the nurses and docs, and knew that they, we, could accomplish a lot.

11

X, eventually, did open his clinic, but because he was unable to generate enough
income to resign from Hospital H, he continued working part-time in the emergency
room.
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I wanted to be a part of that, so I stayed.” A few years later, on August 1, 2014, she
announced her resignation. The next day, she told me:
Sixty percent of the reason I’m leaving is the EMR. They’re going live with
electronic TSheet any day and I don’t want to be here. Unlike the CPOE, the
nurses don’t know how to use the TSheets, so they cannot help the docs, plus
patients will be impacted and length of stay will go way up. I would have been
held accountable despite administrators’ claims to understand that there will be
some hiccups. Past experience tells me that they are not understanding and will
come down on me when things don’t go well, plus the docs and nurses complain
to me as well. I’m caught in the middle.
She also implied that several physicians who were unhappy with the impending changes
had started looking for jobs elsewhere, “When the docs jump ship, I don’t want to be the
one left holding the bag. It’s time to go.” Q agreed to remain in her position as the nurse
manager until Hospital H found someone to replace her.12
Because so many providers at Hospital H complained that they were unhappy and
wanted to quit their jobs, I speculated that some of them suffered burnout, a surface-level
manifestation of SD (Nicotera & Mahon, 2012). I asked providers if they experienced
symptoms of depersonalization or emotional exhaustion, the dimensions that are used
most commonly to measure burnout in medical providers (Rehder et al., 2014). For
example, I asked, “Do you ever feel callous toward other people?” and “Do you ever feel
burned out from you work?” Nurse B said, “I’m more cynical than I’ve ever been. I still
enjoy looking after patients, but the system frustrates me. Maybe I am a little [burned
out], but not as much as I could be.”

12

When the administrators at Hospital H were unable to find a qualified candidate to
replace her, Q agreed to remain the nurse manager, but she lobbied actively to delay the
electronic TSheet implementation. In February 2015, she withdrew her resignation. As
of May 2015, providers still were using paper TSheets.
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Nurse J believed, emphatically, that most of her fellow nurses experienced
symptoms associated with burnout, regularly, and, sometimes, daily. As she explained,
“A lot of people are getting more and more burned out. I see it every day. Some people
are just there for the money, honestly. The passion, the care, is gone.” Several of the
physicians admitted that they experienced burnout frequently. As Dr. E said:
Yeah, I think a lot of us are burned out. I can tell because some of us just go
through the motions sometimes. It’s frustrating, because these days, you don’t get
to practice clinical medicine; you have to practice totally defensive medicine
based on covering your ass. You have EMRs, metrics, and pissed off patients
threatening to sue you at every turn. Cynical? Callous? Yeah, I guess I am. I
think the system [and] the policies have to change before it’s going to improve for
any of us.
In January and February 2015, I administered a questionnaire that solicited
providers’ perceptions about their career and/or workplace satisfaction and burnout. In
response to the prompt, “Since I’ve begun using EMRs . . .,” a third of the respondents (n
= 10) reported that they had considered quitting their jobs, another third reported that
they had considered changing jobs, and 10% (n = 3) had considered retiring. Twenty
percent (n = 6) reported that they had considered changing careers altogether since
Hospital H installed the EMR. Thirty percent (n = 9), however, reported that they were
more satisfied with their jobs following the EMR adoption; of those respondents, five
were nurses, three were technicians, and one identified as “other.” Eighty percent of
respondents reported being very satisfied, satisfied, or somewhat satisfied with their
careers in emergency medicine, but only 63% would choose a career in emergency
medicine if they had it to do over again. Among physicians (n = 5), two were satisfied
with their careers, two were dissatisfied, and one was not sure. Fifteen out of 17 nurses
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were satisfied with their careers, and all three midlevel providers were satisfied with their
careers.
Despite observational evidence accrued over the previous year that indicated
many providers were unhappy with their careers in emergency medicine, results from the
questionnaire, which was administered near the end of the study, suggested that the
majority of providers, generally, were satisfied with their careers. Physicians who
completed the questionnaire were split on career satisfaction, which, according to Dr. F,
was because “physicians shoulder a disproportionate share of the EMR burden, so you
would expect them to be more unhappy compared with nurses.” He added, “I’m
surprised that two docs actually said they were satisfied.”
When asked how he interpreted the discrepancy between my fieldnotes and the
questionnaire results, Dr. A replied:
It’s important to distinguish between how much I hate the EMR and how I view
my career as a whole. Before the EMR, I really liked my job. The last few years?
Not so much. If I have to choose “satisfied” or “dissatisfied,” overall, I’d have to
say I’ve been satisfied. It’s been a good career. Until the EMR, that is. Am I
looking around? Sure. If I can find a hospital with a better EMR, then I’ll go.
Dr. G gave a similar response:
I like being a physician because I enjoy taking care of people, but I hate the EMR.
I’m dissatisfied with the EMR, not my career choice. If I feel burned out, it’s
because of EMRs, not patients. Trust me, I rarely felt burned out before these
things [EMRs] showed up in the emergency room.
Several of the questionnaire respondents reported experiencing emotional
exhaustion (see Table 5.3) and depersonalization (see Table 5.4), which are indicators of
burnout in medical providers. On the emotional exhaustion item (“I feel burned out from
my work”), the most common response was “once a month or less” (n = 10), followed by
“a few times a year or less” (n = 6) and “never” (n = 6). On the depersonalization item
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Table 5.3
Responses to the Questionnaire Item, “I feel burned out from my work.”
User Type
Response

MD
(n = 5)

MLP
(n = 3)

RN
(n = 17)

Tech.
(n = 4)

Other
(n = 1)

Total
(N = 30)

Never

40% (2)

0% (0)

6% (1)

75% (3)

0% (0)

20% (6)

Few times
a year or less

0% (0)

67% (2)

18% (3)

0% (0)

100% (1)

20% (6)

Once a
month or less

40% (2)

67% (2)

41% (7)

0% (0)

0% (0)

33% (10)

A few times
a month

0% (0)

33% (1)

12% (2)

0% (0)

0% (0)

7% (2)

Once a week

0% (0)

0% (0)

6% (1)

0% (0)

0% (0)

3% (1)

A few times
a week

20% (1)

0% (0)

12% (2)

25% (1)

0% (0)

13% (4)

Daily

0% (0)

0% (0)

6% (1)

0% (0)

0% (0)

3% (1)

Note. MD = physician; MLP = midlevel provider; RN = nurse.

(“I have become more callous toward people since I took this job”), “never” was the
most common response (n = 11), followed by “a few times a year or less” (n = 6) and
“few times a month” (n = 6). For both items, responses were coded 0 (“never”) through 6
(“daily”), and then summed. Respondents’ scores ranged from 0 to 12, with a mean score
of 3.8; scores above 3, according to McManus et al. (2003), suggest burnout. Individual
scores (see Table 5.5) indicated that 23% of providers experienced burnout (n = 7): one
physician, five nurses, and one technician scored 3 or above on the burnout scale.
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Table 5.4
Responses to the Questionnaire Item, “I have become more callous toward people since I
took this job.”
User Type
Response

MD
(n = 5)

MLP
(n = 3)

RN
(n = 17)

Tech.
(n = 4)

Never

20% (1)

67% (2)

29% (5)

75% (3)

0% (0)

37% (11)

Few times
a year or less

20% (1)

0% (0)

24% (4)

0% (0)

100% (1)

20% (6)

Once a
month or less

0% (0)

33% (1)

12% (2)

0% (0)

10% (3)

A few times
a month

40% (2)

0% (0)

24% (4)

0% (0)

0% (0)

20% (6)

Once a week

0% (0)

0% (0)

0% (0)

25% (1)

0% (0)

3% (1)

A few times
a week

20% (1)

0% (0)

6% (1)

0% (0)

0% (0)

7% (2)

Daily

0% (0)

0% (0)

6% (1)

0% (0)

0% (0)

3% (1)

0% (0)

Other
(n = 1)

Total
(N = 30)

Note. MD = physician; MLP = midlevel provider; RN = nurse.

To review, providers at Hospital H verbalized frequently their unhappiness and
dissatisfaction over the course of this study, with many providers citing the EMR and
conflicting structures as the primary sources of their grief, frustration, and displeasure.
Several dissatisfied providers resigned their positions and/or indicated that they were
looking for new jobs. Most of the questionnaire respondents, however, reported that they
were satisfied with their careers. Several providers explained the discrepancy between
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Table 5.5
Individual Burnout Scores.
ID

Σ

x̄

role

ID

Σ

x̄

role

1

7

3.5*

RN

16

8

4*

RN

2

3

1.5

RN

17

1

.5

MLP

3

3

1.5

MD

18

2

1

RN

4

3

1.5

MLP

19

9

4.5*

tech

5

10

5*

MD

20

2

1

RN

6

0

0

RN

21

10

5*

RN

7

1

.5

RN

22

0

0

tech

8

3

1.5

other

23

12

6*

RN

9

0

0

tech

24

3

1.5

RN

10

4

2

MD

25

2

1

RN

11

6

3*

RN

26

4

2

RN

12

0

0

tech

27

0

0

MD

13

2

1

RN

28

2

1

MLP

14

4

2

RN

29

5

2.5

RN

15

3

1.5

RN

30

5

2.5

MD

Note. ID = respondent; MD = physician; MLP = midlevel provider; RN = nurse.
*

Indicates burnout.

what they said in interviews and what they reported on the questionnaire: They were
satisfied with their careers, especially in the years before EMRs were adopted, but they
were dissatisfied with EMRs, which impacted, marginally, their overall career
satisfaction. Providers complained that they experienced emotional exhaustion and
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depersonalization regularly, and questionnaire results revealed that 23% of providers
suffered burnout. Next, I describe findings associated with “us” versus “them” language,
which contributed to providers’ dissatisfaction and workplace stress.
“Us” versus “Them” Language
Most of the “us” versus “them” encounters that I witnessed were between floor
nurses and emergency room nurses, and although not all of those exchanges were about
the EMR, such exchanges contributed to SD-nexus conditions. As described previously,
the perceived imbalance in workloads between floor nurses and emergency room nurses,
coupled with floor nurses’ tendency to resist patient admissions, leads many emergency
room nurses to dislike floor nurses (Eisenberg et al., 2005; Nicotera et al., 2010).
Additionally, Nicotera and Mahon (2012) found that discordant interactions between
floor nurses and emergency room nurses contributed to SD-cycle development at the
hospital that they studied. Discordant interactions also may lead to workplace bullying,
which is a surface-level manifestation of SD (Nicotera et al., 2014). I observed many
instances of discordant interactions that contained “us” versus “them” language between
floor nurses and emergency room nurses, with many of discordant interactions being
exacerbated regularly by the EMR. Interactions, such as those described below,
contributed to SD conditions at Hospital H.
I observed Nurse A on the phone one afternoon, and, judging from her facial
expression (e.g., furrowed brow and pursed lips), I surmised that she was upset. My
suspicion was confirmed when she slammed down the phone a few minutes later and
proclaimed, “I hate upstairs nurses!” She explained that the floor nurse she had been
speaking with on the phone “called down demanding an update on an admitted patient,”
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but, as A pointed out, “she can look on the EMR just as well as I can and see the status.
It’s just a power play.”
Nurse J and Nurse Y told me that upstairs nurses engage in “turf work” frequently
to avoid using the EMR. For example, J told me:
The upstairs nurses have a problem with direct admits because they don’t want to
do the [patient’s medical] history. It takes too long to do in the EMR, so they just
turf it to us. They dump their work on us while we’re busy with patients, and it
pisses me off.
Y further explained:
A direct admit bypasses the emergency room and goes straight to the floor, so if
you are at your doctor’s office and he says, “I think you should be admitted for a
few days,” you show up at the main entrance [to the hospital] and get sent up to
the floor. Well, the nurses up there don’t want to do the work so they send the
patients down here and now we have to triage them, do all the paperwork, and
then the patients get sent up. That ties up things down here and adds to our
workload.
On another occasion, I observed a technician returning from a trip to “the floor”
(i.e., the intensive care unit), pushing a patient on gurney who was supposed to have been
admitted. When a nurse asked why the technician had returned with the patient, the
technician responded that the “floor nurse refused to take him because they were busy.”
The technician added, “They had three patients. Poor babies are getting slammed up
there.” The nurse replied, “So? We have 12 [patients]. We’re busier.” The nurse
immediately picked up the phone and dialed the floor nurse’s extension, but no one
answered the phone. Thirty minutes later, the technician told me that a floor nurse
“called down and consented,” finally, to the admission.
The “power plays” described above were commonplace. Typically, power plays
involved floor nurses refusing or delaying admissions, which meant that emergency room
nurses had to continue providing care for the admitted patients and, simultaneously,
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treating new emergency room patients. One afternoon, I heard Nurse J explain to Nurse
M that a floor nurse had refused an admission because “she was on her lunch break and
didn’t want to be disturbed.” J rolled her eyes and said, “Must be nice.” M asked, “She
actually wants us to hold a patient so she can finish her lunch?” J nodded. M waved a
technician over and instructed her to take the patient immediately to that floor. J laughed
and said, “You’re so evil,” to which M replied, “Fuck that bitch. We’ve got MVAs
[motor vehicle accidents] and chest pains rolling in.”
I asked Nurse B if he had experienced incidents such as those I had witnessed.
He told me that confrontations between floor nurses and emergency room nurses
happened routinely and “on almost every shift.” Moreover, the incidents that I described,
from B’s perspective, were “rather civil.” He commented:
Nursing, as a profession, can be evil. I think some nurses are undermining.
Nurses can be conniving. They’re bullies. They’re often not very supportive of
one another. I speak from experience. I don’t think nursing is the profession it
could, or should, be.
When asked if he thought the interactions between floor nurses and emergency room
nurses could be characterized as downward spirals of negative, ineffective, or aggressive
communication, B replied:
Absolutely. The problem is that you got two sets of nurses who are at odds and
there’s no satisfying anyone. We talk past each other all the time. For a lot of
nurses, here and on the floor, there’s no getting past the “us” versus “them”
mentality. It’s even worse between the doctors.
Although several physicians complained to me about their encounters with
“upstairs doctors,” I did not observe discordant interactions between emergency medicine
physicians and consulting or admitting physicians at Hospital H. Dr. E assured me that
“just because you didn’t see it doesn’t mean it doesn’t happen.” I told him that in the 2
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decades that Dr. C and I had been a couple, I had witnessed enough discordant
interactions between emergency medicine physicians and specialists to know that the
phenomenon was real. Dr. E conveyed that, typically, his “problem exchanges” were
rooted in “ego concerns,” explaining that
most of the time it’s specialists on call who don’t want to be bothered with an
admission. They don’t trust our medical judgment, so they put us off by asking
for every test in the book. For example, I had a patient with appendicitis. It was a
clear-cut case. The surgeon wanted a CT scan, because, I guess, the MD behind
my name isn’t as good as the MD behind his name. So, we go through this
rigmarole, back and forth, for a few hours. Finally, the patient gets admitted with,
you guessed it, appendicitis! Now it’s a surgical emergency and we’ve wasted
time because this jerk doesn’t want to get out of bed and come in. . . . People
seem to forget the fact that emergency medicine is a specialty. I’m boarded. I did
a residency. I know my shit. Respect that and when I say “appendicitis,” you can
bet it’s not my first appendicitis. I know what I’m talking about.
Three other physicians shared similar stories and complained that specialists’
antics (e.g., ordering tests to avoid or delay patients’ admissions) added to both
healthcare costs and patients’ length of stay. As Dr. O said:
We’re already clicking on tests just to stop the clock because we don’t have a
choice, and, on top of that, now you want a CT scan? A blood test might add
$100 to the bill, but a CT scan? Now we’re talking thousands of dollars! Plus,
what do you think that does to [patient] length of stay [metrics]? Now I’m really
getting screwed, because this patient is going to be here all night and the hospital
is pushing to get him or her out in under 4 hours.
In sum, tensions between floor nurses and emergency room nurses were
exacerbated by the EMRs, because floor nurses shifted regular documentation chores that
involved the EMR onto emergency room nurses (e.g., refusing direct admissions).
Negative communication spirals and bullying among nurses were present, suggesting an
SD-cycle at Hospital H. Emergency medicine physicians also experienced discordant
interactions with other physicians, which intensified SD-nexus conditions, albeit
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indirectly, by violating metrics and adding to patients’ length of stay. Discordant
interactions between providers and administrators are described next.
Negative Communication Spirals between Providers and Administrators
I observed that relationships and communication between the emergency
medicine providers and administrators at Hospital H were strained, which contributed to
SD conditions and resulted in negative communication spirals between providers and
administrators. As explained below, three themes emerged as I reviewed my fieldnotes
and interview transcripts: (a) there was a lack of collegiality because providers, generally,
viewed administrators negatively; (b) providers believed that administrators
communicated too little information about the electronic TSheet installation; and (c)
providers and administrators had different, often contrasting, recollections of their
interactions with each other.
Lack of collegiality. Providers, like Dr. F, defined administrators as hospital
executives and officers working in “the C-suite” (i.e., corporate office suite), as well as
members of the IT department. Although I would not have categorized IT staff as
administrators, Dr. F explained that “they’re not ‘us’; they’re not emergency room, so
they’re C-suite. They have offices upstairs and they try to tell us what to do, so they’re
administration as far as I’m concerned.” As explained below, providers, generally, did
not regard administrators favorably for two main reasons: providers thought that
administrators neither listened to them nor supported them in their work.
Providers did not view administrators as listening to them. Nearly all of the
providers I interviewed believed that administrators did not listen to them because,
mainly, administrators did not solicit providers’ opinions during the EMR selection
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process. Eighty-three percent of questionnaire respondents reported that none of them
had been asked by administrators for input on the EMR systems being considered for
adoption; the remaining 17% of respondents reported that the EMR already had been
installed before they began working at Hospital H, and, thus, the point was moot. Many
providers had offered administrators unsolicited feedback about the EMR, but 88% of
questionnaire respondents believed that administrators ignored providers’ concerns. Dr.
E said that he advised members of the IT department not to design the generic, electronic
TSheets with “pick boxes, because boxes slow everything down.” He advocated for a
free-text charting platform with voice recognition capability, which would have been
“more user friendly.” Later, during an EMR training session, he saw an electronic
TSheet template and, afterward, he told me, “They obviously didn’t take my advice. It’s
all pick boxes.”
One of Hospital H’s vice presidents consented to an e-mail interview, and, when
asked whose input was taken into account when deciding to purchase the McKessonmade Paragon system, she replied, “We all agreed with input from the emergency room
physicians.” The head of the IT department, however, later contradicted the vice
president when he said, “Corporate made the decision . . . . Providers had no choice
regarding the selection of EMR.” Dr. F described, from his perspective, providers’
involvement in the EMR adoption process:
We [providers] made recommendations, but their minds were made up. They
[administrators] said, “No, we’re sticking with Paragon.” It’s a horrible system! I
am less than happy with Paragon. We made suggestions. We tried to talk to
them, they nodded their heads, pretended to listen, but they [administrators] don’t
care about us. We told them Paragon was bad, but they didn’t listen.

255

Q admitted that one of the many reasons that she resigned was “not being listened
to” by administrators:
I can’t be an effective manager when my input isn’t taken into account, especially
when I could have fixed some of the problems. They’re pushing generic TSheets
on us, but I could have gotten the real thing for a song. The actual TSheet system
is around $55,000, but I talked them [leaders of Company S] down to $35,000. I
brought this up in several meetings and no one said anything. I sent e-mails and
reports [to administrators], and there was no response. No one responded! That
was the last nail in the coffin. My nurse director told me basically to drop it. I
handed in my resignation the next day.
Nurse B admitted that he believed Q was ineffective as the emergency room nurse
manager because of administrators:
She’s run up against too many barriers. She can’t achieve any more. She’s tried
and she’s been denied. They [administrators] stopped listening to her a long time
ago. At this point, they are waiting for the consultant’s report to decide what to
do next.
B explained that Hospital H’s administrators hired a consulting firm to review emergency
room operations and make recommendations:
This firm was hired to tell administration what Q, in essence, is paid to do: assess
patient flow and determine appropriate nursing coverage. They [administrators]
are paying upwards of $25,000 for this report. That money would have gone a
long way toward fixing some of the problems in the emergency room. No wonder
Q resigned.
I told B that the actual, proprietary TSheet system could have been acquired for $35,000,
to which he responded, “I’m guessing no one listened, huh? That alone would have
saved us all a lot of heartache.”
Other nurses also believed that administrators rendered Q ineffective and that
emergency room nurses, consequently, were denied a voice in hospital politics. Nurse Y
commented:
Since they [administrators] cut Q off at the knees, I don’t feel that there’s anyone
I can approach with issues. There’s the head of nursing for the whole hospital,
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but you can talk to her and it’s like it never happened. She just doesn’t hear, or
remember, or seem to care. She’s off on another planet. She’s a great politician,
but she’s not a great communicator. We’re kind of on our own down here.
Nurse J added, “A lot of these administrators used to be nurses. What happened? Have
they forgotten what it’s like to be in the trenches? Don’t they care? Why else don’t they
listen?” Nurse A responded, “The CEO makes $450,000 a year and he just got a raise.
Where is our raise? Oh, wait, we just got a pay cut. Hell no, they don’t care about us.”
Providers did not feel supported by administrators. The other reason that
providers disliked administrators, generally, was because providers did not feel supported
in their work. Not feeling supported by administrators, although not connected directly
to the EMR adoption process, contributed to SD-nexus conditions by creating an
unpleasant work environment for providers. Additionally, many providers saw
administrators as sabotaging them by making providers’ work more difficult. For
example, B explained that the C-suite decided, as a cost-cutting measure, that the
registration office would close each evening at 8:00 p.m., but as B pointed out, “the
emergency room still admits patients after 8:00 p.m.” Moreover, “all of the registration
paperwork that we have to send up with the patients prints out in the registration office.”
As he explained further:
We can’t get to the papers to give to the floor nurses because the department is
locked. I figured out a way in, though: I have to walk out of the ER, down the
hall, then climb over one of the registration desks, shimmy under a glass partition,
get in the back way, get to the printer, and pull out our paper work. It’s
ridiculous, but that’s how I do it.
When asked if anyone had requested a key or an additional printer for the emergency
room, he replied:
Well, administration [sic], in their great wisdom, decided to close up the
registration office, but no, it never occurred to them to give us a key. It’s been
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brought to their attention and it still hasn’t been fixed. The process is broken.
Locking the registration department? Not sure why. Does it save money? I
doubt it, but it makes our jobs harder. If I gain any weight, I won’t fit under the
partition!
I asked other night shift nurses how they retrieved the registration papers from the
locked office. Nurse M replied that he simply stopped collecting the paperwork, and
when floor nurses inquired about the missing documentation, he told them where they
could find it. He added, “I bet they got keys to the office, but not us. As far as I’m
concerned, it’s not my problem anymore.”
Several nurses complained that they had been “singled out for bad treatment” by
administrators’ policies. For instance, because the hospital’s cafeteria was closed at
night, sometimes, night shift nurses would visit the physicians’ lounge for bottled water
or soft drinks. Nurse Y was caught “sneaking into the lounge” one evening and
reprimanded by a nurse manager from the floor. Soon thereafter, a security camera was
mounted above the entrance to the physicians’ lounge. When the nurses were thirsty,
they implored a midlevel provider or physician to “fetch drinks” for them. Y volunteered
that access to the physicians’ lounge was “only half of the story,” adding, “there’s a
paramedic buffet that we’re not allowed to touch.”
Nurse B informed me that in addition to the physicians’ lounge, there was a
separate lounge reserved for ambulance crews. That lounge was adjacent to the
emergency room and accessible only with a five-digit alarm code, but nurses were not
given the code. B said that the paramedics’ lounge was stocked fully with drinks,
sandwiches, and snacks. When asked why there was a lounge for ambulance crews but
not a lounge for nurses, B replied:

258

The lounge is a ploy to attract ambulance traffic. More patients mean more
money. If the ambulance driver bypasses another hospital to come here because
he knows he’ll get a free meal, then the hospital just made money, and all it cost
them [sic] was a sandwich. We [nurses] don’t count, apparently.
Another nurse commented, “They can eat here for free three times a day, but we can’t,”
and another replied, “Yeah, at night, the cafeteria’s closed. We’ve got no options, except
what we bring ourselves. They don’t even have vending machines we can hit up.”
Nearly all of the 15 nurses I interviewed complained that the paramedics’ lounge
left them feeling unappreciated and unsupported by administrators. As Nurse A
lamented, “It’s just not fair. Don’t we work hard enough around here? It’s a slap in the
face.” Administrators’ policies that excluded nurses from the physicians’ lounge and
from the paramedics’ lounge contributed to nurses’ workplace dissatisfaction and eroded
organizational identity. As Nurse M said, “We’re not a team. There’s no pride here.
Hospital H is a terrible place to work.”
To review, providers believed that administrators did not listen to their concerns
about the EMR and did not support them in their work; consequently, many providers
disliked the administrators. Furthermore, providers believed that administrators rendered
the nurse manager ineffective, which left them without a voice in hospital politics.
Nurses, in particular, felt singled out and victimized by policies that barred them from the
physicians’ lounge and the paramedics’ lounge. Collectively, these factors contributed to
providers’ workplace dissatisfaction and SD-nexus conditions, which resulted in a cycle
of ineffective communication between providers and administrators.
Administrators’ communication about the electronic medical records system
installation. When I began fieldwork at Hospital H in September 2013, I was told that
the electronic TSheet component of the EMR was scheduled to launch on November 1,
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but on that day, nothing happened. I asked when and how the launch would be executed,
but no one seemed to know. The midlevel provider on duty that day said, “They
[administrators] don’t tell us anything.” I asked, again, in December, when the system
would launch, and was told by Dr. F., “End of the year, supposedly. At least that’s the
rumor.” I asked when he had last received an official update from administrators about
the electronic TSheet component, and he replied, “Never. I hear stuff in hallways and in
meetings, but there’s been no ‘official’ word about anything.”
When, in January 2014, the electronic TSheet still had not been installed,
providers told me that the “go live” date was “not being communicated.” Nurse Y heard
that there were compatibility problems between the electronic TSheet and the billing
department, which was why the installation was delayed. Nurse B claimed he heard that
administrators had decided to “scrap the whole thing.” The only official communication
from administrators about the EMR installation was an e-mail sent to physicians in June
2014, in which the CEO required physicians to complete mandatory training in
anticipation of the EMR relaunch (see the earlier discussion in this chapter about EMR
training). The EMR, however, was not relaunched or “changed in any perceptible way,”
according to providers, and the electronic TSheets were not installed.
By August 2014, providers complained regularly that the uncertainty about the
electronic TSheet installation added to their work-related stress. Dr. P lamented, “They
[administrators] say it’s coming and then nothing happens. I have no idea what to expect.
Will there be training? Will we at least get some kind of warning?” Dr. G said he
worried that he would come to work one day to find “electronic TSheets already installed
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and no one here to explain how to work them.” He added, “I have nightmares about it. I
just wish somebody would say something. Let us know what’s going on!”
Many of the providers at Hospital H were experiencing technostress, which is
stress experienced by technology users in organizations that is “associated with decreased
job satisfaction and organizational commitment” (Rice & Leonardi, 2014, p. 433).
Technostress, especially in technology-adoption scenarios, can be mitigated by frequent
updates from managers, “practice sessions and early trials to create psychological safety
and encourage new behavior” for end users (Rice & Leonardi, 2014, p. 433), and by
feedback sessions that allow end users to express their opinions and/or concerns, but none
of these things happened at Hospital H. According to Moore (2014), change in
emergency room settings is difficult and requires the understanding and commitment of
staff, “which in turn requires the development of an open communication culture” (p. 29).
Strong internal communication leads to organizational effectiveness (Moore, 2014), but
Hospital H, seemingly, lacked an internal communication network: information about the
TSheet implementation was circulated secondhand or not at all.
On September 20, 2014, Nurse B sent me a text message proclaiming that the “go
live date” was imminent. He wrote, “They recently installed extra monitors at the MD
and MLP [midlevel provider] desks for the new EMR, so I guess it’s happening soon.” I
went to the emergency room that night and asked the midlevel provider, X, what he had
been told about the new computer monitors. X replied, “I have no idea. No one’s told us
anything. They [the computer monitors] just showed up today.” When asked if he
believed that the monitors were related to the electronic TSheet component of the EMR,
he replied, “Probably, but I hope my clinic will be up and running by then so I can quit.”
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He added, “There’s been absolute silence about this. We’ve heard nothing from
administration [and] nothing from IT.”
A few weeks later, when I saw that providers still were using paper TSheets and
the new computer monitors sat unused, I asked Dr. F what he had been told about the
electronic TSheet installation. He said:
I heard someone say the end of the year, but they [administrators] said that this
time last year. IT doesn’t know how to make this happen. In fact, I have no faith
in our IT department. We’ve wanted to see 10 TSheets before any kind of launch
and they’ve not even come up with one. Wait, they did make one. It’s taken
them 6 months to build one template. I have negative 50% faith in their ability to
get this done.
Dr. F, then, reviewed with me the timeline of promised launch dates and missed
deadlines, explaining:
Back in June [2014], they [administrators] told me it would take 30 days to make
10 TSheets. It’s October and I haven’t seen anything yet. You have to consider
that there are new core measures13 coming out and that means updates all the
time. How are they going to stay on top of updates? They can’t. You’re just
chasing your tail. We’re never going to stay current. Look at Ebola. You need
those updates done today, right now.
In April 2015, I asked the providers, again, when the electronic TSheets would be
installed, and, again, I was told by almost everyone, “I don’t know” or “We haven’t
heard.” Nurse B said, “The night and weekend crew is kept in the dark. We’re never
told anything. The last I heard was that Q and Dr. F were trying to squash it [electronic
TSheets].” Dr. G claimed, “All I know is that they [IT administrators] pass through every
once in a while and claim they’re almost finished. It’s been almost 2 years. We haven’t
heard a peep from administration. Nothing.”
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
13

The Joint Commission issues common performance standards (i.e., core measures)
several times a year that hospitals are required to meet to receive Medicare and Medicaid
funding.
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Providers’ and administrators’ contrasting accounts of their shared
interactions. Although I conducted only two interviews with administrators––one
interview was conducted over the phone and the other interview evolved as a series of email exchanges––I noted that there were many discrepancies in what administrators
claimed and what providers said about the EMR adoption process. In some instances, as
described in a previous section, administrators contradicted one another, such as the vice
president claiming that the emergency medicine physicians participated in the EMR
selection process, and SR, head of the IT department, saying that “providers had no
choice regarding the selection of EMR.” Administrators, however, did agree on one
important fact: Providers were pleased with the EMR. The vice president acknowledged
that “the transition was painful in the beginning,” but by October 2014, she was confident
that providers had accepted the EMR because “comments are more positive the longer we
use the EMR.” SR claimed that “75% of the physicians are pleased with our EMR.”
I asked Dr. F and Q if they believed that 75% of physicians were pleased with the
EMR. Dr. F exclaimed, “Absolutely not. We hate this piece of garbage. We’ve told
them [administrators] so. Where did they get that we were happy?” Q seemed genuinely
shocked, staring at me, with her eyes wide and mouth agape, and saying, “Really? They
[administrators] actually told you that? Don’t they know that you’re down here with us?
You see it for yourself. You tell me who here is happy with the EMR.” Q laughed
loudly and then asked the nurses working at a nearby counter who among them liked the
EMR: “Come on, show of hands, who likes the computer?” There were stifled laughs
and a few groans, to which Q replied, “See, nobody likes it.”

	
  

263

SR explained that although physicians wanted, initially, to use the actual,
proprietary TSheet system, he believed that physicians would be happier with the generic
version of the TSheets that were crafted in-house, because Dr. F and Q were involved
heavily in the design process. As he claimed, “The physicians will like the TSheets
better this way because it’s been customized for them.” Both Dr. F and Q, however,
denied participating in the design process. Q reminded me that she had lobbied for the
proprietary TSheet system and had negotiated a discounted rate with Company S. SR
told me that the proprietary TSheet system would have cost $300,000, but Q said that the
discounted rate was $35,000. When I asked SR about the discrepancy, he said, “That’s
not true. Paragon, as an entire system, is much less expensive.” Q’s response to SR’s
comment was, “See, they [administrators] don’t listen. I sent them the actual quote from
[Company] S and nobody looked at it.”
Although I did not witness, directly, interactions between the emergency room
staff and the IT staff outside of the formal training sessions that were described
previously, the secondhand accounts of interactions that were shared with me suggested
that many of the exchanges were tense and unproductive; consequently, relationships
between the emergency room staff and IT staff were strained as well. SR told me that he
was “extremely frustrated with the physicians” because he believed that they were
difficult to work with and were belligerent. He told me that the physicians complained
routinely about the CPOE order sets and, yet, from his perspective, physicians were not
using the order sets properly. Hence, the difficulty that physicians experienced, SR
claimed, “was their own doing.” As SR explained:
They skipped the training for starters, but we [IT staff members] need to ask
ourselves how can we enable them to do their jobs better. The decision support
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and the order sets, if used properly, can help. . . . The average physician will say,
“I went to school for 12 years and I don’t need a computer telling me what to do.
I don’t want to practice cookie-cutter medicine.” Yet, at the same time, they click
on order sets and don’t add or remove any tests to personalize it for the patient.
Dr. F countered, “Adding or removing tests takes longer, and then we get dinged on
length of stay metrics. What’s he [SR] expect us to do?”
Several other Corporation G-owned hospitals used the Paragon EMR because, as
SR explained, “research shows that Paragon meets the need at small hospitals.” He
added, “We’re using it at other facilities and it works really well. We’ve had no
problems anywhere else, just here.” SR tried repeatedly to facilitate conversations
between Dr. F and providers working at the other Corporation G-owned hospitals,
because SR believed that the conversations would help Dr. F to appreciate Paragon’s
potential. However, SR lamented, “Dr. F has refused to talk with facility directors. I
don’t understand that. Why wouldn’t you want to collaborate?” Dr. F explained his
position to me, which he claimed to have also explained to SR:
What are they going to tell me? Their version of Paragon is different. Each
facility has its own customized version, so what’s the director out there going to
tell me that I can use here? Nothing. He’s a busy doc, I’m a busy doc, so let’s
not waste each other’s time.
Dr. F and SR disagreed on many points, including the topics of their past
conversations with one another, but one of the more contentious points between them
centered on how busy each thought the emergency room was. Dr. F pointed out that
patient volumes were increasing steadily, which he attributed to Hospital H’s advertising
campaign, yet SR claimed that the emergency room was “pretty quiet.” On October 9,
2014, SR told me, “I just walked through the emergency room and there were two
patients, with six full-time nurses standing around. They have a lot of free time. It’s an
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easy job.” The following day, I asked Dr. F about SR’s comments, and Dr. F became
livid. He slammed the chart that he was holding onto the countertop and said, “Easy?
Really? We may have had two patients at that exact moment he casually strolled
through, but we had over 40 patients yesterday! Trust me, we’re busy!” Q added:
We don’t have six nurses; we have three or four, tops. He’s confused. Maybe he
saw a tech and assumed it was a nurse. How would he know the difference? He
doesn’t work down here. He doesn’t know how an emergency room operates, so
he needs to quit jumping to conclusions and running his mouth.
Q also was angry because SR made what she believed were disparaging
comments about the emergency room staff. As Q explained:
He has no idea who you are. You call on the phone, he’s never met you, and he’s
going to tell you that we’re not busy [and] that we’re “standing around?” He
undermines me and he makes the emergency room staff members look less
efficient and hardworking than they really are. We’re busting our asses down
here. Who else is he saying this to? I’m begging for additional staff and he’s
running around telling everyone that we’re overstaffed.
Dr. F just shook his head and said, “It’s not warm and fuzzy between us and IT. I think
you can see why.”
To review, communication between providers and administrators at Hospital H
was ineffective because they appeared to draw conflicting conclusions regularly. As Q
explained, “It’s like we’re speaking different languages altogether. I don’t know how
they [administrators] don’t understand us.” This communication impasse was indicative
of an SD-cycle. There, thus, was clear evidence of an SD-cycle (i.e., negative
communication spiral) at Hospital H. First, there was a lack of collegiality between
providers and administrators that affected their communication negatively: Providers did
not view administrators as listening to them because they believed that their opinions
about the EMR were not taken under consideration by administrators, and, furthermore,
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they believed that administrators did not support their work. Second, administrators
communicated very little information to providers about the electronic TSheet installation
process, which added to providers’ uncertainty and technostress. Lastly, providers and
administrators had different, often contrasting, recollections of their interactions with
each other, which exacerbated SD-nexus conditions and led to an SD-cycle. Providers’
diminished agency, a key component of SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation at Hospital H,
is described next.
Providers’ Diminished Agency
As defined in chapter three, agency is human activity, which is enabled or
constrained by structures (Giddens, 1984). Agency hinges on an agent’s ability “to
‘make a difference’ to a preexisting state of affairs” (Giddens, 1984, p. 14); hence,
without some measure of power, agency is not possible. When SD is present in an
organization, individual agency is limited (Nicotera & Mahon, 2012). SD-entrenched
systems often lead to impotent agency, the inability to meet goals effectively because of
conflicting structures in environments where performance and productivity are monitored
closely. Impotent agency feeds unhealthy communication patterns, and, in addition to
immobilization, it can lead to developmental regression (Nicotera & Mahon, 2012).
Providers at Hospital H suffered both limited agency and impotent agency.
Providers, essentially, were unable to change the EMR––they were unable “to ‘make a
difference’ to a preexisting state” (Giddens, 1984, p. 14)––consequently, they had limited
agency. As noted above, providers were excluded from the EMR selection process, and
administrators, largely, ignored providers’ concerns and suggestions about the EMR.
Whereas nurses were involved in customizing some aspects of the EMR display,
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physicians had no involvement either in the CPOE customization or in the electronic
TSheet design. Because the EMR exacerbated SD-nexus conditions (i.e., conflicting
external and internal structures), many providers suffered impotent agency, which further
fueled SD-cycle development (i.e., negative communication spirals).
Most of the providers’ quotations presented in the previous section can be seen as
communicating not only their immobilization and frustration but also their lack of power
and agency. When asked if he believed that his comments conveyed a lack of power
and/or agency, Dr. F, upon reviewing an early draft of this section, replied, “Yes, I would
say I have very little power. When I read what I said, that’s what comes to mind: ‘This
guy has no power.’”
As described in chapter two, forced organizational change (e.g., the EMR
adoption at Hospital H) robs individuals of their freedom and agency, and it activates
reactance (Nesterkin, 2013), which, in turn, triggers hostile or aggressive feelings
(Brehm, 1966). Freedoms may be restored, symbolically, by disparaging the source of
the threat or by exercising other freedoms to maximize feelings of control (Quick et al.,
2013). When providers at Hospital H disparaged the EMR or circumvented order-entry
processes, they also subverted the mechanics of power (i.e., they resisted constraining
structural forces). Through disruptive talk and behaviors that targeted EMRs, providers
also asserted “autonomy of action” (Giddens, 1984, p. 292) and attempted to regain lost
agency.
Many providers adopted two strategies to regain agency: providers implored
others to perform data entry and order-entry tasks for them, and/or providers searched for
employment at hospitals that used EMRs that they believed were superior to the
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McKesson-made Paragon system (i.e., providers then could choose which EMR to use,
and, thereby, restore, indirectly, a measure of control). Both strategies allowed providers
to maximize their feelings of control; however, imploring others to perform data and
order-entry tasks exacerbated hierarchical differences at Hospital H, especially between
physicians and nurses, which, in turn, fed recurring SD-cycles. For example, Nurse A
criticized a physician who “dumped orders” routinely:
Dr. W used to make us put in orders all the time, even though we weren’t
supposed to use the CPOE. He could never figure how to do it, so he would bark
orders at us, literally. He would say stuff like, “I’m the doctor, so do as I
command.” He was horrible.
All of the nurses complained that most of the providers “pulled rank and dumped orders”
regularly, which created tension between them and physicians (see the discussion in the
next section about providers’ strategies for coping with the EMR). Moreover, nurses had
fewer opportunities, when compared with physicians, to dump orders, and, therefore,
nurses’ symbolic restorations of freedom and agency were limited mainly to disparaging
the EMR.
I observed many terse exchanges between physicians and midlevel providers, and
between physicians and nurses; most of the exchanges involved dumped orders or
dropped orders (see the previous discussion about technical glitches). These exchanges,
typically, spiraled into increasingly negative diatribes (i.e., SD-cycles). For instance, I
observed a quarrel between Dr. A and V, a midlevel provider, in which Dr. A told V to
complete an order set for a patient, and V asked, “Do you want an EKG with that, too?”
Dr. A sighed loudly, threw his hands up, and said, “Sure, why not? EKG, EEG, whatever
you want. You go right ahead.” V replied, “Well, don’t let me pressure you or anything.
Just trying to help you do your job.” Dr. A retorted, “How about you just do your job and
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put in the orders, okay? If I wanted an EKG, I would have asked for one.” After Dr. A
retreated into an examination room, V told me, “Shit like that is why doctors have a bad
rap.” Nurse M attempted to diffuse the tension by telling a joke, “What’s the difference
between God and a surgeon? God doesn’t think he’s a surgeon!” V laughed and nodded
in the direction of Dr. A, and said, “Yup, that asshole thinks he’s God alright.” I heard
someone behind me call out, “Amen, brother.”
Although the emergency room at Hospital H was an SD-nexus, I observed that
SD-cycles were not always present: Certain physicians’ efforts to regain lost agency
appeared to incite or enflame SD-cycles, which led Dr. Nicotera to speculate that lost
agency and resulting restoration attempts may explain the SD-nexus to SD-cycle
escalation. I noted that Dr. A and Dr. W became embroiled in negative communication
spirals more than the other physicians did. I shared my hunches with Nurse B—namely,
that order dumping was a symbolic restoration of freedom that heightened hierarchical
differences and led frequently to divergent communication—and he agreed: “With certain
docs, like Dr. A and Dr. W, absolutely, I think you’re right, although, in my opinion, it
happens with every doc to some degree. For some [physicians], it is a real problem.”
To review, observational findings pointed to the presence of SD in Hospital H’s
emergency room. The evidence consisted of conflicting structures, which established
that Hospital H’s emergency room was an SD-nexus; providers’ dissatisfaction and
burnout; “us” versus “them” language, which intensified ineffective and hostile
communication patterns between emergency room nurses and floor nurses; negative
communication spirals between providers and administrators; and providers’ diminished
agency, which led frequently to discordant interactions between providers, which, in turn,
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contributed to SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation. Next, I present findings derived from
the SD scale items that were included in the questionnaire that was administered to
providers at Hospital H.
Structurational Divergence Scale Item Scores
The SD scale consists of 17 items and 3 subscales that measure
immobilization/individual development, unresolved conflict, and organizational
development (Nicotera et al., 2010). Summing scores across all subscales (range 17–85)
determines the degree of SD present in an organization: below 20, SD is absent; a score
between 21 and 35 indicates low SD conditions; a score between 36 and 50 suggests
moderate SD conditions; and a score above 51 signals high SD conditions. The average
SD score for respondents at Hospital H (N = 30) was 36, indicating that the group, as a
whole, experienced moderate SD. Individual SD scores (see Table 5.6) revealed that one
respondent experienced no SD, 50% of respondents (n = 15) experienced low SD, 37% of
respondents (n = 11) experienced moderate SD, and 10% respondents (n = 3) experienced
high SD. As expected, given that burnout is a surface-level manifestation of SD,
respondents who experienced high SD also suffered from burnout.
Together, with the observations reported above, these data support the presence of
SD at Hospital H and that SD affected providers negatively. Many providers described
feeling immobilized, feeling dissatisfied with their jobs, and experiencing symptoms of
burnout regularly. “Us” versus “them” interactions between emergency room nurses and
floor nurses aggravated SD-nexus conditions and led to ineffective communication
patterns and bullying. Providers’ interactions with administrators also were strained,
leading to recurring negative communication spirals (i.e., SD- cycle). The SD-nexus to
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Table 5.6
Individual Structurational Divergence Scores.
ID

Σ

SD

role

ID

Σ

SD

role

1

42

mod

RN*

16

43

mod

RN*

2

42

mod

RN

17

26

low

MLP

3

28

low

MD

18

28

low

RN

4

27

low

MLP

19

39

mod

tech*

5

56

high

MD*

20

32

low

RN

6

37

mod

RN

21

47

mod

RN*

7

39

mod

RN

22

18

none

tech

8

22

low

other

23

68

high

RN*

9

31

low

tech

24

40

mod

RN

10

37

mod

MD

25

27

low

RN

11

59

high

RN*

26

28

low

RN

12

25

low

tech

27

30

low

MD

13

26

low

RN

28

29

low

MLP

14

27

low

RN

29

35

low

RN

15

46

mod

RN

30

44

mod

MD

Note. ID = respondent; mod = moderate; MD = physician; MLP = midlevel provider;
RN = nurse.
*

Indicates respondent also experienced burnout.

SD-cycle escalation was due, in part, to providers’ efforts to regain lost agency. In
response, many providers’ adopted maladaptive strategies to cope with their lost agency,
which, as described next, amplified hierarchical tensions between physicians and nurses.
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Providers’ Strategies for Coping with Electronic Medical Records Systems
Providers at Hospital H developed several strategies for coping with the forced
EMR adoption. Most providers developed workarounds––tactics for circumventing the
EMR or avoiding the EMR altogether––with the most common workaround being order
dumping, asking and/or requiring other providers to enter data and/or orders into the
EMR and/or CPOE. Gaming the system, which included ordering inconsequential and,
oftentimes, unnecessary laboratory tests to stop the clock on “door-to-doc” time (see the
discussion below on unintended consequences), was another common workaround that
providers adopted to satisfy metrics, which were tracked by the EMR. Another
workaround that was adopted widely involved employing scribes to enter data into the
EMR, which left physicians more time for direct patient care. Although Hospital H did
not employ scribes, providers there expressed interest in hiring scribes; consequently, I
observed as Dr. C worked with a scribe at Hospital W and, later, as he recounted the
experience for the providers at Hospital H. A final strategy that was adopted by some
providers, which they dubbed “avoidance,” involved organized resistance that was meant
to thwart the electronic TSheet implementation. The following discussions examine
these coping strategies of order dumping, scribes, and avoidance.
Order Dumping
As described in the previous section, order dumping at Hospital H, generally,
involved a physician asking or demanding a midlevel provider or nurse to enter orders for
laboratory tests and/or procedures into the CPOE component of the EMR. I observed
situations in which nurses asked or demanded that other nurses update patient notes in the
EMR, but such occurrences were infrequent. As Nurse A commented, order dumping
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was regarded widely as a “doc-on-nurse crime.” She explained the order dumping
process, from a nurse’s perspective:
Docs are supposed to do most of the entering of tests and meds, but, often, that
gets put off on nurses. Nurses have to go in through the med-ordering system
under the doc’s name and put the orders in as “verbal orders.” It shows up under
the doc’s action list, which they have to sign off on at some point, saying they
approved the order; that it was the correct medicine, or whatever. Docs are
allowed to dump a certain percentage on the nurses, but Q encourages us to push
the docs to do more of the entering. They resist, especially the older ones.
When asked if order dumping added to her workload or contributed to her
workplace stress, A replied:
Yeah, it doubles my workload. The EMR is easy for me to use, except when they
[physicians] ask me to put in orders because I don’t really know the CPOE very
well. I don’t use it [CPOE] as part of my regular job. It’s only when I get orders
dumped on me that I have to go in and try to remember how to do it [use the
CPOE]. If the doc is busy, genuinely busy with a code or something, then no
problem, I’m happy to help. If it’s because he’s just being an asshole or doesn’t
want to enter his own orders, well, that pisses me off.
Nurse M remarked that physicians “just got a $30 an hour raise. They [physicians] do
less, we do more. Why should we put their orders in for them when they’re getting paid
more?”
As Nurse B mentioned, order dumping happened “with every doc to some
degree,” but Nurse L commented that some physicians “abused the privilege” more than
others:
Having nurses enter orders was a privilege that was available on a limited basis.
That was explained to them [physicians] from the start, but some physicians
demanded that nurses enter orders for them all of the time. One of those
physicians is no longer here.
I learned that L was referring to Dr. W. Nurse Y told me, “Yeah, we canned Dr. W
because he dumped all his orders on nurses.”
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When asked about physicians’ order-dumping habits, N, a midlevel provider, said,
“They all do it and I have to admit, a lot of the time it’s because they’re busy with
multiple patients.” N volunteered that although he believed that a lot of order dumping
was motivated likely by physicians’ reactance, he thought that order dumping was an
unavoidable workaround because of metrics, claiming:
It’s important for all of us to help out to keep the numbers up, like “how long
before seen” and “door-to-doc.” Most of the docs take a while to put in orders
and then we all take the hit for slow times. They [physicians] have to dump
orders or administration comes down on all of us.
Nurse B pointed out that he and several other nurses had avoided the CPOE
training sessions to not be targets of physicians’ order dumping. As B explained, “It was
a calculated move because I saw what was happening to nurses who had gone to the
training. I could honestly say, ‘I don’t know how to use the CPOE.’” Nurse B’s strategy
generated ill will and affected negatively working relationships among some of the
nurses. As Nurse A lamented, “Just because they skipped training they get to slack off,
and now I get twice as many orders dumped on me.”
I asked physicians how they viewed order dumping and, like N, most believed
that it was a necessary workaround because of metrics. Dr. E said, “I don’t have a
choice. If I’ve got two patients at once and I’ve got a nurse sitting here, then, yes, I’m
going to ask her to put something in for me.” When asked if they believed that order
dumping was an attempt to restore their lost agency, three out of six physicians agreed.
Dr. G commented, “I hadn’t thought of it that way but I can see that that might have been
my motivation. ‘I hate the damn thing [the EMR], so I’ll make them put orders in for
me.’” Dr. A said:
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Maybe, but you have to understand that I’m the only physician here in the
emergency room for all of those patients and I have midlevels and nurses whose
job is supporting me. Yes, I hate the EMR, but do your job when I ask you to do
it. Just put in the orders.
The order dumping that I witnessed was split evenly between that which was
justified (e.g., physicians were busy and their requests were appropriate given the
context) and that which was reactance inspired, such as the exchange between Dr. A and
V described previously. I identified instances of reactance-inspired order dumping based
on providers’ nonverbal behaviors (including paralinguistic cues, such as tone of voice),
and their apparent affective state. Using profanity, raised voices, loud sighing, and/or
aggressive gestures (e.g., slamming charts onto the counter) accompanied most
physicians’ reactance-inspired order dumping. Additionally, reactance-inspired order
dumping occurred, typically, when patient volume was low, which suggested that the
context did not support justified order dumping and, hence, it was triggered by reactance.
Such episodes fueled hierarchical tensions between physicians and nurses, and between
physicians and midlevel providers, and, as described previously, resulted in negative
communication spirals.
Scribes
Early during the EMR adoption process at Hospital H, physicians expressed
interest in hiring scribes to alleviate documentation burdens that they were experiencing.
According to Foppe (2014), scribes have the potential to alleviate 80% of documentation
burden that falls to emergency medicine physicians, inasmuch as scribes document
patients’ medical histories and findings. Scribes are seen as necessary “workarounds for
systems that fundamentally do not value physician time” (R. Bukata, personal
communication, February 3, 2014), but scribes also are “a mixed bag,” according to Dr.
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C. Dr. C worked part-time at Hospital H, but partway through my study, he accepted
another part-time position at a hospital that employed scribes. Dr. C agreed to share his
views on scribes with the providers at Hospital H, none of whom had worked with scribes
previously, to enable them to make an informed decision about pursuing scribe support at
Hospital H.
I accompanied Dr. C on his first shift at Hospital W, where I observed his
interactions with a scribe. The scribe, Z, pushed a COW and followed Dr. C around the
emergency room. As Dr. C conducted physical examinations, he verbalized patients’
histories and findings, which Z entered into the EMR. In addition to maintaining
patients’ electronic medical records, Z kept detailed notes about interactions that Dr. C
had with specialists that he consulted, when telephone calls to consultants were returned,
and consultants’ recommendations. Z could amend or add to medical records only when
he was in Dr. C’s physical presence. Although Z assumed responsibility for charting
patients’ medical histories and findings, he was not allowed to enter orders; only licensed
medical providers can enter orders using CPOE systems, and, consequently, despite using
a scribe, Dr. C still spent a lot of time at the computer.
Because Dr. C had to review, eventually, medical records for accuracy, he, too,
kept notes about patients’ histories, complaints, and findings, as well as consultants’
recommendations. As he explained, “I don’t really know how much of what I’m saying
is getting typed up, so I may need these notes later on when I look over the files.”
Checking the medical records for accuracy during the shift was “impossible,” because, as
Dr. C explained, “this place is busy, there are too many patients to manage, and if I stop
to review charts, then length of stay goes up. My metrics would look horrible.” When
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asked if the duplicated effort of both of them keeping detailed notes rendered the scribe
redundant, Dr. C replied:
Not necessarily, but it does seem silly. I’m documenting on paper just as much as
I did at [Hospital H] and I’m still using the CPOE, but at least when I go in the
patient room, I’m having conversations. I’m looking the patient in the eye. The
real advantage, so far, is that the scribe keeps up on pages [to consultants], who
has called back, and who we’re waiting to hear from.
The medical director at Hospital W’s emergency room, overhearing our
conversation, agreed and said that scribes, “keep on top of consults, so that’s one less
thing you have to keep straight, plus I can talk freely to the patient without looking at a
computer screen.” She added:
Before the scribes, we were pushing COWs into the exam room or taking notes on
scraps of paper to add [to the EMR] later. That meant that after an 8–12 hour
shift, you usually spent an extra 3 hours on charting, unpaid, and away from your
family. So the scribes help a lot. I don’t stay nearly as long now.
A nurse chimed in, “The scribes make our docs a lot happier. Happier docs make happier
nurses.” When asked if the physicians at Hospital W dumped orders, the nurse replied,
“Not as much as they used to! The scribes definitely helped out there.”
I asked Z to describe his experience as a scribe working at Hospital W. At the
time of our interview, he had been a scribe only for 4 months. He said that because he
planned to become a physician assistant, the scribe program gave him “valuable
experience working alongside doctors, learning medical terminology.” Despite the onthe-job learning that Z valued, he complained that the work was difficult in many ways
because he worked with a different physician every shift, and because many physicians
with whom he worked were difficult. As he explained:
It is a real challenge because every doctor does things differently. Some docs will
go slow, some hate questions, some like to teach, some try to trip you up, [and]
some talk really fast just to deliberately screw with you. It would be nice if one
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scribe worked with one doc. We [scribes] constantly have to adjust. The
advantage for me is that I get to spend time with the doctor and watch the patient
interactions. I’ve learned a lot.
I was told that Hospital W split the cost of the scribes’ salaries with the hospital’s
physicians. Scribe America, the company that employed Z, charged $20 an hour for
scribe services, but Z was paid only $8 an hour. Z said, “The pay really sucks, but you
can’t beat the experience. I’m kind of held hostage. It’s like I’m paying for this
exposure by accepting less money, but it will help my career later.” Dr. C, however, was
upset that Z was paid so little, exclaiming, “At least give the kid the whole $10 an hour
you’re taking out of my paycheck.” The emergency room medical director at Hospital W
explained that hospital administrators determined scribes’ pay, but she wondered if the
hospital actually contributed anything to offset the cost of the scribes or if the cost was
absorbed solely by physicians. She asked, “Administrators told us it cost $20 an hour,
but where’s the other $12 going?”
At the end of Dr. C’s shift, he spent an hour reviewing Z’s documentation and
found that the medical records were complete and accurate. When asked about his first
day working with a scribe, Dr. C said:
I’d always heard scribes were good to work with and could allow you to function
more efficiently in the emergency room. It went well. It saved me a lot of time
today, especially in this situation, [as] I’m working in a new emergency room.
Although the EMR is a system I’ve used before, of course, it’s always different in
another emergency room. This one has all sorts of variations. Almost everything
was different in terms of how it was organized. While I sorted things out, it was
great having someone else put in the history and physical.
He added, “I’m hoping it’s not just the scribe I worked with today; that this is the
experience I’ll have, more or less, with any scribe in the emergency room.”
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At the end of the week, after Dr. C had worked with several other scribes, I asked
him to reflect on his experiences. He lamented, “Not all scribes are created equal, I can
tell you that,” and said:
Z was thorough and conscientious. His charting looked good. I didn’t have to
make many corrections. The last few days, these scribes aren’t getting it. [There
were] omissions, mistakes, poor grammar, [and] misspellings. If one of those
charts ever goes to court, it makes me look like an idiot. I was reviewing a chart
and saw that the “unincarcerated hernia” I found was actually charted as
“incarcerated hernia.” The difference is that one goes home and the other is a
surgical emergency! Imagine if I hadn’t caught that and someone reviewed the
chart? “That guy sent home an incarcerated hernia! Fire him!” Then, I had a
patient with bronchiolitis and the scribe wrote down that the patient had a broken
leg! How do you get a broken leg out of bronchiolitis?
I asked for Dr. C’s final assessment of whether scribes were a viable EMR workaround
for the physicians at Hospital H, and he replied:
I’ve spent about 2–3 hours after each shift just fixing what they [scribes] got
wrong. The scribes can make the work go faster while I’m on shift, but I’m still
staying late to clean up. It’s kind of a wash at this point for me. I would have to
say, “No. Don’t get scribes there [Hospital H].”
Scribes, from Dr. C’s perspective, facilitated some aspects of his work but they
also constrained him in many ways, and, consequently, he did not advocate using scribes
at Hospital H. Upon hearing about Dr. C’s experiences at Hospital W, Hospital H’s
providers agreed that scribes would not be a worthwhile workaround, and they dismissed
the idea. Dr. F and Q noted that administrators, likely, would not have approved using
scribes anyway, given the added cost that scribes would have posed and Hospital H’s
falling revenue.
Avoidance
Dr. F and Q believed that avoidance was the best strategy for coping with certain
aspects of the EMR; namely, the generic, electronic TSheets that were being designed by
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members of the IT department and that, eventually, would be installed. Q explained that
avoidance involved calculated moves that were meant to slow the TSheet design and
installation process:
In the beginning of this whole process, I was proactive. I lobbied to get things
done. I was calling IT every day asking, “Where are the TSheets? Let me see
them. Let me make suggestions.” But now, I’m not pushing for the [electronic]
TSheets. I have given up on making anything happen. I realized that if I don’t do
my job, then they won’t do theirs. If I don’t push, then it won’t happen, and that
makes the docs happy. IT can’t get it done, so why should I try? This way, I’m
protecting the docs.
Dr. F explained how avoidance was a matter of “calculated inactivity”:
One of our nurses is a super-user and has some computer experience, but when IT
asked him to help out [with the TSheet design process], I told him to go real slow.
“Take your time, no rush.” I’ve seen what IT is designing and it’s a terrible
system. I’m not happy, so I’m not going to press them to get this done.
Later, he elaborated:
They [IT staff members] haven’t listened to any of our suggestions. Even with
one of our guys helping out, they still don’t take our advice. They claim that
whatever the real TSheets can do, they can do it better. They can’t. Excuse me if
I’m underwhelmed, but I’m not going to help facilitate this process that I know
for a fact will slow down charting even more and cost this hospital revenue.
When asked how the electronic TSheets would affect revenue, Dr. F clarified that
because the electronic templates lacked visual reminders for such things as review of
systems and social history, providers might not perform the associated billable
procedures.
Both Dr. F and Q took inspiration from “upstairs docs” who had thwarted
successfully installation of the EMR’s consulting notes component. As Q told me, “They
didn’t like doing their consults on the computer, so they all quit using it one day and the
hospital had to go back to paper.” She noted that, eventually, the consulting physicians
“gave in” and resumed using the EMR, but only after a 6-month delay and several
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revisions to the consulting notes component. “If our avoidance can buy a couple of
months, then that’s fine by me,” she noted. “In the meantime, maybe I can get
administration to reconsider buying the real TSheets.”
Dr. F also believed that the IT staff’s inability to design and implement the
generic, electronic TSheets in a timely manner would give administrators reason to
reconsider their decision to go with an in-house design over the proprietary system. As
Dr. F claimed:
I’m building my case against IT. This is all ammunition. Taking almost a year to
design one TSheet? Well, not even one. I haven’t seen it yet. What have they
been doing all this time? We’ve been hearing since last November [2013], “Any
day now.” What do we have to show for a year’s worth of work? Nothing.
Wasted money. This is all ammunition that I’m taking to the CEO [chief
executive officer].
When asked if he believed administrators would elect to purchase the proprietary system,
Dr. F responded, “It might be false hope, but we’re not using their generic version yet,
are we? Because they haven’t built it. Someone might wise up one day and get us the
real thing.”
Although most of the other providers acknowledged that they were aware of the
avoidance strategy, only Dr. F. and Q employed this strategy to cope with aspects of the
EMR installation. Because Dr. F, the emergency room director, and Q, the emergency
room nurse manager, were the only providers with direct ties to the hospital’s
administration, they had some measure of power and, therefore, some agency. Together,
they tried to “regulate system reproduction . . . to keep things as they are” (Giddens,
1984, p. 27).
In sum, providers at Hospital H developed workarounds to augment their EMRbased documentation tasks. Order dumping, the workaround used most frequently,
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aggravated hierarchical tensions among providers and fueled SD-cycle development.
Although providers considered employing scribes, a common workaround that has been
adopted in other hospitals, providers at Hospital H took Dr. C’s firsthand experience of
working with scribes into account and abandoned the plan. Avoidance tactics were
exercised by the emergency room management, which delayed installation of the
electronic TSheet component of the EMR. Next, I describe ways in which the EMR
changed communication among providers.
How the Electronic Medical Records System Affected Communication Patterns
among Providers
The EMR installation at Hospital H, according to providers there, changed the
communication that they had with other providers in several ways: the EMR reduced the
number of face-to-face exchanges between them and the nature and topics of their
conversations. These changes in communication patterns, in turn, affected providers’
relational growth and/or maintenance. Here, I describe those changes using examples
culled from fieldnotes, interview transcripts, and the questionnaire administered to
providers.
All of the providers I spoke with––15 nurses, 9 physicians, 4 technicians, and 3
midlevel providers––said that face-to-face interactions with other providers declined after
the EMR was installed. In response to the questionnaire item, “How has the EMR
impacted communication between you and your coworkers,” 40% (n = 12) of
respondents reported that they spoke with their coworkers less and 53% (n = 16) spent
less time discussing patient care with their coworkers face-to-face (see Table 5.7). Nurse
Y said that the EMR “changes how we interact with the docs. I might not even see the
doc face-to-face on any of my patients now. Before, we at least discussed game plans
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Table 5.7
Responses to the Questionnaire Item, “How has the EMR system impacted
communication between you and your coworkers?”
Response

Percentage

Total

I talk with my coworkers more.

3%

(n = 1)

I haven’t noticed a difference.

7%

(n = 2)

I talk with my coworkers less.

40%

(n = 12)

We talk about fewer topics.

13%

(n = 4)

We don’t spend as much time chitchatting.

7%

(n = 2)

I spend more time clarifying/asking about
orders.

47%

(n = 14)

We spend more time discussing patient
care face-to-face.

3%

(n = 1)

We spend less time discussing patient
care face-to-face.

53%

(n = 16)

We spend time complaining about
the EMR.

70 %

(n = 21)

We spend time teaching each other how
to use the EMR.

83%

(n = 25)

[and] treatments.” Nurse B added, “Because people are clustered around machines, we
talk less. It’s to be expected.” Dr. G lamented the change, noting that when providers
used a common paper chart, they interacted frequently:
We’re not a team anymore, really. We [providers] work independently of one
another. With paper charts, there was more collaboration [and] more bringing
things to each other’s attention, but not now. Do we talk less? Absolutely. The
only time we talk is when things aren’t working or something goes wrong.
Things worked better before the EMR because we talked to each other.
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When asked which topics related to face-to-face patient care were rarely or no
longer discussed face-to-face, providers indicated that pending orders and patients’ status
updates were verbalized less frequently after the EMR installation compared with when
providers used paper charts. Excluding order dumping, which involved face-to-face
communication, nurses complained that physicians and midlevel providers discussed
orders only intermittently. For example, Nurse B complained, “I hate it when a doc puts
in orders and doesn’t tell anyone.” He stressed that he and the other nurses wanted to be
told––face-to-face––that orders were pending, because, as B explained, they preferred
“verbal exchanges over flashing icons on a computer screen.” Nurse A expressed
sentiments similar to B’s when she said:
There is a lot of aggravation because we [nurses] can’t keep up with the doc in
terms of where he is and where he’s going next. Is he in a patient room? Is he
doing a procedure? He isn’t interacting with us, so we’re not aware that he might
have put orders in. The EMR times how long it takes for us to carry out orders
once they’re put in, so I’d like to be told that the doc has done something or is
going to do something; otherwise, my numbers [metrics] look bad. . . . I have to
keep checking the EMR, but I would prefer a courtesy heads-up, “Hey, I’m
putting orders in on your patient.”
Dr. E complained that he, too, “would like to be told things” more consistently,
exclaiming that the nurses:
should give verbal updates, but it doesn’t always happen, especially if it’s busy.
Just now, a new patient was brought back from triage, but no one told me. I just
happened to notice a new name on the tracking board, but, by then, my door-todoc time was already shot. It doesn’t take long to say, “We’re putting a patient in
[room] 2.”
When asked if physicians gave nurses “verbal updates,” alerting them that new orders
were pending, Dr. E replied, “I try to, but I’ll admit, when it’s busy, I don’t always do it.”
Providers believed that fewer face-to-face interactions took place among them
because they no longer shared a common paper chart, which, previously, ensured that
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they completed documentation tasks in a communal work area, usually along the counter
that divided public space (i.e., hallways and patient rooms) from the space reserved for
providers. When sharing paper charts, providers, naturally, would communicate with
each other. After the EMR was installed, however, nurses tended to work exclusively at
computer terminals that lined the left half of the emergency room’s L-shaped counter;
physicians and midlevel providers worked along the right half of the counter and in a
small office, out of view of the nurses. Dr. O noted that many nurses gave her “verbal
histories and updates” only when she stood near the bend of the L-shaped counter,
adding, “I never get updates if they don’t see me or if they have to look for me. If I’m in
the office on the CPOE, they don’t interact as much.” Nurse Y explained that nurses
“don’t really bother docs if they’re in the office. If the doc’s out here [at the counter], I
take that as a sign that he’s willing to talk or shoot the shit.” Dr. A complained that he
wanted patient updates, regardless of his location (e.g., whether he was in the office at the
CPOE or standing along the counter):
If something happens, find me and tell me. There isn’t a door to the office; you
can walk around the corner and see if I’m sitting here. Not talking is problematic
in a lot ways. We need to be on the same page because when we’re not, things
get missed.
I observed a situation in which “things got missed” because providers did not
communicate face-to-face. On March 15, 2014, I watched the dayshift physician leave,
but as I recorded in my fieldnotes, “He did not handover his patients. There was no
turnover communication between the physicians, so there was not an appropriate transfer
of care. He simply left.” Nurse M told the nightshift physician, Dr. A, that although the
dayshift physician had not “completed discharge summaries,” M believed that the patient
in room 4 was ready to be sent home. A few hours later, Dr. A reviewed the EMR
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belonging to the patient who had been in room 4 earlier. The dayshift physician had
written on the paper TSheet that the patient received “a full cardiac workup,” but Dr. A
could not find EKG results in the electronic record. Additionally, none of the nurses
recalled having received orders to perform an EKG that day. Nurse M volunteered that
the dayshift physician may have clicked “submit” versus “transmit” after he selected the
cardiac order set in the CPOE. As M explained, “There’s been some confusion over
which one to click, so we’ve had some dropped orders.” Nurse Y suggested that if the
dayshift physician “had told somebody the plan, maybe they [sic] would have been on the
lookout for an EKG [order] to come through and could have said something when it
didn’t show up.” Dr. A agreed and added, “There’s always the possibility that the test
was done, but the results were lost. There isn’t a medication list in here [the electronic
record] either, but I know the nurse would have gotten it in triage.” I asked, “What
happens now?” Dr. A replied, “Well, first, we call the patient and get him back here for
the EKG, and, second, we get our asses chewed out.”
I later asked Nurse M and Nurse Y about the dropped EKG order and how the
situation might have been prevented. M said, “Simple: talk. Tell someone the game
plan.” Y added:
We’re not mind readers, so we don’t know [the physician] is ordering a cardiac
workup. Sure, it would make sense that a patient with chest pain would get a
cardiac workup, but if we’re busy with other patients, [then] we might not think to
ask, “Hey, did you put in those cardiac orders?” We should be talking to each
other for every single patient. The doc needs to take 2 minutes to say, “Here’s
what I think is going on, here are the tests I want to run, and here are the meds I
want.” If I know the plan, then I can help execute it.
M told me that many of the “seasoned nurses” asked regularly for physicians to
communicate to them care plans for patients, but that patient volume determined
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workload, and, oftentimes, limited the time that was available for such conversations. As
M said, “When we’re busy, forget it. You just don’t have the time to talk sometimes.”
I observed that although the physicians and nurses spoke infrequently, especially
during busy weekday shifts, nurses did initiate discussions with physicians and asked
them questions. Most nurse-initiated conversations that I observed were about orders that
physicians placed using the CPOE that the nurses did not understand fully and/or
questioned. Among nurses who completed the questionnaire, 65% (n = 11) reported that
they spent more time clarifying/asking about orders following the EMR installation than
when providers used paper charts. When asked if time spent clarifying/asking about
orders was indicative of providers engaging in more––not less––face-to-face
communication, Nurse B replied:
Well, not really because most of the time, that’s the only talking we do. So, we
are, in fact, talking less and when we do talk, it’s because we don’t understand
why the doc has ordered a certain medication. Usually, the doc clicked the wrong
dosage, the wrong preparation, or the wrong patient. That becomes a problem, in
my opinion, because instead of working at the bedside, tending the patient, I’m
looking for the doc to get clarification on what is essentially an EMR issue.
Providers said that many of the face-to-face conversations that did take place with
other providers were not driven directly by patient care concerns but, instead, were driven
by EMR-related issues (e.g., asking how to use the EMR or complaining about the EMR).
Apart from spending time clarifying orders, which most providers regarded as a patient
care issue, providers, like Dr. E, indicated that they spent “a ridiculous amount of time
talking about the EMR.” Eighty-three percent of questionnaire respondents (n = 25)
reported that they spent time teaching each other how to use the EMR, and 70% (n = 21)
spent time complaining about the EMR. Complaining, or griping, about the EMR
appeared to be important for building and/or maintaining rapport among providers,
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especially because providers, according to Dr. F, “had very little time for chitchat” after
the EMR was installed.
Chitchat is considered everyday talk, which, according to Schrodt, Soliz, and
Braithwaite (2008), also includes gossip, small talk, joking around, planning, and
decision making. Relationships are created, enacted, and maintained through everyday
talk; moreover, Schrodt et al. found that people who engaged regularly in everyday talk
were more likely to report that they were satisfied in their relationships. Dr. G lamented
that the EMR, in his opinion, limited the time that was available for everyday talk and,
consequently, relationship development:
The more of a conversation you have, the more comradely there is. There’s more
of a mutual investment in the whole emergency room environment and culture.
When you’re individuals silently ticking away on computer systems, you don’t
have small talk, like “I heard your kid was in a play” or “I heard you went on
vacation.” Those little connections can make you all feel like you’re in it
together. There’s a lot more watching each other’s backs when that happens,
whereas right now, you’re sort of isolated; you’re just data-entry clerks sitting at
computers and have far less of a connection with each other.
Although the range of topics that providers discussed was limited, which affected
some providers’ perceptions of their relationships with each other, as per Dr. G’s account,
I saw providers’ excessive complaining about the EMR as a form of everyday talk that
reinforced relational bonds. Griping, profanity, substandard speech, and kidding,
according to Giddens (1984), “reinforce the basic trust in the presence of intimates . . .
[and] is a dissipation of tensions derived from the demands of tight bodily and gestural
control in other settings of day-to-day life” (p. 129). For instance, I observed frequently
providers complaining about and disparaging the EMR in, oftentimes, exaggerated and
vulgar ways. The resulting laughter reinforced providers’ bonds and was “a dissipation

	
  

289

of tensions” (Giddens, p. 129) that the providers accrued during earlier constrained
interactions with patients and their families.
For example, one evening I observed a nurse approach a physician and say, “The
computer told me to tell you the patient is on Coumadin,14” to which he replied, “Yeah, I
know. I saw it in the chart.” She said, “Well, the computer said to tell you.” The
physician asked, “Did the computer tell you to do pregnancy test on him, too?” She
stared at him, eyes wide, and asked, “It does that?” The physician explained, “Yeah, I’ve
seen it happen. In fact, I was doing a pelvic [examination] on a patient once, because the
computer said to, when I found a prostate [gland]! I thought, ‘Hey, this man’s not
pregnant!’” Another nurse added, “But he already delivered the trunk . . . of a baby
elephant!” The group howled with laughter. When asked later about the purpose of such
EMR stories, the physician said, “It blows off steam. It lets us connect a little as people.”
I observed that negatively framed talk about the EMR bolstered providers’ sense
of belonging by reinforcing group membership. As documented in chapter four, a nurse
who, generally, was enthusiastic about the EMR complained frequently alongside other
nurses about its shortcomings. When asked why she changed her mind about the EMR,
she said that she enjoyed “letting off steam” with her coworkers, and that “complaining
together” helped her to “feel connected to them.” Dr. E also believed that complaining
about the EMR reinforced relational bonds, explaining that providers’ “small talk shifted
from movies and family to the EMR. Mainly, we bitch about it, but that gives us
something in common. For me, I feel like it [complaining about the EMR] brings us
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Coumadin is the generic version of the blood thinner Warfarin.
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closer.” Dr. O added, “I don’t feel like I know people very well here [Hospital H], but I
think we’ve bonded over how much we hate this damn thing [EMR].”
In sum, providers at Hospital H reported that, following the EMR installation, as
compared to before, they talked with their coworkers less, spent less time discussing
patient care face-to-face, and, generally, talked about fewer topics. Providers revealed
that although they talked less, overall, they spent more time clarifying CPOE-generated
orders compared with when providers used paper order sets. Providers interacted when
sharing common paper charts because of their physical proximity, but after the EMR was
installed, nurses worked in one area, whereas physicians and midlevel providers worked
in another area; that physical separation meant that fewer verbal orders and updates were
shared among providers who were out of sight of one another. Providers did, however,
report that they spent time complaining about the EMR, which strengthened their
relational bonds. Hence, although less time for chitchat after the EMR installation meant
that the breadth and depth of providers’ exchanges were limited, griping about the EMR
established commonalities and reinforced group membership. The EMR’s addition to the
emergency room at Hospital H, thus, changed how providers interacted with each other,
but, as described next, the EMR also changed how providers interacted with patients.
How the Electronic Medical Records System Affected Provider–Patient Interactions
and Patients’ Satisfaction
The EMR’s introduction at Hospital H changed providers’ workflow and
interaction habits, but the EMR also changed patients’ emergency room experiences.
Although I was not present to witness pre-EMR provider–patient interactions, I did
observe several providers—namely, nurses—using paper charts to expedite triage
processes, which mimicked pre-EMR workflow patterns. Because I also observed nurses
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using COWs when triaging patients, I compared the two processes––paper- versus COWfacilitated triage––and drew conclusions. Coupled with information obtained during indepth interviews conducted with nurses, my observations revealed that the EMR affected
negatively provider–patient interactions during triage by reducing eye contact between
them and restricting their conversation to a prescribed range and sequence of topics.
Moreover, because physicians and midlevel providers did not see nurses’ triage notes
before they examined patients, physicians and midlevel providers repeated questions that
nurses already had asked patients, and, thereby, forced patients to recount their
complaints, medications, and medical histories. Additionally, results from Hospital H’s
patient satisfaction questionnaires indicated that patients, generally, were displeased with
providers’ communication. These issues are described below.
Triage is the brief interview and examination that is conducted by a healthcare
provider—typically, a nurse—to determine the degree of urgency of a patient’s illness or
injury. Given that triage is the first point of contact between providers and patients,
triage sets the tone for patients’ emergency room experiences (Eisenberg et al., 2005). At
Hospital H, nurses are responsible for triaging patients. After a patient signs in at the
registration desk, he or she is brought into a small room that is adjacent to the emergency
room, where a nurse, oftentimes with a COW (see Figure 5.4), begins the triage process
by taking the patient’s temperature and vital signs. The nurse asks the patient questions,
in a prescribed order, about the patient’s symptoms, medical history, and medications. If
the nurse deems the patient’s condition to be “urgent,” the patient is brought into the
emergency room. If the emergency room is busy and/or the patient is labeled as
“nonurgent,” he or she is sent back to the waiting room until a bed becomes available.
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Figure 5.4. Computer on Wheels. Nurses pushed computers on wheels (COWs) into the
patient triage suite and, oftentimes, positioned the COW between themselves and
patients, which impeded communication and limited eye contact.
I observed the triage process several times, and each time, I stood in the hall and
watched through an open door as providers interacted with patients. Because I oftentimes
could hear the patients, but I could not see them, my observations are limited to
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providers’ behaviors.15 On one occasion, I watched Nurse B push a COW into the triage
room and position it between himself and the patient such that, from the patient’s point of
view, he or she would have seen the back of the COW. B asked about the patient’s
symptoms and typed the patient’s answers, slowly, into the EMR. Although B nodded
occasionally, his gaze remained fixed on the COW. Throughout the 5-minute encounter,
I observed that B looked up and made eye contact, presumably, with the patient only 11
times. At one point, I heard the patient remark, “Oh, I forgot to tell you that I have
asthma.” B replied, “Wait, wait, wait. I have to go back to the history screen. Hold on.”
B clicked through a series of screens and returned to the medical history page, where he
amended the patient’s list of ailments. B then asked, “Did you forget anything else
before we move on?” The patient said, “I’ve been taking prescription pain pills,” to
which B responded, “Nope, that’s on a different page. We’re not there yet, so hold on.”
On another occasion, I observed an ambulance crew push a patient with chest pain
into the triage room, where two nurses with COWs greeted the patient: one nurse began
the triage process and the second nurse began chest pain protocols (e.g., administering
aspirin and/or setting up for an EKG). As before, when I observed B triage a patient,
both nurses positioned their COWs between themselves and the patient. The nurses spent
most of their time engaged with or looking at their COWs. A short while later, the
physician entered with his paper TSheet and asked the patient many of the same
questions that the triage nurse had asked the patient a few minutes prior. The patient
said, “I already told the nurse,” to which the physician replied, “Well, I don’t see the
nurse’s notes, so I need you to tell me what your symptoms are.” After the physician left,
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To preserve patients’ privacy, I did not record patients’ names or symptoms in my
fieldnotes.
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a registration clerk wheeled her COW into the room and, like the nurses, she positioned it
between herself and the patient. Within 10 minutes of arriving, the patient had seen the
backs of three COWs and repeated his symptoms and medical history twice. I asked the
triage nurse how she believed the patient regarded his emergency room stay up to that
point, and she said, “Well, it is rude rolling in with a computer, typing and talking
without even looking at the patient. Then, on top of that, he [the patient] has to repeat
himself. He’s probably not too happy.”
All of the providers that I interviewed agreed that the EMR interfered with
provider–patient relationships. Dr. F said, “Computers slow us down and put a barrier
between us and the patients.” As Nurse B explained:
I feel that I’m not as connected to patients as I used to be. I can’t type without
looking at the keyboard, and so it puts a barrier between me and the patient. I like
to talk to people, eye-to-eye. Because I tend to use my COW all the time, there
isn’t eye contact, and, to me, I find it’s rude. I’m busy looking at the little boxes I
have to fill in, whereas if I were writing it down, it would be easy to look at them
[patients]. It [the EMRs] limits the communication with patients.
During an interview at a medical conference, Dr. Ken Milne, Chief of Staff at
South Huron Hospital in Ontario, Canada, said:
The EMR interferes with the doctor–patient relationship, certainly in the history
and physical taking. We don’t do histories and physicals with our backs to the
patient typing at a computer screen. If we do, we’re saying the computer screen is
the most important thing. You make eye contact, you look up. If I have to
actually remove myself to find a computer terminal to enter the data and then
return to the patient, it creates breaks in the personal relationship and the
therapeutic contact that would normally be there.
Nurse L concurred with Dr. Milne’s assessment of computers in examination rooms and
explained that “the break in the personal relationship” with patients was why she stopped
taking her COW into triage:
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Instead of standing with my back to the patient and looking at the COW, I leave
the COW outside. I walk in with the old paper triage form and I sit down. I look
at the patient, at the patient’s eye level, and we talk. Yes, it doubles my work,
because I have to type up everything that I write, but I actually find that it makes
triage go faster and the patient feels listened to. It sets the tone for a better overall
experience.
When asked how using old paper forms expedited triage, especially given her admission
that the paper forms doubled her workload, L replied:
Patients don’t tell their stories organized according to the EMR screen. They
bounce around, they add stuff, [and] they forget things. They’re all over the
place. With the paper, I can bounce around with them; with the computer, no. It
took me longer having to stop the patient, click on another tab, wait for the page
to load, and then resume documenting. I was constantly interrupting patients and
asking them to wait. It was aggravating for me, and it took longer. When I’m
frustrated, the patients can tell and they get frustrated, too.
I observed Nurse L, from the hallway, as she triaged a patient using paper forms.
She maintained eye contact with the patient for most of the encounter, and compared with
Nurse B’s COW-facilitated triage, described previously, Nurse L completed triage more
quickly. Several other nurses also reported that they found using the paper forms allowed
them to make eye contact with patients and shortened the triage process. Nurse A said,
“If I’m the patient, do I want to look at a computer or a person? I think patients feel
cared about when it’s just us, without the COWs.” She added: “Plus, because the COW
takes so much longer to use, I find that the longer I’m in the room, the more the patients
say, and that means there’s more for me to type. With paper, I get in and get out.”
Several nurses mentioned that patients did not connect providers’ use of COWs to
healthcare delivery. For instance, as Nurse Y mentioned, “Patients think we’re playing
games or surfing the web. They think we’re not working, so I try to show them the
screen and say, ‘No, that’s your chart here, not some website.’” Patients’ perceptions that
COW use was not meaningful work, meant, oftentimes, that patients became upset during
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triage, especially when they experienced long wait times. Nurse L explained that to
combat the illusion “that we’re playing with computers,” she rarely sat down at work:
I stand up at the COW. I only sit with the patient, at the bedside. If we’re sitting
in front of a computer, then we have time to check on patients, or that’s how they
[patients] see it. They get upset because they look out here and see a bunch of
nurses sitting down in front of computers. No wonder they think we’re not
working! Unfortunately, they complain and our satisfaction numbers end up
looking pretty bad.
Nurse J added that nurses’ performance reviews are based on patient satisfaction
questionnaires, and that scores had deteriorated consistently since the EMR was installed:
“Patients get frustrated because everything takes so much longer now. They can tell
we’re frustrated with the EMRs, and it just feeds back on itself. Everybody’s frustrated.”
Nurse B told J, “Well, don’t give surveys to pissed off patients! That’s your problem. I
only give surveys to the happy ones.”
I reviewed a summary analysis of results from all of the patient satisfaction
questionnaires that were administered in 2014, and the report indicated that patient
satisfaction, overall, had declined over the course of that year. Although previous years’
summaries were unavailable to me, and, thus, I could not make comparisons or draw
conclusions, Q assured me that “scores fell sharply after the EMR.” She pointed to
length of stay metrics, which increased steadily over 2014, as the main reason that
patients were dissatisfied.
As Nurse J pointed out, “Everything takes so much longer,” and, consequently, it
appeared that patients were displeased. The average length of stay in January 2014 was
153 minutes, but, by December 2014, the average length of stay climbed to 186 minutes.
In the same period, average “door-to-doc” times climbed from 17 minutes to 31 minutes,
and patients’ satisfaction fell. Although the decline in patient satisfaction was slight,
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from an overall satisfaction score of 84.6% to 78.5%, two key dimensions that measured
patients’ perceptions of providers’ emotional support received “failing” scores. For the
item, “If you had any anxieties or fears about your condition or treatment, did a doctor
discuss them with you?” the average score was 60.8%. The same item measuring nurses’
emotional support garnered a score of 56.3%. When asked how the scores affected
providers, Q replied, “We don’t like that patients aren’t happy, plus, we catch shit from
administration over it, and some people might be let go if scores don’t improve.”
In sum, COWs limited eye contact between nurses and patients during triage, and
it forced their discussions to unfold in a prescribed order; patients who deviated from the
prescribed order lengthened the triage process and frustrated providers. Providers who
used paper triage forms instead of COWs doubled their workload, but shortened the
triage process and increased their eye contact with patients. Physicians and midlevel
providers repeated regularly questions that nurses had asked, which forced patients to
recount their complaints, medications, and medical histories, which nurses believed
contributed to patients’ poor perceptions of emergency room communication. Results
from Hospital H’s patient satisfaction questionnaires indicated that patients’ satisfaction
declined from 84.6% to 78.5%. The EMR installation, as described in the next section,
also led to other unexpected changes in provider–patient interactions.
Unintended and Perverse Consequences of Electronic Medical Records Systems
As discussed in chapter three, an unintended consequence, is “an outcome of an
aggregate of acts . . . each of which is intentionally carried out. But the eventual outcome
is neither intended nor desired by anyone” (Giddens, 1984, p. 10). Unintended
consequences are a regular feature of institutionalized practice because “action
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continually produces consequences which are unintended by actors” (Giddens, 1984, p.
27). Unintended consequences can “systemically feed back to be the unacknowledged
conditions of further acts” (Giddens, 1984, p. 8), potentially creating an infinite cycle of
unintended consequences. Many well-documented, unintended consequences that are
associated with EMR adoptions include: increased waiting times, longer lengths of stays,
decreased provider productivity, lower patient satisfaction scores, and employees’
reactance (see chapter two). Hospital H experienced these and other intended
consequences.
The administrators and providers at Hospital H knew that their EMR adoption
would trigger certain unintended consequences, such as those described above and in
chapter two, but I observed that there were additional unintended––and unexpected––
consequences associated with Hospital H’s EMR adoption, as well as perverse
consequences, intended but contradictory acts that “are perverse in such a way that the
very activity of pursuing an objective diminishes the possibility of reaching it” (Giddens,
1984, p. 313). For instance, metrics were intended to alleviate emergency room
overcrowding by making patient care more efficient, but, instead, providers’ maladaptive
strategies for coping with metrics (e.g., “gaming the system”) cheated the clock and
added to healthcare costs, but they did not reduce overcrowding or patients’ lengths of
stay (see the discussion of conflicting structures above and metrics below). Perverse
outcomes are likely when agents are immobilized in “circumstances of structural
contradiction” (Giddens, 1984, p. 317) and/or SD. Below, I describe six unintended
consequences and/or perverse consequences related to EMR use that I observed at
Hospital H: (a) patients’ truncated narratives, (b) billing issues that contributed to

299

declining revenue and staff redundancies, (c) EMR-enabled metrics tracking and
surveillance, (d) older providers’ difficulties adapting to EMR-induced workflow
changes, (e) increased malpractice risk, and (f) wage theft.
Patients’ Truncated Narratives
As described in chapter two, EMRs have affected how information is solicited
from patients in such a way as to almost eliminate their illness stories altogether. For
patients, “Stories are a way of making sense of an uncertain or chaotic set of
circumstances and . . . enable control in the face of disorder” (Sharf et al., 2011, p. 38),
but truncated storytelling increases patients’ uncertainty and feelings of helplessness.
Even before EMRs were used widely, Eisenberg et al. (2005) found that emergency room
providers reduced patients’ stories to “actionable lists” (p. 390) that prioritized
physicians’ goals, but that such lists, generally, “fail to capture the whole meaning” (Real
& Poole, 2011, p. 110). EMRs in emergency rooms compounded the problem of
truncated stories by limiting the amount of free text available for generating either lists or
stories.
Eight of the nine physicians at Hospital H I interviewed believed that the EMR
removed patients’ narratives from electronic records, leaving, according to Dr. G.,
“numbers that, without a story or a timeline, don’t mean diddly squat.” During an
interview, Dr. Viccellio, Clinical Professor and Vice Chair of Emergency Medicine at
Stony Brook School of Medicine, explained how “context-lacking records” were
emblematic of EMR-using hospitals:
If a patient complained about their [sic] care in the days of the paper charts, when
we recorded what happened as a time sequence, you could pull the chart and there
was a rich story of what happened, “The patient came in, there was the history
and physical.” Then you’d look at the nursing notes and it may say, “The patient
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was angry, blah, blah, blah.” You would actually get a story. Now, we’re so busy
checking boxes, there’s no more story associated with the patient. It’s very hard
to reconstruct the sequence of events that happened with the patient. Chart
reviewers incessantly complain about the difficulty of extracting information
because you can’t recreate a story from boxes and numbers. You would think that
an electronic medical record would make that a given, but, instead, it has created,
sometimes, insurmountable obstacles.
Dr. F said that the lack of patients’ stories in electronic health records contributed
to providers’ perceptions of those records being incomplete (see the earlier discussion in
this chapter on appropriation moves), which, in turn, led providers to regard the records
as “useless for anything but checking past lab results.” “Even then,” he added, “we
usually can’t make much of the labs.” As Dr. F explained:
There won’t be a story explaining why the doc ordered the test, what he
suspected, or how the patient responded to treatment. There isn’t a story, not
even a paragraph that sums up what happened during the visit. Nothing.
Numbers without a story can’t tell me anything. I’m just going to start from
scratch and make sense of the story the patient is telling me today, right now, and
what I click in the EMR won’t tell that story for the doc who sees the patient next
week or next month.
Dr. Milne said that a patient’s “evolving narrative” was an important
“communication tool” on which physicians in Canada relied:
When we hand off care from one physician to another, how do we handoff that
care? We tell the narrative. “Here’s a 45-year-old-man who presents with a oneweek history of upper respiratory track-like infections and symptoms that has
been associated with exertional chest pain. I’m a bit concerned, so I got an ECG
and a cardiac workup.” As opposed to, “Here’s the click box list.” A patient isn’t
a checkbox. In America, you don’t have a choice. How well do those
checkboxes tell the story? They don’t.
Q noted that the EMR-induced shift in the medical record from mostly narrative
data to mostly numerical data was somewhat unexpected: “I knew the record would
change, but not this much.” When asked how that change affected patient care at
Hospital H, she replied:
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It just means that every visit is new. The docs are going to repeat tests that might
have been run last week or even last night, because they’re not going to look at
the record. They can’t take the chance that they’ll miss something and get sued,
so they start fresh.
Q added that the providers’ “start fresh” approach increased healthcare costs, but noted
that Hospital H’s billing department was unlikely to capture those increased charges.
Billing Issues
As noted in chapter two, one of the most common economic consequences
associated with EMRs is higher healthcare costs (Fernando et al., 2009; Georgiou et al.,
2013; Hoffmann, 2009; Kellermann & Jones, 2013; Ward et al., 2013). Increased
laboratory and radiology tests, which are a result of predetermined CPOE order sets (see
Ward et al., 2013), lead to increased healthcare costs, in part, because of better charge
capture associated with EMRs: the recording, and later billing, of the full range of
medical services, medical supplies used, and medications administered during patients’
emergency room visits (Bukata, 2011, 2014). Dr. Viccellio, Clinical Professor and Vice
Chair of Emergency Medicine at Stony Brook School of Medicine, told me that the point
of EMRs was never “to improve documentation but to improve billing.” As he said:
The first EMRs were designed strictly for financial reasons. The original message
was: “These things improve billing, improve billing, improve billing.” We’ve [at
Stony Brook] increased our billing by 20%. That’s what EMRs are designed for.
They were clearly not designed for medical reasons.
As Q explained, administrators at Hospital H expected that billing would increase
after they installed the EMR, but much to everyone’s surprise, revenue fell sharply. The
unexpected decline in revenue was blamed, in part, on incompatible software systems
(e.g., the EMR did not generate billing codes in a format that the billing department’s
computers could read easily). Lost charges also were blamed on providers, who,
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according to administrators, failed to capture adequately the breadth of services that they
offered to patients. Nurse M told me that nurses received, routinely, memoranda that
reminded them to record “billable procedures.” As he explained:
Things like urine tests can be billed for much more than it costs to perform, so
urine tests are kind of encouraged. Checking patients’ vitals at least three times
means the emergency room can bill for a higher level of care. These sorts of
things get casually mentioned in memos or meetings. The problem is that a lot of
the billables [billable items and procedures] aren’t getting billed because people
[nurses] forget to click on the right box because they’re tired or in a rush.
Nurse Y explained that capturing charges were easier when nurses used paper charts:
It was easier to capture charges on paper because there was a visual reminder
right in front of you to check the box if you did the exam. It’s not as obvious with
the computer; you have to click through multiple screens and sometimes things or
procedures get missed or overlooked. It might have been done, but it didn’t get
documented.
As described in chapter three, Hospital H’s falling revenue was associated with
administrators’ decision to sever ties with Company S and to manage billing and
collections in-house. The EMR exacerbated what Q described as “sloppy billing by
people who don’t know what they’re doing.” Q volunteered to meet with the billing
department and to share what she knew about Company S’s billing strategies, but she was
rebuked. She said, “Under [Company] S, we billed $600,000 a month. I could get us
close to that, but no one listens. The EMR, unless they [administrators] fix it, won’t let
us get back to that but we could get close.” In late 2014, upon hearing rumors that the
electronic TSheets would worsen the EMR–billing department incompatibility issues, Q
claimed that she “kicked avoidance [strategy] into high gear” to escape additional “staff
cuts and layoffs.” She added, “If we lose any more money, I’m not sure how we’ll
manage. I heard the hospital might even close.”
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In January 2015, Q lamented that, despite increased patient volume, a result of
television, radio, and print advertisements that were meant to stimulate the emergency
room’s revenue, the emergency room, in fact, was “still hemorrhaging money.” Monthly
revenue had fallen below $100,000, which did not cover physicians’ salaries. Q met
with administrators several times to address the EMR–billing department incompatibility,
but she told me that she was admonished by administrators, who decided the problem
“was with lazy nurses and docs who didn’t chart thoroughly enough.” Administrators’
solutions included cutting nurses’ pay further, eliminating Christmas bonuses, scaling
back paid time off, limiting overtime pay, capping salaries, cutting technicians’ hours,
and reducing nursing coverage at night. Nurse B, who worked night shifts, described the
cuts:
They [administrators] scaled back at night to save money, so that puts even more
work on the nurses. Since they cut the techs’ hours, now, in addition to patient
care, nurses are answering phones, taking patients to X-ray, and up to the floor.
We should have four nurses, but usually it’s just three. We’re already
understaffed and they reduce nursing on top of that? It doesn’t make sense. If it
slows us down, then we can’t move patients quickly. That means patients are
sitting in the waiting room and some of them, eventually, decide to go somewhere
else. Then we’ve just lost a customer, so efforts to save money end up costing us
money.
The EMR also led to staff redundancies (e.g., physicians entered orders using the CPOE,
whereas, previously, unit secretaries and technicians processed paper order sets), and
because of falling revenue, which triggered cost-cutting measures, unit secretaries and
technicians became dispensable. When asked about unit secretaries’ duties after the
EMR installation, a physician replied, “I’m not really sure since we do the orders
ourselves now. I think maybe they page the consulting docs.”
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Unit secretaries’ hours were reduced and, increasingly, technicians absorbed
many of the unit secretaries’ duties. As of May 2015, only technicians remained. When
asked about staff reductions, Nurse B commented that he and the other “senior nurses”
were worried:
They [administrators] are always going to need nurses, but I am concerned
because I’m at salary cap. I am one of the more experienced and expensive
nurses. If they can find a way to get rid of the more expensive nurses and bring in
two new graduates, who are a lot cheaper than I am, then I think that may be their
next move. I’m seriously questioning my long-term future here.
Physicians and midlevel providers also were “gently reminded” in memoranda to
document thoroughly billable tests and procedures that they performed. Administrators
decided that a profit-sharing plan might improve physicians’ and midlevel providers’
compliance with billing strategies. As Q explained, “I wouldn’t call it a commission but
they [physicians and midlevel providers] are incentivized to run the bill up.” Dr. E,
however, said that profit-sharing was irrelevant because physicians
do our jobs regardless and we have no idea how much a certain test costs. I’m not
changing how I practice medicine because I might now suddenly get a $5
commission on that urine pregnancy test. It’s a little offensive to me that
administrators think I’ll chase that carrot.
Dr. O further explained that emergency medicine physicians “don’t chase carrots; they
run from sticks”; in other words, physicians ordered additional tests to avoid metricsrelated reprimands, which are described next.
Metrics and Surveillance
Described previously (see the discussion on SD), metrics are time-based
performance measures that are instituted and monitored by CMS. The EMR at Hospital
H tracked metrics on every physician, midlevel provider, and nurse, which, according to
Dr. O, meant that “we get watched every second of our shifts.” According to Giddens
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(1984), surveillance is common when “superordinates have an interest in harnessing the
activities of those subject to their authority to the enactment of designated tasks” (p. 157).
Because CMS could cut Hospital H’s Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement if providers
did not meet metrics goals, Hospital H’s administrators attempted “to coax a certain level
of performance from workers” (Giddens, p. 157), by instituting surveillance tactics that
recorded metrics violations each day. As Dr. O explained:
We get an e-mail every day that shows your numbers. At the end of the month, if
your numbers are out of whack or too far from the average, you get called on it.
They’re really hot on door-to-doc times. The goal is 30 minutes, but, for January
[2015], our average was 43 [minutes]. All I know is one day, the average was 67
minutes and that guy’s not on the February schedule. My advice: don’t go to the
bathroom, because if a new patient shows up, you won’t be there to click on it.
Gaming the system (e.g., ordering inconsequential and/or unnecessary laboratory
tests) enabled providers to meet metrics goals by stopping artificially the clock on doorto-doc times. Q encouraged physicians to “get creative” and game the system by “seeing
patients in triage and in the waiting room.” A midlevel provider, V, explained that
gaming the system was “institutional practice”:
We’re all playing the system and the real focus gets lost. We should be focused
on patients’ well-being; instead, we’re strategizing which test to order so that
administration doesn’t catch on. Come on, do they [administrators] really think
all those patients needed their blood sugar checked? Not everybody needs a UPT
[urine pregnancy test]. At what point does it cross over from gaming the system
to committing fraud? CMS set this up, but if we don’t comply, we lose CMS
money. We’re playing along, but, someday, someone is going to get accused of
frauding CMS. It’s a vicious cycle.
Dr. F commented that both providers and patients were “better off” before the use
of metrics that were intended to ensure faster and more efficient healthcare. He added,
“EMRs just make it worse; without EMRs, metrics wouldn’t be an issue.” Moreover,
providers believed that metrics, which failed to improve patient outcomes, contributed to
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providers’ dissatisfaction, burnout, and impotent agency. Thus, EMR-enabled metrics
led to a perverse outcome, which, according to Giddens (1984), “ are likely to generate
resentment . . . and things are worse than they were before in circumstances in which all
or the majority of those involved could expect them to be better” (p. 317).
Following the EMR adoption at Hospital H, administrators instituted strict metrics
surveillance and enforcement policies, which, for providers, were unexpected. This
unintended, and, seemingly, perverse consequence of the EMR adoption contributed to
providers’ dissatisfaction and immobilization, and it worsened SD-nexus conditions (see
the SD discussion earlier in this chapter). Moreover, as described next, the EMR
adoption also affected some providers’ employment at Hospital H.
Providers’ Ages and Implications for Electronic Medical Records Systems Use
After the EMR installation at Hospital H, Nurse M told me that the nurses started
a betting pool on “which of the old docs would go or be let go.” Nurses also bet on
physicians’ metrics, and, according to Nurse Y, “the older docs always have the worst
numbers.” Nurse J explained that poor metrics, primarily, was “an older doc problem,
[because] younger docs grew up using computers, but the old ones can’t even see the tabs
or type very well.” Dr. O, who, at age 30, was the youngest physician at Hospital H,
agreed with Nurse J’s assessment and replied, “All of those old docs are all paper, all the
way.” Several nurses pointed out that, in addition to poor metrics, older physicians
dumped orders regularly and played up hierarchical differences, but as Nurse M
observed, those physicians “will age out in 5–10 years, and then we won’t have to worry
about it.” Nurse Y added, “Or they’ll get canned, like Dr. W.”
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Although the nurses assumed that Dr. W was “canned” because he dumped orders
on them, one of the physicians explained to me that Dr. W’s firing was because he was
too old to work the EMR. The physician, who asked not to be identified, said that Dr. W
was an old-fashioned emergency physician and he had a preset way of doing
things. He was pushing 70 [years of age] and trained when docs had dictation and
secretaries. The man didn’t know how to type. He didn’t even have e-mail! He
was horrible with the EMR, truly horrible. Nurses had to put all his orders in for
him because he literally couldn’t do it. His metrics were crap, because he didn’t
know how to game it. If we had had electronic TSheets back then, he would have
fallen apart. I hate to say it, but he was asked to leave because he was basically
too old to function. Medically, he was spot on, but he couldn’t work the
computer.
The physician lamented that, oftentimes, he, too, saw himself as becoming outdated in an
emergency room that, increasingly, was reliant on “doodads and gizmos.” As he
explained:
I’m almost 60 years old and I have no idea what these nurses and residents are
talking about. They go on Twitter, they’re texting people on their phones, or they
have apps to look up doses and side effects. I still look stuff up in books and they
laugh at me. I guess I’ll be the next one let go.
Most of the physicians in their 50s expressed similar concerns that they would become
outdated, but the physicians in their 40s were secure in their ability to adapt to new
technologies. As Dr. F, one of those 40 year olds, explained, “I’m young enough to cope,
but the older docs do struggle a bit.”
I reached out to Dr. W and asked him why he no longer worked at Hospital H. He
said that although he was not fired, the decision to leave was not entirely his. When
asked if the EMR factored into the decision, he replied, “Well, the EMR wasn’t my
choice. I’d still be there if they didn’t have it.” When asked if he believed that his age
was a contributing factor that led to the dissolution of his professional affiliation with
Hospital H, he replied, “Officially, no, but I’m sure it was a factor. I was the oldest doc
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there.” He mentioned that he still worked in a handful of emergency rooms and urgent
care centers that used paper charts to document patient care.
Dr. Milne said that the trend in Canada was for older physicians to gravitate away
from EMR-using facilities and to urgent care centers:
As urban centers are adopting EMRs, the physicians in those centers seem to have
the lowest satisfaction. Unfortunately, it seems the older physicians are suffering
the most in this transition. They’re being shifted into lower acuity facilities or
urgent care clinics. There is clearly a generational divide with regards to
adaptation to this technology.
In sum, an older physician’s inability to adapt to EMR-induced changes in
workflow and documentation patterns led to his departure from Hospital H. Other older
physicians questioned their longevity and ability to adapt to new technologies, whereas
younger physicians were confident that they would adapt their practice habits as new
technologies dictated. Next, I describe an unintended consequence of EMR adoption that
affected all providers, irrespective of their ages: increased malpractice risk.
Increased Malpractice Risk
In 2003, a malpractice case, Breeden v. Anesthesia West, found that physicians
were responsible for information contained in electronic health records, regardless of who
entered the data, and, moreover, that nurses were not culpable for damages if they
documented, but did not verbalize, pertinent findings in cases that resulted in medical
malpractice (Reyes, 2014). In the Breeden case, according to Reyes (2014), a nurse
documented that a patient’s condition had deteriorated in the hours after a preoperative
medical screening examination, but the anesthesiologist did not read the nurse’s update.
Relying on results from the earlier preoperative examination, the anesthesiologist
proceeded with the scheduled procedure and the patient died from complications.
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Five of the physicians at Hospital H cited the Breeden case and pointed to a
similarity in the Dallas Ebola case involving Thomas Duncan: nurses documented––but
did not verbalize––Mr. Duncan’s travel history. Additionally, nurses’ electronic notes
were part of an EMR component that physicians could not access. As Dr. E noted:
In both cases, you have a nurse entering something in the record but not telling
the physician. In Breeden, the physician was liable. Mark my words, the same
thing is going to happen in Dallas. That doctor is getting sued by somebody. I
wouldn’t be surprised if it happens here, eventually.
Dr. Viccellio explained that EMRs were “a field day for plaintiffs’ lawyers” for
several reasons:
The biggest part of it is because of the checkbox thing. You come in because of a
sprained ankle and I go “check, check, check” and now the lawyer is saying,
“Why did you do a pelvic exam on this patient? Why did you do a fundoscopic
exam16 for a sprained ankle?” “Well, you know, I checked those boxes by
accident.” “Well if you did that by accident, is the rest of the chart an accident?
What’s real here and what’s not?” It’s very easy for lawyers to demonstrate to a
jury that a lot of what’s in that record is garbage. “If some of it’s garbage, then
how am I to believe anything else that you write there? You claim that this is
normal, but you also claim that this pelvic exam is normal and you didn’t even do
a pelvic exam.”
Dr. Viccellio noted that boxes “checked by accident” were commonplace:
If I look at any record in my department, I can easily identify stuff that’s in that
chart that clearly nobody did, but they checked off. Maybe by mistake, someone
was in a hurry. This is where medically, legally, I think we’re digging a deep
hole for ourselves.
Several physicians at Hospital H complained that they were liable not only for
nurses’ additions to electronic health records and boxes “checked by accident” but also
for EMR design errors that resulted in medical malpractice. For example, Dr. A showed
me a tip sheet distributed by his malpractice insurance carrier that read, in part, “The
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A fundoscopic exam is an eye exam that gauges the integrity of the retina and iris.
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provider is the covered entity responsible for maintaining the integrity of the patient’s
electronic record, not the [EMR] vendor.” Dr. A said:
The bottom line is that if one of these glitches or bugs that mixes up which patient
is allergic to which medication leads me to administer medication to a patient who
then has an allergic reaction, I’ll be sued, but not the company that made the
faulty product.
When asked if there had been any malpractice claims made against any of the providers
at Hospital H that, in any way, were connected to the EMR, Dr. A replied, “Not yet but
it’s a real worry. It adds to my stress level and I know a lot of the other physicians worry
about it, too.” All of the physicians agreed that the EMRs increased malpractice risk and,
subsequently, their fear of being sued. As Dr. G noted, “I don’t think EMRs were
designed for the benefit of lawyers but it’s turned out that way. I don’t think anyone
envisioned that these [EMRs] would become doctor traps.”
Wage Theft
The last unintended consequence that resulted from Hospital H’s EMR
installation was wage theft, uncompensated work and/or documentation completed by
providers before and/or after their scheduled shifts. I first observed instances of what
providers dubbed wage theft in late 2013, when nurses arrived several minutes before
their scheduled shifts to set up their COWs. When asked if nurses were paid for their
time, Nurse A replied:
No, we don’t get paid until the shift actually starts but we have to be ready to see
patients the minute the shift starts, or we get written up for slow times or taking
too long, so we have to set up early. I wish we were paid extra because this
[setting up the COW] is a necessary component of our jobs.
Whereas nurses came early, physicians, generally, stayed late. Seven of the nine
physicians interviewed reported that they stayed, on average, 1–2 hours after each shift to
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finish documenting patient care that they were unable to complete during their shifts. Dr.
E explained that physicians had little choice because “incomplete charts” could result in
physicians having their salaries withheld “until all their charts were current.” Dr. A
added that wage theft may not happen every shift but it happens often enough that I do
feel cheated. Keep in mind that I’m already working a 12-hour shift and I don’t get any
breaks, so, after a half-hour drive to get here, a 12-hour workday, an extra hour, unpaid,
and a half-hour commute home, I’m looking at a 14-hour day. It’s exhausting. Would I
like to be paid for that extra hour? Why not? I did the work!
Midlevel providers, usually, dedicated the last hour of their shifts to completing
documentation, and, thus, they avoided wage theft. X, a midlevel provider, explained
that midlevel providers’ shifts overlapped with physicians’ shifts, and, as he noted, that
meant “midlevels are not the only ones seeing patients, so we can hand off care.” He
added:
We usually work noon to midnight, and there’s always a doc here, so we
[midlevel providers] can stop seeing patients and start catching up on charting.
The docs can’t really do that, especially the night doc, because there is no one else
here to see patients when his shift winds down. He sees patients right up to 7:00
a.m. He can’t stop and catch up until the day-time doc comes on.
As the EMR adoption process wore on and physicians’ documentation burdens
grew, in part, because of increased patient volume that was fueled by advertisements,
physicians became more incensed at the wage theft that they experienced. Dr. A
complained that once the electronic TSheet was installed, their documentation times
would fall ever further, meaning that physicians would spend “even more unpaid time
catching up.” Dr. F and Q acknowledged that the electronic TSheets would add to
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documentation times, which was one of the reasons that they were fighting actively
against electronic TSheets.
In September 2014, a physician from Hospital H emailed me an article that he
read in The New York Times, entitled “More Workers are Claiming ‘Wage Theft,’” in
which Greenhouse (2014) described a lawsuit in California “that accused employers of
violating minimum wage and overtime laws, erasing work hours and wrongfully taking
employees’ tips” (para. 4). Greenhouse also wrote about an appeals court ruling that
found “FedEx had in effect committed wage theft by insisting that its drivers were
independent contractors rather than employees . . . [but] did not pay them overtime,
which is required only for employees” (para. 7).
I shared the article with the other physicians at Hospital H and asked for their
feedback. Dr. G and Dr. A pointed out that they, like the FedEx drivers mentioned in the
article, were independent contractors, and, consequently, they were not entitled to
overtime pay, paid leave, or benefits. Dr. E wrote a note and left it for me in the
emergency room. In part, the note read:
I have personally been a victim of this [wage theft]. With these crappy EMRs,
along with greater expectations of patients seen per hour, the “move the flesh
policies” or you lose your job, I, and many others, have spent many countless
hours doing charting after the shift (and reimbursement) have ended. The only
way these corporations can bill on this is with the extensive, nonmedical “pencilpushing” physicians must now put in the charts, and it can no longer be completed
in a normal 12-hour shift. I’m all for an EMR that facilitates my work. I use
them at other facilities, but Paragon is not a good EMR. This is a bad system that
is bad for patients and bad for providers.
In sum, the EMR adoption at Hospital H resulted in several unintended
consequences. Patients’ narratives were truncated by a checkbox-laden system that
diminished context in electronic records, which contributed to providers’ perceptions that
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electronic records were incomplete and of limited value. Hospital H experienced a
decline in revenue, in part, because the EMR was not compatible with the billing
department’s computer system, and, consequently, charges were not captured
consistently. The decline in billing set off a series of events, each with a series of
consequences: to stimulate patient volume and revenue, an advertising campaign
promised short wait times, which contributed to increased patient volume, but prior
staffing reductions, necessary because of poor revenue, contributed to increased patients’
lengths of stay and longer door-to-doc times, which, in turn, led to violations in
providers’ metrics and patients’ dissatisfaction. Metrics and EMR-enabled surveillance
policies, consequently, led to sanctions and contributed to providers’ dissatisfaction and
immobilization, which worsened SD-nexus conditions. An older physician left Hospital
H because he was unable to adapt to EMR-induced workflow and documentation
changes. EMR use increased providers’ perceptions of their malpractice risk, which
added to their workplace stress. Increased documentation time after the EMR installation
meant that many providers completed documentation tasks after their shifts ended, which
led them to complain of wage theft. Although some consequences, such as changes in
billing and metrics-induced surveillance, were not altogether unexpected by providers,
for many providers, the ramifications of the EMR (discussed in the next chapter) were
more dire than anticipated.
Conclusion
This chapter presented data derived from fieldwork, in-depth interviews, and
document analysis, as well as questionnaire data, that attested to structural changes
experienced by providers who worked in the emergency room at Hospital H during and
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after the installation of an electronic medical records system. Findings were grouped into
seven major themes: (a) electronic medical records system training for providers, (b)
appropriation moves, (c) structurational divergence, (d) providers’ strategies for coping
with the electronic medical records system, (e) communication between providers, (f)
how electronic medical records system affected patients’ experiences, and (g) unintended
consequences.
Formal electronic medical records system training sessions triggered dissonance
and reactance in physicians. Hierarchically imbalanced relationships exacerbated rolereversal tensions for physicians during formal training sessions, but not during informal
training episodes; instead, nurses and midlevel providers reported that they experienced
feelings associated with dissonance when they trained physicians in the emergency room.
Peer-to-peer training delayed patient care and aggravated tensions among providers.
Moreover, poor practice habits were passed on in peer-to-peer sessions, which
diminished users’ satisfaction with many of the electronic medical records system’s
features.
A microanalysis of speech acts that accompanied providers’ appropriation moves
indicated that providers’ attitudes about the electronic medical records system were
negative. Providers’ relating moves, which compared the electronic medical records
system with other structures, revealed that the electronic medical records system changed
workflow patterns, lengthened documentation time, doubled work for some providers,
and changed how providers thought about and/or planned patient care. Four themes
surfaced in providers’ constraining and judging moves: (a) the electronic medical records
system changed workflow patterns (e.g., longer documentation times, duplicated effort,

	
  

315

delayed work, and interrupted train of thought); (b) providers viewed the medical record
as being incomplete; (c) the electronic medical records system’s spirit, largely, was
incoherent because of poorly designed features (e.g., multiple tabs, small text, and
numerous password prompts); and (d) the electronic medical records system’s
performance was problematic because of hardware and software issues that, in some
instances, increased the risk of medication errors.
Structurational divergence existed in Hospital H’s emergency room as evidenced
by the presence of conflicting external and internal structures (i.e., government policies,
mandates, and legislation, as well as hospital policies), which contributed to providers’
immobilization; providers’ dissatisfaction and burnout; “us” versus “them” language,
which intensified ineffective and hostile communication patterns among providers;
negative communication spirals between providers and administrators; and providers’
diminished agency. Providers’ attempts at regaining lost agency contributed to the
structurational divergence nexus–cycle escalation.
Providers developed and/or employed several strategies to cope with workflow
changes that were brought on by the electronic medical records system. Order dumping
aggravated hierarchical tensions among providers and fueled structurational divergence
cycle development. Providers considered employing scribes, a common workaround
adopted in other hospitals, but they abandoned that plan because of reported difficulties
(e.g., documentation errors) associated with scribe support. Avoidance tactics were
employed by the emergency room management, which delayed installation of the
electronic TSheet component of the electronic medical records system.
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The electronic medical records system also changed providers’ communication
patterns. Providers reported that they talked with their coworkers less, spent less time
discussing patient care face-to-face, and, generally, talked about fewer topics, compared
to the time before the system was employed. Providers revealed that although they talked
less, overall, they spent more time clarifying orders compared with when they used paper
order sets. After the electronic medical records system was installed, nurses worked in
one area, whereas physicians and midlevel providers worked in another area; the physical
separation meant that fewer verbal orders and updates were shared among providers, who
were out of sight of one another. Providers reported that they spent time complaining
about the electronic medical records system, which strengthened their relational bonds.
Patients were affected substantially by electronic medical records system as well.
Computers on wheels limited eye contact between nurses and patients during triage,
which, from nurses’ perspectives, affected negatively patient–nurse relationships.
Physicians and midlevel providers repeated regularly questions that nurses had asked,
which forced patients to repeat their answers. Results from Hospital H’s questionnaires
indicated that patients’ satisfaction declined in the first full year following the electronic
medical records system installation, and, during the same period, that patients’ length of
stay and time spent waiting to see physicians increased.
Six unintended consequences and/or perverse consequences related to electronic
medical records system use were observed at Hospital H: (a) patients’ truncated
narratives, (b) billing issues that contributed to declining revenue and staff redundancies,
(c) EMR-enabled metrics tracking and surveillance, (d) older providers’ difficulties
adapting to EMR-induced workflow changes, (e) increased malpractice risk, and (f) wage
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theft. Patients’ stories were condensed or eliminated by the electronic medical records
system, which contributed to providers’ perceptions that electronic records were
incomplete. The electronic medical records system contributed to a decline in revenue at
Hospital H, which led to staffing and salary cuts. Metrics and EMR-enabled surveillance
policies contributed to providers’ dissatisfaction. An older physician left Hospital H
because he was unable to adapt to electronic medical records system-induced workflow
changes. The electronic medical records system increased providers’ perceptions of their
malpractice risk. Increased documentation time linked to the electronic medical records
system forced many providers to complete documentation tasks after their shifts ended,
which led to complaints of wage theft.
In closing, as the results presented in this chapter show, there were important
effects that resulted from the introduction of an electronic medical records system into
this hospital. The more general conceptual/theoretical and application implications of
these findings are discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION
This chapter begins with a discussion of the research goals for this study,
followed by a review of the research questions that were posed, the major findings that
addressed those research questions, and a discussion detailing how the findings contribute
to the scholarly literature about electronic medical records systems (EMRs) and
emergency rooms. The implications of the study then are addressed, starting with a
discussion of the study’s conceptual/theoretical implications for structuration theory,
adaptive structuration theory (AST), and structurational divergence (SD) theory. The
chapter concludes by identifying some methodological and practical implications of the
findings, followed by a discussion of some limitations that characterized this study and
directions for future research.
Research Goals
The purpose of this research was to extend communication scholarship conducted
on the effects of EMRs on healthcare providers working in a community hospital-based
emergency room. More specifically, this study sought to accomplish three goals. First,
the study sought to enhance scholarly understanding of communication in emergency
rooms by examining the effects of EMRs on providers’ social interactions and system
reproduction. Second, the study employed ethnographic methods in an understudied
environment (i.e., a community hospital’s emergency room), because, “despite its
applicability and value,” there has been “little [such] research in the emergency medicine
care field” (Cooper & Endacott, 2007, p. 818). Ethnographic methods, in particular,
which are “designed to account for action and interaction in real contexts,” are uniquely
situated “to explain how emergency clinicians manage workflow” (Nugus et al., 2011, p.
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1046), and, therefore, those methods can, in comparison to large-scale survey methods,
produce “deeper understanding of emergency medicine as a social practice” (Paltved &
Musaeus, 2012, p. 773). Third, because health communication research “often lacks
theoretical underpinnings” (Nazione et al., 2013, p. 22), this study tested the relevance of
structuration theory and its derivatives for explaining an EMR’s influence on providers in
an emergency room setting.
To accomplish these aims, I spent 162 hours over 18 months in a community
hospital (Hospital H) emergency room, collecting data through participant observation,
in-depth interviews, document analysis, and a questionnaire. The study was conducted in
line with Giddens’s (1984) three guidelines for social-scientific research. Giddens’s first
caveat was that “social science research has a necessary cultural, ethnographic or
‘anthropological’ aspect to it,” which requires researchers “getting to know what actors
already know, and have to know, to ‘go on’ in the daily activities of social life” and, then,
describing “the frames of meaning within which actors orient their conduct” (p. 284).
Resulting social analysis should be “written with the aim of describing a given cultural
milieu to others who are unfamiliar with it,” and it should make use of thick description,
especially in “research . . . of a more ethnographic kind” (Giddens, p. 285); hence, this
analysis provided ample thick description of the structuration processes enacted at the
hospital that was studied. Second, because Giddens believed that social research should
“be sensitive to the complex skills which actors have in co-ordinating the contexts of
their day-to-day behavior” (p. 285), I was attentive to providers’ authoritative resources
and power. Third, researchers, according to Giddens, should be “sensitive to the time–
space constitution of social life,” which means studying not only actors’ social
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interactions but also “the contextual features of locales through which actors move in
their daily path” (p. 286), which is why participant observation was employed “to study
medical work in situ” (Paltved & Musaeus, 2012, p. 773), in addition to other datacollection methods.
Barley (1986) extended Giddens’s (1984) axioms and recommended that
researchers studying technology adoption should conduct longitudinal analyses of ways
in which users incorporate technology into their daily lives, but he cautioned that “it
becomes unsound practice to lump together organizations with radically different
institutional histories and ecological milieu” (p. 81). Because technology adoption,
inevitably, “reflects the situational context, it is quite likely that identical technologies
used in similar contexts can occasion different structures” (Barley, p. 81). Although
numerous studies have examined communication technology adoption in academic
medical center-based emergency rooms (e.g., Callen et al., 2013; Eisenberg et al., 2005;
Farhan et al., 2012; Hill et al., 2013; Kessler et al., 2012; McCarthy et al., 2012, 2013;
Morgan et al., 2011; Park et al., 2012; Rhodes et al., 2003; Stephens et al., 2012; Ward et
al., 2013; Wei at al., 2012), those findings are not generalizable to community hospital
emergency rooms because, as described in chapter one, there are major differences
between academic medical centers and community hospitals, such as academic medical
centers employing both physicians and medical residents, which lowers the physician–
patient ratio, and having specialty and subspecialty consultants available 24 hours a day,
whereas community hospitals have fewer physicians on staff and, generally, very limited
specialty support. Although the only naturalistic “before, during, and after” analysis of
an emergency room’s EMR adoption is valuable (Park et al., 2012), the findings from
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that study are applicable only to academic medical centers, and, therefore, they are not
generalizable to the majority of emergency room settings. Hence, in keeping with
Barley’s advice, I have not “lumped together organizations” (p. 81) by using findings
from studies to explain EMR-induced structural changes that I observed at the hospital
studied but, instead, I conducted a study that contributes to scholarly understanding of
EMR adoption in a community hospital emergency room setting.
In sum, this study set out to accomplish three things: (a) enhance scholarly
understanding of EMR-induced changes in a community hospital emergency room, (b)
contribute an ethnographic study to the emergency room literature, and (c) test the
relevance of structuration theory and its derivatives for explaining the effects of an EMR
adoption. I tried to be sensitive to the skills that agents used as they coordinated their
day-to-day behavior and to what Giddens (1984) called “the time–space constitution of
social life” (p. 286), which meant studying both agents’ interactions and the locale that
housed those interactions. I, thus, conducted a longitudinal analysis of an EMR adoption
in a community hospital emergency room to produce a document rich with thick
description. To address the broader goals of this study, I posed four research questions
(see chapter three), with the next section summarizing the study’s major findings with
regard to those research questions.
Summary of Major Findings that Addressed the Research Questions and
Contributed to the Scholarly Literature
My preliminary research and my reading of structuration theory and its
derivatives (see chapter three) led to posing four research questions for this study: (a)
How do EMRs influence social interactions among providers working in the emergency
room at Hospital H? (b) How does the EMR impact structures, agents, and systems in the
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emergency room at Hospital H? (c) What, if any, unintended consequences emerge
during and after EMR adoption at Hospital H? and (d) Do providers working in the
emergency room at Hospital H experience SD? To answer these questions, findings
culled from participant observational fieldwork, in-depth interviews, document analysis,
and questionnaire data were grouped into seven major themes: (a) EMR training for
providers; (b) providers’ appropriation moves; (c) SD, which included immobilization
and negative communication spirals; (d) providers’ strategies for coping with the EMR;
(e) changes to providers’ communication patterns, (f) how the EMR affected provider–patient interactions and patients’ experiences; and (g) unintended consequences
associated with the EMR. In answering each of the research questions, the themes are
revisited in the sections below.
Findings for Research Question One: Electronic Medical Records Systems and
Providers’ Social Interactions
Findings from themes (a) and (e) answer the question, “How do EMRs influence
social interactions among providers working in the emergency room at Hospital H?” In
line with other studies (Brooks & Grotz, 2010; Granlien & Hertzum, 2012; Top & Gider,
2011), formal EMR training ignited dissonance and reactance in physicians, and,
moreover, it hindered their learning (see, e.g., Robinson et al., 2003). Hierarchical
tensions also were aroused in formal EMR training, as Nambisan et al. (2013) found, but,
in the present study, those tensions were exacerbated when physicians’ trainers were
nonmedical, information technology (IT) department staff members as opposed to nurses
or midlevel providers. Interactions between physicians and IT staff, largely, were
ineffective and negative, but physicians’ reliance on nurses and midlevel providers who
were designated as “super-users” also was problematic because their exchanges created
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role-reversal tensions for super-users. Given results from earlier studies, role-reversal
tensions were expected to aggravate dissonance in physicians (see Nambisan et al. 2013;
Robinson et al., 2003), but, instead, nurses and midlevel providers were more likely to
report dissonance when they trained physicians than were the physicians being trained.
The unease that super-users felt, in many instances, impeded communication between
them and physicians. No study to date, that I am aware of, has identified traininginduced cognitive dissonance in nurses and midlevel providers, pursuant to their training
physicians. This is an important finding, because identifying and eliminating sources of
dissonance, which manifest as resentment, anger, unease, annoyance, frustration, and/or
discomfort (Sweeny et al., 2000) and which contribute to nurses and midlevel providers
feeling dissatisfied in their work, can lower providers’ risk of burnout.
In accordance with studies conducted by Hill et al. (2013) and Park et al. (2012),
EMR adoption was found to limit providers’ face-to-face interactions. Although
providers at Hospital H, by their accounts, spoke less, they spent more time clarifying
orders after, as compared to before, the EMR and CPOE components were installed.
Although this finding seemed contradictory, providers did speak less overall after those
technologies were installed, and much of what they did discuss involved clarifying CPOE
orders that nurses found confusing. The result, according to providers, was that they
spent less time with patients, which, in turn, delayed patient care. This finding
corroborates research that suggests EMRs decrease the time that providers spend with
patients (Hill et al., 2013; Park et al., 2012; Person et al., 2013).
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Similar to the EMR that was used at the Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital
where the Dallas Ebola case unfolded (see chapter one), the EMR at Hospital H divided
physicians’ and nurses’ notes into separate programs (see, e.g., Frazao, 2014; Giblom &
Chen, 2014; Jones, 2014). Many providers at Hospital H indicated that the separate
workflows made them feel isolated from one another’s clinical work and decision
making, and, consequently, providers reported that they felt less like members of a team.
Additionally, in line with other findings (see Hill et al., 2013; Park et al., 2012; Person et
al., 2013), the EMR abolished paper charts, which, previously, stimulated interactions
among providers as they shared charts in common work areas. After the EMR
installation, providers’ designated EMR workstations isolated nurses from both midlevel
providers and physicians, which, consequently, reduced further providers’ face-to-face
encounters (see, e.g., Hill et al., 2013; Park et al., 2012; Person et al., 2013). Fewer
interactions led to dropped orders, and they increased the likelihood of medical mistakes
occurring. Both dropped orders and medical mistakes were uncovered when studying
providers’ appropriation moves, described next.
Findings for Research Question Two: Electronic Medical Records Systems and
Structuration
Findings linked to themes (b) and (f) helped to answer the question, “How does
the EMR impact structures, agents, and systems in the emergency room at Hospital H?”
This study of providers’ appropriation moves showed that the EMR was an allocative
resource (i.e., tool) that providers used and talked about regularly, and, thereby, made the
EMR part of Hospital H’s social context and system (i.e., the patterning of social
relations across time and space). Microanalysis of providers’ speech acts, however,
showed that the EMR was perceived negatively, which corroborates findings that EMRs,
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generally, are not well liked by providers (see Fernando, Georgiou, Holdgate, &
Westbrook, 2009; Feufel, Robinson, & Shalin, 2011; Francis, 2013; Georgiou et al.,
2013; Lee, Kuo, & Goodwin, 2013; Makam et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2013).
Relating moves showed that the EMR changed, fundamentally, structures at
Hospital H in several ways. The EMR altered workflow patterns (e.g., increased
workload and documentation tasks), changed providers’ thought processes (e.g.,
interrupted their train of thought and/or reorganized their mental checklists for
examination procedures), and changed providers’ perceptions of the completeness of
medical records. Nurses, when compared with physicians, found electronic health
records to be more complete than paper records, and, generally, nurses were more
accepting of the EMR, which supports other findings (see Lærum, Karlsen, & Faxvagg,
2004; Likourezos et al., 2004, Otieno, Toyama, Asonuma, Kanai-Pak, & Naitoh, 2007;
Weiner et al., 1999).
Providers’ constraining moves revealed that the EMR inhibited their agency;
mainly, by limiting the time that providers could spend with patients. Whereas relating
moves indicted that changes in workflow patterns occurred, constraining moves showed
that providers regarded the workflow changes negatively. In line with Park et al.’s
(2012) findings, the EMR duplicated workflow (e.g., multiple providers documented the
same thing in separate portions of the health record), led to delayed work, interrupted
providers’ cognitive processes (e.g., train of thought), increased documentation time, and
doubled work for providers who relied on paper notes as memory aids. Moreover, the
EMR’s incoherent spirit meant that software glitches dropped orders frequently, which
increased the likelihood of mistakes occurring. In line with many of the EMR studies
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that were reviewed in chapter two (see Fernando et al., 2009; Feufel al., 2011; Georgiou
et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2013), the EMR’s effects in this study, largely, were negative.
Patients, who, like providers, are agents in emergency rooms, also appeared to be
affected adversely by the EMR. For instance, nurses who used computers on wheels
(COWs) during triage looked at patients less than did nurses who used the old paper
triage forms. COWs were a physical barrier between nurses and patients, and, as Pearce
et al. (2013) observed, the EMR forced patient–provider interactions to unfold in a
prescribed fashion that shifted exchanges toward data gathering and away from patients’
narratives. Providers reported that they believed the EMR affected negatively their
relationships with patients (in line with research conducted by Callen et al., 2013 and
Frankel, 2005) and patients’ emergency room experiences (see Ward et al., 2013), with
patient satisfaction, as measured by questionnaires administered to them by Hospital H
representatives, falling after the EMR was installed.
In sum, the EMR introduction was “an exogenous shock” (Barley, 1986, p. 80)
that altered radically the structures and systems at Hospital H, by limiting providers’
agency, altering workflow, impeding communication among agents, and worsening
patients’ experiences. Providers’ efforts to “subvert the mechanics of disciplinary
power” (Giddens, 1984, p. 292) and regain lost agency led to some of the unintended
consequences that are described next.
Findings for Research Question Three: Electronic Medical Records Systems and
Unintended Consequences
Findings associated with themes (d) and (g) helped to answer the question, “What,
if any, unintended consequences emerge during and after EMR adoption at Hospital H?”
Several unintended consequences emerged during Hospital H’s EMR adoption. As
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expected, patients’ narratives were cut short frequently (see Pearce et al., 2013), which
contributed to physicians’ perceptions that electronic health records lacked context and,
thus, usability. Contrary to research that showed EMRs increased healthcare costs and,
thus, hospitals’ revenue (see Bukata, 2014; Callen et al., 2013; Fernando et al., 2009;
Feufel al., 2011; Georgiou et al., 2013; Kellerman & Jones, 2013; Ward et al., 2013),
billing declined at Hospital H because of conflicting structures (e.g., the EMR and
accounting software were incompatible), and because billable charges were not checked
off regularly in the electronic record by providers. Metrics, legislated by an external
structure (i.e., the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services [CMS]), were monitored
more closely once the EMR was installed, which led providers to “game the system,” a
maladaptive strategy for stopping the clock on door-to-doc times. Metrics increased
providers’ workplace stress, which substantiated other accounts (Bukata, 2011; Leep,
2014; “Metric Madness,” 2014). Older physicians, in particular, compared with younger
physicians, did not acclimate quickly to EMR-induced workflow changes, which, as
Berger (2012) noted, signals a generational divide in providers’ adaptability when it
comes to new technologies being introduced into emergency rooms. Moreover, the
results of this study showed that physicians believed that an unintended consequence of
EMR adoption was increased malpractice risk (see Reyes, 2015), which increased their
self-reported stress and contributed to their workplace dissatisfaction. Additionally,
providers cited increased wage theft as contributing to their dissatisfaction.
In sum, the EMR introduced many unintended consequences, which, oftentimes,
fed “the unacknowledged conditions of further acts” (Giddens, 1984, p. 8), setting off an
infinite cycle of unintended consequences. For example, metrics, which were meant to
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ensure faster and more efficient care, actually led providers to game the system, which,
for patients, led to increased wait times, longer lengths of stay, unnecessary tests,
increased costs, and diminished satisfaction. Additionally, metrics increased providers’
dissatisfaction, added to their workplace stress, and contributed to order dumping, which
exacerbated hierarchical tensions between providers, and, as explained next, set off
negative communication spirals that were associated with SD.
Findings for Research Question Four: Electronic Medical Records Systems and
Structurational Divergence
Findings from theme (c) answered the question, “Do providers working in the
emergency room at Hospital H experience SD?” Questionnaire results showed that
providers at Hospital H experienced moderate SD and that many providers experienced
burnout, a hallmark symptom of SD (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010; Nicotera & Mahon,
2013). In accordance with other research (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010; Nicotera &
Mahon, 2013; Nicotera et al., 2010; Nicotera et al., 2014), conflicting structures
contributed to providers’ immobilization and created an SD-nexus. SD-nexus conditions
were amplified by “us” versus “them” interactions between floor and emergency room
staff, which also led to some instances of workplace bullying (see Nicotera &
Clinkscales, 2010; Nicotera & Mahon, 2013). Negative communication spirals (i.e., SDcycles) among providers oftentimes were triggered by physicians’ dumping orders on
subordinates, which, for many physicians, were attempts to regain their lost agency. This
observation suggested that agency-restorative steps escalated an SD-nexus into an SDcycle. This finding is especially important because what pushes an SD-nexus into an SDcycle had not been established empirically (A. Nicotera, personal communication, April
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7, 2015). As explained next, the findings presented here, and in previous sections, have
important conceptual/theoretical, methodological, and practical implications.
Conceptual/Theoretical, Methodological, and Practical Implications of the Findings
The findings from this study have several important conceptual/theoretical,
methodological, and practical implications. Below, I describe the conceptual/theoretical
implications for structuration theory, AST, and SD theory. Methodological implications
then are discussed, followed by this study’s practical implications, which includes
recommendations for healthcare administrators, providers, and patients.
Conceptual/Theoretical Implications
As noted above and in chapter three, because health communication research
“often lacks theoretical underpinnings” (Nazione et al., 2013, p. 22), this study tested the
relevance of structuration theory and its derivatives for explaining an EMR’s influence on
healthcare providers in an emergency room setting. Giddens’s (1984) structuration
theory is an ontological theory of social organization (Jones et al., 2004), but it seldom
has been employed in empirical health communication research (Heracleous, 2013), with
one notable exception being Barley’s (1986) analysis of technology adoption and
resulting systemic changes experienced by members of a radiology practice. Extensions
of structuration theory, however, have been used in medical and health communication
research. Schwieger et al. (2004, 2006) used a modified adaptive structuration model to
analyze a family practice clinic’s medical billing system integration, and Nicotera and
Clinkscales (2010) expanded Giddens’s (1984) work on contradictory structures and
devised SD theory to explain discordant communication patterns among nurses. This
study used structuration theory, AST, and SD theory to explain aspects of the EMR

	
  

330

adoption at Hospital H, and, as discussed next, the findings showed that structuration
theory and its derivatives can be applied successfully to emergency room communication.
Moreover, the findings reflected the conceptions and expectations of structuration theory
and AST, and, importantly, they advance SD theory.
Conceptual/theoretical implications for structuration theory. Because
structuration theory has been used widely in organizational communication research since
the 1980s (McPhee, Poole, & Iverson, 2014), using it to frame a study of a hospital
undergoing a critical organizational change (e.g., EMR adoption) made sense. Moreover,
McPhee at al. (2014) wrote that structuration theory “focuses especially on systems of
human practices or meaningful patterns of activity that range from narrow micro-level
activities . . . to broader arrays of processes, such as project management or medicine” (p.
76). In fact, emergency room and hospital studies have highlighted relevant
structuration concepts, such as structures, structural constraint, and agency (see Nugus et
al., 2011; Xiao et al., 2007), but they have stopped short of employing structuration
theory as a critical lens through which interactions or processes were viewed and
analyzed. This study, therefore, is unique in its application of structuration theory to
frame an analysis of emergency room system reproduction, and, as described next, the
theory proved to be a valuable lens for examining agents and systems experiencing
change.
Structuration theory provided a useful language for describing what providers
experienced during their EMR adoption and how their day-to-day practices were
changed. Moreover, using the theory primed me, as a researcher, to investigate what
agents thought and felt over time, and, thus, the theory extended this analysis beyond the
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typical variables studied (e.g., length of stay or number of laboratory tests ordered; see
Han et al., 2005; Koppel et al., 2005; Linder et al., 2007; Walsh et al., 2006; Ward et al.,
2013). In so doing, I examined deeper structuration processes and uncovered patterns of
behavior that the theory predicted would emerge during structural constraint and/or
hierarchically imbalanced exchanges. For example, structuration theory predicts that
when their agency is suppressed, agents, in general, and subordinates, in particular, will
“subvert the mechanics of disciplinary power [and] assert their autonomy of action”
(Giddens, 1984, p. 292). These behaviors appeared at Hospital H in the form of “order
dumping” and “gaming the system,” both of which allowed physicians and midlevel
providers to sidestep disciplinary forces that required EMR use, and, in so doing, they
reasserted some measure of their autonomy.
Giddens (1984) predicted that “the greater the convergence of contradictions . . .
the more likely that open conflict will develop along the ‘fault line’ of those
contradictions” (p. 318). Structural contradictions between groups of organizational
members (e.g., administrators, physicians, midlevel providers, and nurses) led frequently
to conflict, which disrupted routines at Hospital H. This study revealed how providers
coped with fractured routines (e.g., order-entry processes), and the findings validated
aspects of structuration theory; namely, Giddens’s predictions about how routines are
restored.
For Giddens (1984), routines are “a fundamental concept of structuration theory .
. . [and] curb the sources of unconscious tension that would otherwise preoccupy most of
our waking lives” (pp. xxiii, xxiv). Routines are the “basic elements of [agents’] day-to-
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day social activity,” and, hence, they make up “the recursive nature of social life”
(Giddens, p. xxiii). Additionally, as Giddens claimed:
Routinization is vital to the psychological mechanisms whereby a sense of trust or
ontological security is sustained in the daily activities of social life. Carried
primarily in practical consciousness, routine drives a wedge between the
potentially explosive content of the unconscious and the reflexive monitoring of
action which agents display. (p. xxiii)
Giddens (1984) suggested that the psychological nature of routines could be
elucidated by “considering the results of situations where the established modes or
accustomed daily life are drastically undermined or shattered—by studying what may be
called ‘critical situations’” (p. 60). The EMR’s introduction at Hospital H initiated a
critical situation, “a circumstance of radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which
affects substantial numbers of individuals [or] situations that threatens or destroys the
certitude of institutionalized routines” (Giddens, p. 61). Giddens explained that, even in
critical situations, routines are resurrected in a predictable fashion through a series of
stages. To illustrate, Giddens described how the actions of many who were held in
concentration camps could be interpreted as “reroutinization.” Following a critical
situation (e.g., expulsion to a concentration camp), according to Giddens, there is an
expected breakdown of social order, with hierarchically superior agents (e.g., wealthy or
privileged individuals) experiencing the greatest shock. All agents experience increasing
anxiety, followed by regressive behaviors (e.g., name-calling and bullying). For many
agents, there follows a period of “resocialization” and identification with authority
figures, and, finally, reconstruction of typical behaviors that mimic the lost routines. On

	
  

333

this last point, Giddens wrote that “old prisoners” who had survived the camps for several
years
reconstituted themselves as agents by integrating themselves into camp life as
participants in the very rituals of degradation which, as new prisoners, they had
found so offensive. . . . The end result, found in most but not all prisoners, was a
reconstructed personality based upon identification with the oppressors
themselves, the camp guards. Old prisoners aped the activities of their captors,
not merely to curry favor with them but also . . . because of an introjection of the
normative values of the SS. (p. 63)
Giddens concluded that “such a sequence of heightened anxiety, regression, followed by
a reconstruction of typical patterns of action, appears in a range of critical situations in
otherwise very different contexts” (p. 64).
The reroutinization pattern that Giddens (1984) theorized unfolded at Hospital H.
Following the critical situation studied in this research (i.e., the installation of the CPOE),
hierarchically superior agents (e.g., physicians) experienced the greatest shock and loss of
agency, which led regularly to their heightened anxiety, ill tempers, and foul moods.
Regressive behavior, such as name-calling, was commonplace, with insults directed,
typically, at the CPOE (e.g., calling the CPOE “crappy” and “a piece of shit”). Although
not every provider acclimated to the change (e.g., Dr. W, who, depending on the
viewpoint, either left or was let go), many providers adapted to the CPOE or adopted
strategies (e.g., order dumping) to restore familiar patterns of action. Some providers,
such as Q, “resocialized” and identified with administrators, even finding value in the
EMR’s potential. Q’s resocialization was surprising because she and Dr. F had been
instrumental in deploying avoidance strategies that slowed the electronic TSheet
implementation. In April 2015, Q told me that she had withdrawn her resignation, in
part, because she had come to see administrators “in a new light.” As Q said:
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I think they [administrators] are in a tough place. They’re being told what to do,
too, so they are just as powerless as I am in some ways. I feel sorry for them. I
see that they’re trying to do their jobs and that means pushing the EMRs. I think
the EMR will get better, with time. At this point, I guess you could say this is my
“new” normal.
Several other providers echoed Q’s assertions that the EMR ushered in a “new normal” at
Hospital H, and they accepted it, albeit reluctantly (see chapter five). Thus, this study’s
findings validated Giddens’s predictions about routinization during critical situations.
In sum, structuration theory contains several concepts that are valuable when
applied to the study of communication in healthcare organizations. The theory’s core
concepts, as Giddens (1984) noted, are “sensitizing devices . . . useful for thinking about
research problems and the interpretation of research results” (p. 326). For instance, as
described here and in chapters three and five, structuration theory promotes consideration
of agents, resources, agency, routines, social interaction, critical situations, front and back
region distinctions, structural contradiction, and unintended and perverse consequences,
which, when taken together, can yield rich data for analysis and elucidate EMR adoption
processes in emergency room settings. Next, I describe how this study’s findings reflect
tenets of AST.
Conceptual/theoretical implications for adaptive structuration theory. As
noted in chapter three, DeSanctis and Poole (1994) proposed AST to study “the role of
advanced information technologies in organization change” (pp. 121). DeSanctis and
Poole proposed that during technology adoption, there always is a “dialectic of control”
(p. 131), which is a phrase that Giddens (1984) used to describe “the two-way character
of the distributive aspects of power” (p. 374). During technology adoption, the dialectic
of control, according to DeSanctis and Poole, means that
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technology structures shape the group, but the group likewise shapes its own
interaction, exerting control over use of technology structures and the new
structures that emerge from their use. Organizational change occurs gradually, as
technology structures are appropriated and bring change to decision processes.
Over time, new social structures may become a part of the larger organizational
life. (p. 131)
Thus, the theory poses two key questions: (a) “What changes do these [technology]
systems actually bring to the workplace?” and (b) “What technology impacts should we
anticipate, and how can we interpret the changes that we observe?” (DeSanctis & Poole,
p. 122).
To answer those questions, this study examined providers’ appropriation moves,
revealing how the EMR at Hospital H was brought into social interaction and how it
changed system reproduction. Findings showed, as DeSanctis and Poole (1994)
predicted, that “if group interaction processes are inconsistent with the structural potential
of the technology, then the outcomes of group use of the structures will be less
predictable and, on the whole, less favorable” (p. 131). Providers’ interaction habits
varied across user groups, and the patterns, largely, were inconsistent with the EMR’s
structural potential (e.g., physicians circumvented order-entry tasks by dumping orders),
and, consequently, the EMR was not viewed favorably. Furthermore, the EMR had an
incoherent spirit from providers’ perspectives, demonstrated by its poor design, lack of
usability, and limited features. Technologies with incoherent spirit, according to McPhee
et al. (2014), “fail to deliver intended benefits . . . [or] lead to unexpected effects” (p. 85),
and, hence, they are harder to incorporate into group practices (DeSanctis & Poole).
Thus, this study confirmed what DeSanctis and Poole had theorized with respect to
incoherent technologies: An incoherent spirit impedes adoption practices, even, in this
case, in forced adoption scenarios.
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Although AST has been applied, mainly, in free-adoption scenarios where agents
can chose to use or disregard a technology (see DeSanctis & Poole, 1994), applying AST
to a forced-adoption scenario, as this study did, was useful because it showed that even
when direct use of a technology (i.e., freely chosen use) was out of the question, relating
and constraining moves, in particular, demonstrated important ways in which the EMR
was integrated into the system. For example, analysis of providers’ relating and
constraining moves showed that the EMR changed workflow patterns, lengthened
documentation times, led to duplicated and delayed work, and changed providers’
thinking about healthcare delivery (e.g., interrupted their train of thought).
When DeSanctis and Poole (1994) proposed AST, they stressed that “technologytriggered changes at micro, global, and institutional levels can be studied,” but they noted
that “individual studies tend to target one level of analysis, rather than multiple levels” (p.
144). They called for more multilevel analyses, and this study answered that call by
analyzing microlevel, global, and institutional interactions across user groups and units.
By documenting providers’ appropriation moves over a period of 18 months, important
themes emerged that, likely, would have remained undetected had the analysis been
contained to microlevel interactions. This study, consequently, validates the utility of
AST for deepening scholarly understanding of the effects of EMRs on emergency
medicine practice. Furthermore, the findings demonstrated that AST is useful for
examining free and forced EMR-adoption scenarios.
Conceptual/theoretical implications for structurational divergence theory.
SD theory expanded on Giddens’s (1984) work by addressing structural contradiction,
and, specifically, “what happens to agency under contradictory structures” (Nicotera &
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Mahon, 2013, p. 94). Nicotera and Clinkscales (2010) theorized that SD exists when
incompatible rule systems and unresolvable conflict (i.e., SD-nexus) lead to negative,
ineffective, or aggressive communication spirals (i.e., SD-cycle). SD immobilizes
agents, impinges agency, and manifests, often, as bullying, stress, dissatisfaction, and
intention to quit (Nicotera et al., 2010). The theory has been used in research conducted
in hospitals; primarily, to study discordant interactions among nurses (see Nicotera &
Clinkscales, 2010; Nicotera & Mahon, 2013; Nicotera et al., 2010; Nicotera et al., 2014).
The theory’s utility in that setting is evident given that hospitals are at “the intersection of
multiple institutional, professional, community, and other cultural meaning systems”
(Nicotera et al., 2010, p. 364), and, accordingly, they are vulnerable to SD.
Given the presence of so many conflicting internal and external structures in the
emergency room at Hospital H, by default, it was an SD-nexus. Consequently, SD theory
provided an angle for exploring structural contradictions that the EMR exacerbated at
Hospital H and ramifications for its agents, which were immobilization and diminished
agency. Because SD theory has not been used to study technology adoption, this study’s
application of the theory was novel. Moreover, this study used SD theory to analyze
interaction patterns among physicians, midlevel providers, and nurses, which marked the
first time that SD theory had been applied to a heterogeneous sample of healthcare
providers.
As SD theory predicts, this study’s findings showed that providers in the SDcompromised emergency room reported surface-level manifestations of SD, such as
dissatisfaction, burnout, and intention to quit. Moreover, there was evidence of an
increased likelihood of medication errors, as the theory predicts (see Nicotera et al.,
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2010). Moreover, in line with other reports (see Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010; Nicotera
& Mahon, 2013; Nicotera et al., 2010, 2014), this study demonstrated that providers’
agency, largely, was impotent because they could not change structures in a
transformative way. Findings revealed that a pattern of attempted restoration of agency
(e.g., order dumping) led to negative communication spirals, which suggested that lost
agency and efforts to restore it tipped the SD-nexus into the SD-cycle. Given that why or
how the SD-cycle emerges had not been explained empirically, this study provided
valuable insight into the SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation (A. Nicotera, personal
communication, April 7, 2015), and, thereby, this study advanced that theory.
To review, this study tested the relevance of structuration theory, AST, and SD
theory for explaining an EMR’s influence on emergency medicine providers. The
findings supported Giddens’s (1984) theorized reroutinization processes following
critical situations. Findings also demonstrated the utility of AST in forced-adoption
scenarios and supported predictions that incoherent technologies constrain agency and are
not well liked. SD theory’s predictions regarding SD manifestations also were
substantiated by this study; furthermore, the findings advanced the theory by suggesting
an explanation for the SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation. In addition to these
conceptual/theoretical implications, as explained next, this study had important
methodological implications.
Methodological Implications
This study has important methodological implications. First, it used proven
ethnographic techniques to address researchers’ calls for more in-depth, observational
research to be conducted in emergency rooms (e.g., Cooper & Endacott, 2007; Nugus et
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al., 2011; Paltved & Musaeus, 2012). Second, it is the only naturalistic study of an EMR
adoption in a community hospital’s emergency room. Additionally, as described next,
the study’s methodological approach enhances understanding of communication in
emergency rooms by addressing gaps in the emergency room literature.
When studying social interactions and specific communicative acts,
“quantification and the use of a statistical method pose a fixity of social life that it does
not in fact have” (Giddens, 1984, p. 330). Studies about EMR adoptions in emergency
rooms have relied, mainly, on quantifying relevant phenomena (e.g., number of
medication errors, number of mouse clicks per order-entry task, or how providers’
minutes are allocated), and although such studies are valuable (see Han et al., 2005;
Koppel et al., 2005; Linder et al., 2007; Walsh et al., 2006; Ward et al., 2013), according
to Nugus and Forero (2011), numerical studies tell only part of the story. Paltved and
Musaeus (2012) explained that observational researchers “can help to unpack the
processes surrounding EM [emergency medical] care and explain ‘how, why and what’ is
going on” (p. 772). Thus, more observational work is needed in emergency rooms to
illuminate processes pertaining to providers’ thinking, feeling, and acting, and to capture
organizational and team processes amid medical and social practices; such research may
lead to the development of theory that has important clinical and/or organizational
implications (Paltved & Musaeus, 2012). Ethnographic research, in particular, “can
advance the understanding and delivery of emergency care [by] capturing the moment-tomoment action of life when and where it happens, and in the context of, reflecting and
amending, broader social patterns” (Nugus et al., 2011, p. 69).
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Much of the observational research conducted in emergency rooms, however,
lacks methodological rigor (Cooper & Endacott, 2007); hence, this study employed
proven techniques, such as saturation, triangulation, and member checks (Cooper &
Endacott, 2007), to increase the accuracy of the findings. Over 18 months, data were
collected via participant observations, in-depth interviewing, a questionnaire, and
document analysis. Findings were validated through triangulation, which involved
identifying convergent data “in fieldnotes, interviews, [and] documents” (Lindlof &
Taylor, 2011, p. 274). Following open and in vivo coding, themes were identified using
Owen’s (1984) criteria, which posit that themes emerge when there are recurring
descriptions using similar phrases and with the same forcefulness of expression. Seven
major themes answered the four research questions posed, and, hence, the themes
contributed to the scholarly understanding of communication in emergency rooms,
generally, and in community hospital-based emergency rooms, specifically. Moreover,
this study is the only one to date to employ ethnographic techniques to analyze an EMR
adoption and its ramifications in a community hospital’s emergency room. The findings,
then, may be generalizable to some of the 5,724 community hospitals (Dunn & Becker,
2013)—more than 90% of the hospitals—in the United States and yield important
practical applications that may prove useful as more community hospitals adopt federally
mandated EMRs in the coming years.
Despite this study’s utility, however, it is important to note that ethnography,
similar to other methodologies, “has its strengths and weakness” (Perlmutter, 2015, para.
1). Perlmutter (2015) identified five potential weaknesses that characterize ethnographic
research: (a) the problem of witnessed truth, (b) researchers’ lack of objectivity, (c)
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researchers’ credibility, (d) replicability of findings, and (e) valorization of the observed
community. Below, I describe how I grappled with each of these issues.
First, with respect to the potential issue of witnessed truth that characterizes
ethnography, Perlmutter (2015) argued that “human beings are terrible at accurately
understanding, remembering, and recounting what happened at an unexpected, fastmoving event” (para. 9). The emergency room at Hospital H, indeed, was a fast-paced,
hectic environment, but even amid the chaos, typically, there were moments of calm
during which I asked healthcare providers to explain and clarify events and interactions.
During those and other times, I took copious notes, conducted frequently member checks,
and elicited on-the-fly commentary from the site’s inhabitants about their interactions.
Moreover, by triangulating fieldnotes with interview transcripts, questionnaire data, and
document analysis, I achieved a measure of descriptive validity and, thus, overcame, in
part, the problem of witnessed truth. There is, however, “no way of seeing, hearing, or
representing the world of others that is absolutely, universally valid or correct” (Van
Maanen, 2011, p. 35).
Second, the perceived lack of “objectivity,” as Perlmutter (2015) pointed out, is
not exclusive to ethnography but is evident in all other methodologies as well.
Researchers who have employed positivistic methods, such as experiments, surveys, and
content analysis, have long been, as Perlmutter noted, “concocting data sets, suppressing
negative findings, and embellishing positive results” (para. 11); hence, “the idea that
ethnography is especially flawed is absurd” (para. 11). However, because researcher
subjectivity “is an inherent part of research,” and, especially, ethnography, researchers
should “contextualize [their] own positionality, thereby making it accessible, transparent,
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and vulnerable to judgment and evaluation” (Madison, 2012, pp. 10, 11). To that end, I
have acknowledged at various places in this dissertation my researcher subjectivity, such
as my relationship with Dr. C influencing my view of emergency medicine practice,
physician–nurse and provider–administrator dynamics, and EMRs. Such researcher
subjectivity, however, was counterbalanced both by my formal training in conducting
research and by use of numerous methodological procedures to achieve intersubjective
understanding and interpretation of events and interactions that occurred at Hospital H.
My positionality on three key points—physician–nurse interactions, provider–
administrator relationships, and EMRs—warrants further discussion. First, as noted in
chapter three, I began preliminary research by identifying with physicians, but, gradually,
I gravitated to the nurses’ camp. My identification with nurses intensified over the
course of the study, to the extent that by the end of the study, nurses, almost exclusively,
reviewed, critiqued, and evaluated my work during routine member checks. Hence, this
report did not privilege physicians’ perspectives and experiences over those of nurses.
As Nurse B believed, my strong identification with nurses resulted in “a fairly balanced
study, overall, especially considering it was written by a doctor’s wife. To be honest, we
[nurses] thought you’d make us look bad while glorifying the docs. You make some of
them [physicians] look like assholes.”
Moreover, as Nurse B noted, this dissertation “paints administrators in a pretty
bad light, at times.” With regard to Hospital H’s administrators, I am, decidedly
opinionated, as apart from granting me access to the site, administrators were uninvolved
in my research and, generally, unresponsive to my requests for interviews. Admittedly, I
could have been more persistent in my requests for interviews with administrators, but as
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the study wore on and the electronic TSheet implementation stalled, I feared losing
access to the site if I “rocked the boat,” and, consequently, I would have missed an
opportunity to observe the electronic TSheet aftermath that I wanted to document.17 Still,
my reticence to pursue the administrators’ perspective is an important limitation of this
study.
Lastly, my position on EMRs, unquestionably, is negative. Despite Dr. C’s
incessant complaining in recent years about EMRs, I began this study, more or less, with
an open mind about them. Dr. C is not technologically savvy, and I assumed that his
complaints about EMRs were indicative of his typical complaints when confronted with a
new technology that he does not like (e.g., a new television remote control or a new
computer operating system). I soon discovered, however, in the early stages of
preliminary research that Dr. C was not alone in his dislike of EMRs, as the majority of
providers I observed and/or interviewed did not like EMRs. Although many providers
preferred some EMRs (e.g., Epic) over other EMRs (e.g., McKesson’s Paragon),
overwhelmingly, providers railed against EMRs and CPOEs. Moreover, in reading the
scholarly literature for this dissertation (see chapter two), it was apparent that most
studies about EMRs, especially studies appearing in the emergency medicine literature,
were negative. Those studies were in line with the findings from this study, which also
pointed to negative consequences of EMRs (e.g., increased risk of medical mistakes
occurring and diminished provider satisfaction in light of increased workload, workplace
stress, and likelihood of burnout). Moreover, during a formal EMR training session, I
was allowed to engage with the EMR and its medication-ordering platform, and despite
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1

Although not documented in this dissertation, my work at Hospital H is ongoing and I
will observe the electronic TSheet’s implementation and its aftermath during Fall 2015.
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being adept technologically18, I found the EMR cumbersome and very hard to use. Thus,
over the course of this study, my view of EMRs shifted from “undecided” to “squarely
against” them. I do, however, see the potential for EMRs to improve healthcare delivery
and health information exchange, but, similar to most of the informants in this study, I do
not believe that current EMR technology is poised to deliver such improvements.
Third, with respect to the issue of researcher credibility (Perlmutter, 2015), this
report is credible to the extent that my positionality is “accessible, transparent, and
vulnerable to judgment and evaluation” (Madison, 2012, p. 11). Moreover, as Perlmutter
(2015) attested, ethnography is “very hard to fake outright,” because the “volume of work
required to produce credible ‘thick description’ . . . is immense” (para. 12). The many
hours that I spent at Hospital H can be corroborated by informants and gatekeepers, and,
furthermore, many of the people who participated in this study member-checked my
work, and, thereby, ensured an added measure of credibility. Additionally, my fieldnotes
and interview transcriptions are available for review, and they may be used to validate
findings that are described in this dissertation.
Fourth, replicability of findings is no more guaranteed in any other methodology
than it is in ethnography (Perlmutter, 2015). “Furthermore,” according to Perlmutter
(2015), “the lack of replicability inherent in ethnography is a guidepost to reliability, not
a fundamental flaw” (para. 14). Although “no two ethnographers can study the same
community” (Perlmutter, para. 14), typically, that is the case for other methodologists as
well (e.g., experimental researchers). As Frey et al. (2000) contended, “There is, of
course, no way to ever replicate someone’s study exactly, since every investigation
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I have spent 20 years as a videographer and film editor, and use, regularly, advanced
editing, special effects, and compositing software; hence, I am adept technologically.
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involves a different researcher and different research participants” (p. 135). Nonetheless,
other ethnographers, certainly, can replicate some of the findings from this study by
examining the use of EMRs in other emergency rooms, just as this study replicated other
researchers’ findings (e.g., Park et al.’s, 2012, finding that EMRs reduce face-to-face
interactions among providers) by using “different procedures, measurement instruments,
sampling procedures, and data-analytic techniques” (Frey et al., 2000, p. 136).
Fifth, there is “a longstanding criticism that ethnographers tend to valorize the
communities they are immersed in . . . [and] to turn the people [they] aren’t studying into
a stereotype” (Perlmutter, 2015, para. 19, 21). Although I valorized, to a large extent, the
community of emergency medicine providers I studied, I was, oftentimes, critical of
providers’ behaviors; additionally, I did not reduce patients and administrators to
simplistic stereotypes. Although my descriptions of patients and administrators are not
drawn as richly as are those of providers, such descriptions are individualized and true to
my experience. Moreover, as Perlmutter (2015) noted, ethnographers “give voice to
people who aren’t necessarily otherwise heard” (p.), and although I would take exception
with the concept of “giving voice to people,” I did offer many opportunities to hear the
voices of emergency medicine physicians, midlevel providers, and nurses, whose views
on EMRs have been, largely, ignored by policy makers, EMR makers, and hospital
administrators.
In sum, although this study may have some important limitations due to the
methodology employed—specifically, ethnography—the study attempted to address
those limitations. In particular, (a) the problem of witnessed truth was offset by the use
of triangulation of procedures, including member checks; (b) my subjectivity was
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acknowledged and made available for judgment by readers, which, in part, addressed (c)
my, and this report’s, credibility; (d) the lack of complete replicability, and the need for
additional replication, was acknowledged; and (e) the people studied were valorized, to
an extent, but much of that valorizing emerged from opportunities to hear their voices
and to respect their views, but also by engaging in some criticism of their views. Next,
the practical applications arising from the findings of this study for administrators,
providers, and patients are described.
Practical Implications
This study identified a number of problems that (a) plagued the EMR installation
at Hospital H, and, ultimately, derailed its full implementation; (b) affected negatively
providers’ experiences and workflow; and (c) impeded effective communication among
providers. Below, I offer suggestions for improving EMR adoption processes, generally,
and for Hospital H, in particular. First, I offer recommendations to healthcare
administrators for improving providers’ receptivity to EMRs, improving EMR training,
encouraging providers’ autonomy, addressing EMR-induced workflow changes, and
cultivating an environment of inclusion. I then offer recommendations to providers for
improving their communication with one another. Lastly, I offer suggestions for patients
and their companions for improving their emergency room experiences and interactions
with healthcare providers.
Suggestions for administrators. Forced EMR adoptions, as this and other
studies have demonstrated, are problematic and invite providers’ reactance (see Brooks &
Grotz, 2010; Estrada & Dunn, 2012; Farley et al., 2013; Francis, 2013; Huryk, 201;
Nambisan et al., 2013; Tomes, 2010). As Bukata (2009) noted, “Resistance is
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fundamental and doctors, more than most, seem not to like being told what to do” (p. 2).
Kellermann and Jones (2013) cautioned that successful and widespread EMR adoption is
possible only when providers are engaged “early in the health IT development process”
(p. 65). In their white paper on facilitating change in emergency rooms, Lozano, Biehl,
and Organ (2011) wrote that “workers will always find excuses to forestall a process
change” (p. 5). Fittingly, then, this study uncovered providers’ maladaptive avoidance
strategies, which delayed the electronic TSheet implementation. According to Lozano et
al. (2011), “To obtain complete buy-in of any process change, the ED [emergency
department] staff and providers must feel that they had a say and fully agree with the new
approach” (p. 5). Hence, the first recommendation emerging from the findings of this
study is that administrators should solicit providers’ input at the start of the EMR
selection process, and, generally, they should communicate more with providers during
the process by offering providers updates regularly and requesting providers’ feedback
about the EMR.
The second recommendation is that following an EMR installation, administrators
should seek providers’ feedback about the EMR’s performance and address providers’
concerns. As Xiao et al. (2007) noted, administrators should allow “physicians and
nurses to tailor an electronic system appropriately to meet their needs” (p. 394).
Providers’ suggestions for improvements to the EMR at Hospital H, largely, were
ignored. For instance, changing the EMR’s interface and electronic TSheet template to
reduce the number of checkboxes and to increase the space available for free-text entries,
and, thereby, allow providers to capture patients’ narratives, would have enhanced many
providers’ perceptions of the completeness and utility of the EMR. This suggestion,
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however, was ignored by administrators, which triggered reactance in providers and
contributed to negative communication spirals between providers and administrators.
The third recommendation for administrators is that they avoid “homegrown IT
systems” (Kellermann & Jones, 2013, p. 65). Although designing EMR components inhouse can afford some advantages, such as customizable features, “most healthcare
organizations lack the in-house technical expertise and resources to develop and maintain
them” (Kellermann & Jones, 2013, p. 65). True to Kellermann and Jones’s (2013)
predictions, Hospital H’s IT department failed—for nearly 2 years—to design, unveil,
and launch its “homegrown” electronic TSheet, which exacerbated providers’ uncertainty
and dread. Thus, for the administrators at Hospital H, the recommendation is that they
abandon plans to design and install a generic, electronic TSheet system, and, instead,
purchase the proprietary TSheet system.
The fourth recommendation for administrators, generally, and administrators at
Hospital H, specifically, is to examine and improve formal EMR training programs.
Formal training sessions at Hospital H ignited dissonance and reactance in physicians,
because, essentially, the designated trainers were nonmedical, IT department staff
members—one of the trainers was especially insensitive to physicians’ concerns amid the
forced adoption, and her insensitivity fueled physicians’ reactance. A suggestion for
lessening physicians’ reactance and dissonance is that persons well known to physicians,
or who, themselves, are medical providers, should lead EMR formal training sessions.
Alternatively, physicians’ EMR training could be self-taught via handouts or through the
use of online- and/or video-training modules, which would allow physicians to complete
the training at their leisure. Furthermore, self-guided training would curb some of the
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reactance and/or dissonance that this study demonstrated was associated with in-person
training that impeded physicians’ learning.
Any overhaul of an EMR training program also must take into account the role of
super-users. This study leads to three recommendations for improving informal training
that relies on super-users. First, because this study showed that informal training
dependent on super-users stimulated role-reversal tensions and dissonance for nurses and
midlevel providers, super-users should self-select rather than be forced to learn EMR
components and then made to train physicians, as they were at Hospital H. Moreover,
nurses and midlevel providers who volunteer to train as super-users, presumably, would
feel less reactance than would nurses and midlevel providers forced to learn how to use
EMR components (e.g., CPOE) that they do not employ regularly in the course of their
work. Second, super-users should be offered additional compensation for their added
work. At Hospital H, additional compensation for the extra work that being a designated
super-user entailed may have alleviated some of the hard feelings that providers harbored
against administrators, which only fueled the SD-nexus conditions. Third, because many
of the physicians at Hospital H could not always identify the designated super-users,
super-users could wear a special name badge to ensure that physicians directed their
inquiries to those who were equipped to offer assistance using the EMR. This simple
solution could have saved time and alleviated frustration for the nurses, who, repeatedly,
were asked for help using the EMR and CPOE, despite their inability to provide the
requested help.
Peer-to-peer training exacerbated “us” versus “them” tensions between
emergency room nurses and floor nurses, who were sent to the emergency room to cover
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staffing shortages. Peer-to-peer training was made worse because the EMR interface in
the intensive care unit did not resemble the EMR interface in the emergency room. A
single EMR interface at Hospital H would cut down on problems, as would giving
emergency room staff and the nurse manager, in particular, more autonomy in deciding
appropriate staffing levels. Thus, the fifth recommendation is that administrators give
emergency room personnel more autonomy to make staffing decisions. At Hospital H,
nursing managers regularly sent floor nurses down to the emergency room to assist
during perceived staff shortages or during high patient volume, but, oftentimes, decisions
were made without input from the emergency room staff. As several emergency room
nurses pointed out, the “extra help” often made them less productive because their time
was spent training floor nurses how to use the EMR instead of treating patients.
The EMR’s introduction at Hospital H changed many workflow patterns for
providers, and although some changes (e.g., to providers’ perceived cognitive processes)
cannot be addressed easily, other changes, such as where work takes place, can be
addressed. The sixth recommendation, therefore, is that administrators and providers
examine ways to encourage collaborative work and face-to-face communication among
providers by developing common workspaces and/or reconfiguring where computer
terminals are placed, such that nurses, midlevel providers, and physicians are not isolated
physically from one another. Additionally, administrators may consider replacing COWs
with smaller, handheld devices or tablets, which could alleviate providers’ perceptions
that EMRs interfere with provider–patient interactions.
The seventh recommendation is that administrators consider ways to alleviate
additional EMR-induced workflow changes that affect providers negatively, such as
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increased documentation time. Lengthy documentation processes at Hospital H ran
counter to CMS-mandated metrics, which, oftentimes, led providers to delay
documentation chores until after their shifts ended. This delayed work affected the
completeness and utility of the electronic health record, especially for providers who
cared for admitted patients, such as floor nurses and specialists. Heeding providers’
suggestions for EMR improvements, such as incorporating voice-recognition software to
limit the amount of typing that providers must do, may shorten the time needed for
completing documentation tasks. Additionally, charting tasks completed after providers’
shifts ended led many providers to complain of wage theft. Administrators, therefore,
should reexamine how physicians’ reimbursable time is measured, which could alleviate
physicians’ dissatisfaction. Better training also could mitigate the problem of delayed
work and perceived wage theft: If providers were trained better, they could use EMRs
more efficiently during their shifts, and, consequently, they could limit the number of
documentation chores that they completed after their shifts.
The eighth recommendation is that administrators foster an environment of
inclusion, which should involve regular communication between administrators and
providers about managing emergency room operations and the EMR installation. For
Hospital H’s administrators, initiating regular feedback sessions in which they listen to
providers’ concerns would help providers to feel integrated into hospital practices and
supported in their work. Because providers and IT staff department members disagreed
routinely on what was said in their shared exchanges, meeting minutes should be
distributed to everyone to ensure agreement among and between administrators and
providers. Additionally, developing an employees’ lounge would allow nurses to feel
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supported, as their exclusion from physicians’ and paramedics’ lounges contributed to
their dissatisfaction and eroded their organizational identity.
The last recommendation is that administrators and policy makers should
reexamine metrics. Many metrics are incompatible (“Metric Madness,” 2014), which has
forced providers to adopt strategies, such as “gaming the system,” to satisfy door-to-doc
and patient greet times. Gaming the system adds to healthcare costs, increases providers’
work-related stress and burnout, adds to patients’ lengths of stay, and diminishes patients’
satisfaction with the care process.
To review, this study proposed nine recommendations that administrators should
take into account: administrators should (a) involve providers at the start of the EMR
selection process; (b) solicit and then act on providers’ suggestions; (c) avoid
“homegrown” EMR systems; (d) improve EMR training processes and, simultaneously,
be attentive to role-reversal tensions that nurses and midlevel providers experience; (e)
give emergency room leaders autonomy over staffing decisions; (f) address EMRinduced workflow changes by maintaining or creating spaces for collaborative work, and
acquiring handheld devices and/or tablets; (g) devise ways to lessen providers’
documentation time; (h) foster an environment of inclusion by listening to and supporting
providers; and (i) review the utility of metrics, which lead to unintended and perverse
consequences.
Suggestions for providers. Because many healthcare providers are powerless to
decide which EMR they use, the recommendations emerging from this study focus on
ways in which providers can (a) improve communication, especially face-to-face
communication, with their coworkers after EMRs are installed; (b) reduce the frequency

	
  

353

of negative communication spirals, which are exacerbated by EMRs; (c) enhance
collegial relationships with coworkers; and (d) improve their interactions with patients by
changing how they use COWs.
The first recommendation is that providers make time to communicate, face-toface, about each of their shared patients. After an EMR is installed, typically, providers
no longer share common charts, and, consequently, physically isolated workspaces
reduce face-to-face encounters among nurses, midlevel providers, and physicians. All of
the providers involved in this study admitted the need for frequent verbal updates, but
they also acknowledged that during high patient volume, face-to-face interactions did not
occur, which, oftentimes, led to dropped orders and/or mistakes. A solution may be
implementing nurse–midlevel provider and/or nurse–physician rounds, whereby
providers converge at appointed times and discuss care plans for their patients.
The second recommendation is that physicians examine their order-dumping
habits and limit the practice. Moreover, physicians should be sensitive to hierarchical
tensions that order dumping may incite in midlevel providers and nurses, and, when order
dumping is necessary, physicians should pose their requests politely. As this study
demonstrated, the emergency room at Hospital H, inherently, is an SD-nexus, and,
consequently, it is prone to ineffective, aggressive, and negative communication spirals.
Order dumping tips the SD-nexus into an SD-cycle, which inhibits collaborative work
and diminishes providers’ workplace satisfaction. To curb SD tensions, according to
Nicotera et al. (2014), providers must regard those with whom they are locked in SDcycles not as enemies but as persons with a common problem. Thus, the third
recommendation is that providers at Hospital H try to reframe perceptions of themselves
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from hierarchically and diametrically opposed providers, to providers who are burdened
equally by the EMR.
Because EMR-induced changes to workflow patterns limit the time for small talk
among providers and, hence, their relational growth, the fourth recommendation is that
providers look for opportunities outside of the emergency room to encourage relational
growth and maintenance with their coworkers. This study found that many providers at
Hospital H viewed themselves as being less connected with their coworkers after, as
opposed to before, the EMR was installed; consequently, planned activities may stimulate
bonding and cut across nurse–physician–midlevel lines. Moreover, improved
interpersonal relationships may curb SD-cycle development.
The final recommendation is that providers should rethink how they use and
position COWs in examination rooms. This study found that nurses, typically, place the
COW between themselves and patients during triage, and, thereby, create a physical
barrier between them. The practice appeared to limit eye contact between nurses and
patients. Positioning COWs next to patients may improve eye contact between nurses
and patients, as well as nurses’ perceptions of their provider–patient interactions.
In sum, this study offers five recommendations for providers: (a) make time for
regular face-to-face interactions; (b) examine order-dumping habits and be sensitive to
hierarchical tensions; (c) regard themselves as colleagues with a common problem, which
would reduce SD; (d) create opportunities outside of the emergency room for bonding
with coworkers; and (e) reposition COWs such that they are not barriers between
themselves and patients.
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Suggestions for patients. Although this study did not assess directly patients’
perspectives about emergency medical care or ways that EMRs affected their interactions
with healthcare providers, many of the providers’ comments, as featured throughout this
dissertation, centered on their perceptions of patients’ experiences, providing the basis for
offering some suggestions for patients. Thus, I offer the following recommendations on
ways that patients and their companions can improve their experiences in emergency
rooms and their interactions with providers.
First, emergency rooms should be reserved for medical emergencies (e.g., injuries
sustained in major motor vehicle crashes, heart attacks, strokes, and other traumatic
injuries). Thirty-seven percent of emergency room visits are for nonurgent conditions—
conditions not requiring immediate attention, and for which a delay of several hours does
not result in adverse outcomes (Uscher-Pines, Pines, Kellermann, Gillen, & Mehrotra,
2013). Nonurgent conditions (e.g., upper respiratory infections, sinusitis, and/or
toothaches) can be treated more effectively by primary care physicians (PCPs) or by
urgent care providers, with better health outcomes for patients, and for less cost
(Weinick, Burns, & Mehrotra, 2010; Mehrotra, Wang, Lave, Adams, & McGlynn, 2008).
Emergency rooms, typically, charge two to five times more than do PCPs to address
minor medical problems (Mehrotra et al., 2008; Weinick et al., 2010). For instance,
PCPs charge, on average, $160 to diagnose and treat a urinary tract infection, whereas a
similar diagnosis and treatment in an emergency room can cost $570 or more (Mehrotra
et al., 2008). Continued reliance on emergency rooms for primary and nonurgent care,
thus, is a problem that contributes both to overcrowding in the emergency room and
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spiraling healthcare costs (Overton, in press-b). Hence, people should exercise caution in
going to the emergency room for healthcare.
Second, because most emergency rooms are overcrowded, patients and their
companions should anticipate long waits. EMRs exacerbate the problem of long wait
time because they slow providers’ documentation chores and medication-administration
processes. Moreover, patients and their companions should note that “advertised wait
times,” appearing most frequently on billboards for emergency room services, usually
refer to the time that it takes for a patient to be triaged and not the total time that it takes
for a patient to be evaluated by a physician, diagnosed, and released or admitted. As Dr.
F explained:
We advertise 15 minutes, but that’s not the whole truth; that’s the typical wait for
getting to triage, but, afterward, they [patients] might wait another 1 or 2 hours to
see a doc. Average visits from start to finish, on a good day, last about 4–5 hours.
Some days, it might be 6 or 7 hours.
Thus, patients and their companions should be prepared to wait and, furthermore, because
emergency medical care is not administered on a “first come, first serve” basis, patients
and their companions should be prepared to wait even longer if persons with critical
health problems (e.g., heart attack or stroke) present to the emergency room.
Third, EMRs are not interoperable; consequently, patients and their companions
should not assume that emergency medicine providers can access patients’ pertinent
medical records, histories, and/or medication lists. Even within the same hospital system,
patients’ medical records often are not accessible from within the emergency room.
Consequently, patients and their companions, should, when possible, bring a list of their
medical issues and medications, including over-the-counter medications and dietary
supplements (e.g., vitamins), noting dosages and frequency of use; legal documents (e.g.,
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medical power of attorney); health insurance provider information; and, if applicable,
their physicians’ names and contact information. Moreover, because electronic health
data stored on portable hard drives, usually, will not be accessed because of security
concerns (e.g., portable drives may contain malware), it is important that patients and
their companions bring hardcopies of patients’ health data.
Fourth, patients and their companions should anticipate that COWs and/or other
technologies will be used during triage, and throughout the medical examination process,
and that these technologies will affect their interactions with providers. In particular,
generally, there will be less eye contact between them and providers, compared with
provider–patient interactions in non-EMR settings, and that many of their interactions
with providers will flow according to prescribed data-gathering tasks. Normal
conversational turn taking, oftentimes, will be suspended to satisfy EMR-induced
changes to triage and examination processes. To facilitate efficient triage interviews,
patients should answer questions as they are posed by providers, avoid volunteering
information out of turn (e.g., stating allergies or past surgeries before asked), and speak
slowly to allow providers to type accurate information into the medical record.
Additionally, it is important for patients and their companions to remember that providers
looking at and using these technologies are engaged in healthcare delivery and are not
otherwise “goofing off.” Patients should keep in mind that providers, frequently, are just
as frustrated as patients by the barriers that EMRs introduce to provider–patient
interactions.
Lastly, patients and their companions should ask questions about the purpose and
utility of the medical tests and procedures that providers order. Because emergency
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medicine providers, oftentimes, order tests that are not medically necessary to satisfy
performance metrics, which increase healthcare costs, patients and their companions
should understand and consent to tests and procedures, and, thereby, to some extent, coconstruct the medical interaction
In sum, this study offers five recommendations for patients involved in
emergency care: (a) avoid seeking emergency medical care for nonurgent conditions,
which can be treated more efficiently in other healthcare settings and cost less; (b) be
prepared to wait a long time to see a physician; (c) know that EMRs are not interoperable
and, therefore, when possible, bring printed copies of their health data, medical
conditions, and medications; (d) understand that EMRs and other technology will affect
providers’ eye contact with them and limit spontaneity during the medical interview; and
(e) ask questions about the necessity of medical tests and procedures. Next, the
limitations of this study are addressed and suggestions for future research are offered.
Limitations of the Study and Directions for Future Research
Despite the important findings and conceptual/theoretical, methodological, and
practical implications of this research, there are several limitations that merit discussion.
First, although I intended to study the EMR adoption process during and after installation
of key components, such as the CPOE and the electronic TSheets, the installation was
delayed repeatedly because of IT staff’s difficulty designing and building the TSheets,
which was exacerbated by providers’ avoidance strategies; thus, I could comment only on
a partial, stalled adoption. Moreover, because nurses had been using aspects of the EMR
for 5 months before I arrived on the scene, I was unable to make “before, during, and
after” comparisons of their interactions and workflow habits; instead, I had to rely
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exclusively on nurses’ accounts of changes that they believed the EMR introduced to
their emergency room operations.
Second, I interviewed only two administrators and would have preferred input
from additional members of Hospital H’s executive staff. Efforts to schedule interviews,
largely, were unsuccessful because many administrators did not respond to my requests.
The absence of administrators’ voices from this study is unfortunate, as it was not
possible to corroborate the many claims made by providers about administrators’
intentions and actions.
Third, although I did not set out to capture how patients’ emergency room
experiences and interactions with providers would change because of the EMR, many of
the findings from this study centered on providers’ perceptions of patients’ experiences;
however, I do not know what patients, themselves, experienced. Talking with patients
about how they viewed the EMR and its effects, thus, would have produced a more
robust reading of the EMR installation process.
Fourth, the questionnaire administered to providers was potentially problematic in
two ways. First, the questionnaire should have teased out and/or separated providers’
satisfaction with their workplace and satisfaction with their careers, which are two
separate things. Second, because the questionnaire was not administered before the
CPOE installation, I was unable to measure changes in physicians’ and midlevel
providers’ self-reports of burnout and career satisfaction before and after the installation.
Fifth, I was the only researcher collecting and analyzing data, which, according to
Lindlof and Taylor (2011), can affect the validity of findings, whereas “multiple
researchers can be used to overcome the biases of other short comings of a lone
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researcher” (p. 275). To mitigate potential errors or misunderstandings due to being the
sole researcher, I conducted member checks regularly to ensure that my interpretations of
events and conversations were accurate. I also shared early drafts of this research with
key respondents for feedback to make certain that my reporting was correct.
Sixth, my husband is an emergency medicine physician and served as a key
informant in this study, which, as describe above, influenced my view of EMRs and
emergency room operations. To mitigate partiality on my part, I limited his participation
in this study to formal EMR training and working with scribes; otherwise, I did not
observe him during the course of my regular fieldwork.
Lastly, this study’s findings may have only short-term implications. For instance,
many older physicians experience reactance when forced to abandon paper-based
charting systems, but most younger physicians, whose training on healthcare
documentation, largely, is EMR-based, appear to adapt easily to new and changing EMR
systems. Thus, the reactance-inspired behaviors that were identified in this study (e.g.,
order dumping and negative communication spirals) may not appear in future studies,
especially when younger healthcare providers are studied. Moreover, as EMR
technologies evolve, the incoherent spiritual properties (e.g., lack of usability, multiple
tabs, small text, and slow performance) that were identified in the EMR used at Hospital
H and in EMRs that were described in the literature (see chapter two), undoubtedly, will
improve, and, consequently, prevent—not contribute to—medical errors. This study’s
findings and other findings on EMR use in emergency rooms, however, have long-term
implications and point to a continuing decline in the frequency of face-to-face
interactions among healthcare providers, providers’ growing dissatisfaction, strained
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provider–patient interactions, and increased healthcare costs (see Bukata, 2014; Callen et
al., 2013; Fernando et al., 2009; Feufel al., 2011; Georgiou et al., 2013; Hill et al., 2013;
Kellerman & Jones, 2013; Park et al., 2012; Person et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2013).
Future research should address the limitations noted above by: (a) following an
EMR adoption in a community hospital’s emergency room from start to finish, (b)
including more administrative figures as participants, and (c) incorporating patients’
perspectives. Future research also could explore several of the practical implications and
recommendations that this study advanced. For instance, a study comparing a forced
adoption with an adoption in which providers are active participants may inform
understanding of EMR adoption outcomes, providers’ acceptance and/or rejection of
EMRs, and providers’ workplace satisfaction after adoption of an EMR. Testing
alternative EMR training methods, such as online and/or video modules, could produce
findings that may alleviate training-induced dissonance and reactance in providers, and,
thereby, enhance providers’ learning. Additionally, studies could examine the utility of
common workspaces for enhancing face-to-face communication after EMRs are installed.
Some of this study’s conceptual/theoretical implications also should be examined
in future research. For instance, this study suggested that there are, likely, relationships
among EMR adoption, SD, and burnout, but those relationships have not been
demonstrated empirically; establishing whether such relationships exist, thus, would be
worthwhile. Additional research should test relationships among providers’ agency,
restoration attempts, and SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation. Although this study
explained the nexus to cycle escalation in providers at Hospital H, the relationship
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between agency-restorative efforts and negative communication spirals may not manifest
in other agents and contexts.
Conclusion
This study investigated the effects of electronic medical records systems in an
emergency room setting to extend what is known about forced adoptions of those systems
in a community hospital and subsequent changes to providers’ social interactions and
workflow patterns. The findings were in accordance with tenets of structuration theory
and adaptive structuration theory, respectively, that predicted reroutinization following
critical situations, and that technology adoptions are impeded by incoherent structural
features. The findings also advanced structurational divergence theory by identifying a
trigger for SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation. Because this study used sound ethnographic
methods and, to date, is the only naturalistic study of an electronic medical records
systems adoption in a community hospital’s emergency room, the study is an important
methodological extension of the research literature. Finally, the findings suggest ways
that administrators and providers can improve communication and workflow during and
after electronic medical records systems adoptions. In sum, this study invites careful
consideration of electronic medical records systems, because, as Giddens (1984) wrote,
“Once all those in a given sector of the economy have introduced the same technological
innovation, they may all be worse off than they were before” (p. 312).
Although this research contributes to a richer understanding of emergency room
work and communication among providers during and after an electronic medical records
systems adoption, there is much more to be explored by communication scholars. Future
research that extends this study’s findings, hopefully, will result in collaborative efforts
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of communication scholars and healthcare providers to integrative electronic medical
records systems adoptions that incorporate providers’ wishes and perspectives; enhance
communication among emergency medicine providers and between providers and their
patients; improve workflow for providers in ways that contribute to their workplace and
career satisfaction, and, consequently, decrease their risk for burnout; and improve
patients’ safety, health outcomes, and experiences with the emergency medical care
system. The Dallas Ebola case demonstrated that flawed electronic medical records
systems have deadly consequences, and this study explains some of the systemic changes
that electronic medical records systems introduce that put patients in harm’s way. This
and future studies, hopefully, facilitate improvements to the design and usability of
electronic medical records systems by eliminating design flaws that inhibit collaborative
work and face-to-face communication among and between providers, and, consequently,
reduce risks for patients. The very best medical care must be provided to people and to
do so requires effective communicative practices among healthcare providers in
emergency room and hospital settings that are facilitated—not inhibited—by health
information technology.
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